oa 


' 


4 


THE 


ELEMENTS 


MORAL    SCIENCE. 


BY  FRANCIS  WAYLAND,  D.  D., 

PRESIDENT   OF   BROWN   UNIVERSITY1,    AND    PROFESSOR   OF   MORAL   PHILOSOPHY. 


SIXTEENTH  THOUASND. 

REVISED    AND    STEREOTYPED, 


BOSTON: 

GOULD, KENDALL, AND    LINCOLN. 

SOLD     BY    THE     PRINCIPAL     BOOKSELLERS     THROUGHOUT     THE 
UNITED     STATES. 

1841. 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1835, 

BY  FRANCIS  WAYLAND, 
In  the  District  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  Rhode  Island. 


PREFACE. 


IN  presenting  to  the  public  a  new  treatise  upon 
Moral  Science,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  state 
the  circumstances  which  led  to  the  undertaking, 
and  the  design  which  it  is  intended  to  accomplish. 
\^"When  it  became  my  duty  to  instruct  in  Moral 
Philosophy,  in  Brown  University,  the  text-book 
in  use  was  the  work  of  Dr.  Paley.  From  many 
of  his  principles  I  found  myself  compelled  to  dis- 
sent, and,  at  first,  I  contented  myself  with  stating 
to  my  classes  my  objections  to  the  author,  and 
offering  my  views,  in  the  form  of  familiar  conver- 
sations, upon  several  of  the  topics  which  he  dis- 
cusses. These  views,  for  my  own  convenience, 
I  soon  committed  to  paper,  and  delivered,  in  the 
form  of  lectures.  In  a  few  years,  these  lectures 
had  become  so  far  extended,  that,  to  my  surprise, 
they  contained,  by  themselves,  the  elements  of  a 
different  system  from  that  of  the  text-book  which 
I  was  teaching.  To  avoid  the  inconvenience  of 
teaching  two  different  systems,  I  undertook  to 
reduce  them  to  order,  and  to  make  such  addi- 
tions, as  would  render  the  work  in  some  measure 
complete  within  itself.  I  thus  relinquished  the 
work  of  Dr.  Paley,  and,  for  some  time,  have 


PREFACE. 


been  in  the  habit  of  instructing  solely  by  lecture. 
The  success  of  the  attempt  exceeded  my  expec- 
tations, and  encouraged  me  to  hope,  that  the 
publication  of  what  I  had  delivered  to  my  classes, 
might,  in  some  small  degree,  facilitate  the  study 
of  moral  science 

From  these  circumstances  the  work  has  de- 
rived its  character.  Being  designed  for  the  pur- 
poses of  instruction,  its  aim  is,  to  be  simple,  clear, 
and  purely  didactic.  I  have  rarely  gone  into  ex- 
tended discussion,  but  have  contented  myself 
with  the  attempt  to  state  the  moral  law,  and  the 
reason  of  it,  in  as  few  and  as  comprehensive 
terms  as  possible.  The  illustration  of  the  princi- 
ples, and  the  application  of  them  to  cases  in  or- 
dinary life,  I  have  generally  left  to  the  instructor, 
or  to  the  student  himself.  Hence,  also,  I  have 
omitted  every  thing  which  relates  to  the  history 
of  opinions,  and  have  made  but  little  allusion 
even  to  the  opinions  themselves,  of  those  from 
whom  I  dissent.  To  have  acted  otherwise, 
would  have  extended  the  undertaking  greatly  be- 
yond the  limits  which  I  had  assigned  to  myself; 
and  it  seemed  to  me  not  to  belong  to  the  design 
which  I  had  in  view.  A  work  which  should  at- 
tempt to  exhibit  what  was  true,  appeared  to  me 
more  desirable  than  one  which  should  point  out 
what  was  exploded,  discuss  what  was  doubtful, 
or  disprove  what  was  false. 

In  the  course  of  the  work,  I  have  quoted  but 
few  authorities,  as,  in  preparing  it,  I  have  refer- 
red to  but  few  books.  I  make  this  remark  in  no 
manner  for  the  sake  of  laying  claim  to  originality, 
but  to  avoid  the  imputation  of  using  the  labors  of 


PREFACE.  5 

others  without  acknowledgment^  When  I  com- 
menced the  undertaking,  I  attempted  to  read  ex- 
tensively, but  soon  found  it  so  difficult  to  arrive 
at  any  definite  results,  in  this  manner,  that  the 
necessities  of  my  situation  obliged  me  to  rely 
upon  my  own  reflection.  That  I  have  thus  come 
to  the  same  conclusions  with  many  others,  1 
should  be  unwilling  to  doubt.  When  this  coinci- 
dence of  opinion  has  come  to  my  knowledge,  I 
have  mentioned  it.  When  it  is  not  mentioned,  it 
is  because  I  have  not  known  it. 
i  The  author  to  whom  I  am  under  the  greatest 
[obligations  is  Bishop  Butler.  The  chapter  on' 
Conscience  is,  as  I  suppose,  but  little  more  than 
a  development  of  his  ideas  on  the  same  subject. 
How  much  more  I  owe  to  this  incomparable  wri- 
ter, I  know  not.  As  it  was  the  study  of  his  ser- 
mons on  human  nature,  that  first  turned  my  at- 
tention to  this  subject,  there  are,  doubtless,  many 
trains  of  thought  which  I  have  derived  from  him, 
but  which  I  have  not  been  able  to  trace  to  their 
source,  as  they  have  long  since  become  incorpo- 
rated with  my  own  reflections.  The  article  on 
the  Sabbath,  as  is  stated  in  the  text,  is  derived 
chiefly  from  the  tract  of  Mr.  J.  J.  Gurney,  on  the 
same  subject.  Entertaining  those  views  of  the 
Sacred  Scriptures,  which  I  have  expressed  in  the 
work  itself,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  here, 
that  I  consider  them  the  great  source  of  moral 
truth ;  and  that  a  system  of  ethics  will  be  true, 
just  in  proportion  as  it  develops  their  meaning. 
To  do  this  has  been  my  object ;  and  to  have,  in 
ever  so  humble  a  manner,  accomplished  it,  I  shall 
consider  as  the  greatest  possible  success. 
1  * 


PREFACE. 


It  is  not  without  much  diffidence,  that  1  have 
ventured  to  lay  before  the  public  a  work  on  this 
important  subject.  That  something  of  this  sort 
was  needed,  has  long  been  universally  confessed. 
My  professional  duty  led  me  to  undertake  it; 
and  I  trust  that  the  hope  of  usefulness  has  in- 
duced me  to  prepare  it  for  publication.  If  I 
have  not  been  so  happy  as  to  elucidate  truth, 
have  endeavored  to  express  myself  in  such  a 
manner,  that  the  reader  shall  have  as  little  trou- 
ble as  possible  in  detecting  my  errors.  And  if 
it  shall  be  found,  that  I  have  thrown  any  light 
whatever  upon  the  science  of  human  duty,  I  shall 
have  unspeakable  cause  for  gratitude  to  that 
Spirit,  whose  inspiration  alone  teacheth  man  un- 
derstanding. And  my  cause  for  gratitude  will 
scarcely  be  less,  should  my  failure  incite  some 
one,  better  able  than  myself  to  do  justice  to  the 
subject,  to  a  more  successful  undertaking. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY,  April,  1835. 


PREFACE 


TO    THE 


SECOND    EDITION 


A  SECOND  edition  of  the  Elements  of  Moral 
Science  having  been  demanded,  within  a  much 
shorter  period  than  was  anticipated,  I  have  given 
to  the  revisal  of  it  all  the  attention  which  my 
avocations  have  permitted. 

The  first  edition,  owing  to  circumstances 
which  could  not  be  foreseen,  was,  unfortunately, 
in  several  places,  inaccurate  in  typographical  exe- 
cution. I  have  endeavored,  I  hope  with  better 
success,  to  render  the  present  edition,  in  this 
respect,  less  liable  to  censure.  In  a  few  cases, 
single  words  and  modes  of  expression  have  also 
been  changed.  I  have,  however,  confined  myself 
to  verbal  corrections,  and  have,  in  no  case  that  I 
remember,  intentionally  altered  the  sense. 

Having  understood  that  the  work  has  been 
introduced,  as  a  text-book,  into  some  of  our 
highest  seminaries  of  education,  I  hope  that  I 
may  be  forgiven,  if  I  suggest  a  few  hints  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  I  suppose  it  may  be  most 
successfully  used  for  this  purpose. 


8  PREFACE. 

1.  In  the  recitation  room,  let  neither  instructor 
nor  pupil  ever  make  use  of  the  book. 

2.  Let  the  portion  previously  assigned  for  the 
exercise,  be  so  mastered  by  the  pupil,  both  in 
plan  and  illustration,  that  he  will  be  able  to  re- 
cite it  in  order,  and  explain  the  connection  of  the 
different  parts  with  each  other,  without  the  ne- 
cessity of  assistance  from  his  instructor.     To  give 
the   language   of  the    author   is   not,    of  course, 
desirable.     It  is  sufficient  if  the  idea  be  given. 
The    questions   of    the    instructor    should     have 
respect  to  principles  that  may  be   deduced  from 
the    text,  practical  application  of  the  doctrines, 
objections  which  may  be  raised,  &,c. 

3.  Let  the  lesson  which  was  recited  on  one 
day,  be  invariably  reviewed  on  the  day  succeed- 
ing. 

4.  As  soon  as  any  considerable   progress  has 
been  made  in  the  work,  let  a  review  from  the 
beginning   be   commenced.     This    should    com- 
prehend, for  one  exercise,  as  much  as  had  been 
previously   recited   in    two   or  three    days ;   and 
should   be    confined    to    a   brief  analysis  of  the 
argument,  with  a  mere  mention  of  the   illustra- 
tions. 

5.  As  soon  as  the  whole  portion  thus  far  re- 
cited, has  been  reviewed,  let  a  new  review  be 
commenced,  and  continued  in  the  same  manner  ; 
and  thus  on  successively,  until  the  work  is  com- 
pleted.    By  pursuing  this  method,  a  class   will, 
at  any  period  of  the  course  of  study,  be  enabled, 
with  the  slightest  effort,  to  recall  whatever  they 
have   already  acquired;  and  when  the  work  is 
completed,  they  will  be  able  to  pursue  the  whole 


PREFACE. 


thread  of  the  argument,  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end  ;  and  thus  to  retain  a  knowledge,  not 
only  of  the  individual  principles,  but  also  of  their 
relations  to  each  other. 

But  the  advantage  of  this  mode  of  study  is 
not  confined  to  that  of  a  more  perfect  knowl- 
edge of  this  or  of  any  other  book.  By  present- 
ing the  whole  field  of  thought  at  one  view  be- 
fore the  mind,  it  will  cultivate  the  power  of 
pursuing  an  extended  range  of  argument ;  of 
examining  and  deciding  upon  a  connected  chain 
of  reasoning  ;  and  will,  in  no  small  degree,  ac- 
custom the  student  to  carry  forward  in  his  own 
mind  a  train  of  original  investigation. 

I  have  been  emboldened  to  make  these  sug- 
gestions, not  in  the  least  because  I  suppose  the 
present  work  worthy  of  any  peculiar  attention 
from  an  instructor,  but  simply  because,  having 
been  long  in  the  habit  of  pursuing  this  method, 
and  having  witnessed  its  results  in  my  own 
classes,  1  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  suggest  it 
to  those  who  are  engaged  in  the  same  profession 
with  myself.  Other  instructors  may  have  suc- 
ceeded better  with  other  methods.  I  have  suc- 
ceeded best  with  this. 

At  the  suggestion  of  some  of  his  friends,  the 
author  has  it  in  contemplation  to  prepare  a  small 
abridgment  of  the  present  work,  in  duodecimo, 
for  the  use  of  schools  and  academies.  It  will 
be  published  as  soon  as  his  engagements  will 
permit. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY,  September,  1835. 


PREFACE 


FOURTH    EDITION 


THE  publishers  having  thought  proper  to  give  to  the 
Elements  of  Moral  Science  a  more  permanent  form,  I 
have  revised  the  work  with  all  the  care  that  my  engage- 
ments would  allow.  In  doing  this,  I  have  made  many 
verbal  alterations ;  I  have  modified  some  paragraphs ;  some 
I  have  transposed,  and  a  few  I  have  added. 

I  embrace,  with  pleasure,  this  opportunity  of  returning 
my  grateful  acknowledgments  to  those  gentlemen  who, 
either  privately  or  through  the  medium  of  the  press,  have 
favored  me  with  their  critical  remarks.  I  have  endeavored 
to  weigh  their  suggestions  with  all  the  impartiality  in  my 
power.  Where  I  have  been  convinced  of  error,  I  have 
altered  the  text.  Where  I  have  only  doubted,  I  have  suffer- 
ed it  to  remain  ;  as  it  seemed  profitless  merely  to  exchange 
one  doubtful  opinion  for  another.  Where,  notwithstanding  the 
arguments  advanced,  my  views  remained  unchanged,  I  have 
also  contented  myself  with  allowing  the  text  to  stand  with- 
out additional  remark.  The  reasons  for  so  doing  may  be 
very  briefly  stated  : — I  supposed  that  those  considerations 
in  favor  of  what  I  had  advanced,  which  occurred  to  me, 
would  naturally  occur  to  any  other  person  ;  and  I  seem  to 
myself  to  have  observed  that  the  public  really  take  very 
little  interest  in  the  controversies  of  authors.  A  very  con- 
siderable amount  of  manuscript,  which  I  had  prepared  for 
the  purpose  of  publication,  in  connection  with  this  edition,  I 
have  therefore  suffered  to  lie  quietly  in  my  desk. 

BROWN  UNIVERSITY,  January,  1837 


CONTENTS 


PLAN    OF    THE    WORK 


BOOK    FIRST. 

THEORETICAL,    ETHICS. 

CHAPTER    FIRST. 

Page. 

Or   THE  ORIGIN   OF   OUR  NOTION  OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF 
ACTIONS, 23 

SECTION    I. 

Of  Moral  Law, 23 

Of  law  in  general, 23 

Of  moral  law, 24 

SECTION    II. 

What  is  a  moral  Action  ? 26 

Of  action, 26 

Of  moral  action, 29 

SECTION    III. 

In  what  part  of  an  Action  do  we  discover  its  moral  Quality  f 30 

The  intention, 31 

When  is  intention  wrong  ? 31 

SECTION    IV. 

IVJience  do  ice  derive  our  Notion  of  the  moral  Quality  of  Actions?  . .     33 

Is  it  a  modification  of  any  other  idea  ? 33 

Is  it  an  exercise  of  the  judgment  ? . . .  , 35 


12 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

Is  it  derived  from  association  ? 35 

Is  it  derived  from  the  idea  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?  36 

General  view  of  the  subject, 44 

CHAPTER    SECOND. 

CONSCIENCE,  OR  THE  MORAL  SENSE,.. 49 

SECTION    I. 

Is  there  a  Conscience  ? 49 

Question  considered, 50 

Objections  answered, ^ 50 

SECTION    II. 

Of  the  Manner  in  which  the  Decision  of  Conscience  is  expressed, ...  53 

Its  discriminating  power, 53 

Its  impulsive  power, 54 

A  source  of  pleasure  or  of  pain, 56 

Illustrations, 57 

SECTION    III. 

The  Authority  of  Conscience, 59 

From  the  conceptions  which  we  form  of  it, 60 

By  a  comparison  of  the  actions  of  men  and  inferior  animals,. . .  61 
From  the  necessity  of  thjs  supremacy  to  the  accomplishment  of 

its  object, : 63 

SECTION   IV. 

Law  by  which  Conscience  is  governed, 71 

As  a  discriminating  power, 72 

As  an  impulsive  power, 74 

As  a  source  of  pleasure  or  pain, 76 

SECTION    V. 

Rules  for  moral  Conduct, 79 

CHAPTER    THIRD. 

THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE, 85 


SECTION    1. 

Of  Virtue  in  general, 85 

SECTION    II. 

Of  Virtue  in  imperfect  Beings, 88 

Limit  of  moral  obligation, 89 

Moral  relations  of  habit, 96 


CONTENTS.  13 

CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

Page. 

HUMAN  HAPPINESS, ! 

The  gratification  of  desire, 99 

Within  limits, 101 

CHAPTER    FIFTH. 

OF  SELF-LOVE, 104 

Nature  of  self-love, 104 

Its  relative  rank, 107 

I        CHAPTER    SIXTH. 

IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE;    NECESSITY    OF     SOME    ADDI- 
TIONAL MORAL  LIGHT, Ill 

Imperfection  of  conscience, Ill 

Necessity  of  additional  light, .4 113 

What  light  might  be  expected, 115 

CHAPTER    SEVENTH. 
OF  NATURAL  RELIGION, 118 

SECTION    I. 

Of  the  Manner  in  which  we  learn  our  Duty  ly  the  Light  of  Nature,  118 

From  general  consequences, 119 

Objection    considered, 122 

SECTION    II. 

How  far  ice  may  learn  our  Duty  by  the  Light  of  Nature, 125 

Knowledge  acquired  in  this  manner, 125 

Motives  which  it  presents, 127 

SECTION    III. 

Defects  of  the  System  of  Natural  Religion, 129 

From  facts, 129 

From  the  nature  of  the  case, 131 

CHAPTER   EIGHTH. 

RELATIONS   BETWEEN  NATURAL  AND  REVEALED  RELIGION,....  134 

What  expectations  to  be  entertained, 134 

These  are  realized  by  revelation, 135 


CHAPTER    NINTH. 


THE  HOLY   SCRIPTURES,. 

2 


14  CONTENTS. 

SECTION    I. 

Page. 

A  View  of  the  Holy  Scriptures, .x 139 

The  Old  Testament, 139 

The  New  Testament, 141 

SECTION  II. 

fre  wnat  Manner  are  ice  to  ascertain  our  Duty  by  the  Holy  Scrip- 
tures ? 142 

What  is  excluded, 144 

What  is  included, 145 

Our  means  of  moral  instruction, 147 


BOOK   SECOND. 

PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 

. 

PART    FIRST. 

LOVE    TO    GOD,    OR    PIETY. 

CHAPTER    FIRST. 

GENERAL  OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD, 154 

Relation  between  God  and  Man, 154 

Rights  and  obligations  arising  from  this  relation, 156 

These  suited  to  our  nature, 165 

CHAPTER   SECOND. 
OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT, 167 

CHAPTER    THIRD. 

OF    PRAYER, 172 

Nature  of  prayer, 172 

Kinds  of  prayer, 173 

Duty  of  prayer, 174 

"  "        from  our  condition, 174 

"       from  the  Scriptures, 1 

The  utility  of  prayer, 177 


CONTENTS.  15 

CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

Page. 

OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH, 180 

Original  institution  of  the  Sabbath, 180 

The  Mosaic  Sabbath, 183 

The  Christian  Sabbath, 185 

The  day  to  be  observed, 185 

The  manner  of  its  observance, 188 

Duty  of  magistrates  in  respect  to  it,. 190 

PART  SECOND. 

DUTIES    TO    MAN. 

DIVISION    FIRST. — RECIPROCITY. 
DIVISION    SECOND. — BENEVOLENCE. 

DIVISION  FIRST. 

RECIPROCITY. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  ILLUSTRATED,  AND   THE  DUTIES   OF   RE- 
CIPROCITY  CLASSIFIED, , 192 

Nature  of  human  equality, '. 192 

Subject  illustrated, 193 

Teaching  of  the  Scriptures, 196 

Classification  of  the  duties  of  reciprocity, 200 

CLASS   FIRST. 

JUSTICE    AND    VERACITY. 

OF  JUSTICE. 

CHAPTER  FIRST. 


PERSONAL  LIBERTY, 


SECTION  1. 

Nature  of  personal  Liberty, 202 

Physical  Liberty, 203 

Intellectual  Liberty, 204 

Religious  Liberty, '. 206 

Exceptions, 206 


16  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  II. 

Page. 

Modes  in  which  personal  Liberty  may  be  violated, 208 

By  the  individual,  as  in  domestic  slavery, 208 

Its  nature  and  effects, 209 

Doctrine  of  the  Scriptures, 211 

Duties  of  masters, 216 

Duties  of  slaves, 218 

Personal  liberty  violated  by  society, 218 

Violation  of  physical  liberty, 219 

Violation  of  intellectual  liberty, 220 

Violation  of  religious  liberty, 227 

CHAPTER  SECOND. 
JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  PROPERTY, 231 

SECTION  I. 

The  Right  of  Property, 231 

Definition, 231 

On  what  the  right  of  property  is  founded, 231 

Modes  in  which  the  right  of  property  may  be  acquired, 234 

SECTION  II. 

Modes  in  which  the  Right  of  Property  may  be  violated  by  the  Indi- 
vidual,  238 

Without  consent, — 1.  Theft.     2.  Robbery, 239 

By  consent  fraudulently  obtained, 240 

(a.)  Where  no  equivalent  is  offered, 240 

(6.)  Where  the  equivalent  is  different  from  what  it  purports  to 
be, 240 

1.  Where  the  equivalent  is  material,  and  the  transfer  perpetual,  240 
The  law  of  buyer  and  seller, 240 

2.  When  the  transfer  is  temporary, 245 

Interest  or  loan  of  money,. 245 

Loan  of  other  property, 249 

Insurance, 250 

3.  Where  the  equivalent  is  immaterial, 251 

Of  master  and  servant, 251 

Of  principal  and  agent, 252 

Of  representatives, 255 

SECTION   III. 
Right  of  Property  as  violated  by  Society, 256 

CHAPTER  THIRD. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  CHARACTER, 260 

Nature  of  the  obligation, 260 

Violated  by  weakening  the  moral  restraints  of  men, 262 

Violated  by  exciting  their  evil  dispositions, 263 


CONTENTS.  17 

CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

Page. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION, 266 

Nature  of  the  obligation, 266 

Giving  publicity  to  bad  actions, 268 

Unjust  conclusions  respecting  character, 269 

Assigning  bad  motives  unnecessarily, 269 

Ridicule  and  mimicry, 270 

Our  duty  to  reveal  the  bad  actions  of  others, 273 

Our  duty  to  promote  the  ends  of  public  justice,. 273 

Our  duty  to  protect  the  innocent,  and  for  the  good  of  the  of- 
fender,   273 

Duty  of  historians, 274 

Duty  of  the  public  press, 275 

OF    VERACITY. 

CHAPTER    FIRST. 

VERACITY  OF  THE  PAST  AND  PRESENT, 278 

Law  of  veracity, 278 

What  it  forbids, 278 

Necessity  of  such  a  law,. 281 

CHAPTER   SECOND. 

VERACITY  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FUTURE, 284 

Of  promises, 284 

Their  intention  and  obligation, 284 

When  promises  are  not  binding, 285 

Of  contracts, 287 

CHAPTER   THIRD. 

OF   OATHS, 290 

The  theory  of  oaths, 290 

Lawfulness  of  oaths, 292 

Interpretation  of  oaths, 293 

Different  kinds  of  oaths, .293 


CLASS   SECOND. 

DUTIES  WHICH  ARISE  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE  SEXES,.  295 

CHAPTER  FIRST. 

GENERAL  DUTY  OF  CHASTITY, 297 

What  this  moral  law  forbids, 297 

What  it  commands,— exclusive  union, 296 

union  for  life, 300 

Precepts  of  religion  on  this  subject, 302 


18  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  SECOND. 

Page. 

Tin:  LAW  OK  MARRIAGE, 305 

The  nature  of  the  contract, 305 

Duties  imposed  by  the  contract, 308 

Chastity, 308 

Mutual  affection, 309 

Mutual  assistance, 310 

Relation  of  parties  as  to  authority, 311 

CHAPTER  THIRD. 

THE  LAW  OF  PARENTS, 314 

Relation  of  the  parties  to  each  other, 314 

Duties  of  parents, 316 

Support  or  maintenance, 316 

Physical  education, 317 

Intellectual  education, . . , 318 

Moral  education, 320 

Rights  of  parents, 324 

Duration  of  these  rights, 324 

Of  instructors, 325 

CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

THE  LAW  OF  CHILDREN, 326 

Duties  of  children, 326 

Obedience, 326 

Reverence, 328 

Filial  affection, 328 

Necessary  maintenance, 329 

Rights  of  children, 329 

Duration  of  these  rights  and  obligations, 329 

Duties  of  pupils, 329 


CLASS  THIRD. 
DUTIES  TO  MAN,  AS  A  MEMBER  OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY, 333 

CHAPTER   FIRST. 
OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY, 334 

SECTION  I. 

Of  a  Simple  Society, 334 

Nature  of  the  contract, 334 

Manner  in  which  governed, 336 

Limits  of  the  power  of  a  majority, 336 

Durability  of  corporations, 337 


CONTENTS.  19 

SECTION  II. 

Page. 

Of  Civil  Society. 339 

Civil  society  an  institution  of  God, 340 

Conclusions  from  the  above, 342 

Of  the  nature  and  limitations  of  civil  society, 344 

Of  what  is  essential  to  civil  society, 345 

The  compact  entered  into  by  the  individual  and  scciety, 346 

Of  the  accidental  modifications  of  civil  society, 350 

CHAPTER  SECOND. 
OF  THE  MODE  IN  AVHICH  THE  OBJECTS  OF    SOCIETY  ARE 

COMPLISIIED, v 

The  parts  of  a  government^ 

What  form  of  government  is  preferable, 356 

CHAPTER  THIRD. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  A  GOVERNMENT, 358 

Of  legislative  officers, 358 

Of  judicial  officers, 360 

Of  executive  officers, 361 

CHAPTER  FOURTH 

DUTIES  OF  CITIZENS, 363 

As  individuals, 363 

As  constituent  members  of  society, 364 

When  the  compact  is  violated, 366 


DIVISION    SECOND. 

THE    LAW    OF    BENEVOLENCE. 

CHAPTER  FIRST 

GENERAL  OBLIGATION,  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT, 369 

Nature  and  proof  of  the  obligation  from  our  constitution, 369 

Proof  from  the  Holy  Scriptures, 371 

CHAPTER  SECOND. 
BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  UNHAPPT, 376 

SECTION   I. 

Unhappiness  from  physical  condition, 376 

Objects  of  charity, 376 

Laws  affecting  the  recipient, 377 


20  CONTENTS. 

Page. 

Laws  affecting  the  benefactor, x.  378 

Poor  laws, 379 

Voluntary  associations, 380 

SECTION  II. 
Unhappiness  from  intellectual  condition, 382 

CHAPTER  THIRD 
BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  WICKED, 386 

CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  INJURIOUS, 389 

Injury  committed  by  an  individual  against  an  individual, 389 

Injury  committed  by  an  individual  against  society, 391 

Injury  committed  by  a  society  against  a  society, 392 

Of  war, .  392 


NOTE. 
Duties  to  Brutes, 397 


BOOK    FIRST. 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS 


THEORETICAL   ETHICS. 


CHAPTER   FIRST. 

OF    THE    ORIGIN    OF    OUR    NOTION     OF    THE    MORAL 
QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS. 

SECTION    I. 

OP  MORAL  LAW 

ETHICS,  or  Moral  Philosophy,  is  the  Science  of  Moral 
Law. 

The  first  question  which  presents  itself  is,  What  is  moral 
law  ?  Let  us  then  inquire,  first,  what  is  law ;  and,  secondly, 
what  is  moral  law. 

By  the  term  law,  I  think,  we  generally  mean  a  form  of 
expression,  denoting  either  a  mode  of  existence,  or  an  order 
of  sequence. 

Thus,  the  first  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton's  laws,  namely,  that 
every  body  will  continue  in  a  state  of  rest,  or  of  uniform 
motion  in  a  right  line,  unless  compelled  by  some  force  to 
change  its  state,  denotes  a  mode  of  existence. 

The  third  law  of  motion,  that,  to  every  action  of  one 
body  upon  another,  there  is  an  equal  and  contrary  reaction, 
denotes  an  order  of  sequence ;  that  is,  it  declares  the  gen- 
eral fact,  that,  if  one  event  occur,  the  constitution  of  things 
under  which  we  exist,  is  such,  that  another  event  will  also 
occur. 

The  axioms  in  Mathematics  are  laws  of  the  same  kind. 


24  OF    MORAL   LAW. 

Thus,  the  axiom,  "  if  equals  be  added  to  equals,  the  wholes 
will  be  equal,"  denotes  an  order  of  sequence,  in  respect  to 
quantity. 

Of  the  same  nature  are  the  laws  of  Chemistry.  Such, 
for  instance,  is  the  law  that,  if  soda  be  saturated  with  muri- 
atic acid,  the  result  will  be  common  salt. 

Thus,  also,  in  Intellectual  Philosophy.  If  a  picture  of 
a  visible  object  be  formed  upon  the  retina,  and  the  impres- 
sion be  communicated,  by  the  nerves,  to  the  brain,  the 
result  will  be  an  act  of  perception. 

The  meaning  of  law,  when  referring  to  civil  society,  is 
substantially  the  same.  It  expresses  an  established  order 
of  sequence  between  a  specified  action,  and  a  particular 
mode  of  reward  or  of  punishment.  Such,  in  general,  is  the 
meaning  of  law. 

Moral  Philosophy  takes  it  for  granted  that  there  is  in 
human  actions  a  moral  quality  ;  that  is,  that  a  human  action 
may  be  either  right  or  wrong.  Every  one  knows  that  we 
may  contemplate  the  same  action  as  wise  or  unwise;  as 
courteous  or  impolite ;  as  graceful  or  awkward  ;  and,  also, 
as  right  or  wrong.  It  can  have  escaped  the  observation  of 
no  one,  that  there  are  consequences  distinct  from  each 
other,  which  follow  an  action,  and  which  are  connected, 
respectively,  with  each  of  its  attributes.  To  take,  for 
instance,  a  moral  quality.  Two  men  may  both  utter  what 
is  false ;  the  one  intending  to  speak  the  truth,  the  other 
intending  to  deceive.  Now,  some  of  the  consequences  of 
this  act  are  common  to  both  cases,  namely,  that  the  hearers 
may,  in  both  cases,  be  deceived.  But  it  is  equally  man- 
ifest, that  there  are  also  consequences  peculiar  to  the  case 
in  which  the  speaker  intended  to  deceive ;  as,  for  example, 
the  effects  upon  his  own  moral  character,  and  upon  the 
estimation  in  which  he  is  held  by  the  community.  And 
thus,  in  general,  Moral  Philosophy  proceeds  upon  the  sup- 
position that  there  exists  in  the  actions  of  men  a  moral 
quality,  and  that  there  are  certain  sequences  connected  by 
our  Creator  with  the  exhibition  of  that  quality. 

A  moral  law  is,  therefore,  a  form  of  expression  denoting 
an  order  of  sequence  established  between  the  moral  quality 
of  actions,  and  their  results. 


OF    MORAL    LAW.  25 

Moral  Philosophy,  or  Ethics,  is  the  science  which  classi- 
fies and  illustrates  moral  law. 

Here  it  may  be  worth  while  to  remark,  that  an  order  of 
sequence  established,  supposes,  of  necessity,  an  Establisher. 
Hence  Moral  Philosophy,  as  well  as  every  other  science, 
proceeds  upon  the  supposition  of  the  existence  of  a 
universal  cause,  the  Creator  of  all  things,  who  has  made 
every  thing  as  it  is,  and  who  has  subjected  all  things  to  the 
relations  which  they  sustain.  And  hence,  as  all  relations, 
whether  moral  or  physical,  are  the  result  of  His  enactment, 
an  order  of  sequence  once  discovered  in  morals,  is  just  as 
invariable  as  an  order  of  sequence  in  physics. 

Such  being  the  fact,  it  is  evident,  that  the  moral  laws  of 
God  can  never  be  varied  by  the  institutions  of  man,  any 
more  than  the  physical  laws.  The  results  which  God  has 
connected  with  actions,  will  inevitably  occur,  all  the  created 
power  in  the  universe  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
Nor  can  these  consequences  be  eluded  or  averted,  any 
more  than  the  sequences  which  follow  by  the  laws  of  grav- 
itation. What  should  we  think  of  a  man  who  expected  to 
leap  from  a  precipice,  and,  by  some  act  of  sagacity,  elude 
the  effect  of  the  accelerating  power  of  gravity?  or,  of 
another,  who,  by  the  exercise  of  his  own  will,  determined 
to  render  himself  imponderable  ?  Every  one  who  believes 
God  to  have  established  an  order  of  sequences  in  morals, 
must  see  that  it  is  equally  absurd,  to  expect  to  violate,  with 
impunity,  any  moral  law  of  the  Creator. 

Yet  men  have  always  flattered  themselves  with  the  hope 
that  they  could  violate  moral  law,  and  escape  the  conse- 
quences which  God  has  established.  The  reason  is  obvious. 
In  physics,  the  consequent  follows  the  antecedent,  often 
immediately,  and  most  commonly  after  a  stated  and  well 
known  interval.  In  morals,  the  result  is  frequently  long 
delayed  ;  and  the  time  of  its  occurrence  is  always  uncertain. 
Hence,  "  because  sentence  against  an  evil  work  is  not  exe- 
cuted speedily,  therefore  the  hearts  of  the  sons  of  men  are 
fully  set  in  them  to  do  evil."  But  time,  whether  long  or 
short,  has  neither  power  nor  tendency  to  change  the  ord  3r 
of  an  established  sequence.  The  time  required  for  vege- 
tation, in  different  orders  of  plants,  may  vary;  but  yet 
3 


26  OF    MORAL    ACTION. 

wheat  will  always  produce  wheat,  and  an  acorn  will  always 
produce  an  oak.  That  such  is  the  case  in  morals,  a  heathen 
poet  has  taught  us : 

Raro,  antecedentem  scelestum 
Deseruit,  pede  poena  claudo. 

HOR.  Lib.  3.  Car.  2. 

A  higher  authority  has  admonished  us,  "  Be  not  deceived  ; 
God  is  not  mocked  ;  whatsoever  a  man  soweth,  that  shall 
he  also  reap."  It  is  also  to  be  remembered,  that,  in  morals 
as  well  as  in  physics,  the  harvest  is  always  more  abundant 
than  the  seed  from  which  it  springs. 


SECTION    II. 

WHAT  IS   A  MORAL  ACTION? 

Action,  from  actum,  the  supine  of  the  Latin  verb  ago, 
I  do,  signifies  something  done ;  the  putting  forth  of  some 
power. 

But  under  what  circumstances  must  power  be  put  forth, 
in  order  to  render  it  a  moral  action  ? 

1.  A  machine  is,  in  common  conversation,  said  to  be 
powerful.     A  vegetable  is  said  to  put  forth  its  leaves,  a 
tree  to  bend  its  branches,  or  a  vine  to  run  towards  a  prop ; 
but  we  never  speak  of  these  instances  of  power,  as  actions. 

2.  Action  is  never  affirmed,  but  of  beings  possessed  of  a 
will ;  that  is,  of  those  in  whom  the  putting  forth  of  power 
is  immediately  consequent  upon  their  determination  to  put 
it  forth.      Could  we  conceive  of  animate  beings,  whose 
exertions  had  no  connection  with  their  will,  we  should  not 
speak  of  such  exertions  as  actions. 

3.  Action,  so  far  as  we  know,  is  affirmed  only  of  beings 
possessed  of  intelligence  ;  that  is,  who  are  capable  of  com- 
prehending a  particular  end,  and   of  adopting  the  means 
necessary  to  accomplish  it.     An  action  is  something  done  ; 
that  is,  some  change  effected.     But  man  effects  change, 


OF    MORAL    ACTION.  27 

only  by  means  of  stated  antecedents.  An  action,  there- 
fore, in  such  a  being,  supposes  some  change  in  view,  and 
some  means  employed  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  it. 

We  do  not,  however,  affirm  this  as  essential.  Suppose 
a  being  so  constituted  as  to  be  able  to  effect  changes  with- 
out the  use  of  means ;  action  would  then  not  involve  the 
necessity  of  intelligence,  in  the  sense  in  ivhich  it  is  here 
explained.  All  that  would  be  necessary,  would  be  the 
previous  conception  of  the  change  which  he  intended  to 
effect. 

4.  All  this  exists  in  man.  He  is  voluntary  and  intelli- 
gent, capable  of  foreseeing  the  result  of  an  exertion  of 
power,  and  that  exertion  of  power  is  subject  to  his  will. 
This  is  sufficient  to  render  man  the  subject  of  govern- 
ment. He  can  foresee  the  results  of  a  particular  action,  and 
can  will,  or  not  will,  to  accomplish  it.  And  other  results 
can  be  connected  with  the  action,  of  such  a  nature,  as  to 
influence  his  will  in  one  direction  or  in  another.  Thus,  a 
man  may  know  that  stabbing  another  will  produce  death. 
He  has  it  in  his  power  to  will  or  not  to  will  it.  But  such 
other  consequences  may  be  connected  by  society  with  the 
act,  that,  though  on  many  accounts  he  would  desire  to  do 
it,  yet,  on  other  and  graver  accounts,  he  would  prefer 
not  to  do  it.  This  is  sufficient  to  render  man  a  subject  of 
government.  But  is  this  all  that  is  necessary  to  constitute 
man  a  moral  agent ;  that  is,  to  render  him  a  subject  of 
moral  government  ? 

May  not  all  this  be  affirmed  of  brutes  ?  Are  they  not 
voluntary,  and  even,  to  some  extent,  intelligent  agents  ? 
Do  they  not,  frequently,  at  least,  comprehend  the  relation 
of  means  to  an  end,  and  voluntarily  put  forth  the  power 
necessaiy  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  end?  Do  they 
not  manifestly  design  to  injure  us,  and  also  select  the  most 
appropriate  means  for  effecting  their  purpose  ?  And  can 
we  not  connect  such  results  with  their  actions,  as  shall 
influence  their  will,  and  prevent  or  excite  the  exercise  of 
their  power  ?  We  do  this,  whenever  we  caress  or  intirai 
date  them,  to  prevent  them  from  injuring  us,  or  to  excite 
them  to  labor.  They  are,  then,  subjects  of  government, 
as  truly  as  man. 


28  OF    MORAL    ACTION. 

Is  there,  then,  no  difference  between  the  intelligent  and 
voluntary  action  of  a  brute,  and  the  moral  action  of  a 
man  ?  Suppose  a  brute  and  a  man  both  to  perform  the 
same  action ;  as,  for  instance,  suppose  the  brute  to  kill  its 
offspring,  and  the  man  to  murder  his  child.  Are  these 
actions  of  the  same  character  ?  Do  we  entertain  the  same 
feelings  towards  the  authors  of  them  ?  Do  we  treat  the 
authors  in  the  same  manner,  and  with  the  design  of  pro- 
ducing in  them  the  same  result  ? 

I  think  no  one  can  answer  these  questions  in  the  affir- 
mative. We  pity  the  brute,  but  we  are  filled  with  indig- 
nation against  the  man.  In  the  one  case,  we  say  there 
has  been  harm  done ;  in  the  other,  injury  committed.  We 
feel  that  the  man  deserves  punishment :  we  have  no  such 
feeling  towards  the  brute.  We  say  that  the  man  has  done 
wrong;  but  we  never  affirm  this  of  the  brute.  We  may 
attempt  to  produce  in  the  brute  such  a  recollection  of  the 
offence,  as  may  deter  him  from  the  act  in  future ;  but  we 
can  do  no  more.  We  attempt,  in  the  other  case,  to  make  the 
man  sensible  of  the  act  as  wrong,  and  to  produce  in  him  a 
radical  change  of  character ;  so  that  he  not  only  would 
not  commit  the  crime  again,  but  would  be  inherently  averse 
to  the  commission  of  it. 

These  considerations  are,  I  think,  sufficient  to  render  it 
evident,  that  we  perceive  an  element  in  the  actions  of  men, 
which  does  not  exist  in  the  actions  of  brutes.  What  is 
this  element? 

If  we  should  ask  a  child,  he  would  tell  us  that  the  man 
knows  better.  This  would  be  his  mode  of  explaining  it. 

But  what  is  meant  by  knowing  better?  Did  not  the 
brute  and  the  man  both  know  that  the  result  of  their  action 
would  be  harm  ?  Did  not  both  intend  that  it  should  be 
harm  ?  In  what  respect,  then,  did  the  one  know  better 
tnan  the  other  ? 

1  think  that  a  plain  man  or  a  child  would  answer,  the 
man  Jcneiv  that  he  ought  not  to  do  it,  and  that  the  brute 
did  not  know  that  he  ought  not  to  do  it ;  or  he  might  say, 
the  man  knew,  and  the  brute  did  not  know,  that  it  was 
wrong ;  but  whatever  terms  he  might  employ,  they  would 


OF    MORAL    ACTION.  29 

involve  the  same  idea.  I  do  not  know  that  a  philosopher 
could  give  a  more  satisfactory  answer. 

If  the  question,  then,  be  asked,  what  is  a  moral  action  ? 
we  may  answer,  it  is  the  voluntary  action  of  an  intelligent 
agent,  who  is  capable  of  distinguishing  between  right  and 
wrong,  or  of  distinguishing  what  he  ought,  from  what  he 
ought  not,  to  do. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  remarked,  that,  although  action  is 
defined  to  be  the  putting  forth  of  power,  it  is  not  intended 
to  be  asserted,  that  the  moral  quality  exists  only  where 
power  is  actually  exerted.  It  is  manifest,  that  our  thoughts 
and  resolutions  may  be  deserving  either  of  praise  or  of 
blame  ;  that  is,  may  be  either  right  or  wrong,  where  they 
do  not  appear  in  action.  When  the  will  consents  to  the 
performance  of  an  action,  though  the  act  be  not  done,  the 
omniscient  Deity  justly  considers  us  as  either  virtuous  or 
vicious. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  may  be  seen  that  there 
exists,  in  the  actions  of  men,  an  element  which  does  not 
exist  in  the  actions  of  brutes.  Hence,  though  both  are 
subjects  of  government,  the  government  of  the  one  should 
be  constructed  upon  principles  different  from  that  of  the 
other.  We  can  operate  upon  brutes  only  by  fear  of  pun- 
ishment, and  hope  of  reward.  We  can  operate  upon  man, 
not  only  in  this  manner,  but,  also,  by  an  appeal  to  his  con- 
sciousness of  right  and  wrong ;  and  by  the  use  of  such 
means  as  may  improve  his  moral  nature.  Hence,  all 
modes  of  punishment  which  treat  men  as  we  treat  brutes, 
are  as  unphilosophical  as  they  are  thoughtless,  cruel  and  vin- 
dictive. Such  are  those  systems  of  criminal  jurisprudence, 
which  have  in  view  nothing  more  than  the  infliction  of 
pain  upon  the  offender.  The  leading  object  of  all  such 
systems  should  be  to  reclaim  the  vicious.  Such  was  the 
result  to  which  all  the  investigations  of  Howard  led.  Such 
is  the  improvement  which  Prison  Discipline  Societies  are 
laboring  to  effect. 

And  it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  Christian  precept 

respecting    the   treatment   of  injuries,    proceeds   precisely 

upon  this  principle.     The  New  Testament  teaches  us  to 

love  our  enemies,  to  do  good  to  those  that  hate  us,  to  over- 

3* 


30  IN    WHAT    PART    OF    AN    ACTION    DO    WE 

come  evil  with  good  ;  that  is,  to  set  before  a  man  who  does 
wrong,  the  strongest  possible  exemplification  of  the  opposite 
moral  quality,  right.  Now,  it  is  manifest,  that  nothing 
would  be  so  likely  to  show  to  an  injurious  person  the  tur- 
pitude of  his  own  conduct,  and  to  produce  in  him  self- 
reproach  and  repentance,  as  precisely  this  sort  of  moral 
exhibition.  Revenge  and  retaliation  might,  or  might  not, 
prevent  a  repetition  of  the  injury  to  a  particular  individual. 
The  requiting  of  evil  with  good,  in  addition  to  this  effect, 
has  an  inherent  tendency  to  produce  sorrow  for  the  act, 
and  dislike  to  its  moral  quality ;  and  thus,  by  producing  a 
change  of  character,  to  prevent  the  repetition  of  the  offence 
under  all  circumstances  hereafter. 


SECTION  III. 


IN   WHAT   PART    OF    AN    ACTION  DO    WE    DISCOVER   ITS    MORAL 
QUALITY? 

In  a  deliberate  action,  four  distinct  elements  may  be 
commonly  observed.  These  are — 

1.  The  outward  act,  as  when  I  put  money  into  the  hands 
of  another. 

2.  The  conception  of  this  act,  of  which  the  external 
performance  is  the  mere  bodying  forth. 

3.  The  resolution  to  carry  that  conception  into  effect. 

4.  The  intention,  or  design,  with  which  all  this  is  done. 
Now,  the  moral  quality  does  not  belong  to  the  external 

act ;  for  the  same  external  act  may  be  performed  by  two 
men,  while  its  moral  character  is,  in  the  two  cases,  entirely 
dissimilar. 

Nor  does  it  belong  to  the  conception  of  the  external  act, 
nor  to  the  resolution  to  carry  that  conception  into  effect ; 
for  the  resolution  to  perform  an  action  can  have  no  other 
character  than  that  of  the  action  itself.  It  must,  then, 
reside  in  the  intention. 


DISCOVER    ITS    MORAL    QUALITY  ?  31 

That  such  is  the  fact,  may  be  illustrated  by  an  example. 
A  and  B  both  give  to  C  a  piece  of  money.  They  both 
conceived  of  this  action  before  they  performed  it.  They 
both  resolved  to  do  precisely  what  they  did.  In  all  this, 
both  actions  coincide.  A,  however,  gave  it  to  C,  with 
the  intention  of  procuring  the  murder  of  a  friend ;  B,  with 
the  intention  of  relieving  a  family  in  distress.  It  is  evident 
that,  in  this  case,  the  intention  gives  to  the  action  its  char- 
acter as  right  or  wrong. 

That  the  moral  quality  of  the  action  resides  in  the  inten- 
tion, may  be  evident  from  various  other  considerations. 

1.  By  reference  to  the  intention,  we  inculpate  or  excul- 
pate others,  or  ourselves,  without  any  respect  to  the  hap- 
piness or  miseiy  actually  produced.     Let  the  result  of  an 
action  be  what  it  may,  we  hold  a  man  guilty  simply  on  the 
ground  of  intention,  or,  on  the  same  ground,  we  hold  him 
innocent.     Thus,  also,  of  ourselves.     We  are  conscious  of 
guilt  or  of  innocence,  not  from  the  result  of  an  action,  but 
from  the  intention  by  which  we  were  actuated. 

2.  We  always  distinguish  between  being  the  instrument 
of  good,  and  intending  it.     We  are  grateful  to  one  who  is 
the  cause   of  good,  not  in  the  proportion  of  the  amount 
effected,  but  of  the  amount  intended. 

Intention  may  be  wrong  in  various  ways. 

As,  for  instance,  first,  where  we  intend  to  injure  another, 
as  in  cruelty,  malice,  revenge,  deliberate  slander. 

Here,  however,  it  may  be  remarked,  that  we  may  intend 
to  inflict  pain,  without  intending  wrong ;  for  we  may  be 
guilty  of  the  violation  of  no  right.  Such  is  the  case,  when 
pain  is  inflicted  for  the  purposes  of  justice  ;  for  it  is  mani- 
fest, that,  if  a  man  deserve  pain,  it  is  no  violation  of  right 
to  inflict  it.  Hence  we  see(the  difference  between  harm, 
injury,  and  punishment.  We  harm  another  when  we  act- 
ually inflict  pain  ;  we  injure  him  when  we  inflict  pain  in 
violation  of  his  rights  ;  we  punish  him  when  we  inflict  pain 
which  he  deserves,  and  to  which  he  has  been  properly 
adjudged — and,  in  so  doing,  there  is,  therefore,  a  violation 
of  no  right. 

2.  Intention  is  wrong,  where  we  act  for  the  gratification 
of  our  own  passions,  without  any  respect  to  the  happiness 


32  IN    WHAT    PART    OF    AN    ACTION,    ETC. 

of  others.  Such  is  the  case  of  seduction,  ambition,  and,  in 
nations,  commonly,  of  war.  Every  man  is  bound  to  restrain 
the  indulgence  of  his  passions  within  such  limits,  that  they 
will  work  no  ill  to  his  neighbor.  If  they  actually  inflict 
injury,  it  is  no  excuse  to  say  that  he  had  no  ill  will  to  the 
individual  injured.  The  Creator  never  conferred  on  him 
the  right  to  destroy  another's  happiness  for  his  own  gratifi- 
cation. 

3.  As  the  right  and  wrong  of  an  action  reside  in  the 
intention,  it  is  evident,  that,  where  an  action  is  intended, 
though  it  be  not  actually  performed,  that  intention  is  worthy 
of  praise  or  blame,  as  truly  as  the  action  itself,  provided  the 
action  itself  be  wholly  out  of  our  power.     Thus  God  re- 
warded David  for  intending  to  build  the  temple,  though  he 
did  not  permit  him  actually  to  build  it.     So,  he  who  intends 
to  murder  another,  though  he  may  fail  to  execute  his  pur- 
pose, is,  in  the  sight  of  God,  a  murderer.     The  meditation 
upon  wickedness  with  pleasure,  comes  under  the  same  con- 
demnation. 

4.  As  the  right  or  wrong  exists  in  the  intention,  wherever 
a   particular   intention  is  essential  to   virtuous  action,  the 
performance  of  the  external  act,  without  that  intention,  is 
destitute  of  the  element  of  virtue.  \_  Thus,  a  child  is  bound 
to  obey  his  parents,  with  the  intention  of  thus  manifesting 
his  love  and  gratitude.     If  he  do  it  from  fear,  or  from  hope 
of  gain,  the  act  is  destitute  of  the  virtue  of  filial  obedience, 
and  becomes  merely  the  result  of  passion  or  self-interest. 
And  thus  our  Savior  charges   upon  the  Jews  the  want  of 
the  proper  intention,  in   all  their  dealings  with  God.     "  I 
know  you,"  said  he,  "  that  ye  have  not  the  love  of  God  in 
you." ' 

And,  again,  it  is  manifest,  that  our  moral  feelings,  like 
our  taste,  may  be  excited  by  the  conceptions  of  our  own 
imagination,  scarcely  less  than  by  the  reality.  These, 
therefore,  may  develop  moral  character.  He  who  medi- 
tates, with  pleasure,  upon  fictions  of  pollution  and  crime, 
whether  originating  with  himself  or  with  others,  renders  it 
evident  that  nothing  but  opposing  circumstances  prevents 
him  from  being  himself  an  actor  in  the  crime  which  he 
loves.  And  still  more,  as  the  moral  character  of  an  action 


WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR    NOTION,    ETC.  33 

resides  in  the  intention,  and  as  whatever  tends  to  corrupt 
the  intention  must  be  wrong,  the  meditating  with  pleasure 
upon  vice,  which  has  manifestly  this  tendency,  must  be 
wrong  also. 

And  here  let  me  add,  that  the  imagination  of  man  is  the 
fruitful  parent  both  of  virtue  and  vice.  Thus  saith  the 
wise  man,  "  Keep  thy  heart  with  all  diligence,  for  out  of  it 
are  the  issues  of  life."  No  man  becomes  openly  a  villain, 
until  his  imagination  has  become  familiar  with  conceptions 
of  villany.  The  crimes  which  astonish  us  by  their  atrocity, 
were  first  arranged,  and  acted,  and  reacted,  in  the  recesses 
of  the  criminal's  own  mind.  Let  the  imagination,  then,  be 
most  carefully  guarded,  if  we  wish  to  escape  from  tempta- 
tion, and  make  progress  in  virtue.  Let  no  one  flatter  him- 
self that  he  is  innocent,  if  he  love  to  meditate  upon  any 
thing  which  he  would  blush  to  avow  before  men,  or  fear  to 
unveil  before  God. 


SECTION   IV. 

WHENCE  DO    WE  DERIVE    OUR  NOTION  OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY 
OF  ACTIONS  ? 

To  this  question  several  answers  have  been  given. 
Some  of  them  we  shall  proceed  to  consider. 

1.  Is  our  notion  of  right  and  wrong  a  modification  of  any 
other  idea  ? 

The  only  modifications  of  which  an  idea  is  susceptible, 
are,  first,  that  of  greater  or  less  vividness  of  impression.,  or, 
secondly,  that  of  simplicity  or  of  composition.  Thus,  the 
quality  of  beauty  may  impress  us  more  or  less  forcibly,  in 
the  contemplation  of  different  objects ;  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  idea  of  beauty  may  be  simple,  or  else  combined, 
in  our  conceptions,  with  the  idea  of  utility. 

Now,  if  our  notion  of  right  and  wrong  be  a  modification 
of  some  other  idea,  in  the  first  sense,  then  one  degree  of 


34  WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION    OF 

the  original  quality  will  be  destitute  of  any  moral  element, 
and  another  degree  of  it  will  possess  a  moral  element ;  and, 
by  ascending  higher  in  the  scale,  it  may  at  last  lose  all  its 
original  character,  and  possess  another,  having  no  remains 
of  resemblance  to  itself.  This  would  be  to  say,  that  a 
quality,  by  becoming  more  intense,  ceased  to  be  itself;  as  if 
a  triangle,  by  becoming  more  perfect  as  a  triangle,  at  last 
became  a  square.  Thus,  if  it  be  said,  that  the  idea  of  right 
and  wrong  is  a  modification  of  the  idea  of  beauty,  then 
the  same  object,  if  beautiful  in  one  degree,  would  have  no 
moral  quality ;  if  beautiful  in  another  degree,  would  begin 
to  be  virtuous  ;  and,  if  beautiful  in  the  highest  degree, 
would  cease  to  be  beautiful,  and  be  purely  virtuous  or  holy. 
What  meaning  could  be  attached  to  such  an  affirmation,  I 
am  not  able  to  discover. 

The  other  meaning  of  a  modification  of  an  idea,  is,  that 
it  is  compounded  with  some  other  idea.  Now,  suppose  our 
notion  of  light  and  wrong  to  be  a  modification  in  this  latter 
sense.  Then  this  notion  either  enters  into  the  original  ele- 
ments of  the  compound  idea,  or  it  does  not.  If  it  does, 
then  it  is  already  present ;  and  this  supposition  does  not 
account  for  its, existence.  If  it  does  not  enter  into  the  ele- 
ments of  the  compound  idea,  then  these  elements  must  exist 
either  merely  combined,  but  each  possessing  its  original 
character,  in  which  combination  the  moral  idea  is  not  in- 
volved ;  or  else  they  must  lose  their  original  character,  and 
be  merely  the  stated  antecedents  to  another  idea,  which  is 
an  idea  like  neither  of  them,  either  separately  or  combined. 
In  this  latter  case,  it  is  manifest,  that  the  consequent  of  an 
antecedent  is  no  modification  of  the  antecedent,  but  an 
entirely  different  subject,  coming  into  existence  under  these 
particular  circumstances,  and  in  obedience  to  the  laws  of 
its  own  organization.  Do  we 'ever  term  a  salt  a  modifica- 
tion of  an  acid,  or  of  an  alkali,  or  of  an  acid  and  alkali 
united  ?  Is  the  explosive  power  of  gunpowder  a  modifica- 
tion of  the  spark  and  the  gunpowder?  We  think,  then,  it 
may  be  safely  concluded,  that  the  notion  of  right  and  wrong 
is  not  a  modification  of  any  other  idea. 

If  any  one  assert,  that  this  idea  universally  ensues  upon  the 
combination  of  two  other  ideas,  it  will  become  him  to  show 


THE    MORAL    QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS  ?  35 

what  those  two  ideas  are,  neither  of  which  involves  the 
notion  of  right  and  wrong,  but  upon  the  combination  of 
which,  this  notion  always  arises,  while  the  original  elements 
which  precede  it,  entirely  disappear. 

2.  Is  our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions  derived 
from  an  exercise  of  the  judgment  ? 

Judgment  is  that  act  of  the  mind,  by  which,  a  subject 
and  a  predicate  being  known,  we  affirm,  that  the  predicate 
belongs  to  the  subject.  Thus,  he  who  knows  what  grass 
is,  and  what  green  is,  may  affirm  that  grass  is  green.  But 
in  this  act  of  the  mind,  the  notion  of  the  two  things  of 
which  the  affirmation  is  made,  must  exist  before  the  act  of 
judgment  can  be  exerted.  A  man  who  had  no  notion 
either  of  grass,  or  of  green,  could  never  affirm  the  one  of 
the  other.  And  so  of  any  other  instance  of  this  act.  A 
man  who  had  no  notion  of  right  or  of  wrong,  could  never 
affirm  either  quality  of  any  subject  ;  much  less  could  he,  by 
this  faculty,  acquire  the  original  idea.  And  thus,  in  gene- 
ral, the  judgment  only  affirms  a  relation  to  exist  between 
two  notions  which  previously  existed  in  the  mind  ;  but  it 
can  give  us  no  original  notions  of  quality,  either  in  morals 
or  in  any  thing  else. 

3.  Is^ouf-jiQtion  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions  derived 
from 


The  term  association  is  used  to  designate  two  habits  of 
mind  considerably  alike.  The  first  is  that,  by  which  the 
sight  or  rgcojlection  pf  one  object  calls  to  rftr.nllftr.tion  some 
,  to  which  it  stands  in  some  particular  relation. 


Thus,  the  sight  of  a  hearse  may  recall  to  recollection  the 
death  of  a  friend  ;  or  the  sound  of  his  native  language,  in 
a  foreign  country,  may  awaken  in  the  breast  of  an  exile  all 
the  recollections  of  home.  The  second  case  is,  where  a  /}y 
particular  emotion,  belonging  to  one  train  of  circoomstaiices, 
is  awakened  by  another,  with  which  it  has.  na.  .necessary 
connection  ;  and  this  first  emotion  comes  at  last  to  be 
awakened  by  the  accidental,  instead  of  by  the  necessary, 
antecedent.  Thus,  the  countenance  of  a  person  may  be 
suited  to  awaken  no  emotion  of  pleasure  in  itself;  but,  if 
I  become  acquainted  with  him,  and  am  pleased  with  his 
moral  and  intellectual  character,  a  degree  of  pleasure  is,  at 


36  WHENCE    DO   WE   DERIVE    OUR   NOTION 

last,  excited  by  his  countenance,  which,  in  the  end,  appears 
to  me  agreeable,  or,  it  may  be,  beautiful. 

Now,  in  both  these  cases,  it  is  evident  that  no  new  idea 
is  gained.  In  the  one  case,  a  well  known  idea  is  revived ; 
in  the  other,  two  known  ideas  are  connected  in  a  new  re- 
lation ;  but  this  is  all.  Association  is  the  faculty  by  which 
we  transfer;  but  we  can  transfer  nothing  which  did  not 
previously  exist.  We  could  never  use  the  idea  of  right  and 
wrong  by  association,  unless  we  had  already  acquired  it. 
In  the  acts  of  judgment  and  association,  therefore,  as  the 
existence  of  the  notion  must  be  presupposed,  neither  of  these 
acts  will  account  for  the  origin  of  the  notion  itself. 

4.  Is  our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  of  actions  derived 
from  the  idea  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ? 

Thus,  it  is  said,  that  our  notion  of  right  and  wrong  is 
derived  from  our  idea  of  productiveness  of  happiness,  or,  in 
other  words,  that  an  action  is  right  or  wrong  because  it  is  pro- 
ductive or  not  productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

When  the  affirmative  of  this  question  is  asserted,  it  is,  I 
presume,  taken  for  granted,  that  the  idea  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  of  productiveness  of  the  greatest  amount  of  hap- 
piness, are  two  distinct  ideas.  If  they  be  not,  then  one 
cannot  be  derived  from  the  other ;  for  nothing  can  correctly 
be  said  to  be  a  cause  of  itself.  We  shall,  therefore,  con- 
sider them  as  different  ideas,  and  inquire,  in  what  sense  it  is 
true  that  the  one  is  the  cause  of  the  other. 

When  we  speak  of  two  events  in  nature,  of  which  one 
is  the  cause  of  the  other,  we  use  the  word  cause  in  one  of 
the  two  following  senses.  First,  we  use  it  to  denote  stated 
antecedency  merely  ;  as  when  we  say  that  sensation  is  the 
CflM*e~'6f  perception,  or,  that  a  man  perceives  an  external 
object,  because  an  impression  is  made  upon  an  organ  of 
sense.  Secondly,  we  use  it  to  signify  that  the  event  or 
change  of  which  we  speak  may  be  referred  to  some  law  or 
fact,  more  general  than  itself.  We  say,  in  other  words, 
that  the  fact  in  question  is  a  species  under  some  genus,  with 
which  it  agrees  as  to  generic  qualities ;  and  from  which  it  is 
distinguished  by  its  specific  differences.  Thus,  when  asked 
why  a  stone  falls  to  the  earth,  we  reply,  because  all  matter  is 
reciprocally  attractive  to  all  other  matter.  This  is  the  generic 


OF    THE    MORAL    QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS  ?  37 

fact,  under  which  the  fact  in  question  is  to  be  comprehended  ; 
and  its  specific  difference  is,  that  it  is  a  particular  form  of 
matter,  attracted  by  a  particular  form  of  matter,  and  prob- 
ably unlike  the  matter  of  the  planets,  the  comets,  or  the  sun. 
First.  When  it  is  said  that  an  action  is  right,  because  it 
is  productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  suppose 
because  to  be  used  in  the  first  of  these  senses.  It  will  then 
mean,  that  we  are  so  constituted,  that  the  idea  of  the  great- 
est amount  of  happiness  is  always  the  stated  antecedent  to 
the  idea  of  right,  or  moral  obligation.  Now,  this  is  a  ques- 
tion purely  of  fact.  It  does  not  admit  of  a  reason  a  priori. 
And,  if  it  be  the  fact,  it  must  be  the  universal  fact ;  that  is 
to  say,  this  consequent  must  always,  under  similar  con- 
ditions, be  preceded  by  this  antecedent,  and  this  antecedent 
be  followed  by  this  consequent. 

1.  To  facts,  then,  let  us  appeal.     Is  it  a  fact,  that  we 
are  conscious  of  the  existence  of  this  connection  ?     When 
we  are  conscious  that  an  act  is  right,  is  this  consciousness 
preceded  by  a  conviction  that  this  action  will  be  productive 
of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?     When  we  say  it  is 
wrong  to  lie  or  to  steal,  do  we  find  this  consciousness  pre- 
ceded by  the  notion,  that  lying  or  stealing  will  not  produce 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?     When  we  say  that  a 
murderer  deserves  death,  do  we  find  this  notion  preceded 
by  the  other,  that  murder  will  not  produce  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness,  and  that  putting  a  murderer  to  death 
will  produce  it?     When  we  say  that  a  man  ought  to  obey 
God,  his  Creator  and  Preserver,  do  we  find  this  conviction 
preceded  by  the  other — that  the  exercise  of  this  affection 
will  produce  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?     Now,  I 
may  have  greatly  mistaken  the  nature  of  moral  affections ; 
but  I  am  much  deceived  if  many  persons  will  not  be  found, 
who  will  declare,  that,  often  as  they  have   formed  these 
judgments,  the  idea  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness 
never  acruaily  entered  into  their  conception. 

2.  Or,  take  the  case  of  children.     When  you  would  im- 
press upon  a  child  the  duty  of  obeying  its  parents,  or  of 
loving  God,  do  you  begin  by  explaining  to  it  the  idea  of 
the  greatest   amount   of  happiness?     Are  we   obliged  to 
make  use  of  this  antecedent,  in  order  to  produce  this  con- 

4 


33  WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION 

sequcnt  ?  If  so,  it  surely  would  take  a  much  longer  time 
than  is  actually  required,  to  produce  in  a  child  any  moral 
sensihility.  Do  we  not  find  children,  well  instructed  into  the 
consciousness  of  right  and  wrong,  who  could  not  be  made  to 
comprehend  the  notion  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ? 

3.  How  do  we  attempt  to  arouse  the  consciences  of  the 
heathen?     When  we  tell  them   that  they  ought  to  obey 
God,  and  believe  on  Jesus  Christ,  do  we  begin  by  explain- 
ing to  them  that  this  course  of  life  will  produce  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness?      Suppose  we  could  never  arouse 
them  to  duty,  until  we  had  produced  a  conviction  of  the 
amount  of  happiness  which  would  result  to  the  universe 
from  piety,  would  a  single  one  of  them  ever  listen  to  us 
long  enough  to  understand  our  doctrine  ? 

4.  Does  the  Bible  any  where  assert,  that  the  conviction 
of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  is  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  moral  obligation  ?     If  I  mistake  not,  it  presents 
a  very  different  view  of  the  subject.     It  declares  that  the 
heathen  are  without  excuse.     But  why  ?     Because  disobe- 
dience to  God  interferes  with  the  greatest  amount  of  hap- 
piness ?     No,  but  for  a  very  different  reason :   "  Because 
that  ivhich  may  be  Iknown  of  God  is  manifest  in  them,  for 
God  hath  showed  it  unto- them  ;  so  THAT  they  are  without 
excuse."     Rom.  i.  19,  20.     St.  Paul  here  seems  to  assume, 
that  the  revelation  of  God's  eternal  power  and  divinity,  and 
the  manifestation  of  his  will,  are  sufficient,  of  themselves, 
without  any  other  consideration,  to  make  whatever  he  shall 
command  obligatory  upon  his  creatures. 

It  seems,  then,  to  me,  by  no  means  proved,  that  an  ac- 
tion is  right  because  it  is  productive  of  the  greatest  amount 
of  happiness  ;  if  we  mean  by  it  that,  in  our  conceptions,  the 
one  idea  is  the  stated  antecedent  to  the  other. 

Secondly.  But  let  us  take  the  other  meaning  of  because. 
Suppose  it  said,  that  the  idea  of  moral  obligation  is  an 
idea  comprehended  under,  and  to  be  referred  to,  a  more 
general  idea,  namely,  that  of  the  productiveness  of  the 
gre  .test  amount  of  happiness.  Now,  if  this  be  the  case, 
then,  manifestly,  either  the  notion  of  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness,  and  the  notion  of  right,  must  be  equally  exten- 
sive ;  that  is,  must  extend  precisely  to  the  same  number 


OF    THE    MORAL    QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS  ?  39 

of  individual  instances :  or  else  their  extent  must  be  differ- 
ent ;  that  is,  the  generic  notion  of  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness  must  comprehend  cases  which  are  excluded  from 
its  species,  the  idea  of  right.  If  the  latter  be  the  case,  then, 
there  will  be  some  cases  in  which  an  action  would  produce 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  which  would  not  contain 
the  moral  element ;  and,  besides,  if  this  were  the  case,  it 
would  become  those  who  make  this  assertion,  to  show  what 
is  that  other  element,  which,  combining  with  the  idea  of 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  designates  the  subordinate 
and  different  idea,  as  the  idea  of  moral  obligation.  This, 
however,  would  not  be  attempted,  and  it  will  be  at  once 
admitted,  that  these  two  ideas  are,  in  their  nature,  coexten- 
sive ;  that  is,  that  whatever  is  productive  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness,  is  right,  and  whatever  is  right,  is  pro- 
ductive of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

Let  us  suppose  it  then  to  be  assumed,  that  the  terms  are 
precisely  coextensive,  viz.,  that  they  apply  exactly  to  the 
same  actions  and  in  the  same  degrees.  It  would  then  be 
difficult  to  assign  a  meaning  to  the  word  because,  corre- 
sponding to  either  of  the  senses  above  stated.  Nor,  if  two 
terms  are  precisely  coextensive,  do  I  see  how  it  is  possible 
to  discover  which  of  the  two  is  to  be  referred  to  the  other  : 
or,  whether  either  is  to  be  referred  to  either.  If  A  and  B 
arc  equally  extensive,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  determine 
whether  A  is  to  be  referred  to  B,  or  B  to  be  referred  to  A, 

The  only  other  meaning  which  I  can  conceive  as  capa- 
ble of  being  attached  to  the  assertion,  is  this  ;  that  we  are 
not  under  moral  obligation  to  perform  any  action,  unless  it 
be  productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness;  thus 
making  moral  obligation  rest  upon  this  other  idea,  that  of 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

Now,  if  this  be  asserted,  it  is,  surely,  from  what  has  been 
said  above,  not  self-evident ;  for  we  manifestly  do  not, 
instinctively  and  universally,  as  soon  as  this  connection  is 
asserted,  yield  our  assent  to  it,  nor  is  it  absurd  to  deny  it ; 
and,  therefore,  the  assertion  is  capable  of  proof,  and  we 
may  justly  demand  the  proof  before  we  believe  it.  Let  us, 
then,  examine  the  proof  on  which  it  rests. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  remarked,  that,  if  the  assertion  be 


40  WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR    NOTION 

true,  that  we  are  under  obligation  to  perform  an  action  only 
on  the  ground  that  it  is  productive  of  the  greatest  good,  the 
assertion  must  be  true  in  its  widest  sense.  It  must  apply 
to  actions  affecting  our  relations,  not  only  to  man,  but  also 
to  God  ;  for  these  are  equally  comprehended  within  the 
notion  of  moral  obligation.  And  thus,  the  assertion  is,  that 
we  are  not  under  obligation  to  perform  any  action  whatever, 
under  any  circumstances,  unless  it  be  productive  of  the 
greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

1.  It  is  said,  that  these  two  always  coincide ;  that  is, 
that  we  always  are  under  obligation  to  do  whatever  is  pro- 
ductive of  the  greatest  amount   of  happiness  ;  and   that, 
whatever  we  are  under  obligation  to  do,  is  productive  of  the 
greatest  amount  of  happiness.     Now,  granting  the  premises, 
I  do  not  see  that  the  conclusion  would  follow.     It  is  possi- 
ble to  conceive,  that  God  may  have  created  moral  agents 
under  obligations  to  certain  courses  of  conduct,  and  have 
so  arranged  the  system  of  the  universe,  that  the  following 
of  these  courses  shall  be  for  the  best,  without  making  our 
obligation  to  rest  at  all  upon  their  tendency  to  produce  the 
greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

A  parent  may  require  a  child  to  do  that  which  will  be 
for  the  good  of  the  family ;  and  yet  there  may  be  other  rea- 
sons besides  this,  which  render  it  the  duty  of  the  child  to 
obey  his  parent. 

2.  BuU^secondly,  how  do  we  know  that  these  premises 
are  true-%hat  whatever  we  are  under  obligation  to  do,  is 
productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?     Itjiever 
can  be  known,  unless  we  know  the  whole  history  of  this 
universe  from  everlasting  to  everlasting.     And,  besides,  we 
know  that  God  always  acts  right,  that  is,  deals  with   all 
beings  according  to  their  deserts ;  but  whether  he  always 
acts  simply  to  promote  the  greatest  happiness,  I  do  not  know 
that  he  has  told  us.     His  government  could  not  be  more 
perfectly  right  than  it  is  ;  but  whether  it  could  have  in- 
volved less  misery,  or  have  produced  more  happiness,  I  do 
not  know  that  we  have  the  means  of  ascertaining.     As, 
therefore,  the  one  quantity,  so  to  speak,  is  fixed,  that  is,  is 
as  great  as  it  can  be,  while  we  do  not  certainly  know  that 
the  other  is  as  great  as  it  can  be    we  cannot  affirm  that 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS  ?       41 

right  and  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  always  coincide ; 
nor,  that  we  are  under  obligation  to  do  nothing,  unless  it 
would  tend  to  produce  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness. 

3.  Besides,  suppose  we  are  under  no  obligation  to  do 
any  thing  unless  it  were  productive  of  the  greatest  amount 
of  happiness,  it  would  follow  that  we  are  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  obey  God,  unless  the  production  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness  were  the  controlling  and  universal 
principle  of  his  government.  That  is,  if  his  object,  in 
creating  and  governing  the  universe,  were  any  other,  or,  if 
it  were  doubtful  whether  it  might  not  be  any  other,  our 
obligation  to  obedience  would  either  be  annihilated,  or 
would  be  contingent ;  that  is,  it  would  be  inversely  as  the 
degree  of  doubt  which  might  exist.  Now,  as  I  have  be- 
fore remarked,  this  may,  or  may  not,  be  the  ultimate  end 
of  God's  government ;  it  may  be  his  own  pleasure,  or  his 
own  glory,  or  some  other  end,  which  he  has  not  seen  fit  to 
reveal  to  us  ;  and,  therefore,  on  the  principle  which  we 
are  discussing,  our  obligation  to  obedience  seems  a  matter 
yet  open  for  discussion.  Now,  if  I  mistake  not,  this  is 
wholly  at  variance  with  the  whole  tenor  of  Scripture  and 
reason.  I  do  not  know  that  the  Scriptures  ever  give  us  a 
reason  why  we  ought  to  obey  God,  aside  from  his  existence 
and  attributes,  or  that  they  ever  put  this  subject  in  a  light 
susceptible  of  a  question. 

To  this  view  of  the  subject,  the  following  remarks  of 
Bishop  Butler  manifestly  tend :  "  Perhaps  divine  goodness, 
with  which,  if  I  mistake  not,  we  make  very  free  in  our 
speculations,  may  not  be  a  bare  single  disposition  to  produce 
happiness  ;  but  a  disposition  to  make  the  good,  the  faithful, 
the  honest  man  happy.  Perhaps  an  infinitely  perfect 
mind  may  be  pleased  with  seeing  his  creatures  behave  suit- 
ably with  the  nature  which  he  has  given  them,  to  the  rela- 
tions in  which  he  has  placed  them  to  each  other,  and  to 
that  in  which  they  stand  to  himself;  that  relation  to  himself, 
which  during  their  existence  is  ever  necessary,  and  wh«ch 
is  the  most  important  one  of  all.  I  say,  an  infinitely  perfect 
mind  may  be  pleased  with  this  moral  piety  of  moral  agents 
in  and  for  itself.,  as  well  as  upon  account  of  its  being 
essentially  conducive  to  the  happiness  of  his  creation.  Or 
4* 


42  WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION 

the  whole  end  for  which  God  made  and  thus  governs  the 
world,  may  be  utterly  beyond  the  reach  of  our  faculties : 
there  may  be  somewhat  in  it,  as  impossible  for  us  to  have 
any  conception  of,  as  for  a  blind  man  to  have  a  conception 
of  colors."  Analogy,  part  1,  ch.  2. 

Again.  "  Some  men  seem  to  think  the  only  character 
of  the  Author  of  nature,  to  be  that  of  single,  absolute 
benevolence.  This,  considered  as  a  principle  of  action, 
and  infinite  in  degree,  is  a  disposition  to  produce  the  great- 
est possible  happiness,  without  regard  to  persons'  behavior, 
otherwise  than  as  such  regard  would  produce  the  highest 
degrees  of  it.  And,  supposing  this  to  be  the  only  charac 
ter  of  God,  veracity  and  justice  in  him  would  be  nothing 
but  benevolence,  conducted  by  wisdom.  Now,  surely  this 
ought  not  to  be  asserted,  unless  it  can  be  proved ;  for  we 
should  speak  with  cautious  reverence  upon  such  a  subject. 
There  may  possibly  be,  in  the  creation,  beings,  to  whom 
the  Author  of  nature  manifests  himself  under  this  most 
amiable  of  all  characters,  this  of  infinite,  absolute  benevo- 
lence ;  for  it  is  the  most  amiable,  supposing  it  is  not,  as 
perhaps  it  is  not,  incompatible  with  justice ;  but  he  mani- 
fests himself  to  us  under  the  character  of  a  Righteous  Gov 
ernor.  He  may,  consistently  with  this,  be  simply  and  abso- 
lutely benevolent,  in  the  sense  now  explained  ;  but  he  is, 
for  he  has  given  us  a  proof,  in  the  constitution  and  govern- 
ment of  the  world,  that  he  is,  a  Governor  over  servants,  as  he 
rewards  and  punishes  us  for  our  actions."  Analogy,  ch.  3. 

"  Nay,  farther,  were  treachery,  violence,  and  injustice,  no 
otherwise  vicious,  than  as  foreseen  likely  to  produce  an 
overbalance  of  misery  to  society,  then,  if  a  man  could  pro- 
cure to  himself  as  great  advantage  by  an  act  of  injustice, 
as  the  whole  foreseen  inconvenience  likely  to  be  brought 
upon  others  by  it  would  amount  to,  such  a  piece  of  injus- 
tice would  not  be  faulty  or  vicious  at  all ;  because  it  would 
be  no  more  than,  in  any  other  case,  for  a  man  to  prefer  his 
own  satisfaction  to  another's  in  equal  degrees.  The  fact 
then  appears  to  be,  that  we  are  constituted  so  as  to  con- 
demn falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  injustice,  and  to 
approve  of  benevolence  to  some  in  preference  to  others, 
abstracted  from  all  consideration  whid  onduct  is  likeliest 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS?       43 

to  produce  an  overbalance  of  happiness  or  misery.  And, 
therefore,  were  the  Author  of  nature  to  propose  nothing  to 
himself  as  an  end,  but  the  production  of  happiness,  were 
his  moral  character  merely  that  of  Benevolence,  yet  ours 
is  not  so.  Upon  that  supposition,  indeed,  the  only  reason 
of  his  giving  us  the  above-mentioned  approbation  of  benev- 
olence to  some  persons,  rather  than  others,  and  disapproba- 
tion of  falsehood,  unprovoked  violence,  and  injustice,  must 
be  that  he  foresaw  this  constitution  of  our  nature  would 
produce  more  happiness,  than  forming  us  with  a  temper 
of  mere  general  benevolence.  But  still,  since  this  is  our 
constitution,  falsehood,  violence,  injustice,  must  be  vice  in 
us,  and  benevolence  to  some,  preferably  to  .others,  must  be 
virtue,  abstracted  from  all  consideration  of  the  overbalance 
of  evil  or  good  which  they  appear  likely  to  produce. 

"  Now,  if  human  creatures  are  endued  with  such  a  moral 
nature  as  we  have  been  explaining,  or  with  a  moral  faculty, 
the  nature  of  which  is  action,  moral  government  must  con- 
sist in  rendering  them  happy  or  unhappy,  in  rewarding  or 
punishing  them,  as  they  follow,  neglect,  or  depart  from,  the 
moral  rule  of  action,  interwoven  in  their  nature,  or  sug- 
gested and  enforced  by  this  moral  faculty,  in  rewarding  or 
punishing  them  on  account  of  their  so  doing."  Second 
Dissertation  on  Virtue. 

For  these  reasons,  I  think  it  is  not  proved  that  an  action 
is  right  because  it  is  productive  of  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness.  It  may  be  so,  or  it  may  not,  but  we  ought  not 
to  believe  it  to  be  so  without  proof;  and  it  may  even  be 
doubted  whether  we  are  in  possession  of  the  media  of 
proof,  that  is,  whether  it  is  a  question  fairly  within  the 
reach  of  the  human  faculties ;  and,  so  far  as  we  can  learn 
from  the  Scriptures,  I -think  their  testimony  is  decidedly 
against  the  supposition.  To  me,  the  Scriptures  seem  ex- 
plicitly to  declare,  that  the  will  of  our  God  alone  is  suffi- 
cient to  create  the  obligation  to  obedience  in  all  his  crea- 
tures ;  and  that  this  will,  of  itself,  precludes  every  other 
inquiry.  This  s.eems  to  be  the  view  of  St.  Paul,  in  the 
passage  which  we  have  quoted,  as  well  as  in  several  other 
places,  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans.  To  the  same  import 
is  the  prayer  of  our  Savior,  "  I  thank  thee,  O  Father,  Lord 


44  WHENCE    DO   WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION 

of  heaven  and  earth,  because  thou  hast  hid  these  things 
from  the  wise  and  prudent,  and  hast  revealed  them  unto 
babes  ;  even  so,  Father,  for  so  it  seemed  good  in  thy 
sight." 

It  seems,  therefore,  to  me,  that  these  explanations  of 
the  origin  of  our  moral  sentiments  are  unsatisfactory.  I 
^believe  the  idea  of  a  moral  quality  in  actions  to  be  ultimate, 
to  arise  under  such  circumstances  as  have  been  appointed 
by  our  Creator,  and  that  we  can  assign  for  it  no  other 
reason,  than  that  such  is  his  will  concerning  us. 

If  this  be  true,  our  only  business  will  be,  to  state  the 
^circumstances  under  which  our  moral  notions  arise.  In 
doing  this,  it  would  be  presumption  in  me  to  expect  that  I 
shall  be  able  to  give  an  account  of  this  subject  more  satis- 
factory to  others,  than  theirs  has  been  to  me.  I  merely 
offer  it  as  that  which  seems  to  me  most  accurately  to  cor- 
respond with  the  phenomena. 

The  view  which  I  take  of  this  subject  is  briefly  as 
follows : 

1.  It  is  manifest  to  every  one,  that  we  all  stand  in  vari- 
ous   and   dissimilar   relations   to   all   the   sentient   beings, 
created  and   uncreated,  with   which  we   are    acquainted. 
Among  our  relations  to  created  beings  are  those  of  man  to 
man,  or  that  of  substantial  equality,  of  parent  and  child, 
of  benefactor  and  recipient,  of  husband  and  wife,  of  brother 
and  brother,  citizen  and  citizen,  citizen  and  magistrate,  and 
a  thousand  others. 

2.  Now,  it  seems  to  me,  that,  as  soon  as  a  human  being 
comprehends  the  relation  in  which  two  human  beings  stand 
to  each  other,  there  arises  in  his  mind  a  consciousness  of 
moral  obligation,  connected,  by  our  Creator,  with  the  very 
conception  of  this  relation.      And  the  fact  is  the  same, 
whether  he  be  one  of  the  parties  or  not.     The  nature  of 
this  feeling  is,  that  the  *one  ought  to  exercise  certain   dis- 
positions towards  the  othersjto  whom  he  is  thus  related  ; 
and  to  act  towards  them  in  a  manner  corresponding  with 
those  dispositions. 

3.rThe  nature  of  these  dispositions  varies,  of  course, 
with  the  relations^  Thus,  those  of  a  parent  to  a  child  are 
different  from  those  of  a  child  to  a  parent ;  those  of  a 


OF    THE    MORAL    QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS?  45 

benefactor  to  a  recipient,  from  those  of  a  recipient  to  a 
benefactor :  and  both  of  them  differ  from  that  of  a  brother 
to  a  brother,  or  of  a  master  to  a  servant.  But,  different  as 
these  may  be  from  each  other^hey  are  all  pervaded  by 
the  same  generic  feeling,  that  of  moral  obligation  ;\  that  is, 
we  feel  that  we  ought  to  be  thus  or  thus  disposed,  and  to 
act  in  this  or  that  manner. 

4.  This  I  suppose  to  be  our  constitution,  in  regard  to 
created  beings  ;  and  such  do  I  suppose  would  be  our  feel- 
ing, irrespectively  of  any  notion  of  the  Deity.     That  is, 
upon  the  conception  of  these  and  such  like  relations,  there 
would  immediately  arise  this  feeling  of  moral  obligation,  to 
act  towards  those  sustaining  these  relations,  in  a  particular 
manner. 

5.  But  there  is  an  Uncreated  Being,  to  whom  we  stand 
in  relations  infinitely  more  intimate  and  inconceivably  more 
solemn,  than  any  of  those  of  which  we  have  spoken.     It 
is  that  Infinite  Being,  who  stands  to  us  in  the  relation  of 
Creator,  Preserver,  Benefactor,  Lawgiver,  and  Judge ;  and 
to    whom   we  stand  in  the  relation  of    dependent,   help- 
less, ignorant,  and  sinful  creatures.     How  much  this  rela- 
tion involves,  we  cannot  possibly  know;  but  so  much  as 
this  we  know,  that  it  involves  obligations  greater  than  our 
intellect  can  estimate.     We  cannot  contemplate  it  without 
feeling  that,  from  the  very  fact  of  its  existence,  /  we  are 
under  obligations  to  entertain  the  disposition  of  filial  love 
and  obedience  towards  God,  and  to  act  precisely  as  he 
shall  condescend   to   direct.     And   this    obligation    arises 
simply  from  the  fact  of  the  relation  existing  between  the 
parties,  and  irrespectively  of  any  other  consideration ;  and 
if  it  be  not  felt,  when  the  relations  are  perceived,  it  can 
never  be  produced  by  any  view  of  the  consequences  which 
would  arise  to  the  universe  from  exercising  it. 

6.  This  relation,  and  its  consequent  obligation,  involve, 
comprehend,  and  transcend  every  other.     Hence  it  places 
obligation  to  man  upon  a  new  foundation.     For  if  we  be 
ourselves  thus  under  illimitable  obligations  to  God,  and  if, 
by  virtue  of  the  relation  which  he  sustains  to  the  creation, 
he  is  the  Protector,  Ruler,  and  Proprietor  of  all,  we  are 
under  obligations  to  obey  him  in  every  thing.     And  as 


46  WHENCE    DO    WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION 

every  other  being  is  also  his  creature,  we  are  bound  to  treat 
that  creature  as  he  its  Proprietor  shall  direct.  Hence  we 
are  bound  to  perform  the  obligation  under  which  we  stand 
to  his  creatures,  not  merely  on  account  of  our  relations  to 
them,  but  also  on  account  of  the  relations  in  which  we 
and  they  stand  to  God. 

r       And  hence,  in  general,  our  feeling  of  moral  obligation  is 

a  peculiar  and  instinctive  impulse,  arising  at  once  by  the 

principles  of  our  constitution,  as  soon  as  the  relations  are 

perceived  in  which  we  stand  to  the  beings,  created  and 

^  uncreated,  with  whom  we  are  connected. 

The  proof  of  this  must  rest,  as  I  am  aware,  with  every 
L  man's   consciousness.      A    few   illustrative    remarks   may, 
however,  not  be  altogether  useless. 

I  think,  if  we  reflect  upon  the  subject,  that  the  manner 
in  which  we  attempt  to  awaken  moral  feelings,  confirms 
the  view  which  I  have  taken.  In  such  a  case,  if  I  mistake 
not,  we  always  place  before  the  mind  the  relation  in  which 
the  parties  stand  to  each  other. 

1.  If  we  wish  to  awaken  in  ourselves  gratitude  to  another, 
we  do  not  reflect  that  this  affection  will   produce  the  great- 
est good ;  but  we  remember  the  individual  in  the  relation 
of  benefactor ;  and  we  place  this  relation  in  the  strongest 
possible  light.     If  this  will  not  produce  gratitude,  our  effort, 
of  necessity,  fails. 

2.  If  we  desire   to   inflame   moral   indignation    against 
crime,  we  show  the  relations  in  which  the  parties  stand  to 
each  other,  and  expect  hence  to  produce  a  conviction  of 
the  greatness  of  the  obligation  which  such  turpitude  vio- 
lates. 

3.  So,  if  we  wish  to  overcome  evil  with  good,  we  place 
ourselves  in  the  relation  of  benefactor  to  the  injurious  per- 
son ;  and,  in  spite  of  himself,  he  is  frequently  compelled  to 
yield  to  the  law  of  his  nature ;  and  gratitude  for  favors,  and 
sorrow  for  injury,  spontaneously  arise  in  his  bosom. 

4.  And,  in  the  plan  of  man's  redemption,  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  Deity  has  acted  on  this  principle.     Irrespectively 
of  a  remedial  dispensation,  he  is  known  to  us  only  as  a 
Creator,  all  wise  and  all  powerful,  perfect  in  holiness,  jus- 
tice, and  truth.     To  our  fallen  nature,  these  attributes  could 


OF    THE    MORAL    QUALITY    OF    ACTIONS  ?  47 

minister  nothing  but  terror.  He,  therefore,  has  revealed 
himself  to  us  in  the  relation  of  a  Savior  and  Redeemer,  a 
God  forgiving  transgression  and  iniquity ;  and  thus,  by  all 
the  power  of  this  new  relation,  he  imposes  upon  us  new 
obligations  to  gratitude,  repentance,  and  love. 

5.  And  hence  it  is,  that  God  always  asserts,  that  as,  from 
the  fact  of  this  new  relation,  our  obligations  to  him  are  in- 
creased ;  so,  he  who  rejects  the  gospel  is,  in  a  special  man- 
ner, a  sinner,  and  is  exposed  to  a  more  terrible  condemnation. 
The  climax  of  all  that  is  awful  in  the  doom  of  the  unbe- 
lieving, is  expressed  by  the  terms,  "  the  wrath  of  the 
Lamb." 

Again.  I  am  not  much  accustomed  to  such  refined 
speculations ;  but  I  think  that  obedience  or  love  to  God, 
from  any  more  ultimate  motive,  than  that  this  affection  is 
due  to  him  because  he  is  God,  and  our  God,  is  not  piety. 
Thus,  if  a  child  say,  I  will  obey  my  father,  because  it  is 
for  the  happiness  of  the  family  ;  what  the  character  of  this 
action  would  be,  I  am  not  prepared  to  say  ;  but  I  think 
the  action  would  not  be  filial  obedience.  Filial  obedience 
is  the  obeying  of  another,  because  he  is  my  father ;  and  it 
is  FILIAL  obedience,  only  in  so  far  as  it  proceeds  from  this 
motive.  This  will  be  evident,  if  we  substitute  for  the  love 
of  the  happiness  of  the  family,  the  love  of  money,  or  some 
other  such  motive.  Every  one  sees,  that  it  would  not  be 
filial  obedience,  for  a  child  to  obey  his  parent  because  he 
would  be  well  paid  for  it. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me,  that  the  same  principle  applies  in 
the  other  case.  To  feel  under  obligation  to  love  God, 
because  this  affection  would  be  productive  of  the  greatest 
good,  and  not  on  account  of  what  he  is,  and  of  the  relations 
in  which  he  stands  to  us,  seems  to  me  not  to  be  piety ;  that 
is,  not  to  be  the  feeling,  which  a  creature  is  bound  to  exer- 
cise towards  his  Creator.  If  the  obligation  to  the  love  of 
God  ran  really  arise  from  any  thing  more  ultimate  than  the 
essential  relation  which  he  sustains  to  us,  why  may  not  this 
more  ultimate  motive  be  something  else,  as  well  as  the  love 
of  the  greatest  good  ?  I  do  not  say  that  any  thing  else 
would  be  as  benevolent ;  but  I  speak  metaphysically,  and 
say,  that,  if  real  piety,  or  love  to  God,  may  truly  spring 


48  WHENCE    DO   WE    DERIVE    OUR   NOTION,    ETC. 

from  any  thing  more  ultimate  than  God  himself,  I  do  not 
see  why  it  may  not  spring  from  one  thing  as  well  as  from 
another;  and  thus,  true  piety  might  spring  from  various 
and  dissimilar  motives,  no  one  of  which  has  any  real  refer- 
ence to  God  himself. 

My  view  of  this  subject,  in  few  words,  is  as  follows : 

1.  We  stand  in  relations  to  the  several  beings  with  which 
we  are  connected,  such,  that  some  of  them,  as  soon  as  they 
are  conceived,  suggest  to  us  the  idea  of  moral  obligation. 

2.  Our  relations  to  our  fellow-men  suggest  this  convic- 
tion, in  a  limited  and  restricted  sense,  corresponding  to  the 
idea  of  general  or  essential  equality. 

3.  The  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  the  Deity  suggests 
the  conviction  of  universal  and  unlimited  love  and  obedience. 
This  binds  us  to  proper  dispositions  towards   Him ;  and, 
also,  to  such  dispositions  towards  his  creatures,  as  he  shall 
appoint. 

4.  Hence,  our  duties  to  man  are  enforced  by  a  twofold 
obligation ;  first,  because  of  our  relations  to  man  as  man ; 
and,  secondly,  because  of  our  relation  to  man  as  being,  with 
ourselves,  a  creature  of  God. 

5.  And  hence  an  act,  which  is  performed  in  obedience  to 
our  obligations  to  man,  may  be  virtuous  ;  but  it  is  not  pious, 
unless  it  also  be  performed  in  obedience  to  our  obligations 
to  God. 

6.  And  hence  we  see  that  two  things  are  necessary,  in 
I      order  to  constitute  any  being  a  moral  agent.     They  are, 

first,  that  he  possess  an  intellectual  power,  by  which  he  can 
understand  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  the  beings  by 
whom  he  is  surrounded  ;  secondly,  that  he  possess  a  moral 
power,  by  which  the  feeling  of  obligation  is  suggested  to 
him,  as  soon  as  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  is  under- 
stood. This  is  sufficient  to  render  him  a  moral  agent.  He 
is  accountable,  just  in  proportion  to  the  opportunity  which 
he  has  enjoyed,  for  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  the  relations 
in  which  he  stands,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  hi?  obliga- 
tions are  to  be  discharged. 


CHAPTER   SECOND. 

CONSCIENCE,  OR    THE   MORAL  SENSE. 
SECTION    1. 

IS   THERE  A  CONSCIENCE  ? 

BY  conscience,  or  the  moral  sense,  is  meant,  that  faculty 
by  which  we  discern  the  moral  quality  of  actions,  and  by 
which  we  are  capable  of  certain  affections  in  respect  to  this 
quality. 

By  faculty,  is  meant  any  particular  part  of  our  constitu- 
tion, by  which  we  become  affected  by  the  various  qualities 
and  relations  of  beings  around  us.  Thus,  by  taste,  we  are 
conscious  of  the  existence  of  beauty  and  f  deformity ;  by 
perception,  we  acquire  a  knowledge  of  the  existence  and 
qualities  of  the  material  world.  And,  in  general,  if  we 
discern  any  quality  in  the  universe,  or  produce  or  suffer  any 
change,  it  seems  almost  a  truism  to  say,  that  we  have  a 
faculty,  or  power,  for  so  doing.  A  man  who  sees,  must 
have  eyes,  or  the  faculty  for  seeing ;  and  if  he  have  not 
eyes,  this  is  considered  a  sufficient  reason  why  he  should 
not  see.  And  thus,  it  is  universally  admitted,  that  there 
may  be  a  thousand  qualities  in  nature,  of  which  we  have 
no  knowledge,  for  the  simple  reason,  that  we  have  not  been 
created  with  the  faculties  for  discerning  them.  There  is  a 
world  without  us,  and  a  world  within  us,  which  exactly 
correspond  to  each  other.  Unless  both  exist,  we  can  never 
be  conscious  of  the  existence  of  either. 

Now,  that  we  do  actually  observe  a  moral  quality  in  the 

actions  of  men,  must,  I  think,  be  admitted.     Every  human 

being  is  conscious,  that,  from  childhood,  he  has  observed  it. 

We  do  not  say,  that  all  men   discern   this    quality  w*th 

5 


i 


GO  IS    THERE    A    CONSCIENCE  ? 

equal  accuracy,  any  more  than  that  they  all  see  with  equal 
distinctness  :  but  we  say,  that  all  men  perceive  it  in  some 
actions  ;  and  that  there  is  a  multitude  of  cases  in  which 
their  perceptions  of  it  will  be  found  universally  to  agree. 
And,  moreover,  this  quality,  and  the  feeling  which  accom- 
panies the  perception  of  it,  are  unlike  those  derived  from 
every  other  faculty.  r 

The  question  would  then  seem  reduced  to  this.  Do  we 
perceive  this  quality  of  actions  by  a  single  faculty,  or  by  a 
combination  of  faculties  ?J  I  think  it  must  be  evident,  from 
what  has  been  already  stated,  thatHhis  notion  is,  in  its 
nature,  simple  and  ultimate,  and  distinct  from  every  other 
notion.  Now,  if  this  be  the  case,  it  seems  self-evident,  that 
we  must  have  a  distinct  and  separate  faculty,  to  make  us 
acquainted  with  the  existence  of  this  distinct  and  separate 
quality,  j  This  is  the  case  in  respect  to  all  other  distinct 
qualities  :  it  is,  surely,  reasonable  to  suppose,  that  it  would 
be  the  case  with  this,  unless  some  reason  can  be  shown  to 
the  contrary. 

But,  after  all,  this  question  is,  to  the  moral  philosopher, 
of  but  comparatively  little  importance.  All  that  is  necessa- 
ry to  his  investigations  is,  that  it  be  admitted  that  there  is 
such  a  quality,  and  that  men  are  so  constituted  as  to  per- 
ceive it,  and  to  be  susceptible  of  certain  affections,  in  con- 
sequence of  that  perception.  Whether  these  facts  are 
accounted  for,  on  the  supposition  of  the  existence  of  a 
,  single  faculty,  or  of  a  combination  of  faculties,  will  not 
^affect  the  question  of  moral  obligation.  All  that  is  neces- 
sary to  the  prosecution  of  the  science  is,  that  it  be  admitted 
that  there  is  such  a  quality  in  actions,  and  that  man  is 
endowed  with  a  constitution  capable  of  bringing  him  into 
relation  to  it. 

It  may,  however,  be  worth  while  to  consider  some  of  the 
objections  which  have  been  urged  against  the  supposition 
of  the  existence  of  such  a  faculty. 

I.  It  has  been  said,  if  such  a  faculty  has  been  bestowed, 
it  must  have  been  bestowed  universally  :  but  it  is  not  be- 
stowed universally  ;  for,  [what  some  nations  consider*  right, 
other  nations  consider  wrong,,  as  infanticide,  parricide, 
duellin 


, 


IS    THERE    A    CONSCIENCE  ?  51 

1.  To  this  it  may  be  answered,  first,  the  objection  seems    ^ 
to  admit  the  universality  of  the  existence  of  conscience,    .   . 
or  the  power  of  discerning  in  certain  actions  a  moral  quality. 

It  admits  that,  every  where  ,V  men  make  this  distinction ;] 
but  affirms,  that,  in  different  countries,  they  refer  the  quality 
to  different  actions.  Now,  hoiv  this  difference  is  to  be 
accounted  for,  may  be  a  question  ;  but  the  fact,  as  stated 
in  the  objection,  shows  the  universality  of  the  power  of 
observing  such  a  quality  in  actions. 

2.  But,   secondly,  we   have  said  that  we  discover  the 
moral  quality  of  actions  in  the  intention.     Now,  it  is  not  the 
fact,  that  this  difference  exists,  as  stated  in  the  objection,  if 
the  intention  of  actions  be  considered.     Where  was  it  not 
considered    right    to    intend   the    happiness    of    parents  ? 
Where  was  it  not  considered  wrong  to  intend  their  misery  ? 
Where  was  it  ever  considered  right  to  intend  to  requite 
kindness    by  injury  ?    and  where  was   it  ever  considered 
wrong  to  intend  to  requite  kindness  with  still  greater  kind- 
ness ?     In  regard  to  the  manner  in  which  these  intentions! 
may  be  fulfilled,  there  may  be  a  difference ;  but  as  to  the    ^ 
moral  quality  of  these  intentions  themselves,  as  well  as  of 
many  others,  there  is  a  very  universal  agreement  among  men.j 

3.  And  still  more,  it  will  be  seen,  on  examination,  that, 
Tin  these  very  cases,  in  which  wrong  actions  are   practised, 

they  are  justified  on  the  ground  of  a  good  intention!  or  of  (V 
some  view  of  the  relations  between  the  parties,  wTTich,  if 
true,  would  render  them  innocent.  Thus,  if  infanticide  be 
justified,  it  is  on  the  ground,  that  this  world  is  a  place  of 
misery,  and  that  the  infant  is  better  off  not  to  encounter  its 
troubles ;  that  is,  that  the  parent  wishes  or  intends  well  to 
the  child :  or  else  it  is  defended  on  the  ground,  that  the  re- 
lation between  parent  and  child  is  such  as  to  confer  on  the 
one  the  right  of  life  and  death  over  the  other;  and,  there- 
fore, that  to  take  its  life  is  as  innocent  as  the  slaying  of  a 
brute,  or  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable.  Thus,  also,  are 
parricide,  and  revenge,  and  various  other  wrong  actions, 
defended.  Where  can  the  race  of  men  be  found,  be  they 
ever  so  savage,  who  need  to  be  told  that  ingratitude  is 
wrong,  that  parents  ought  to  love  their  children,  or  that 


52  IS    THERE    A    CONSCIENCE? 

men  ought  to  be  submissive  and  obedient  to  the  Supreme 
Divinity  ? 

4.  And  still  more,  I  think  one  of  the  strongest  exemplifi- 
cations of  the  universality  of  moral  distinctions,  is  found  in 
the  character  of  many  of  the  ancient  heathen.  They  per- 
ceived these  distinctions,  and  felt  and  obeyed  the  impulses 
of  conscience,  even  though  at  variance  with  all  the  ex- 
amples of  the  deities  whom  they  worshipped.  Thus,  says 
Rousseau,  "  Cast  your  eyes  over  all  the  nations  of  the 
world,  and  all  the  histories  of  nations.  Amid  so  many 
inhuman  and  absurd  superstitions,  amid  that  prodigious 
diversity  of  manners  and  characters,  you  will  find  every 
where  the  same  principles  and  distinctions  of  moral  good 
and  evil.  The  paganism  of  the  ancient  world  produced, 
indeed,  abominable  gods,  who,  on  earth,  would  have  been 
shunned  or  punished  as  monsters ;  and  who  offered,  as  a 
picture  of  supreme  happiness,  only  crimes  to  commit,  or  pas- 
sions to  satiate.  But  Vice,  armed  with  this  sacred  authority, 
descended  in  vain  from  the  eternal  abode.  She  found  in 
the  heart  of  man,  a  moral  instinct  to  repel  her.  The  con- 
tinence of  Xenocrates  was  admired  by  those  who  cele- 
brated the  debaucheries  of  Jupiter.  The  chaste  Lucretia 
adored  the  unchaste  Venus.  The  most  intrepid  Roman 
sacrificed  to  fear.  He  invoked  the  god  who  dethroned  his 
father,  and  died  without  a  murmur  by  the  hand  of  his  own. 
The  most  contemptible  divinities  were  served  by  the  great- 
est men.  The  holy  voice  of  nature,  stronger  than  that  of 
the  gods,  made  itself  heard,  and  respected,  and  obeyed  on 
earth,  and  seemed  to  banish  to  the  confines  of  heaven,  guilt 
and  the  guilty."  Quoted  by  Dr.  Brown,  Lecture  75. 

II.  Again,  the  objection  has  been  made  in  another  form. 
It  is  said,  that  savages  violate,  without  remorse  or  compunc- 
tion, the  plainest  principles  of  right.  Such  is  the  case, 
when  they  are  guilty  of  revenge  and  licentiousness. 

This  objection  has  been  partly  considered  before.  It 
may,  however,  be  added, 

First.  '  No  men,  nor  any  class  of  men,  violate  every  moral 
precept  without  compunction,  without  the  feeling  of  guilt, 
and  the  consciousness  of  desert  of  puiiishmemy 


THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  53 

Secondly.  Hence  the  objection  will  rather  prove  the 
existence  of  a  defective  or  imperfect  conscience,  than  that 
no  such  faculty  exists.  The  same  objection  would  prove 
us  destitute  of  taste  or  of  understanding ;  because  these 
faculties  exist,  only  in  an  imperfect  state,  among  savagesj 
and  uncultivated  men. 

III.  It  has  been  objected,  again,  that,  if  we  suppose  this 
faculty  to  exist,  it  is,  after  all,  useless  ;  for  if  a  man  please 
to  violate  it,  and  to  suffer  the  pain,  then  this  is  the  end  of 
the  question,  and,  as  Dr.  Paley  says,  "the  moral  instinct 
man  has  nothing  more  to  offer." 

To  this  it  may  be  answered : 

The  objection  proceeds  upon  a  mistake  respecting  the 
function  of  conscience.  Its  use  is,  to  teach  us  to  discern 
our  moral  obligations,  and  to  impel  us  towards  the  corre- 
sponding action.  It  is  not  pretended,  by  the  believers  in  a 
moral  sense,  that  man  may  not,  after  all,  do  as  he  chooses. 
All  that  they  contend  for  is,  that  he  is  constituted  with 
such  a  faculty,  and  that  the  possession  of  it  is  necessary  to 
his  moral  accountability.  It  is  in  his  power  to  obey  it  or 
to  disobey  it,  just  as  he  pleases.  I  The  fact  that  a  man  may 
obey  or  disobey  conscience,  no  more  proves  that  it  does 
not  exist,  than  the  fact  that  he  sometimes  does,  and  some- 
times does  not  obey,  passion,  proves  that  he  is  destitute  of^ 
passion. 


SECTION    II. 


OP    THE    MANNER    IN    WHICH    THE    DECISION  OF    CONSCIENCE  IS 
EXPRESSED. 

Whoever  will  attentively  observe  the  operations  of  his 
own  mind,  when  deciding  upon  a  moral  question,  and  when 
carrying  that  decision  into  effect,  will,  I  think,  be  conscious 
of  several  distinct  forms  of  moral  feeling.  These  I  sup- 
pose to  be 'flie  following  : 

1.  Suppose   we  are  deliberating,  respecting  an  action,  j 
before  performing  it. 
5* 


54  THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE 

,-        l\t  ,    *%f  ~( 

1.  Tf  we  pause,  and  candidly  consider  the  nature  of  an 
action,  whicn  involves,  in  any  respect,  our  relations  with 
others ;  amidst  the  various  qualities  which  characterize  the 
action,  we  shall  not  fail  to  perceive  its  moral  quality.     We 
may  perceive  it  to  be  gratifying  or  self-denying,  courteous 
or  uncivil,  in  favor  of,  or  against,  our  interest ;  but,  distinct 
from  all  these,  and  differing  from  them  alr^"we  may  always 

^     perceive,  that  it  seems  to  us  to  be  either  right  or  wrong._J 

Let  a  man  recollect  any  of  the  cases  in  his  own  history,  in 
>v"\  which  he  has   been  called  upon  to    act  under   important 

**  responsibility,  and  he  will  easily  remember,  both  the  fact, 
and  the  pain  and  distress  produced  by  the  conflict  of  these 
opposite  impulsions.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  remark, 
that  we  easily,  or,  at  least,  with  much  greater  ease,  perceive 
this  quality  in  the  actions  of  others.  We  discern  the  mote 
in  our  brother's  eye  much  sooner  than  the  beam  in  our 
own  eye. 

2.  Besides  this   discriminating  power,  I  think  we  may 
readily  observe^  a  distinct  impulse  to  do  that  which  we  con- 
ceive to  be  right,  and  to  leave  undone  that  which  we  con- 
ceive to  be  wrong.     This  impulse  we  express  by  the  words 
ought,  and  ought  notJ    Thus,  we  say  it  is  right  to  tell  the 
truth  ;  and  I  ought  to  tell  it.     It  is  wrong  to  tell  a  lie  ; 
and  J  ought  not  to  tell  it.     Ought,  and  ought  not,  seem  to 
convey  the  abstract  idea  of  right  and  wrong,  together  with 
the  other  notion  of  impulsion  to  do,  or  not  to  do,  a  partic- 
ular action.     Thus,  we  use  it  always  to  designate  a  motive 
to  action,  as  we  do  passion,  or  self-love,  or  any  other  motive 
power.     If  we  are  asked,  why  we  performed  any  action, 
we  reply,  we  acted  thus,  because  it  gratified  our  desires,  or 
because  it  was  for  our  interest,  upon  the  whole,  or  because 
we  felt  that  we  ought  to  act  thus.     Either  of  them  is  con- 
sidered sufficient  to  account  for  the  fact ;  that  is,  either  of 
them  explains  the  motive  or  impulse,  in  obedience  to  which 
we  acted,  rit  is,  also,  manifest,  that  we  use  the  term,  not 
merely  to  designate  an  impulse,  but,  also,  an  obligation  to 
act  in  conformity  with  itj   Thus  we  say.  we  ought  to  do 
a  thing,  meaning  that  we  are  not  only  impelled  towards  the 
action,  but  that  we  are  under  an  imperative  obligation  to 
act  thus.     This  is  still  more  distinctly  seen,,  when  we  speak 


THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  55 

of  another.  When  we  say  of  a  friend,  that  he  ought  to 
do  any  thing,  as  we  cannot  judge  of  the  impulses  which 
move  him,  we  refer,  principally,  to  this  conviction  of  obli- 
gation, which,  above  every  other,  should  govern  Jiim. 

The   power  of  this  impulse  of  conscience  is  most  dis-~| 
tinctly  seen,  when  it  comes  into  collision  with  the  impulse 
of  strong  and  vehement  passion.     It  is  then,  that  the  hu- 
man  soul  is  agitated  to  the  full  extent  of  its  capacity  for 
emotion.     And  this  contest  generally  continues,  specially    J 
if  we  have  decided  in  opposition  to  conscience,  until  the 
action   is  commenced.     The   voice  of  conscience  is  then 
lost  amid  the  whirlwind  of  passion ;  and  it  is  not  heard 
until  after  the  deed  is  done.     It  is  on  this  account,  that  this 
state  of  mind  is  frequently  selected  by  the   poets,   as    a 
subject  for  delineation.     Shakspeare  frequently  alludes  to  I 
all  these  offices  of  conscience,  with  the  happiest  effect. 

The  constant  monitory  power  of  conscience  is  thus  illus- 
trated, by  one  of  the  murderers  about  to  assassinate  the 
Duke  of  Clarence  :  "  I'll  not  meddle  with  it  (conscience)  ; 
it  is  a  dangerous  thing  ;  it  makes  a  man  a  coward  ;  a  man 
cannot  steal,  but  it  accuseth  him ;  a  man  cannot  swear, 
but  it  checks  him.  'Tis  a  blushing,  shamefaced  spirit, 
that  mutinies  in  a  man's  bosom :  it  fills  one  full  of  ob- 
stacles. It  made  me  once  restore  a  purse  of  gold,  that, 
by  chance,  I  found.  It  beggars  any  man  that  keeps  it." 
Richard  III,  Act  i,  Sc.  4.  The  whole  scene  is  a  striking 
exemplification  of  the  workings  of  conscience,  even  in  the 
bosoms  of  the  most  abandoned  of  men.  The  wicked 
Clarence  appeals  to  the  consciences  of  his  murderers  ;  and 
they  strengthen  themselves  against  his  appeals,  by  referring 
to  his  own  atrocities,  and  thus  awakening  in  their  own 
bosoms  the  conviction  that  he  ought  to  die. 

The  state  of  mind  of  a  man  meditating  a  wicked  act, 
and  the  temporary  victory  of  conscience,  are  seen  in  the 
following  extract  from  Macbeth.  He  recalls  the  relations 
in  which  Duncan  stood  to  him,  and  these  produce  so  strong 
a  conviction  of  the  wickedness  of  the  .murder,  that  he 
decides  not  to  commit  it. 

"  If  the  assassination 
Could  trammel  up  the  consequence,  and  catch, 


56  THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

With  his  surcease,  success  ;  that  but  this  blow 
Might  be  the  be-all  and  the  end-all  here, 
But  here,  upon  this  bank  and  shoal  of  time, — 
We  'd  jump  the  life  to  come. — But,  in  these  cases, 
We  still  have  judgment  here ;  that  we  but  teach 
Bloody  instructions,  which,  being  taught,  return 
To  plague  the  inventor.     This  even-handed  justice 
Commends  the  ingredients  of  our  poisoned  chalice 
To  our  own  lips.     He's  here  in  double  trust: 
First,  as  I  am  his  kinsman  and  his  subject, 
Strong  bot/t  against  the  deed;  then,  as  his  host, 
Who  should  against  his  murderer  shut  the  door, 
Not  bear  the  knife  myself.     Besides,  this  Duncan 
Hath  borne  his  faculties  so  meek,  hath  been 
So  clear  in  his  great  office,  that  his  virtues 
Will  plead  like  angels,  trumpet-tongued,  against 
The  deep  damnation  of  his  taking  off. 

*  *  *  *  *  * 

I  have  no  spur 

To  prick  the  sides  of  my  intent,  but  only 
Vaulting  ambition,  which  o'erleaps  itself." 

Macbeth,  Act  i,  Sc.  7. 

The  anguish  which  attends  upon  an  action  not  yet  com- 
menced, but  only  resolved  upon,  while  we  still  doubt  of 
its  lawfulness,  is  finely  illustrated  by  the  same  author,  in 
the  case  of  Brutus,  who,  though  a  man  of  great  fortitude, 
was,  by  the  anguish  of  contending  emotions,  deprived  of 
sleep,  and  so  changed  in  behavior,  as  to  give  his  wife 
reason  to  suspect  the  cause  of  his  disquietude : 

"  Since  Cassius  first  did  whet  me  against  Caesar, 
I  have  not  slept. 

Between  the  acting  of  a  dreadful  thing 
And  the  first  motion,  all  the  interim  is 
Like  a  phantasma,  or  a  hideous  dream : 
The  genius,  and  the  mortal  instruments, 
Are  then  in  council;  and  the  state  of  man, 
Like  to  a  little  kingdom,  suffers  then 
The  nature  of  an  insurrection." 

J,  Casar,  Act  ii,  Sc.  1. 

The  same  contest  between  conscience  and  the  lower 
propensities,  is,  as  I  suppose,  graphically  described  by  the 
Apostle  Paul,  in  the  seventh  chapter  of  his  Epistle  to  the 
Romans. 

II.  Suppose  now  an  action  ^.to._.be_done,  I  think  that 
every  one  who  examinesTTnT~own  heart  will  be  conscious 
of  another  class  of  feelings  consequent  on  those  to  which 
we  have  just  alluded. 


THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  57 

1.  If  he  have  obeyed   the  impulses  of  conscience,  and  ' 
resisted   successfully  the  impulses  at  variance  with  it,  he  - 
will  be  conscious  of  a  feeling  of  innocence,  of  self-appro- 
bation, of  desert  of  reward.     If  the  action  have  been  done 
by  anotlieiyhe  will  fee,l  towards  him  a  sentiment  of  respect, 
of  moral  approbation, -and  a  desire  to  see  him  rewarded,] 
and,  on  many  occasions,  to  reward  him  himself. 

2.  If  he  have  disobeyed  the  impulses  of  conscience,  he 
will  be  conscious  of  guilt,  of  self-abasement,  and  self-disap- 
probation or  remorse,  and  of  desert  of  punishment.     If  it 
have  been  done  by  another,  he  will  be  conscious  of  a  sen- 
timent of  moral  rSsapprobation,\and  of  a  desire  that  the 
offender  should  be"  punished,  and;  in  many  cases,  of  a  desire) 
to  punish  him  himself.     Of  course,  I  do  not  say  that  all 
these   feelings   can    be    traced,   by  reflection    upon    every 
action ;  but  I  think  that,   in   all  cases  in  which  our  moral 
sensibilities  are  at  all  aroused,  we  can  trace  some,  and  fre 
quently  all  of  them. 

In  accordance  with  these  remarks,  several  facts  may  be 
noticed. 

The  boldness  of  innocence,  and  the  timidity  of  guilt,  so? 
often  observed  by  moralists  and  poets,  may  be  thus  easily 
accounted  for.  The  virtuous  man  is  conscious  of  deserving 
nothing  but  reward.  Whom,  then,  should  he  fear?  The 
guilty  man  is  conscious  of  desert  of  punishment,  and  is 
aware  that  every  one  who  knows  of  his  offence  desires  to 
punish  him  ;  and  as  he  never  is  certain  but  that  every  one 
knows  it,  whom  can  he  trust?  And,  still  more,  there  is, 
with  the  feeling  of  desert  of  punishment,  a  disposition  to 
submit  to  punishment  arising  from  our  own  self-disapproba- 
tion and  remorse.  This  depresses  the  spirit,  and  humbles 
the  courage  of  the  offender,  far  more  than  even  the  externalj 
circumstances  by  which  he  is  surrounded. 

Thus,  says  Solomon,  "  the  wicked  flee  when  no   man 
pursueth ;  but  the  righteous  is  bold  as  a  lion." 

"  What  stronger  breastplate  than  a  heart  untainted  i 
Thrice  is  he  armed,  who  hath  his  quarrel  just; 
And  he  but  naked,  though  luck'dup  in  steel, 
Whose  conscience  with  injus  ice  is  corrupted." 

2d  Part  Henry  VI,  Act  iii,  Sc.  2 


6. 


58  THE    DECISION    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

"  Suspicion  always  haunts  the  guilty  mind; 
The  thief  doth  fear  each  bush  an  officer." 

2d  Part  Henry  VI,  Act  v,  Sc 

"  I  feel  within  me 

A  peace,  above  all  earthly  dignities,  — 
A  still  and  quiet  conscience." 

Henry  VIII,  Act  iii,  Sc.  2. 

The  effect  of  guilt  : 

"  No  wonder  why 
I  felt  rebuked  beneath  his  eye  ; 
I  might  have  known,  there  \vas  but  one, 
Whose  look  could  quell  Lord  Marmion." 

Marmion,  Cant,  vi,  17. 

"  Curse  on  yon  base  marauder's  lance, 
And  doubly  curs'd  my  failing  brand  ! 
A  sinful  heart  makes  feeble  hand." 

Marmion,  Cant,  vi,  St.  32. 

It  is  in  consequence  of  the  same  facts,  that  crime  is,  with 
so  great  certainty,  detected. 

A  man,  before  the  commission  of  crime,  can  foresee  no 
reason  why  he  might  not  commit  it,  with  the  certainty  of 
escaping  detection.  He  can  perceive  no  reason  why  he 
should  be  even  suspected  ;  and  can  imagine  a  thousand 
methods,  in  which  suspicion,  awakened,  might  with  perfect 
ease  be  allayed^  But,  as  soon  as  he  becomes  guilty,  his 
relations  to  his  fellow-men  are  entirely  changed.  He  be- 
comes suspicious  of  every  one,  and  thus  sees  every  occur- 
rence through  a  false  medium.  Hence,  he  cannot  act  like 
an  innocent  man  ;  and  this  very  difference  in  his  conduct, 
is  very  often  the  sure  means  of  his  detection./  When  to 
this  effect,  produced  upon  the  mind  by  guilt,  is  added  the 
fact,  that  every  action  must,  by  the  condition  of  our  being, 
be  attended  by  antecedents  and  consequents  beyond  our 
control,  all  of  which  lead  directly  to  the  discovery  of  the 
truth,  it  is  not  wonderful,  that  the  guilty  so  rarely  escape. 
Hence  it  has  grown  into  a  proverb,  "  murder  will  out  ;  " 
and  such  we  generally  find  to  be  the  fact. 

This  effect  of  guilt  upon  human  action  has  been  fre- 
quently remarked. 

Thus,  Macbeth,  after  the  murder  of  Duncan  : 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  59 

"  Hc\v  is  it  with  me  when  every  noise  appals  me  ?  " 

Act  ii,  Sc.  2 

"  Guiltiness  will  speak,  though  tongues  were  out  of  use." 

The  same  fact  is  frequently  asserted  in  the  sacred  Scrip- 
tures. Thus,  "  The  Lord  is  known  by  the  judgment  that 
he  executeth ;  the  wicked  is  snared  in  the  work  of  his  own 
hands." 

"  Though  hand  join  in  hand,  the  wicked  shall  not  go 
unpunished." 

I  hope  that  I  need  not  apologize  for  introducing  into 
such  a  discussion  so  many  illustrations  from  poetry.  They 
are  allowed,  on  all  hands,  to  be  accurate  delineations  of  the 
workings  of  the  human  mind,  and  to  have  been  made  by 
most  accurate  observers.  They  were  made,  also,  without 
the  possibility  of  bias  from  any  theory ;  and  therefore  are 
of  great  value,  when  they  serve  to  confirm  any  theoretical 
views,  with  which  they  may  chance  to  coincide.  They 
show,  at  least,  in  what  light  poets,  whose  only  object  is  -to 
observe  the  human  heart,  have  considered  conscience,  and 
what  they  have  supposed  to  be  its  functions,  and  its  mode 
of  operation. 


SECTION    III. 

THE  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

We  have,  thus  far,  endeavored  to  show,  that  there  is  in 
man  a  faculty  denominated  Conscience ;  and  that  it  is  not 
merely  a  discriminating,  but  also  an  impulsive  faculty 
The  next  question  to  be  considered  is,  what  is  the  authority 
of  this  impulse. 

The  object  of  the  present  section  is,  to  show  that  this 
is  the  most  authoritative  impulse  of  which  wejind  ourselves 
susceptible. 

The  supremacy  of  Conscience  may  be  illustrated  in 
various  ways. 


60  THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CO 

I.  It  is  involved  in  the  very  conception  which  men  form 
of  this  faculty. 

The  various  impulses,  of  which  we  find  ourselves  suscep- 
tible, can  differ  only  in  two  respects,  that  of  strength  and 
that  of_jgM///.or/ty. 

When  we  believe  them  to  differ  in  nothing  but  strength, 
we  feel  ourselves  perfectly  at  liberty  to  obey  the  strong- 
est. Thus,  if  different  kinds  of  food  be  set  before  us, 
all  equally  healthy,  we  feel  entirely  at  liberty  to  partake 
of  that  which  we  prefer ;  that  is,  of  that  to  which  we  are 
most  strongly  impelled.  If  a  man  is  to  decide  between 
making  a  journey  by  land,  or  by  water,  he  considers  it  a 
sufficient  motive  for  choice,  that  the  one  mode  of  travel- 
ling is  more  pleasant  to  him  than  the  other.  But  when 
our  impulses  differ  in  authority,  we^ieel^obliged  to  neglect 
the  difference  in  strength  of  impulse,  and  to  obey  that,  be 
it  ever  so  weak,  which  is  of  the"higher^  authority.  Thus, 
suppose  our  desire  for  any  particular  kind  of  food  to  be 
ever  so  strong,  and  we  know  that  it  would  injure  our 
health ;  self-love  would  admonish  us  to  leave  it  alone. 
Now,  self-love  being  a  more  authoritative  impulse  than 
passion,  we  should  feel  an  obligation  to  obey  it,  be  its 
admonition  ever  so  weak,  and  the  impulse  of  appetite  ever 
so  vehement.  If  we  yield  to  the  impulse  of  appetite,  be  it 
ever  so  strong,  in  opposition  to  that  of  self-love,  be  it  ever 
so  weak,  we  feel  a  consciousness  of  self-degradation,  and  of 
acting  unworthily  of  our  nature ;  and,  if  we  see  another 
person  acting  in  this  manner,  we  cannot  avoid  feeling 
towards  him  a  sentiment  of  contempt.  "  'Tis  not  in  folly 
not  to  scorn  a  fool."  And,  in  general,  whenever  we  act 
in  obedience  to  a  lower,  and  in  opposition  to  a  higher  sen- 
timent, we  feel  this  consciousness  of  degradation,  which  we 
do  not  feel  when  the  impulses  differ  only  in  degree.  And, 
conversely,  whenever  we  feel  this  consciousness  of  degrada- 
tion, for  acting  in  obedience  to  one  instead  of  to  another, 
we  may  know  that  we  have  violated  that  which  is  of  the 
higher  authority. 

If,  now,  we  reflect  upon  our  feelings  consequent  upon 
any  moral  action,  I  think  we  shall  find,  that  we  always  are 
conscious  of  a  sentiment  of  self-degradation,  whenever  we 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  Gl 

disobey  the  monition  of  conscience,  be  that  monition  ever 
so  weak,  to  gratify  the  impulse  of  appetite,  or  passion,  or 
self-love,  be  that  impulse  ever  so  strong.  Do  we  consider 
it  any  palliation  of  the  guilt  of  murder,  for  the  criminal  to 
declare,  that  his  vindictive  feelings  impelled  him  much  more 
strongly  than  his  conscience  ?  whereas,  if  we  perceived  in 
these  impulses  no  other  difference  than  that  of  strength,  we 
should  ^consider  this  not  merely  an  excuse,  but  a  justifica- 
tion. (And  that  the  impulse  of  conscience  is  of  thenhighest*' 
authority,  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that  we  cannot  conceive 
of  any  circumstances,  in  which  we  should  not  feel  guilty 
and  degraded,  from  acting  in  obedience  to  any  impulse 
whatever,  in  opposition  to  the  impulse  of  conscience^  And 
thus,  we  cannot  conceive  of  any  more  exalted  "cnaracter, 
than  that  of  him,  who,  on  all  occasions,  yields  himself  up 
implicitly  to  the  impulses  of  conscience,  all  things  else 
to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.  I  think  no  higher  evi- 
dence can  be  produced,  to  show  that  we  do  really  consider 
the  impulse  of  conscience  of  higher  authority  than  any 
other  of  which  we  are  susceptible. 

— H.  The  same  truth  may,  I  think,  be  rendered  evident, 
by  observing  the  feelings  which  arise  within  us,  when  we 
compare  the  actions  of  men  with  those  of  beings  of  an 
inferior  order. 

Suppose  a  brute  to  act  from  appetite,  and  injure  itself  by 
gluttony  ;  or  from  passion,  and  injure  another  brute  from 
anger:  we  feel  nothing  like  moral  disapprobation.  We 
pity  it,  and  strive  to  put  it  out  of  its  power  to  act  thus  in 
future.  We  never  feel  that  a  brute  is  disgraced  or  degraded 
by  such  an  action.  But  suppose  a  man  to  act  thus,  and 
we  cannot  avoid  a  feeling  of  disapprobation  and  of  disgust ; 
a  conviction  that  the  man  has  done  violence  to  his  nature. 
Thus,  to  call  a  man  a  brute,  a  sensualist,  a  glutton,  is  to 
speak  of  him  in  the  most  insulting  manner :  it  is  to  say, 
in  the  strongest  terms,  that  he  has  acted  unworthily  of  him- 
self, and  of  the  nature  with  which  his  Creator  has  endowed 
him. 

Again.     Let  a  brute  act  from  deliberate  selfishness ;  that 
is,  with  deliberate  caution  seek  its  own  happiness  upon  t  he 
whole,  unmindful  of  the  impulsions  of  present  appetite,  but 
6 


62  THE    AUTHORITY    OF     CONSCIENCE. 

yet  wholly  regardless  of  the  happiness  of  any  other  of  its 
species.  In  no  case  do  we  feel  disgust  at  such  a  course  of 
action;  and  in  many  cases,  we,  on  the  contrary,  rather 
regard  it  with  favor.  We  thus  speak  of  the  cunning  of 
animals  in  taking  their  prey,  in  escaping  danger,  and  in 
securing  for  themselves  all  the  amount  of  gratification  that 
may  be  in  their  power.  We  are  sensible,  in  these  cases, 
that  the  animal  has  acted  from  the  highest  impulses  of 
which  the  Creator  has  made  it  susceptible.  But  let  a  man 
act  thus.  Let  him,  careful  merely  of  his  own  happiness 
upon  the  whole,  be  careful  for  nothing  else,  and  be  perfectly 
willing  to  sacrifice  the  happiness  of  others,  to  any  amount 
whatsoever,  to  promote  his  own,  to  the  least  amount  soever. 
Such  has  been,  frequently,  the  character  of  sensual  and 
unfeeling  tyrants.  We  are  conscious,  in  such  a  case,  of  a 
sentiment  of  disgust  and  deep  disapprobation.  We  feel 
that  the  man  has  not  acted  in  obedience  to  the  highest 
impulses  of  which  he  was  susceptible ;  and  poets,  and 
satirists,  and  historians,  unite  in  holding  him  up  to  the  world, 
as  an  object  of  universal  detestation  and  abhorrence. 

Again.  Let  another  man,  disregarding  the  impulses  01 
passion,  and  appetite,  and  self-love,  act,  under  all  circum- 
stances, in  obedience  to  the  monitions  of  conscience,  un- 
moved and  unallured  by  pleasure,  and  unawed  by  power ; 
and  we  instinctively  feel  that  he  has  attained  to  the  highest 
eminence  to  which  our  nature  can  aspire  ;  and  that  he  has 
acted  from  the  highest  impulse  of  which  his  nature  is  sus- 
ceptible. We  are  conscious  of  a  conviction  of  his  superi- 
ority, which  nothing  can  outweigh ;  of  a  feeling  of  venera- 
tion, allied  to  the  reverence  which  is  due  to  the  Supreme 
Being.  And  with  this  homage  to  virtue,  all  history  is 
filled.  The  judge  may  condemn  the  innocent,  but  posterity 
will  condemn  the  judge.  The  tyrant  may  murder  the 
martyr,  but  after  ages  will  venerate  the  martyr,  and  exe- 
crate the  tyrant.  And  if  we  will  look  over  the  names  of 
those,  on  whom  all  past  time  has  united  in  conferring  the 
tribute  of  praise-worthiness,  we  shall  find  them  to  be  the 
names  of  those  who,  although  they  might  differ  in  other 
respects,  yet  were  similar  in  this,  that  they  shone  resplendent 
in  the  lustre  of  unsullied  virtue. 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  03 

'Now,  as  our  Creator  has  constituted  us  such  as  we  are, 
and  as,  by  our  very  constitution,  we  do  thus  consider  con- 
science to  be  the  most  authoritative  impulse  of  our  nature,  -7 
it  must  be  the  most  authoritative,  unless  we  believe  that  He 
has  deceived  us,  or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  that  He  has 
so  formed  us,  as  to  give  credit  to  a  lie. 

III.  The  supremacy  of  conscience  may  be  also  illustra- 
ted, by  showing  the  necessity  of  this  supremacy,  to  the 
accomplishment  of  the  objects  for  which  man  was  created. 

When  we  consider  any  work  of  art,  as  a  system  com- 
posed of  parts,  and  arranged  for  the  accomplishment  of  a- 
given  object,  there  are  three  several  views  which  we  may 
have  of  it,  and  all  of  them  necessary  to  a  complete  and 
perfect  knowledge  of  the  thing. 

1.  We  mustjiave  a  knowledge  of  the  several  .parts  of 
which  it  is  composed.     Thus,  he  who  would  understand  a 
watch,  must  know  the  various  wheels  and  springs  which 
enter  into  the  formation  of  the  instrument.     But  this  alone, 
as,  for  instance,  if  they  were  spread  separately  before  him, 
upon  a  table,  would  give  him  a  very  imperfect  conception 
of  a  watch. 

2.  He  must,  therefore,  understand  how  these  parts  are 
put  together.     This  will  greatly  increase  his  knowledge  ; 
but  it  will  still  be  imperfect,  for  he  may  yet  be  ignorant  of 
thc_rclations  which  the  parts  sustain  to  each  other.     A 
man  might  look  at  a  steam-engine  until  he  was  familiarly 
acquainted  with  its  whole  machinery,  and  yet  not  know 
whether  the  paddles  were  designed  to  move  the  piston-rod, 
or  the  piston-rod  to  move  the  paddles. 

3.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  he  should  have  a  con- 
ception of  the  relation  .,which  the  several  parts  sustain  to 
each  other;  that  is,  of  the  effect  which  every  part  was 
designed  to  produce  upon  every  other  part.     When  he  has 
arrived  at  this  idea,  and  has  combined   it  with  the  other 
ideas  just  mentioned,  then,  and  not  till  then,  is  his  knowl- 
edge of  the  instrument  complete. 

It  is  manifest,  that  this  last  notion,  that  of  the  relations 
which  the  parts  sustain  to  each  other,  is,  frequently,  of 
more  importance  than  either  of  the  others.  He  who  has 
a  conception  of  the  cause  of  motion  in  a  steam-engine,  and 


64  THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

of  the  manner  in  which  the  ends  are  accomplished,  has  a 
more  valuable  notion  of  the  instrument,  than  he  who  has 
ever  so  accurate  a  knowledge  of  the  several  parts,  without 
a  conception  of  the  relation.  Thus,  in  the  history  of 
astronomy,  the  existence  of  the  several  parts  of  the  solar 
system  was  known  for  ages,  without  being  productive  of 
any  valuable  result.  The  progress  of  astronomy  is  to  be 
dated  from  the  moment,  when  the  relation  which  the  several 
parts  hold  to  each  other,  was  discovered  by  Copernicus. 

Suppose,  now,  we  desire  to  ascertain  what  is  the  relation 
which  the  several  parts  of  any  system  are  designed,  by  its 
author,  to  sustain  to  each  other.  I  know  of  no  other  way, 
than  to  find  out  that  series  of  relations,  in  obedience  to  which 
the  system  will  accomplish  the  object  for  which  it  was  con- 
structed. Thus,  if  we  desire  to  ascertain  the  relation  which 
the  parts  of  a  watch  are  designed  to  sustain  to  each  other, 
we  inquire  what  is  that  series  of  relations,  in  obedience  to 
which,  it  will  accomplish  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  con- 
structed, that  is,  to  keep  time.  For  instance,  we  should 
conduct  the  inquiry  by  trying  each  several  part,  and  ascer- 
taining by  experiment,  whether,  on  the  supposition  that  it 
was  the  cause  of  motion,  the  result,  namely,  the  keeping  of 
time,  could  be  effected.  After  we  had  tried  them  all,  and 
had  found,  that  under  no  other  relation  of  the  parts  to  each 
other,  than  that  which  assumes  the  mainspring  to  be  the 
source  of  motion,  and  the  balance  wheel  to  be  the  regulator 
of  the  motion,  the  result  could  be  produced ;  we  should 
conclude,  with  certainty,  that  this  was  the  relation  of  the 
parts  to  each  other,  intended  to  be  established  by  the  maker 
of  the  watch. 

And,  again,  if  an  instrument  were  designed  for  several 
purposes,  and  if  it  was  found,  that  not  only  a  single  pur- 
pose could  not  be  accomplished,  but  that  no  one  of  them 
could  be  accomplished,  under  any  other  system  of  relations 
than  that  which  had  been   at  first  discovered,  we  should 
arrive  at  the  highest  proof  of  which  the  case  was  suscep- 
tible, that  such  was  the  relation  intended  to  be  established 
between  the  parts,  by  the  inventor  of  the  machine. 
/"~  Now,  man  is  a  system  composed  of  parts  in  the  manner 
\  above  stated.     He  has  various  powers,  and  faculties,  and 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  65 

impulses ;  and  he  is  manifestly  designed  to  produce  some 
result.  As  to  the  ultimate  design  for  which  man  was 
created,  there  may  be  a  difference  of  opinion.  In  one 
view,  however,  I  presume  there  will  be  no  difference.  It 
will  be  ajlawed--byt--all,,that  he  was  designed  for  the  produc- 
tion of  (his  own  happines^.V  Look  at  his  senses,  his  intellect, 
his  affecticnr^-attd-irrfhe  external  objects  with  which  these 
are  brought  into  relation ;  and  at  the  effects  of  the  legiti- 
mate action  of  these  powers  upon  their  appropriate  objects  ; 
and  no  one  can  for  a  moment  doubt,  that  this  was  one 
object  for  which  man  was  created.  Thus,  it  is  as  clear, 
that  the  eye  was  intended  to  be  a  source  of  pleasure,  as  that 
it  was  intended  to  be  the  instrument  of  vision.  It  is  as  clear, 
that  the  ear  was  intended  to  be  a  source  of  pleasure,  as  to  be 
the  organ  of  hearing.  And  thus  of  the-otlier-fiiculties. 

But  when  we  consider  man  as  an  mstrumejrt^for  the  p 
duction  of  happiness-,  it  is  manifest,  that  we  must  take  into 
the  account,  man  as  a  society,  as  well  as  man  as  an  indi- 
vidual.    The  larger  part  of  the  happiness  of  the  individual 
depends   upon  |ociety>;   so   that  whatever  would   destroy 
society, — or,  wnairls,   in    fact,   the   same   thing,  destroy 
the   happiness  of  man  as  a   society, — would    destroy  the 
happiness  of  man  as  an  individual.     And  such  is  the  con- 
stitution under  which  we  are  placed,  that  no  benefit  or 
injury.__Qsin_bea ..jn ..its  nature,  individual.  ^Whoever   truly,.     , 
promotes  his  own  happiness,  promotes  the  happiness  of    \»\ 
society  Q  and  ^whoever  promotes  the  happiness  of  society ^-^w 
promotes  his  own  happiness.!   In  this  view  of  the  subject, 
it  will  then  be  proper  to  consider  man  as  a  society,  as  an 
instrument  for  producing  the  happiness  of  man  as  a  society ; 
as  well  as  man  as  an  individual,  as  an  instrument  for  pro-J 
ducing  the  happiness  of  man  as  an  individual. 

Let  us  now  consider  man  as  an  instrument  for  the  pro- 
duction of  human  happiness,  m  the-  sense-here  explained. 

If  we  examine  the  impulsive  and  restraining  faculties  of 
man,  we  shall  find,  that  they  may,  generally,  be  compre- 
hended under  three  classes  : — 

1.  J&tmon  or  appetite.     The  object  of  this  class  of  ourl 
faculties  is,  to  impel  us  towards  certain  acts,  which  produce  J 
immediate  pleasure.     Thus,  the  appetite  for  food  impels  us 
6* 


66  THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

to  seek  gratification  by  eating.  The  love  of  power  impels 
us  to  seek  the  gratification  resulting  from  superiority ;  and 
so  of  all  the  rest. 

If  we  consider  the  nature  of  these  faculties,  we  shall  find, 
that  tlu'y  impel  us  to  immediate  gratification,  without  any 
respect  to  the  consequences,  either  to  ourselves  or  to 
others ;  and  that  they  know  of  no  limit  to  indulgence,  until, 
by  their  own  action,  they  paralyze  the  power  of  enjoyment. 
Thus,  the  love  of  food  would  impel  us  to  eat,  until  eating 
ceased  to  be  a  source  of  pleasure.  And  where,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  no  such  limit  exists,  our  passions  are 
insatiable.  Such  is  the  case  with  the  loy,e  of  wealth,  and 
the  love  of  power.  In  these  instances,vthere  being,  in  the 
constitution  of  man,  no  limit  to  the  power  of  gratification, 
the  appetite  grows  by  what  it  feeds  on*A 

2.  Interest  or  self-love.     This  faculty  impels  us  to  seek 
our  own  happiness,  considered  in  reference  to  a  longer  or 
shorter  period;   but  always  beyond   the  present  moment. 
Thus,   if  appetite   impelled   me   to    eat,   self-love   would 
prompt  me  to  eat  such  food,  and  in  such  quantity,  as  would 
produce  for  me  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness,  upon  the 
whole.    HTf  passion  prompted  me  to  revenge,  self-love  would 
prompt  me  to  seek  revenge  in  such  a  manner  as  would  not 
involve  me  in  greater  distress  than  that  which  I  now  suffer ; 
or,  to  control  the  passion  entirely,  unless  I  could  so  gratify 
it,  as  to  promote  my  own  happiness  for  the  future,  as  well 
as  for  the  present^  In  all  cases,  however,  the  promptings 
of  self-love  have  respect  solely  to  the  production  of  our  own 
happiness  ;  they  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  happiness  of 
any  other  being. 

3.  £onscjeiice.     The  office  of  conscience,  considered  in 
relation  to  these  other  impulsive  faculties,  is,  to  restrain  our 
appetites  within  such  limits,  thatthe^gratification  of  them 
will  injure  neither  ourselves  nor*  other/;  and  so  to  govern 
nur  self-Iojggj  that  we  shall  act,  not  solely  in  obedience  to 
the  law  of  our  own  happiness,  but  in  obedience  to  that  law, 
which  restricts  the  pursuit  of  happiness  within  such  limits, 
as  shall  not  interfere  with   the  happiness  of 'others.     It  is 
not  here  asserted,  that  conscience  always  admonishes  us  to 
this  effect;  or,  that,  when  it  admonishes  us,  it  is  always 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  67 

successful.  We  may,  if  we  please,  disobey  its  monitions ; 
or,  from  reasons  hereafter  to  be  mentioned,  its  monitions 
may  have  ceased.  What  we  would  speak  of  here,  is  the 
tendency  and  object  of  this  faculty ;  and  the  result  to  which, 
if  it  were  perfectly  obeyed,  it  would  manifestly  lead.  And, 
that  such  is  its  tendency,  I  think  that  no  one,  who  reflects 
upon  the  operations  of  his  own  mind,  can,  for  a  moment, 
doubt. 

Suppose,  now,  man  to  be  a  system,  for  the  promotion 
of  happiness,  individual  and  social ;  and  that  these  various 
impelling  powers  are  parts  of  it.  These  powers  being  fre- 
quently, in  their  nature,  contradictory  ;  that  is,  being  such, 
that  one  frequently  impels  to,  and  another  repels  from,  the 
same  action  ;  the  question  is,  in  what  relation  of  these 
powers  to  each  other,  can  the  happiness  of  man  be  most 
successfully  promoted. 

1.  It  cannot  be  asserted,  that,  when  these  impulsions  are 
at  variance,  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  which  of  them 
we  yield ;  that  is,  that  a  man  is  just  as  happy,  and  renders 
society  just  as  happy,  by  obeying  the  one  as  the  other. 
For,  as  men  always  obey  either  the  one  or  the  other,  this 
would  be  to  assert  that  all  men  are  equally  happy ;  and 
that  every  man  promoted  his  own  happiness  just  as  much 
by  one  course  of  conduct,  as  by  another  ;  than  which,  noth- 
ing can  be  more  directly  at  variance  with  the  whole  experi- 
ence of  all  men,  in  all  ages.     It  would  be  to  assert,  that  the 
glutton,  who  is  racked  with  pain,  is  as  happy  as  the  tem- 
perate and  healthy  man ;  and  that  Nero  and  Caligula  were 
as  great  benefactors  to  mankind,  as  Howard  or  Wilberforce. 

2.  If,  then,  it  be  not  indifferent  to   our   happiness,  to 
which  of  them  we  yield  the  supremacy,  the  question  re- 
turns, Under  what  relation  of  each  to  the  other,  can  the 
happiness  of  man  be  most  successfully  promoted  ? 

1.  Can  the  happiness  of  man  be  promoted,  by  subjecting 
his  other  impulses  to  his  appetites  and  passions  ? 

By  referring  to  the  nature  of  appetite  and  passion,  as 
previously  explained,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  result  to  the 
individual,  of  such  a  course,  would  be  sickness  and  death. 
It  would  be  a  life  of  unrestrained  gratification  of  every 
desire,  until  the  power  of  enjoyment  was  exhausted,  without 


68  THE    AUTHORITY   OF    CONSCIENCE. 

the  least  regard  to  the  future ;  and  of  refusal  to  endure  any 
present  pain,  no  matter  how  great  might  be  the  subsequent 
advantage.  Every  one  must  see,  that,  under  the  present 
constitution,  such  a  course  of  life  must  produce  nothing  but 
individual  misery. 

The  result  upon  society  would  be  its  utter  destruction. 
It  would  render  every  man  a  ferocious  beast,  bent  upon 
nothing  but  present  gratification,  utterly  reckless  of  the 
consequences  which  gratification  produced  upon  himself, 
either  directly,  or  through  the  instrumentality  of  others; 
and  reckless  of  the  havoc  which  he  made  of  the  happiness 
of  his  neighbor.  Now,  it  is  manifest,  that  the  result  of 
subjecting  man  to  such  a  principle,  would  be,  not  only  the 
destruction  of  society,  but,  also,  in  a  few  years,  the  entire 
destruction  of  the  human  race. 

2.  Can  the  happiness  of  man  be  best  promoted  by  sub- 
Ejecting  all  his  impulses  to  self-love  ? 

It  may  be  observed,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  future, 
and  of  the  results  of  the  things  around  us,  is  manifestly 
insufficient  to  secure  our  own  happiness,  even  by  the  most 
sagacious  self-love.  When  we  give  up  the  present  pleas- 
ure, or  suffer  the  present  pain,  we  must,  from  necessity,  be 
wholly  ignorant  whetherwe  shall  ever  reap  the  advantage 
which  we  anticipate.  PThe  system,  of  which  every  in- 
dividual forms  a  part,  was  not  constructed  to  secure  the 
happiness  of  any  single  individual  ;  and  he  who  devises  his 
plans  with  sole  reference  to  himself,  must  find  them  contin- 
ually thwarted  by  that" Omnipotent" and  ^Invisible  Agency, 
which  is  overruling  all  things  upon  principles  directly  at 
variance  with  those  which  he  has  adopted.  Inasmuch,  then, 
as  we  can  never  certainly  secure  to  ourselves  those  results 
which  self-love  anticipates,  it  seems  necessary,  that,  in  order 
to  derive  from  our  actions  the  happiness  which  they  are 
capable  of  producing,  they  involve  in  themselves  some  ele- 
ment, irrespective  of  future  result,  which  shall  give  us 
pleasure,  let  the  result  be  what  it  mayj 

The  imperfection  of  self-love,  as  a  director  of  conduct,  is 
nobly  set  forth  in  Cardinal  Wolsey's  advice  to  Cromwell : 

"  Mark  but  my  fall,  and  that  which  ruin'd  me. 
Cromwell,  I  charge  thee  fling  away  ambition 


THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE.  69 

Lovethyselflast.     Cherish  the  hearts  that  hate  thee. 

Be  just,  and  fear  not ; 

Let  all  the  ends  thou  aim'st  at,  be  thy  country's, 
Thy  God's,  and  truth's;  then,  if  thou  fall'st,  O  Cromwell ! 
Thou  fall'st  a  blessed  martyr." 

Henry  VIII,  Act  iii,  Sc.  2. 

"  May  he  do  justice, 

For  truth's  sake,  and  his  conscience  ;  that  his  bones, 
When  he  has  run  his 'course,  and  sleeps  in  blessings, 
May  have  a  tomb  of  orphans'  tears  wept  on  them." 

Ibid. 

"  For  care  and  trouble  set  your  thought, 

Ev'n  when  your  end's  attained  ; 
And  all  your  plans  may  come  to  nought, 
When  every  nerve  is  strained." 

BURNS'S  Epistle  to  a  Young  Friend. 

"  But,  mousie  !  thou  art  not  alone, 

In  proving  foresight  may  be  vain . 
The  lest  laid  schemes  of  mice  and  men 

Gang  oft  agley, 

And  leave  us  nought  but  grief  and  pain 
t  or  promised  joy. 

BURNS,  On  turning  up  a  Mouse's  Nest. 

Besides,  a  man,  acting  from  uncontrolled  self-love,  knows 
of  no  other  object  than  his  own  happiness.  He  would 
sacrifice  the  happiness  of  others,  to  any  amount,  how  great 
soever,  to  secure  his  own,  in  any  amount,  how  small  soever. 
j  Now,  suppose  every  individual  to  act  in  obedience  to  this 
principle ;  it  must  produce  universal  war,  and  terminate  in 
the  subjection  of  all  to  the  dominion  of  the  strongest ;  and 
in  sacrificing  the  happiness  of  all  to  that  of  one :  that  is,  pro- 
duce the  least  amount  of  happiness  of  which  the  system  is 
susceptible.  J  And,  still  more,  since  men,  who  have  acted 
upon  this  principle,  have  been  proverbially  unhappy ;  the 
result  of  such  a  course  of  conduct  is,  to  render  ourselves 
miserable  by  the  misery  of  every  one  else  ;  that  is,  its  ten- 
dency is  to  the  entire  destruction  of  happiness.  It  is  mani- 
fest, then,  that  the  highest  happiness  of  man  cannot  be 
promoted  by  subjecting  all  his  impulses  to  the  government 
of  self-love. 

Lastly.  Suppose,  now,  all  the  impulses  of  man  to  be 
subjected  to  conscience. 

The  tendency  of  this  impulse,  so  far  as  this  subject  is 


70  THE    AUTHORITY    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

concerned,  is,  to  restrain  the  appetites  and  passions  of  man 
within  those  limits,  that  shall  conduce  to  his  happiness,  on 
the  whole  ;  and  so  to  control  the  impulse  of  self-love,  that 
the  individual,  in  the  pursuit  of  his  own  happiness,  shall 
never  interfere  with  the  rightful  happiness  of  his  neighbor. 
Each  one,  under  such  a  system,  and  governed  by  such  an 
impulse,  would  enjoy  all  the  happiness  which  he  could 
create  by  the  use  of  the  powers  which  God  had  given  him. 
Every  one  doing  thus,  the  whole  would  enjoy  all  the  hap- 
piness of  which  their  constitution  was  susceptible.  The 
happiness  of  man,  as  an  individual,  and  as  a  society,  would 
thus  be,  in  the  best  conceivable  manner,  provided  for. 
And  thus,  under  the  relation  which  we  have  suggested  ; 
that  is,  conscience  being  supreme,  and  governing  both  self- 
love  and  passion  ;  and  self-love,  where  no  higher  principle 
intervened,  governing  passion;  man  individual,  and  man 
universal,  considered  as  an  instrument  for  the  production  of 
happiness,  would  best  accomplish  the  purpose  for  which 
he  was  created.  This,  then,  is  the  relation  between 
nis  powers,  which  was  designed  to  be  established  by  his 
Creator. 

It  can,  in  the  same  manner,  be  shown,  that,  if  man,  in- 
dividual and  universal,  be  considered  as  an  instrument  for 
the  production  of  power,  this  end  of  his  creation  can  be 
accomplished  most  successfully  by  obedience  to  the  relation 
here  suggested  ;  that  is,  on  the  principle,  that  the  authority 
of  conscience  is  supreme.*  This  is  conclusively  shown  in 
Butler's  Analogy,  Part  i,  Chapter  3.  And  thus,  let  any 
reasonable  end  be  suggested,  for  which  it  may  be  supposed 
that  man  has  been  created  ;  and  it  will  be  found,  that  this 
end  can  be  best  attained,  by  the  subjection  of  every  other 
impulse  to  that  of  conscience  ;  nay,  that  it  can  be  attained 
in  no  other  way.  And  hence,  the  argument  seems  con- 
clusive, that  this  is  the  relation  intended  by  his  Creator  to 
be  established  between  his  faculties. 


Vis  consili  expers,  mole  ruit  sua. 
Vim  tcmperatam,  di  quoque  provehunt 
In  majus  ;  idem  odere  vires 
Omne  nefas  animo  moventes. 

HOR.  Lib.  3,  Car.  4. 


THE    LAW   BY    WHICH,    ETC.  71 

If  the  preceding  views  be  correct,  it  will  follow  : 

1 .  If  God  has  given  man  an  impulse  for  virtue,  it  is  as 
true,  that  he  has  designed  him  for  virtue,  as  for  any  thing 
else  ;  as,  for  instance,  for  seeing  or  for  hearing. 

2.  If  this  impulse  be  the  most  authoritative  in  his  nature, 
it  is  equally  manifest,  that  man   is  made  for  virtue  more 
than  for  any  thing  else. 

3.  And  hence,  he  who  is  vicious,  not  only  acts  contrary 
to  his  nature,  but  contrary  to  the  highest  impulse  of  his 
nature  ;  that  is,  he  acts  as  much  in  opposition  to  his  nature 
as  it  is  possible  for  us  to  conceive. 


SECTION  IV. 

THE  LAW  BY  WHICH  CONSCIENCE  IS  GOVERNED. 

Conscience  follows  the  general  law,  by  which  the  im- 
provement of  all  our  other  faculties  is  regulated.  It  is 
strengthened  by  use,  it  is  impaired  by  disuse. 

Here  it  is  necessary  to  remark,  that,  by  use,  we  mean 
the  use  of  the  faculty  itself,  and  not  of  some  other  faculty. 
This  is  so  plain  a  case,  that  it  seems  wonderful  that  there 
should  have  been  any  mistake  concerning  it.     Every  one 
knows,  that  the  anus   are   not  strengthened  by  using   the 
legs,  nor  the  eyes  by  using  the  ears,  nor  the  taste  by  using 
the  understanding.     So,  the  conscience  can  be  strength- 
ened, not  by  using  the  memory,  or  the  taste,  or  the  under- 
standing;    but  by  using  the  conscience,  and  by  using  it 
precisely  according  to  the  laws,  and  under  the  conditions, 
designed  by  our  Creator.     The  conscience  is  not  improved"] 
by  the  reading  of  moral    essays,  nor   by   committing   to  f 
memory  moral  precepts,  nor  by  imagining  moral  vicissi- 
tudes ;  but  by  hearkening  to  its  monitions,  and  obeying  its_[ 
impulses. 

If  we  reflect  upon  the  nature  of  the  monition  of  con- 
science, we  shall  find  that  its  office  is  of  a  threefold 
character. 


72  THE    LAW   BY    WHICH 


]  .  It  enables  us  to  discover  the  moral  quality  of  actions. 
_   .  kwtpuCttvA  rp<4iui  i         j  ^         -\  j  • 

2.  It  impels  us  to  do  right,  and  to  avoid  doing  wrong. 

3.  It  is  a  source  of  pleasure,  when  we  have  done  right, 
,  and  of  pain,  when  we  have  done  wrong. 

Let  us  illustrate  the  manner  in  which  it  may  be  im- 
proved, and  injured,  in  each  of  these  respects. 

I.  Of  the  improvement  of  the  discriminating  power  of 
conscience. 

1.  The  discriminating  power  of  conscience  is  improved 
by  reflecting  upon  the  moral  character  of  our  actions,  both 

\  before  and  after  we  have  performed  them.  If,  before  we 
resolve  upon  a  course  of  conduct,  or  before  we  suffer  our- 
selves to  be  committed  to  it,  we  deliberately  ask,  Is  this 
right  ?  Am  I  now  actuated  by  appetite,  by  self-love,  or  by 
conscience?  we  shall  seldom  mistake  the  path  of  duty. 
After  an  action  has  been  performed,  if  we  deliberately  and 
impassionately  examine  it,  we  may  without  difficulty  de- 
cide whether  it  was  right  or  wrong.  Now,  with  every 
such  effort  as  this,  the  discriminating  power  of  conscience 
is  strengthened.  We  discern  moral  differences  more  dis- 
tinctly ;  and  we  distinguish  between  actions,  that  before 
seemed  blended  and  similar. 

2.  The  discriminating  power  of  conscience  is  improved, 
by  meditating  upon  characters  of  pre-eminent  excellence, 
and  specially  upon  the  character  of  God  our  Creator,  and 
Christ  our  Redeemer,  the  Fountain  of  all  moral  excellence. 
As  we  cultivate  taste,  or  our  susceptibility  to  beauty,  by 
meditating  upon  the  most  finished  specimens  of  art,  or  the 
most  lovely  scenery  in  nature,  so  conscience,  or  our  moral 
susceptibility,  is\improved,  by  meditating  upon  any  thing 
eminent  for  moral  goodness.     It  is  hence,  that  example 
produces  so  powerful  a  moral  effect  ;  and  hence,  that  one 
single  act  of  heroic  virtue,  as  that  of  Howard,  or  of  illus- 
trious self-denial,  gives  a  new  impulse  to  the  moral  char- 
acter of  an  age.  (  Men   cannot  reflect  upon  such   actions, 
without  the  proouction  of  a  change  in  their  moral  suscep- 
tibility.    Hence,  the  effect  of  the  Scripture  representations 
of  the  character  of  God,   and  of  the  moral  glory  of  the 
heavenly  state.     The  Apostle  Paul  refers  to  this  principle, 
when  he  says,  "  We  all,  with  open  face,  beholding,  as  in  a 


CONSCIENCE    IS    GOVERNED.  73 

glass,  the  glory  of  the  Lord,  are  changed  into  the  same 
image,  from  glory  to  glory,  even  as  by  the  Spirit  of  the 
Lord." 

On  the  contrary,  the  discriminating  power  of  conscience 
may  be  injured, 

1.  By  neglecting  to  reflect  upon  the  moral  character  of 
our  actions,  both  before  and  after  we  have  performed  them. 
As  taste  is  rendered  obtuse  by  neglect,  so  that  we  fail  to  dis- 
tinguish between  elegance  and  vulgarity,  and  between  beauty 
and  deformity  ;  so,  if  we  yield  to  the  impulses  of  passion,  and 
turn  a  deaf  ear  to  the  monitions  of  conscience,  the  dividing 
line  between  right  and  wrong  seems  gradually  to  become 
obliterated.     We  pass  from  the  confines  of  the   one  into 
those  of  the  other,  with  less  and  less  sensation,  and  at  last 
neglect  the  distinction  altogether. 

Horace  remarks  this  fact  : 

Fas  atque  nefas,  exiguo  fine,  libidinum 
Discernunt  avidi. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  common  causes  of  the  grievous 
moral  imperfection  which  we  every  where  behold.  Men 
act  without  moral  reflection.  They  will  ask,  respecting  an 
action,  every  question  before  that  most  important  one,  Is  it 
right  ?  and,  in  the  great  majority  of  cases,  act  without 
putting  to  themselves  this  question  at  all.  "  The  ox 
knoweth  his  owner,  and  the  ass  his  master's  crib ;  but 
Israel  doth  not  know,  my  people  do  not  consider."  If  any 
man  doubt  whether  this  be  true,  let  him  ask  himself,  How 
large  is  the  portion  of  the  actions  which  I  perform,  upon 
which  I  deliberately  decide  whether  they  be  right  or  wrong  ? 
And  on  how  large  a  portion  of  my  actions  do  I  form  such 
a  decision,  after  they  have  been  performed  ?  For  the 
want  of  this  reflection,  the  most  pernicious  habits  are  daily 
formed  or  strengthened  ;  and,  when  to  the  power  of  habit 
is  added  the  seductive  influence  of  passion,  it  is  not  won- 
derful that  the  virtue  of  man  should  be  the  victim. 

2.  The  discriminating  power  of  conscience  is  impaired 
by  frequent  meditation  upon  vicious  character  and  action. 
By  frequently   contemplating  vice,  our   passions   become 
excited,  and  our  moral  disgust  diminishes.     Thus,  also,  by 

7 


74  THE    LAW    BY    WHICH 

becoming  familiar  with  wicked  men,  we  learn  to  associate 
whatever  they  may  possess  of  intellectual  or  social  interest, 
with  their  moral  character;  and  hence  our  ahorrence  of 
vice  is  lessened.  Thus,  men  who  are  accustomed  to  view, 
habitually,  any  vicious  custom,  cease  to  have  their  moral 
feelings  excited  by  beholding  it.  All  this  is  manifest,  from 
the  facts  made  known  in  the  progress  of  every  moral  refor- 
mation. Of  so  delicate  a  texture  has  God  made  our  moral 
nature,  and  so  easily  is  it  either  improved  or  impaired. 
Pope  says,  truly, 

Vice  is  a  monster  of  so  frightful  mien, 
As,  to  be  dreaded,  needs  but  to  be  seen ; 
But,  seen  too  oft,  familiar  with  her  face, 
We  first  endure,  then  pity,  then  embrace. 

It  is  almost  unnecessary  to  remark,  that  this  fact  will  enable 
us  to  estimate  the  value  of  much  of  our  reading,  and  of 
much  of  our  society.  Whatever  fills  the  memory  with 
scenes  of  vice,  or  stimulates  the  imagination  to  conceptions 
of  impurity,  vulgarity,  profanity,  or  thoughtlessness,  must, 
by  the  whole  of  this  effect,  render  us  vicious.  As  a  man 
of  literary  sensibility  will  avoid  a  badly  written  book,  for 
fear  of  injuring  his  taste,  by  how  much  more  should  we 
dread  the  communion  with  any  thing  wrong,  lest  it  should 
contaminate  our  imagination,  and  thus  injure  our  moral 
sense ! 

II.  The  impulsive  power  of  conscience  is  improved  by 
use,  and  weakened  by  disuse. 

To  illustrate  this  law,  we  need  only  refer  to  the  elements 
of  man's  active  nature.  We  are  endowed  with  appetites, 
passions,  and  self-love,  in  all  their  various  forms ;  and  any 
one  of  them,  or  all  of  them,  may,  at  times,  be  found  impel- 
ling us  towards  actions  in  opposition  to  the  impulsion  of 
conscience ;  and,  of  course,  one  or  the  other  impulse  must 
be  resisted.  Now,  as  the  law  of  our  faculties  is  universal, 
that  they  are  strengthened  by  use,  and  weakened  by  disuse, 
it  is  manifest,  that,  when  we  obey  the  impulse  of  conscience, 
and  resist  the  impulse  of  passion,  the  power  of  conscience  is 
strengthened ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  when  we  obey  the 
impulse  of  passion,  and  resist  that  of  conscience,  the  power 


CONSCIENCE    IS    GOVERNED.  75 

of  passion  is  strengthened.  And,  yet  more,  as  either  of 
these  is  strengthened,  its  antagonist  impulse  is  weakened. 
Thus,  every  time  a  man  does  right,  he  gains  a  victory  over 
his  lower  propensities,  acquires  self-control,  and  becomes 
more  emphatically  a  freeman.  Every  time  a  man  does 
wrong,  that  is,  yields  to  his  lower  propensities,  he  loses  self- 
control,  he  gives  to  his  passions  power  over  him,  he  weakens 
the  practical  supremacy  of  conscience,  and  becomes  more 
perfectly  a  slave.  The  design  of  the  Christian  religion,  in 
this  respect,  is  to  bring  us  under  the  dominion  of  conscience, 
enlightened  by  revelation,  and  to  deliver  us  from  the  slavery 
of  evil  propensity.  Thus,  our  Lord  declares,  "  If  the  Son 
shall  make  you  free,  ye  shall  be  free  indeed."  And,  on 
the  contrary,  "  Whosoever  committeth  sin,  is  the  servant 
(the  slave)  of  sin." 

Again.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  there  exists  a  recipro- 
cal connection  between  the  use  of  the  discriminating  and  of 
the  impulsive  power  of  conscience.  The  more  a  man 
reflects  upon  moral  distinctions,  the  greater  will  be  the 
practical  influence  which  he  will  find  them  to  exert  over 
him.  And  it  is  still  more  decidedly  true,  that,  the  more 
implicitly  we  obey  the  impulsions  of  conscience,  the  more 
acute  will  be  its  power  of  discrimination,  and  the  more 
prompt  and  definite  its  decisions.  This  connection  between 
theoretical  knowledge  and  practical  application,  is  frequently 
illustrated  in  the  other  faculties.  He  who  delineates  objects 
of  loveliness,  finds  the  discriminating  power  of  taste  to 
improve.  And  thus,  also,  this  effect,  in  morals,  is  frequent- 
ly alluded  to  in  the  Scriptures. 

Our  Savior  declares,  "  If  any  man  will  do  his  will,  he 
shall  know  of  the  doctrine." 

Thus,  also,  "  Unto  him  that  hath,  shall  be  given,  and  he 
shall  have  abundance  ;  but  from  him  that  hath  not  (that 
is,  does  not  improve  what  he  has),  shall  be  taken  away 
even  that  which  he  hath." 

Thus,  also,  the  Apostle  Paul :  "  I  Keseech  you  therefore, 
brethren,  by  the  mercies  of  God,  tjiat  ye  present  your 
bodies  a  living  sacrifice,  holy  and  acceptable  unto  God, 
which  is  your  rational  service ;  and  be  ye  not  conformed  to 
this  world,  but  be  ye  transformed  unto  the  renewing  of  your 


76  THE    LAW    BY    WHICH 

mind,  that  (so  that,  to  the  end  that)  ye  may  Tcnoiv  what  is 
that  good,  and  acceptable,  and  perfect  will  of  the  Lord." 

III.  The  sensibility  of  conscience,  as  a  source  of  pleas- 
ure or  of  pain,  is  strengthened  by  use,  and  weakened  by 
disuse. 

The  more  frequently  a  man  does  right,  the  stronger  is 
his  impulse  to  do  right,  and  the  greater  is  the  pleasure  that 
Jesuits  from  the  doing  of  it.  A  liberal  man  derives  a  pleasure 
from  the  practice  of  charity,  of  which  the  covetous  man 
can  form  no  conception.  A  beneficent  man  is  made 
happy  by  acts  of  self-denial  and  philanthropy,  while  a 
selfish  man  performs  an  act  of  goodness  by  painful  and 
strenuous  effprt,  and  merely  to  escape  the  reproaches  of 
conscience.^  By  the  habitual  exercise  of  the  benevolent 
affections,  a  man  becomes  more  and  more  capacious  of  vir- 
tue, capable  of  higher  and  more  disinterested  and  more 
self-denying  acts  of  mercy,  until  he  becomes  an  enthusiast, 
in  goodness,  loving  to  do  good  better  than  any  thing  else. 
And,  in  the  same  manner,  the  more  our  affections  to  God 
are  exercised,  the  more  constant  and  profound  is  the 
happiness  which  they  create,  and  the  more  absolutely  is 
every  other  wish  absorbed  by  the  single  desire  to  do  the 
will  of  God.  Illustrations  of  these  remarks  may  be  found 
in  the  lives  of  the  Apostle  Paul,  John  Howard,  and  other 
philanthropists.  Thus,  it  is  said  of  our  Savior,  "  He 
went  about  doing  good."  And  h^p  says  of  himself,  "  My 
meat  is  to  do  the  will  of  Him  that  sent  me,  and  to  finish 
his  work." 

And  it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that,  in  our  present 
state,  opportunities  for  moral  improvement  and  moral  pleas- 
ure are  incessantly  occurring.  Under  the  present  conditions 
of  our  being,  there  are  every  where,  and  at  all  times,  sick 
to  be  relieved,  mourners  to  be  comforted,  ignorant  to  be 
taught,  vicious  to  be  reclaimed,  and  men,  by  nature  enemies 
to  God,  to  be  won  back  to  reconciliation  to  Him.  The 
season  for  moral  labor  depends  not,  like  that  for  physical 
labor,  upon  vicissitudes  beyond  our  control:  it  depends 
solely  upon  our  own  will.  This  I  suppose  to  be  the  gener- 
al principle  involved  in  our  Savior's  remark  to  his  Apostles : 
"  Say  ye  not,  There  are  four  months,  and  then  cometh  the 


/     CONSCIENCE    IS    GOVERNED.  77 

harvest  ?  Lift  up  your  eyes,  and  look  upon  the  fields,  for  they 
are  white  already  to  the  harvest."  That  is,  the  fields  are 
always  waiting  for  the  laborer  in  the  moral  harvest. 

And,  on  the  contrary,  the  man  who  habitually  violates 
his  conscience,  not  only  is  more  feebly  impelled  to  do  right, 
but  he  becomes  less  sensible  to  the  pain  of  doing  wrong. 
A  child  feels  poignant  remorse  after  the  first  act  of  pilfer- 
ing. Let  the  habit  of  dishonesty  be  formed,  and  he  will  be- 
come so  hackneyed  in  sin,  that  he  will  perpetrate  robbery 
with  no  other  feeling  than  that  of  mere  fear  of  detection. 
The  first  oath  almost  palsies  the  tongue  of  the  stripling.  It 
requires  but  a  few  months,  however,  to  transform  him  into 
the  bold  and  thoughtless  blasphemer.  The  murderer,  after 
the  death  of  his  first  victim,  is  agitated  with  all  the  horrors 
of  guilt.  He  may,  however,  pursue  his  trade  of  blood, 
until  he  have  no  more  feeling  for  man,_than  the  butcher  for 
the  animal  which  he  slaughters.  Burk,  who  was  in  the 
habit  of  murdering  men,  for  the'  purpose  of  selling  their 
bodies  to  the  surgeons  for  dissection,  confessed  this  of  him- 
self. Nor  is  this  true  of  individuals  alone.  Whole  com- 
munities may  become  so  accustomed  to  deeds  of  violence, 
as  not  merely  to  lose  all  the  milder  sympathies  of  their 
nature,  but  also  to  take  pleasure  in  exhibitions  of  the  most 
revolting  ferocity.  Such  was  the  case  in  Rome  at  the 
period  of  the  gladiatorial  contests ;  and  such  was  the  fact  in 
Paris  at  the  time  of  the  French  revolution. 

This  also  serves  to  illustrate  a  frequently  repeated  aph- 
orism, Quern  Deus  vult  perdere,  prius  dement  at.  As  a  man 
becomes  more  wicked,  he  becomes  bolder  in  crime.  Un- 
checked by  conscience,  he  ventures  upon  more  and  more 
atrocious  villany,  and  he  does  it  with  less  and  less  precau- 
tion. As,  in  the  earliest  stages  of  guilt,  he  is  betrayed  by 
timidity,  in  the  later  stages  of  it,  he  is  exposed  by  his  reck- 
lessness. He  is  thus  discovered  by  the  very  effect  which 
his  conduct  is  producing  upon  his  own  mind.  Thus, 
oppressors  and  despots  seem  to  rush  upon  their  own  ruin, 
as  though  bereft  of  reason.'  Such  limits  has  our  Creator, 
by  the  conditions  of  our  being,  set  to  the  range  of  human 
atrocity. 

Thus  we  see,  that,  by  every  step   in   our   progress  in 


78  THE    LAW    BY    WHICH,    ETC. 

virtue,  the  succeeding  step  becomes  less  difficult.  In  pro- 
portion as  we  deny  our  passions,  they  become  less  imper- 
ative. The  oftener  we  conquer  them,  the  less  is  the  moral 
effort  necessary  to  secure  the  victory,  and  the  less  frequently 
and  the  less  powerfully  do  they  assail  us.  By  every  act 
of  successful  resistance,  we  diminish  the  tremendous  power 
of  habit  over  us,  and  thus  become  more  perfectly  under 
the  government  of  our  own  will.  Thus,  with  every  act  of 
obedience  to  conscience,  our  character  is  fixed  upon  a  more 
immovable  foundation. 

And,  on  the  contrary,  by  every  act  of  vicious  indulgence, 
we  give  our  passions  more  uncontrolled  power  over  us, 
and  diminish  the  power  of  reason  and  of  conscience. 
Thus,  by  every  act  of  sin,  we  not  only  incur  new  guilt, 
but  we  strengthen  the  bias  towards  sin,  during  the  whole 
of  our  subsequent  being.  Hence  every  vicious  act  renders 
our  return  to  virtue  more  difficult  and  more  hopeless.  The 
tendency  of  such  a  course  is,  to  give  to  habit  the  power 
which  ought  to  be  exerted  by  our  will.  And,  hence,  it 
is  not  improbable,  that  the  conditions  of  our  being  may  be 
such,  as  to  allow  of  our  arriving  at  such  a  state,  that 
reformation  may  be  actually  impossible.  That  the  Holy 
Scriptures  allude  to  such  a  condition  during  the  present 
life,  is  evident.  Such,  also,  is  probably  the  necessary  con- 
dition of  the  wicked  in  another  world. 

In  stating  the  change  thus  produced  upon  our  moral 
nature,  it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that  this  loss  of  sensi- 
bility is,  probably,  only  temporary.  There  is  reason  to 
believe,  that  no  impressions  made  upon  the  human  soul, 
during  its  present  probationary  state,  are  ever  permanently 
erased.  Causes  operating  merely  upon  man's  physical 
nature,  frequently  revive  whole  trains  of  thought,  and  even 
the  knowledge  of  languages,  which  had  been  totally  forgot- 
ten during  the  greater  portion  of  a  long  life.  This  seems 
to  show,  that  the  liability  to  lose  impressions,  once  made 
upon  us,  depends  upon  some  condition  arising  from  our 
material  nature  only,  and  that  this  liability  will  cease  as 
soon  as  our  present  mode  of  existence  terminates.  That 
is  to  say,  if  the  power  of  retaining  knowledge  is  always 
the  same,  but  if  our  consciousness  of  knowledge  is  veiled 


RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT.  79 

by  our  material  organs,  when  these  have  been  laid  aside, 
our  entire  consciousness  will  return.  Now,  indications  of 
the  same  nature  are  to  be  found  in  abundance,  with  respect 
to  conscience.  Wicked  men,  after  having  spent  a  life  in 
prosperous  guilt,  and  without  being  in  trouble  like  other 
men,  are  frequently,  without  any  assignable  cause,  tor- 
mented with  all  the  agonies  of  remorse  ;  so  that  the  mere 
consciousness  of  guilt  has  become  absolutely  intolerable, 
and  they  have  perished  by  derangement,  or  by  suicide. 
The  horrors  of  a  licentious  sinner's  death  bed,  present  a 
striking  illustration  of  the  same  solemn  fact.  A  scene  of 
this  sort  has  been,  no  less  vividly  than  accurately,  described 
by  Dr.  Young,  in  the  death  of  Altamont.  All  these  things 
should  be  marked  by  us  as  solemn  warnings.  They  show 
us  of  what  the  constitution,  under  which  we  exist,  is  capa- 
ble ;  and  it  is  in  forms  like  these,  that  the  "  coming  events " 
of  eternity  "  cast  their  shadows  before." 

In  such  indexes, 

There  is  seen 

The  baby  figures  of  the  giant  mass 
Of  things  to  come  at  large. 

SHAKS. 


SECTION  V. 

\  RULES  IFOR  MORAL  CONDUCT,  DERIVED  FROM  THE  PRECEDING 
REMARKS. 

Several  plain  rules  of  conduct  are  suggested  by  the 
above  remarks,  which  may  more  properly  be  introduced 
here,  than  in  any  other  place. 

I.  Before  you  resolve  upon  an  action,  or  a  course  of 
action,, 

1.  Cultivate  the  habit  of  deciding  upon  its  moral  char- 
acter. Let  the  first  question  always  be,  Is  this  action  right  ? 
For  this  purpose,  God  gave  you  this  faculty.  If  you  do 
not  use  it,  you  are  false  to  yourself,  and  inexcusable  before 
God.  We  despise  a  man  who  never  uses  his  reason,  and 


80  RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT. 

scorn  him  as  a  fool.  Is  he  not  much  more  to  be  despised, 
who  neglects  to  use  a  faculty  of  so  much  higher  authority 
than  reason  ?  And  let  the  question,  Is  this  right  ?  be 
asked  first,  before  imagination  has  set  before  us  the  seduc- 
tions of  pleasure,  or  any  step  has  been  taken,  which  should 
pledge  our  consistency  of  character.  If  we  ask  this 
question  first,  it  can  generally  be  decided  with  ease.  If 
we  wait  until  the  mind  is  agitated  and  harassed  by  con- 
tending emotions,  it  will  not  be  easy  to  decide  correctly. 

2.  Remember  that  your  conscience  has  become  imper- 
fect,  from    your   frequent   abuse  of  it.     Hence,  in  many 
cases,  its  discrimination  will  be  indistinct.     Instead  of  decid- 
ing, it  will,  frequently,  only  doubt.     That  doubt  should  be, 
generally,  as  imperative  as  a  decision.     When  you,  there- 
fore, doubt,  respecting  the  virtue  of  an  action,  do  not  per- 
form it,  unless  you  as  much  doubt  whether  you  are    at 
liberty  to  refrain  from  it.     Thus,  says  President  Edwards, 
in    one  of  his  resolutions :    "  Resolved,  never  to  do  any 
thing,  of  which  I  so  much  question  the  lawfulness,  as  that 
I  intend,  at  the  same  time,  to  consider  and  examine  after- 
wards, whether  it  be  lawful  or  not ;  except  I  as  much  ques- 
tion the  lawfulness  of  the  omission." 

3.  Cultivate,  on  all  occasions,  in  private  or  in  public,  in 
small  or  great,  in  action  or  in  thought,  the  habit  of  obeying 
the  monitions  of  conscience ;  all  other  things  to  the  con- 
trary notwithstanding. 

Its  slightest  touches,  instant  pause ; 

Debar  a'  side  pretences ; 
And,  resolutely,  keep  its  laws, 

Uncaring  consequences. 

BURNS. 

The  supremacy  of  conscience  imposes  upon  you  the  obli- 
gation to  act  thus.  You  cannot  remember,  in  the  course 
of  your  whole  life,  an  instance  in  which  you  regret  having 
obeyed  it ;  and  you  cannot  remember  a  single  instance  in 
which  you  do  not  regret  having  disobeyed  it.  There  can 
nothing  happen  to  you  so  bad  as  to  have  done  wrong  : 
there  can  nothing  be  gained  so  valuable  as  to  have  done 
right.  And  remember,  that  it  is  only  by  cultivating  the 
practical  supremacy  of  conscience  over  every  other  impulse, 


RULES  FOB  MORAL  CONDUCT.  81 

that  you  can  attain  to  that  bold,  simple,  manly,  elevated 
character,  which  is  essential  to  true  greatness. 

This  has  been  frequently  taught  us,  even  by  the  heathen 
poets  : 

Virtus,  repulsae  nescia  sordid®, 
Intaminatis  fulget  honoribus : 
Nee  sumit  aut  ponit  secures 
Arbitrio  popularis  aurse  : 

Virtus,  recludens  immeritis  mori 
Coelum,  negata  tentat  iter  via ; 
Ccetusque  vulgares  et  udam 
Spernit  humum  fugiente  penna. 

HOR.  Lib.  3,  Car.  2. 

A  greater  than  a  heathen  has  said,  "  If  thine  eye  be  single, 
thy  whole  body  shall  be  full  of  light ; "  and  has  enforced 
the  precept  by  the  momentous  question,  "  What  shall  it 
profit  a  man,  though  he  should  gain  the  whole  world,  and 
lose  his  own  soul  ?  or  what  shall  a  man  give  in  exchange 
for  his  soul  ?  " 

II.  After  an  action  has  been  per  formed, 

1.  Cultivate  the  habit  of  reflecting  upon  your  actions, 
and  upon  the  intention  with  which  they  have  been  per- 
formed, and  of  thus  deciding  upon  their  moral  character. 
This  is  called  self-examination.  It  is  one  of  the  most 
important  duties  in  the  life  of  a  moral,  and  specially  of  a 
probationary  existence. 

'Tis  greatly  wise,  to  talk  with  our  past  hours, 
And  ask  them  what  report  they  bore  to  Heaven, 
And  how  they  might  have  borne  more  welcome  news. 

a.  Perform  this  duty  deliberately.     It  is  not  the  business 
of  hurry  or  of  negligence.     Devote  time  exclusively  to  it. 
Go  alone.     Retire  within  yourself,  and  weigh  your  actions 
coolly  and  carefully,  forgetting  all  other  things,  in  the  con- 
viction that  you  are  a  moral  and  an  accountable  being. 

b.  Do  it  impartially.     Remember  that  you  are  liable 
to  be  misled  by  the  seductions  of  passion,  and  the  allure- 
ments of  self-interest.     Put  yourself  in  the  place  of  those 
around  you,  and  put  others  in  your  own  place,  and  remark 
how  you  would  then  consider  your  actions.     Pay  great 


8*2  RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT. 

attention  to  the  opinions  of  your  enemies  :  there  is  generally 
foundation,  or,  at  least,  the  appearance  of  it,  in  what  they 
say  of  you.  But,  above  all,  take  the  true  and  perfect 
standard  of  moral  character,  exhibited  in  the  precepts  of 
the  gospel,  and  exemplified  in  the  life  of  Jesus  Christ ;  and 
thus  examine  your  conduct  by  the  light  that  emanates  from 
the  holiness  of  heaven. 

2.  Suppose  you  have   examined  yourself,   and   arrived 
at  a  decision  respecting  the  moral  character  of  your  actions. 

1.  If  you  are  conscious  of  having  done  right,  be  thank- 
ful to  that  God  who  has  mercifully  enabled  you  to  do  so. 
Observe  the  peace  and  serenity  which  fills  your  bosom, 
and  remark  how   greatly  it  overbalances  the  self-denials 
which  it  has  cost.     Be   humbly  thankful  that  you  have 
made  some  progress  in  virtue. 

2.  If  the  character  of  your  actions  have  been  mixed, 
that  is,  if  they  have  proceeded  from  motives  partly  good 
and  partly  bad,  labor  to  obtain  a  clear  view  of  each,  and 
of  the  circumstances   which   led  you  to  confound   them. 
Avoid  the  sources  of  this  confusion  ;  and,  when  you  per- 
form the  same  actions  again,  be  specially  on  your  guard 
against  the  influence  of  any   motive  of  which   you  now 
disapprove. 

3.  If  conscience  convicts  you  of  having  acted  wrongly, 

1.  Reflect  upon  the  wrong,  survey  the  obligations  which 
you  have  violated,  until  you  are  sensible  of  your  guilt. 

2.  Be  willing  to  suffer  the  pains  of  conscience.     They 
are  the  rebukes  of  a  friend,  and  are  designed  to  withhold 
you  from  the  commission  of  wrong  in  future.     Neither  turn 
a  neglectful  ear  to  its  monitions,  nor  drown  its  voice  amid 
the  bustle  of  business,  or  the  gayety  of  pleasure. 

3.  Do  not  let  the  subject  pass  away  from  your  thoughts, 
until  you  have  come  to  a  settled  resolution,   a  resolution 
founded  on  moral  disapprobation  of  the  action,  never  to  do 
so  any  more. 

4.  If  restitution   be  in    your   power,  make  it,  without 
hesitation,  and  do  it  immediately.     The  least  that  a  man 
ought  to  be  satisfied  with,  who  has  done  wrong,  is  to  repair 
the  wrong  as.  soon  as  it  is  possible. 

5.  As  every  act  of  wrong  is  a  sin  against  God,  seek,  in  hum- 


RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT.  83 

ble  penitence,  his  pardon,  through  the  merits  and  interces- 
sion of  his  Son,  Jesus  Christ. 

6.  Remark  the  actions,  or  the  courses  of  thinking,  which 
were   the   occasions   of  leading   you   to   do   wrong.     Be 
specially  careful  to  avoid  them  in  future.     To  this  effect, 
says  President  Edwards,  "  Resolved,  that  when  I  do  any 
conspicuously  evil  action,  to  trace  it  back,  till  I  come  to 
the  original  cause  ;  and  then  both  carefully  endeavor  to  do 
so  no  more,  and  to  fight  and  pray,  with   all  my  might, 
against  the  original  of  it." 

7.  Do  all  this,  in  humble  dependence  upon  that  merciful 
and  every  where  present  Being,  who  is  always  ready  to 
grant  us  all  assistance  necessary  to  keep  his  commandments ; 
and  who  will  never  leave  us,  nor  forsake  us,  if  we  put  our 
trust  in  him. 

It  seems,  then,  from  what  has  been  remarked,  that  we 
are  all  endowed  with  conscience,  or  a  faculty  for  discerning 
a  moral  quality  in  human  actions,  impelling  us  towards 
right,  and  dissuading  us  from  wrong ;  and  that  the  dictates 
of  this  faculty  are  felt  and  known  to  be  of  supreme  au- 
thority. 

The  possession  of  this  faculty  renders  us  accountable 
creatures.  Without  it,  we  should  not  be  specially  distin- 
guished from  the  brutes.  With  it,  we  are  brought  into 
moral  relations  with  God,  and  all  the  moral  intelligences  in 
the  universe. 

It  is  an  ever-present  faculty.  It  always  admonishes  us, 
if  we  will  listen  to  its  voice,  and  frequently  does  so,  even 
when  we  wish  to  silence  its  warnings.  Hence,  we  may 
always  know  our  duty,  if  we  will  but  inquire  for  it.  We 
can,  therefore,  never  have  any  excuse  for  doing  wrong, 
since  no  man  need  do  wrong,  unless  he  chooses ;  and  no 
man  will  do  it  ignorantly,  unless  from  criminal  neglect  of 
the  faculty  which  God  has  given  him. 

How  solemn  is  the  thought,  that  we  are  endowed  with 
such  a  faculty,  and  that  we  can  never  be  disunited  from  it ! 
It  goes  with  us  through  all  the  scenes  of  life,  in  company 
and  alone,  admonishing,  warning,  reproving,  and  recording ; 
and,  as  a  source  of  happiness  or  of  misery,  it. must  °&de 


84  RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT. 

with  us  for  ever.     Well  doth  it  become  man,  then,  to  rev- 
erence himself. 

And  thus  we  see,  that,  from  his  moral  constitution,  were 
there  no  other  means  of  knowledge  of  duty,  man  is  an 
accountable  creature.  Man  is  under  obligation  to  obey  the 
will  of  God,  in  what  manner  soever  signified.  That  it  is 
signified  in  this  manner,  I  think  there  cannot  be  a  question ; 
and  for  this  knowledge  he  is  justly  held  responsible.  Thus, 
the  Apostle  Paul  declares,  that  "  the  Gentiles,  who  have 
not  the  law,  are  a  law  unto  themselves,  which  show  the 
work  of  the  law,  written  on  their  hearts,  their  consciences 
being  continually  excusing  or  accusing  one  another."  How 
much  greater  must  be  the  responsibility  of  those  to  whom 
God  has  given  the  additional  light  of  natural  and  revealed 
religion ! 


CHAPTER    THIRD 

THE    NATURE     OF    VIRTUE. 
SECTION    I. 

OF   VIRTUE  IN   GENERAL. 

IT  has  been  already  remarked,  that  we  find  ourselves  so 
constituted,  as  to  stand  in  various  relations  to  all  the  beings 
around  us,  especially  to  our  fellow-men,  and  to  God. 
There  may  be,  and  there  probably  are,  other  beings,  to 
whom,  by  our  creation,  we  are  related:  but  we,  as  yet, 
nave  no  information  on  the  subject;  and  we  must  wait 
until  we  enter  upon  another  state,  before  the  fact,  and  the 
manner  of  the  fact,  be  revealed. 

In  consequence  of  these  relations,  and  either  by  the 
appointment  of  God,  or  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, — if, 
indeed,  these  terms  mean  any  thing  different  from  each 
other, — there  arise  moral  obligations  to  exercise  certain  affec- 
tions towards  other  beings,  and  to  act  towards  them  in  a 
manner  corresponding  to  those  affections.  Thus,  we  are 
taught  in  the  Scriptures,  that  the  relation  in  which  we 
stand  to  Deity,  involves  the  obligation  to  universal  and  un- 
limited obedience  and  love  ;  and  that  the  relation  in  which 
we  stand  to  each  other,  involves  the  obligation  to  love, 
limited  and  restricted ;  and,  of  course,  to  a  mode  of  conduct, 
in  all  respects,  correspondent  to  these  affections. 

An  action  is  right,  when  it  corresponds  to  these  obliga- 
tions, or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  is  the  carrying  into  effect 
of  these  affections.  It  is  wrong,  when  it  is  in  violation  of 
these  obligations,  or  is  the  carrying  into  effect  of  any  other 
affections. 

By  means  of  our  intellect,  we  become  conscious  of  the 
8 


I  «.l 


86  OF    VIRTinE    IN    GENERAL. 

relations  in  which  we  stand  to  the  beings  with  whom  we 
are  connected.  Thus,  by  the  exertion  of  our  intellectual 
faculties,  we  become  acquainted  with  the  existence  and 
attributes  of  God,  his  power,  his  wisdom,  his  goodness ; 
and  it  is  by  these  same  faculties,  that  we  understand  and 
verify  those  declarations  of  the  Scriptures,  which  give  us 
additional  knowledge  of  his  attributes  ;  and  by  which  we 
arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the  conditions  of  our  being,  as 
creatures,  and  also  of  the  various  relations  in  which  we 
stand  to  each  other. 

Conscience,  as  has  been  remarked,  is  that  faculty  by 
which  we  become  conscious  of  the  obligations  arising  from 
these  relations ;  by  which  we  perceive  the  quality  of  right 
in  those  actions  which  correspond  to  these  obligations,  and 
of  wrong  in  those  actions  which  violate  them ;  and  by 
which  we  are  impelled  towards  the  one,  and  repelled  from 
.  the  other.  It  is,  manifestly,  the  design  of  this  faculty  to 
suggest  to  us  this  feeling  of  obligation,  as_sopn_as  the  rela- 
tions on  which  it  is  founded,  are  understood  ;  and  thus  to 
excite  in  us  the  corresponding  affections.) 

Now,  in  a  perfectly  constituted  moral  and  intellectual 
being,  it  is  evident,  that  there  would  be  a  perfect  adjust- 
ment between  these  external  qualities  and  the  internal 
faculties.  A  perfect  eye  is  an  eye  that,  under  the  proper 
conditions,  would  discern  every  variety  and  shade  of  color, 
in  every  object  which  it  was  adapted  to  perceive.  The 
same  remark  would  apply  to  our  hearing,  or  to  any  other 
sense.  So,  a  perfectly  constituted  intellect  would,  under 
the  proper  conditions,  discern  the  relations  in  which  the 
being  stood  to  other  beings;  and  a  perfectly  constituted 
conscience  would,  at  the  same  time,  become  conscious  of  all 
the  obligations  which  arose  from  such  relations,  and  would 
impel  us  to  the  corresponding  courses  of  conduct.  That 
is,  there  would  exist  a  perfect  adaptation  between  the 
external  qualities  which  were  addressed  to  these  faculties, 
and  the  faculties  themselves,  to  which  these  qualities  were 
addressed. 

Hence,  in  a  being  thus  perfectly  constituted,  it  is  mani- 
fest, that  virtue,  the  doing  of  right,  or  obedience  to  con- 
science, would  mean  the  same  thing. 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    GENERAL.  &7 

/ '  ; ~~~ — «* 

\  When,  however,  we  speak  of  the  perfection  of  a  moral 
j  organization,  we  speak  of  the  perfection  of  adjustment  be- 
tween the  faculty  of  conscience,  and  the  relations  and  obli- 
Jgations  under  which  the  particular  being  is  created.  Hence, 
this  very  perfection  admits  of  various  gradations  and  modi- 


\fications./"  For  example: 

1.  The  relations  of  the  same  being  change,  during  the 
progress  of  its  existence,  from  infancy,  through  childhood 
and  manhood,  until  old  age.     This  change  of  relations 
involves  a  change  of  obligations ;  and  the  perfection  of  its 
moral  organization  would  consist  in  the  perfect  adjustment 
of  its  moral  faculty  to  its  moral  relations,  throughout  the 
whole  course  of  its  history.     Now,  the   tendency  of  this 
change  is,  manifestly,  from  less  to  greater ;  that  is,  from 
less  imperative  to  more  imperative,  and  from  less  numerous 
to  more  numerous  obligations.     That  is,  the  tendency  of 
the  present  system  is  to  render  beings  more  and  more  capa- 
cious of  virtue  and  of  vice,  as  far  as  we  are  permitted  to 
have  any  knowledge  of  them. 

2.  As  it  is  manifestly  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  either 
how  numerous,  or  how  important,  may  be  our  relations  to 
other  creatures,  in  another  state,  or  how  much  more  intimate 
may  be  the  relations  in  which  we  shall  stand  to  our  Crea- 
tor;  [an  J,  as  there  can  be  no  limit  conceived  to  our  power 

/of  comprehending  these  relations,  nor  to  our  power  of  be- 
coming conscious  of  the  obligations  which  they  involve  ;  \c<^ 
I  so,  it  is  manifest,  that  no  limit  can  be  conceived  to  the    \  ^ 
\progress  of  man's  capacity  for  virtue.     It  evidently  contains  j 
jwithin  itself  elements  adapted  to  infinite  improvement,  in  / 
[any  .state  in  which  we  may  exist.    / 

3.  Andjhe^same  may  be  said  of  xvice.     As  our  obliga- 
tions must,  from  what  we  already  know,  continue  to  in- 
crease, and   our   power   for   recognizing  them   must   also 
continue  to  increase ;  if  we  perpetually  violate  them,  we 
become  more  and  more  capable  of  wrong ;  and  thus,  also, 
become  more  and  more  intensely  vicious.     And  thus,  the 

/very  elements  of  a  moral  constitution,  seem  to  involve  the 
(  necessity  of  illimitable  progress,  either  in  virtue  or  in  vice, 
so  long  as  we  exist. 

4.  And  as,  on  the  one  hand,  we  can  have  no  conception 


88  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS. 

of  the  amount  of  attainment,  both  in  virtue  and  vice,  of 
which  man  is  capable,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  we  can  have 
no  conception  of  the  delicacy  of  that  moral  tinge  by  which 
his  character  is  first  designated.  We  detect  moral  character 
at  a  very  early  age  ;  but  this  by  no  means  proves,  that  it 
did  not  exist  long  before  we  detected  it.  Hence,  as  it  may 
thus  have  existed  before  we  were  able  to  detect  it,  it  is 
manifest  that  we  have  no  elements  by  which  to  determine 
the  time  of  its  commencement.  That  is  to  say,  in  general, 
we  are  capable  of  observing  moral  qualities  within  certain 
limits,  as  from  childhood  to  old  age  ;  but  this  is  no  manner 
of  indication  that  these  qualities  may  not  exist  in  the  being 
both  before,  and  afterwards,  in  degrees  greatly  below  and 
infinitely  above  any  thing  which  we  ate  capable  of  ob- 
serving. 


SECTION   II. 

OF  VIRTUS  IN  IMPERFECT  BEINGS. 

Let  us  now  consider  this  subject  in  relation  to  a  being 
whose  moral  constitution  has  become  disordered. 
Now,  this  disorder  might  be  of  two  kinds  : 

1.  He  might  not  perceive  all  the  relations  in  which  he 
stood,  and  which  gave  rise  to  moral  obligations,  and,  of 
course,  would  be  unconscious  of  the  corresponding  obliga- 
tions. 

2.  He  might  perceive  the  relation,  but  his  conscience 
might   be   so  disordered,  as  not  to  feel  all  the  obligation 
which  corresponded  to  it. 

What  shall  we  say  concerning  the   actions   of  such  a 
being  ? 

1.  The  relations  under  which  he  is  constituted  are  the 
same,  and  the  obligations  arising  out  of  these  relations  are 
the  same,  as  though  his  moral  constitution  had  not  become 
disordered. 

2.  His  actions  would  all  be  comprehended  under  two 
classes  : 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS.  89 

1.  Those  which  came,  if  I  may  so  express  it,  within 
the  Hmit  of  his  conscience  ;    that  is,  those   in  which  his 
conscience  did  correctly  intimate  to  him  his  obligation  ;  and, 

2.  Those  in  which  it  did  not  so  intimate  it. 

Now,  of  the  first  class  of  actions,  it  is  manifest  that,  where 
conscience  did  correctly  intimate  to  him  his  obligations,  the 
doing  of  right,  and  obedience  to  conscience,  would,  as  in 
the  last  section,  be  equivalent  terms. 

But,  what  shall  we  say  of  those  without  this  limit ;  that 
is,  of  those  which  he,  from  the  conditions  of  his  being,  is 
under  obligation  to  perform ;  but  of  which,  from  the  de- 
rangement of  his  moral  nature,  he  does  not  perceive  the 
obligation  ? 

1.  Suppose   him  to  perform  these   very  actions,  there 
could  be  in  them  no  virtue  ;  for,  the  man  perceiving  in  them 
no  moral  quality,  and  having  towards  them  no  moral  im- 
pulsion, moral  obligation  could  be  no  motive  for  performing 
them.     He  might  act  from  passion,  or  from  self-love  ;  but, 
under  such  circumstances,  as  there  is  no  moral   motive, 
there  could  be  no  praiseworthiness.    Thus,  for  a  judge  to  do 
justice  to  a  poor  widow,  is  manifestly  right  ;  but,  a  man 
may  do  this  without  any  moral  desert ;  for,  hear  what  the 
unjust  judge  saith :  "  Though  I  fear  not  God,  nor  regard 
man,  yet,  because  this  widow  troubleth  me,  I  will  avenge 
her,  lest,  by  her  continual  coming,  she  weary  me." 

It  does  not,  however,  follow,  that  the  performing  of  an 
action,  in  this  manner,  is  innocent.  The  relation  in  which 
a  being  stands  to  other  beings,  involves  the  obligation  to 
certain  feelings,  as  well  as  to  the  acts  correspondent  to  those 
feelings.  If  the  act  be  performed,  and  the  feeling  be 
wanting,  the  obligation  is  not  fulfilled,  and  the  man  may  be 
guilty.  How  far  he  is  guilty  will  be  seen  below. 

2.  But,  secondly,  suppose  him  not  to  perform  those  ac- 
tions, which  are,  as  we  have  said,  without  the  limit  of  his 
conscience.     In  how  far  is  the  omission  of  these  actions,  or 
the  doing  of  the  contrary,  innocent  ?     That  is  to  say,  is  the 
impulse  of  conscience,  in  an  imperfectly  constituted  moral 
being,  the  limit  of  moral  obligation  ? 

This  will,  I  suppose,  depend  upon  the  following  consid- 
erations : 

8* 


90  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS. 

1.  His  knowledge  of  the  relations  in  which  he  stands. 

If  he  know  not  the  relations  in  which  he  stands  to  others, 
and  have  not  the  means  of  knowing  them,  he  is  guiltless. 
If  he  Icnow  them,  or  have  the  means  of  knowing  them,  and 
have  not  improved  these  means,  he  is  guilty.  This  is,  1 
think,  the  principle  asserted  by  the  Apostle  Paul,  in  his 
Epistle  to  the  Romans.  He  asserts,  that  the  heathen  are 
guilty  in  sinning  against  God,  because  His  attributes  may 
be  known  by  the  light  of  nature.  He  also  asserts  that 
there  will  be  a  difference  between  the  condemnation  of  the 
Jews  and  that  of  the  heathen,  on  the  ground  that  the  Jews 
were  informed  of  many  points  of  moral  obligation,  which 
the  heathen  could  not  have  ascertained,  without  a  revela- 
tion :  "  Those  that  sin  without  law,  shall  perish  without  law  ; 
and  those  that  have  sinned  in  the  law,  shall  be  judged 
by  the  law." 

2.  His  guilt  will  depend,  secondly,  on  the  cause  of  this 
imperfection  of  his  conscience. 

Were  this  imperfection  of  conscience  not  the  result  of  his 
own  act,  he  would  be  guiltless.  But,  in  just  so  far  as  it  is 
the  result  of  his  own  conduct,  he  is  responsible.  And, 
inasmuch  as  imperfection  of  conscience,  or  diminution  of 
moral  capacity,  can  result  from  nothing  but  voluntary  trans- 
gression ;  I  suppose  that  he  must  be  answerable  for  the 
whole  amount  of  that  imperfection.  We  have  already  seen, 
that  conscience  may  be  improved  by  use,  and  injured  by 
disuse,  or  by  abuse.  Now,  as  a  man  is  entitled  to  all  the 
benefits  which  accrue  from  the  faithful  improvement  of  his 
conscience,  so  he  is  responsible  for  all  the  injury  that  results 
from  the  abuse  of  it. 

That  this  is  the  fact,  is,  I  think,  evident,  from  obvious 
considerations  : 

1.  It  is  well  known,  that  the  repetition  of  wickedness 
produces  great  stupidity  of  conscience,  or,  as  it  is  frequently 
termed,  hardness  of  heart.  But  no  one  ever  considers  this 
stupidity  as  in  any  manner  an  excuse.  It  is,  on  the  con- 
trary, always  held  to  be  an  aggravation  of  crime.  Thus, 
we  term  a  man,  who  has  become  so  accustomed  to  crime, 
that  he  will  commit  murder  without  feeling  and  without 
regret,  a  remorseless  murderer,  a  cold-blooded  assassin  ;  and 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS.  91 

every  one  knows  that,  by  these  epithets,  we  mean  to  des- 
ignate a  special  and  additional  element  of  guiltiness.  This 
I  take  to  be  the  universal  sentiment  of  man. 

2.  The  assertion  of  the  contrary  would  lead  to  results 
manifestly  erroneous. 

Suppose  two  men,  of  precisely  the  same  moral  attain- 
ments, to-day,  to  commence,  at  the  same  time,  two  courses 
of  conduct,  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other.  The  first, 
by  the  scrupulous  doing  of  right,  cultivates,  to  the  utmost, 
his  moral  nature,  and  increases,  with  every  day,  his  capa- 
city for  virtue.  The  sphere  of  his  benevolent  affections  en- 
larges, and  the  play  of  his  moral  feelings  becomes  more 
and  more  intense,  until  he  is  filled  with  the  most  ardent 
desire  to  promote  the  welfare  of  every  fellow-creature,  and 
to  do  the  will  of  God  with  his  whole  heart.  The  other,  by 
a  continued  course  of  crime,  gradually  destroys  the  sus- 
ceptibility of  his  conscience,  and  lessens  his  capacity  for 
virtue,  until  his  soul  is  filled  with  hatred  to  God,  and  no 
other  feeling  of  obligation  remains,  except  that  of  fidelity  to 
his  copartners  in  guilt. 

Now,  at  the  expiration  of  this  period,  if  both  of  these  men 
should  act  according  to  what  each  felt  to  be  the  dictate  of 
conscience,  they  would  act  very  differently.  But,  if  a  man 
can  be  under  obligation  to  do,  and  to  leave  undone,  nothing 
but  what  his  conscience,  at  a  particular  moment,  indicates, 
I  do  not  see  but  that  these  men  would  be,  in  the  actions  of 
that  moment,  equally  innocent.  The  only  difference  be- 
tween them,  so  far  as  the  actions  of  a  particular  moment 
were  concerned,  would  be  the  difference  between  a  virtuous 
man  and  a  virtuous  child. 

From  these  facts,  we  are  easily  led  to  the  distinction  be- 
tween right  and  wrong,  and  innocence  and  guilt.     Right 
and  wrong  depend  upon  the  relations  under  which  beings 
are  created  ;  and,  hence,  the  obligations  resulting  from  these 
relations   are,   in   their   nature,   fixed   and    unchangeable. 
Guilt  and  innocence  depend  upon  the  knowledge  of  these  A 
relations,  and  of  the  obligations  arising  from   them.     As* 
these  are   manifestly  susceptible  of  variation,  while  right    f 
and  wrong  are  invariable,  the  two  notions  may  manifestly 
not  always  correspond  to  each  other. 


92  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS. 

Thus,  for  example,  an  action  may  be  wrong ;  but,  if  the 
actor  have  no  means  of  knowing  it  to  be  wrong,  he  is  held 
morally  guiltless,  in  the  doing  of  it.  Or,  again,  a  man  may 
have  a  consciousness  of  obligation,  and  a  sincere  desire  to 
act  in  conformity  to  it;  and  may,  from  ignorance  of  the 
way  in  which  that  obligation  is  to  be  discharged,  perform 
an  act  in  its  nature  wrong  ;  yet,  if  he  have  acted  according 
to  the  best  of  his  possible  knowledge,  he  may  not  only  be 
held  guiltless,  but  even  virtuous.  And,  on  the  contrary,  ii 
a  man  do  what  is  actually  right,  but  without  a  desire  to 
fulfil  the  obligation  of  which  he  is  conscious,  he  is  held  to 
be  guilty ;  for  he  has  not  manifested  a  desire  to  act  in 
obedience  to  the  obligations  under  which  he  knew  himself 
to  be  created.  Illustrations  of  these  remarks  may  be  easily 
drawn  from  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  or  from  the  Scriptures. 

And,  hence,  we  also  arrive  at  another  principle,  of  impor- 
tance in  our  moral  judgments,  namely,  that  our  own  con- 
sciousness of  innocence,  or  our  not  being  conscious  of  guilt, 
is  by  no  means  a  sufficient  proof  of  our  innocence.  A  man 
may  never  have  reflected  on  the  relations  in  which  he 
stands  to  other  men,  or  to  God ;  and,  hence,  may  be  con- 
scious of  no  feeling  of  obligation  toward  either,  in  any  or  in 
particular  respects.  This  may  be  the  fact ;  but  his  inno- 
cence would  not  be  established,  unless  he  can  also  show 
that  he  has  faithfully  and  impartially  used  all  the  powers 
which  God  has  given  him,  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  these 
relations.  Or,  again,  he  may  understand  the  relation,  and 
have  no  corresponding  sensibility.  This  may  be  the  fact ; 
but  his  innocency  would  not  be  established,  unless  he  can 
also  show  that  he  has  always  faithfully  and  honestly  obeyed 
his  conscience,  so  that  his  moral  insensibility  is,  in  no  man- 
ner, attributable  to  his  own  acts.  Until  these  things  can 
be  shown,  the  want  of  consciousness  of  guilt  will  be  no 
proof  of  innocence.  To  this  principle,  if  I  mistake  not,  the 
Apostle  Paul  alludes,  in  1  Cor.  iv.  3,  4 :  "  But  with  me,  it 
is  a  very  small  thing  to  be  judged  of  you,  or  of  man's  judg- 
ment :  yea,  I  judge  not  my  ownself,  for  I  know  nothing 
of  my  ownself  (or,  rather,  I  am  conscious  of  nothing  wrong 
in  myself;  that  is,  of  no  unfaithfulness  in  office)  ;  yet,  am 
I  not  hereby  justified :  but  he  that  judgeth  me  is  the  Lord." 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS.  93 

/  And,  ihus,  a  man   may  do   great  wrong,  and  be  deepH 

guilty,  in  respect  to  a  whole  class  of  obligations,  without^ 

1  being,  in  any  painful  degree,  sensible  of  it.     Such  I  think! 

\to  be  the  moral  state  in  which   rn.en,  in  general,  are,  in) 

\respect  to  their  obligations  to  God.  /  Thus,  saith  our  Savior 

to  the  Jews  :  "  I  know  you,  that  ye  have  not  the  love  of 

God  in  you ; "  while  they  were  supposing  themselves  to 

be  the  special  favorites  of  Heaven. 

From  these  remarks,  we  may  also  learn  the  relation  in 
which  beings,  created  as  we  are,  stand  to  moral  law. 

Man  is  created  with  moral  and  intellectual  powers,  capa- 
ble of  progressive  improvement.     Hence,   if  he   use   his 
faculties  as  he  ought,  he  will  progressively  improve ;  that/ 
and  more  capable  of.yirtueJ   He  is  assured 


of  enjoying  all  the  benefits  which  can  result  from  such 
improvement.  If  he  use  these  faculties  as  he  ought  not, 
and  become  less  and  less  capable  of  virtue,  he  is  hence  held 
responsible  for  all  the  consequences  of  his  misimprovement. 

Now,  as  this  misimprovement  is  his  own  act,  for  which 
he  is  responsible,  it  manifestly  does  not  affect  the  relations 
under  which  he  is  created,  nor  the  obligations  resulting  from 
these  relations ;  that  is,  he  stands,  in  respect  to  the  moral 
requirements  under  which  he  is  created,  precisely  in  the 
same  condition  as  if  he  had  always  used  his  moral  powers 
correctly.  That  is  to  say,  under  the  present  moral  consti- 
tution, every  man  is  justly  held  responsible,  at  every  period 
of  his  existence,  for  that  degree  of  virtue  of  which  he  would 
have  been  capable,  had  he,  from  the  first  moment  of  his 
existence,  improved  his  moral  nature,  in  every  respect,  just 
as  he  ought  to  have  done.  In  other  words,  suppose  some 
human  being  to  have  always  lived  thus,  (Jesus  Christ,  for 
instance,)  every  man,  supposing  him  to  have  the  same  means 
of  knowing  his  duty,  would,  at  every  successive  period  of  his 
existence,  be  held  responsible  for  the  same  degree  of  virtue 
as  such  a  perfect  being  attained  to,  at  the  corresponding 
periods  of  his  existence.  Such  I  think  evidently  to  be  the 
nature  of  the  obligation  which  must  rest  upon  such  beings, 
throughout  the  whole  extent  of  their  duration. 

In  order  to  meet  this  increasing  responsibility,  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  moral  law,  a  being 


94  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT   BEINGS 

under  such  a  constitution,  must,  at  every  moment  of  his 
existence,  possess  a  moral  faculty,  which,  by  perfect  previ- 
ous cultivation,  is  adapted  to  the  responsibilities  of  that 
particular  moment.  But,  suppose  this  not  to  have  been 
the  case ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  his  moral  faculty,  by 
once  doing  wrong,  has  become  impaired,  so  that  it  either 
does  not  admonish  him  correctly  of  his  obligations,  or  that 
he  has  become  indisposed  to  obey  its  monitions.  This 
must,  at  the  next  moment,  terminate  in  action  more  at 
variance  with  rectitude  than  before.  The  adjustment  be- 
tween conscience  and  the  passions,  must  become  deranged ; 
and  thus,  the  tendency,  at  every  successive  moment,  must 
be,  to  involve  him  deeper  and  deeper  in  guilt.  And,  unless 
some  other  moral  force  be  exerted  in  the  case,  such  must 
be  the  tendency  for  ever. 

And  suppose  some  such  force  to  be  exerted,  and,  at  an) 
period  of  his  existence,  the  being  to  begin  to  obey  his  con- 
science in  every  one  of  its  present  monitions.  It  is  mani- 
fest, that  he  would  now  need  some  other  and  more  perfect 
guide,  in  order  to  inform  him  perfectly  of  his  obligations, 
and  of  the  mode  in  which  they  were  to  be  fulfilled.  And, 
supposing  this  to  be  done :  as  he  is  at  this  moment  respon- 
sible for  such  a  capacity  for  virtue,  as  would  have  been 
attained  by  a  previously  perfect  rectitude ;  and  as  his  capa- 
city is  inferior  to  this ;  and  as  no  reason  can  be  suggested, 
why  his  progress  in  virtue  should,  under  these  circum- 
stances, be  more  rapid  than  that  of  a  perfect  being,  but  the 
contrary ;  it  is  manifest,  that  he  must  ever  fall  short  of  what 
is  justly  required  of  him, — nay,  that  he  must  be  continually 
falling  farther  and  farther  behind  it. 

And  hence,  the  present  constitution  tends  to  show  us 
the  remediless  nature  of  moral  evil,  under  the  government 
of  God,  unless  some  other  principle,  than  that  of  Jaw,  be 
admitted  into  the  case.  These  conditions  of  being  having 
been  violated,  unless  man  be  placed  under  some  other  con- 
ditions, natural  religion  would  lead  us  to  believe,  that  he 
must  suffer  the  penalty,  whatever  it  be,  of  wrong.  Peni- 
tence could  in  no  manner  alter  his  situation  ;  for  it  is  merely 
a  temper  justly  demanded,  in  consequence  of  his  sin.  But 
this  could  not  replace  him  in  his  original  relation  to  the  law 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS.  95 

which  had  been  violated.  Such  seems  to  be  the  teachings 
of  the  Holy  Scriptures ;  and  they  seem  to  me  to  declare, 
moreover,  that  this  change  in  the  conditions  of  our  being, 
has  been  accomplished  by  the  mediation  of  a  Redeemer, 
by  which  change  of  conditions  we  may,  through  the 
obedience  of  another,  be  justified  (that  is,  treated  as  though 
just),  although  we  are,  by  confession,  guilty. 

And  hence,  although  it  were  shown  that  a  man  was,  at 
any  particular  period  of  his  being,  incapable  of  that  degree 
of  virtue  which  the  law  of  God  required,  it  would  neither 
follow  that  he  was  not  under  obligation  to  exercise  it,  nor 
that  he  was  not  responsible  for  the  whole  amount  of  that 
exercise  of  it ;  since,  if  he  have  dwarfed  his  own  powers, 
he  is  responsible  for  the  result.  And,  conversely,  if  God 
require  this  whole  amount  of  virtue,  it  will  not  prove  that 
man  is  now  capable  of  exercising  it ;  but  only,  that  he  is 
either  thus  capable,  or,  that  he  would  have  been  so,  if  he 
had  used  correctly  the  powers  which  God  gave  him. 

A  few  suggestions  respecting  the  moral  relations  of  habit, 
will  close  this  discussion. 

Some  of  the  most  important  facts  respecting  habit,  are 
the  following: 

It  is  found  to  be  the  fact,  that  the  repetition  of  any 
physical  act,  at  stated  periods,  and  especially  after  brief 
intervals,  renders  the  performance  of  the  act  easier ;  it  is 
accomplished  in  less  time,  with  less  effort,  with  less  ex- 
pense of  nervous  power,  and  of  mental  energy.  This  is 
exemplified,  every  day,  in  the  acquisition  of  the  mechan- 
ical arts,  and  in  learning  the  rudiments  of  music.  And 
whoever  will  remark,  may  easily  be  convinced,  that  a  great 
part  of  our  education,  physical  and  intellectual,  in  so  far  as 
it  is  valuable,  consists  in  the  formation  of  habits. 

The  same  remarks  apply,  to  a  very  considerable  extent, 
to  moral  habits.  x 

The  repetition  of  a  virtuous  act  produces  a  tendency  to 
continued  repetition ;  the  force  of  opposing  motives  is  les- 
sened ;  the  power  of  the  will  over  passion  is  more  decided; 
and  the  act  is  accomplished  with  less  moral  effort.  Perhaps 
we  should  express  the  fact  truly,  by  saying,  that,  by  the 
repetition  of  virtuous  acts,  moral  power  is  gained  j  while 


96  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS. 

for  the  performance  of  the  same  acts,  less  moral  power  is 
required. 

On  the  contrary,  by  the  repetition  of  vicious  acts,  a 
tendency  is  created  towards  such  repetition ;  the  power  of 
the  passions  is  increased  ;  the  power  of  opposing  forces  is 
diminished;  and  the  resistance  to  passion  requires  a  greater 
moral  effort ;  or,  as  in  the  contrary  of  the  preceding  case, 
a  greater  moral  effort  is  required  to  resist  our  passions, 
while  the  moral  power  to  resist  them  is  diminished. 

Now,  the  obvious  nature  of  such  a  tendency  is,  to  arrive 
at  a  fixed  and  unalterable  moral  state.  Be  .  the  fact 
accounted  for  as  it  may,  I  think  that  habit  has  an  effect 
upon  the  will,  such  as  to  establish  a  tendency  towards  the 
impossibility  to  resist  it.  Thus,  the  practice  of  virtue 
seems  to  tend  towards  rendering  a  man  incapable  of  vice, 
and  the  practice  of  vice  towards  rendering  a  man  incapa- 
ble of  virtue.  It  is  common  to  speak  of  a  man  as  incapa- 
ble of  meanness  ;  and  I  think  we  see  men  as  often,  in  the 
same  sense,  incapable  of  virtue.  And,  if  I  mistake  not, 
we  always  speak  of  the  one  incapacity  as  an  object  of 
praise,  and  of  the  other  as  an  object  of  blame. 

If  we  inquire,  what  are  the  moral  effects  of  such  a  con- 
dition of  our  being,  I  think  we  shall  find  them  to  be  as 
follows  : 

1.  Habit  cannot  alter  the  nature  of  an  action,  as  right 
or  wrong.     It  can  alter  neither  our  relations  to  our  fellow- 
creatures,  nor  to  God,  nor  the  obligations  consequent  upon 
those  relations.     Hence,  the  character  of  the  action  must 
remain  unaffected. 

2.  Nor  can  it  alter  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  action. 
As  he  who  acts  virtuously,  is   entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
virtuous    action,  among  which   the  tendency   to  virtuous 
action  is  included  ;  so,  he  who  acts  viciously,  is  responsi- 
ble for  all  the  consequences  of  vicious  action,  the  corre- 
spondent tendency  to  vicious  action  also  included.     The 
conditions  being  equal,  and  he  being  left  to  his  own  free 
choice,  the  consequences  of  either  course  rest  justly  upon 
himself. 

The  final  causes  of  such  a  constitution  are  also  apparent. 
1.  It  is  manifestly  and  precisely  adapted  to  our  present 


OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS.  97 

state,  when  considered  as  probationary,  and  capable  of 
moral  changes,  and  terminating  in  one  where  moral  change 
is  impossible.  The  constitution  under  which  we  are  placed, 
presents  us  with  the  apparent  paradox  of  a  state  of  inces- 
sant moral  change,  in  which  every  individual  change  has 
a  tendency  to  produce  a  state  that  is  unchangeable. 

2.  The   fact   of  such  a  constitution    is,  manifestly,  in 
tended  to  present  the  strongest  possible  incentives  to  virtue, 
and   monitions    against   vice.     It    teaches    us    that  conse- 
quences are  attached  to  every  act  of  both,  not  only  present 
but  future,  and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  interminable.     As 
every  one  can  easily  estimate  the  pleasures  of  vice  and 
the  pains  of  virtue,  both  in  extent  and  duration  ;  but,  as 
no   one,  taking   into  consideration  the  results  of  the  ten- 
dency which  each  will  produce,  can  estimate  the  intermi- 
nable consequences  which  must  arise  from  either, — there  is", 
therefore,  hence  derived  the  strongest  possible  reason,  why 
we  should  always  do  right,  and  never  do  wrong. 

3.  And  again.     It  is  evident,  that  our  capacity  for  in- 
crease in  virtue,  depends  greatly  upon  the  present  constitu- 
tion, in  respect  to  habit.     I  have  remarked,  that  the  effect 
of  the  repetition  of  virtuous  action,  was  to  give  us  greater 
moral    power,  while  the  given    action  itself  required  less 
moral  effort.     There,  hence,   arises,  if  I  may   so   say,   a 
surplus  of  moral  power,  which  may  be  applied  to  the  accom- 
plishment  of  greater  moral   achievements.     He  who  has 
overcome  one  evil  temper,  has  acquired  moral  power  to 
overcome  another;  and  that  which  was   first  subdued,  is 
kept  in  subjection  without  a  struggle.     He  who  has  formed 
one  habit  of  virtue  practises  it,  without  effort,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  .or   of  original   impulse ;  and   the   power   thus 
acquired,  may  be  applied  to  the  attainment  of  other  and 
more  difficult  habits,  and  the  accomplishment  of  higher 
and  more  arduous  moral  enterprises.     He  who  desires  to 
see  the  influence  of  habit  illustrated,  with  great  beauty  and 
accuracy,  will  be  gratified  by  the  perusal  of  "  The  Hermit 
of  Teneriffe,"  one  of  the  most  delightful  allegories  to  be 
found  in  the  English  language. 

The   relation   between   the   moral   and  the  intellectual 
9 


98  OF    VIRTUE    IN    IMPERFECT    BEINGS. 

powers,  in  the  moral  conditions  of  our  being,  may  be  thus 
briefly  stated  : 

1.  We  are  created  under  certain  relations  to  our  Creator, 
and  to  our  fellow-creatures. 

2.  We   are   created   under  certain   obligations   to  our 
Creator,  and  our  fellow-creatures,  in  consequence  of  these 
relations, — obligations  to  exercise  certain  affections,  and  to 
maintain  courses  of  action  correspondent  to  those  affections. 

3.  By   means  of  our  intellectual  powers,  we   perceive 
these  relations. 

4.  By  means  of  our  moral  powers,  we  become  conscious 
of  these  obligations. 

5.  The  consciousness  of  these  obligations  alone,  would 
not  always  teach  us  how  they  were  to  be  discharged ;  as, 
for  example,  the  consciousness  of  our  obligations  to  God, 
would  not  teach  us  how  God  should  be  worshipped,  and 
so  in  various  other  cases.     It  is  by  the  use  of  the  powers 
of  our  intellect,  that  we  learn  how  these  moral  affections 
are  to  be  carried  into  action.     The  use  of  the  intellect  is, 
therefore,  twofold.     First,  to  discover  to  us  our  relations. 
Secondly,  to  discover  in  what  manner  our  obligations  are  to 
be  discharged. 


99 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

HUMAN  HAPPINESS. 

WE  have  already,  on  several  occasions,  alluded  to  the 
fact,  that  God  has  created  every  thing  double  ;  a  world 
without  us,  and  a  correspondent  world  within  us.  He  has 
made  light  without,  and  the  eye  within;  beauty  without, 
and  taste  within  ;  moral  qualities  in  actions,  and  conscience 
to  judge  of  them  ;  and  so  of  every  orfier  case.  By  means 
of  this  correspondence,  our  communication  with  the  external 
world  exists.  \ 

These  internal  powers  are  called  into  exercise  by  the 
presence  of  their  correspondent  ex temaljobjeels.  Thus,  the 
organ  of  vision  is  excited  by  the  presence  of  light,  the  sense 
of  smell  by  odors,  the  faculty  of  taste  by  beauty  or  by  deform- 
ity, and  so  of  the  rest. 

The  first, effect  of  this  exercise  of  these  faculties  is,  that 
we  are  conscious  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of  surround- 
ing objects.  Thus,  by  sight,  we  become  conscious  of  the 
existence  and  colors  of  visible  objects ;  by  hearing,  of  the 
existence  and  sound  of  audible  objects,  &c. 

But,  it  is  manifest,  that  this  knowledge  of  the  existence 
and  qualities  of  external  objects  is  far  from  being  all  the 
intercourse  which  we  are  capable  of  holding  with  them. 
This  knowledge  of  their  existence  and  qualities  is,  most 
frequently,  attended  with  pleasure  or  pain,  desire  or  aver- 
sion. Sometimes  the  mere  perception  itself  is  immediate- 
ly pleasing  ;  in  other  cases,  it  is  merely  the  sign  of  some 
other  quality  which  has  the  power  of  pleasing  us.  In  the 
first  case,  the  perception  produces  gratification ;  in  the  other, 
it  awakens  desire. 

That  is,  we  stand  in  such  relations  to  the  external  world, 
that  certain  objects,  besides  being  capable  of  being  per- 
ceived, are  also  capable  of  giving  us  pleasure ;  and  certain 


100  HUMAN    HAPPINESS. 

other  objects,  besides  being  perceived,  are  capable  of  giving 
us  pain.  Or,  to  state  the  same  truth  in  the  other  form,  we 
are  so  made  as  to  be  capable,  not  only  of  perceiving,  but 
also  of  being  pleased  with,  or  pained  by,  the  various  objects 
by  which  we  are  surrounded. 

This  general  power  of  being  pleased  or  pained,  may  be, 
and  I  think  frequently  is,  termed  sensitiveness. 

This  sensitiveness,  or  the  power  of  being  made  happy  by 
suiTounding  objects,  is  intimately  connected  with  the  exer- 
cise of  our  various  faculties.  Thus,  the  pleasure  of  vision 
cannot  be  enjoyed  in  any  other  manner,  than  by  the  exer- 
cise of  the  faculty  of  sight.  The  pleasure  of  knowledge  can 
be  enjoyed  in  no  other  way,  than  by  the  exercise  of  the  in- 
tellectual powers.  The  pleasure  of  beauty  can  be  enjoyed 
in  no  other  manner,  than  by  the  exercise  of  the  faculty  of 
taste,  and  of  the  other  subordinate  faculties  on  which  this 
faculty  depends.  And  thus,  in  general,  our  sensitiveness 
derives  pleasure  from  the  exercise  of  those  powers  which  are 
made  necessary  for  our  existence  and  well-being  in  our 
present  state. 

Now,  I  think  thatpve  can  have  no  other  idea  of  happi- 
ness than  the  exercise  of  this  sensitiveness  upon  its  cor- 
responding objects  and  qualities.  It' is  the  gratification  of 
desire,  the  enjoyment  of  what  we  lovej^  or,  as  Dr.  John- 
son remarks,  "  Happiness  consists  in  the  multiplication  of 
agreeable  consciousness." 

It  seems,  moreover,  evident,  that  this  very  constitution  is 
to  us  an  indication  of  the  will  of  our  Creator  ;  that  is,  inas- 
much as  he  has  created  us  with  these  capacities  for  happi- 
ness, and  has  also  created  objects  around  us  precisely 
adapted  to  these  capacities,  he  meant  that  the  one  should  be 
exercised  upon  the  other  ;  that  is,  that  we  should  be  made 
happy  in  this  manner. 

And  this  is  more  evident,  from  considering  that  this  hap- 
piness is  intimately  connected  with  the  exercise  of  those 
faculties,  the  employment  of  which  is  necessary  to  our  ex- 
istence and  our  well-being.  It  thus  becomes  the  incitement 
to  or  the  reward  of  certain  courses  of  conduct,  which  it  is 
necessary,  to  our  own  welfare,  or  to  that  of  society,  that 
we  should  pursue. 


HUMAN    HAPPINESS.  101 

And  thus  we  arrive  at  the  general  principle,  that  our  \ 
desire  for  a  particular  object,  and  the  existence  of  the  object  \ 
adapted  to  this  desire,  is,  in  itself,  a  reason  why  we  should    | 
enjoy  that  object,  in  the  same  manner  as  our  aversion  to 
another  object,  is  a  reason  why  we  should  avoid  it.     There 
may  sometimes  be,  it  is  true,  other  reasons  to  the  contrary, 
more  authoritative  than  that  emanating  from  this  desire  or 
aversion,  and  these  may  and  ought  to  control  jt;  but  this 
does  not  show  that  this  desire  is  not  a  Veasbn,  -and  a  suffi- 
cient one,  if  no  better  reason  can  be  shown  to  the  contrary. 

But,  if  we  consider  the  subject  a  little  more  minutely,  we 
shall  find  that  the  simple  gratification  of  desire,  in  the  man- 
ner above  stated,  is  not  the  only  condition  on  which  our 
happiness  depends. 

We  find,  by  experience,  that  a  desire  or  appetite  may  be 
so  gratified  as  for  ever  afterwards  to  destroy  its  power  of 
producing  happiness.  Thus,  a  certain  kind  of  food  is 
pleasant  to  me  ;  this  is  a  reason  why  I  should  partake  of  it. 
But  I  may  eat  of  it  to  excess,  so  as  to  loathe  it  for  ever 
afterwards,  and  thus  annihilate,  in  my  constitution,  this 
mode  of  gratification.  Now,  the  same  reasoning  which 
proves  that  God  intended  me  to  partake  of  this  food, 
namely,  because  it  will  promote  my  happiness,  also  proves 
that  he  did  not  intend  me  to  partake  of  it  after  this  manner ; 
for,  by  so  doing,  I  have  diminished,  by  this  whole  amount, 
my  capacity  for  happiness,  and  thus  defeated,  in  so  far,  the 
very  end  of  my  constitution.  Or,  again,  though  I  may  not 
destroy  my  desire  for  a  particular  kind  of  food,  by  a  partic- 
ular manner  of  gratification,  yet  I  may  so  derange  my 
system,  that  the  eating  of  it  shall  produce  pain  and  distress, 
so  that  it  ceases  to  be  to  me  a  source  of  happiness,  upon 
the  whole.  In  this  case,  I  equally  defeat  the  design  of  my 
constitution  The  result  equally  shows  that,  although  the 
Creator  means  that  I  should  eat  it,  he  does  not  mean  that 
I  should  eat  it  in  this  manner. 

Again,  every  man  is  created  with  various  and  dissimilar 
forms  of  desire,  correspondent  to  the  different  external 
objects  designed  to  promote  his  happiness.  Now,  it  is 
found  that  one  form  of  desire  may  be  gratified  in  such  a 
manner,  as  to  destroy  the  power  of  receiving  happiness  from 
9* 


102  HUMAN    HAPPINESS. 

another ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  the  first  may  be  so  gratified 
as  to  leave  the  other  powers  of  receiving  happiness  unim- 
paired. Since,  then,  it  is  granted  that  these  were  all  given 
us  for  the  same  end,  namely,  to  promote  our  happiness,  if, 
by  the  first  manner  of  gratification,  we  destroy  another 
power  of  gratification,  while,  by  the  second  manner  of 
gratification,  we  leave  the  other  power  of  gratification  unin- 
jured, it  is  evidently  the  design  of  our  Creator  that  we 
should  limit  ourselves  to  this  second  mode  of  gratification. 

Thus,  I  am  so  formed  that  food  is  pleasant  to  me.  This, 
even  if  there  were  no  necessity  for  eating,  is  a  reason  why 
I  should  eat  it.  But  I  am  also  formed  with  a  desire  for 
knowledge.  This  is  a  reason  why  I  should  study  in  order 
to  obtain  it.  That  is,  God  intended  me  to  derive  happi- 
ness from  both  of  these  sources  of  gratification.  If,  then,  I 
eat  in  such  a  manner  that  I  cannot  study,  or  study  in  such 
a  manner  that  I  cannot  eat,  in  either  case,  I  defeat  his 
design  concerning  me,  by  destroying  those  sources  of  hap- 
piness with  which  he  has  created  me.  The  same  principle 
might  be  illustrated  in  various  other  instances. 

Again,  we  find  that  the  indulgence  of  any  one  form  of 
gratification,  in  such  manner  as  to  destroy  the  power  of 
another  form  of  gratification,  also  in  the  end  diminishes,  and 
frequently  destroys,  the  power  of  deriving  happiness,  even 
from  that  which  is  indulged.  Thus,  he  who  eats  so  as  to 
injure  his  power  of  intellectual  gratification,  injures  also  his 
digestive  organs,  and  produces  disease,  so  that  his  pleasure 
from  eating  is  diminished.  Or,  he  who  studies  so  as  to 
destroy  his  appetite,  in  the  end  destroys  also  his  power  of 
study.  This  is  another  and  distinct  reason,  to  show,  that, 
while  I  am  designed  to  be  happy  by  the  gratification  of  my 
desires,  I  am  also  designed  to  be  happy  by  gratifying  them 
within  a  limit.  The  limit  to  gratification  enters  into  my 
constitution,  as  a  being  designed  for  happiness,  just  as  much 
as  the  power  of  gratification  itself. 

And  again,  our  Creator  has  endowed  us  with  an  addi- 
tional and  superior  power,  by  which  we  can  contemplate 
these  two  courses  of  conduct ;  by  which  we  can  approve 
of  the  one,  and  disapprove  of  the  other ;  and  by  which  the 
one  becomes  a  source  of  pleasure  and  the  other  a  source  of 


HUMAN    HAPPINESS.  103 

pain ;  both  being  separate  and  distinct  from  the  sources  of 
pain  and  pleasure  mentioned  above.  And,  moreover,  he 
has  so  constituted  us,  that  this  very  habit  of  regulating  and 
limiting  our  desires,  is  absolutely  essential  to  our  success  in 
every  undertaking.  Both  of  these  are,  therefore,  additional 
and  distinct  reasons  for  believing,  that  the  restriction  of  our 
desires  within  certain  limits,  is  made,  by  our  Creator,  as 
clearly  necessary  to  our  happiness,  as  the  indulgence  of 
them. 

All  this  is  true,  if  we  consider  the  happiness  of  man 
merely  as  an  individual.  But  the  case  is  rendered  still 
stronger,  if  we  look  upon  man  as  a  society.  It  is  manifest 
that  the  universal  gratification  of  any  single  appetite  or 
passion,  without  limit,  not  to  say  the  gratification  of  all, 
would,  in  a  very  few  years,  not  only  destroy  society,  but 
absolutely  put  an  end  to  the  whole  human  race.  And, 
hence,  we  see  that  the  limitation  of  our  desires  is  not  only 
necessary  to  our  happiness,  but  also  to  our  existence. 

Hence,  while  it  is  the  truth,  that  human  happiness  con- 
sists in  the  gratification  of  our  desires,  it  is  not  the  whole 
truth.  It  consists  in  the  gratification  of  our  desires  within 
the  limits  assigned  to  them  by  cur  Creator.  And,  the 
happiness  of  that  man  will  be  the  most  perfect,  who  regu- 
lates his  desires  most  perfectly  in  accordance  with  the 
laws  under  which  he  has  been  created.  And,  hence,  the 
greatest  happiness  of  which  man  is,  in  his  present  state, 
capable,  is  to  be  attained  by  conforming  his  whole  conduct 
to  the  laws  of  virtue,  that  is,  to  the  will  of  God. 


104 


CHAPTER    FIFTH. 

OF   SELF-LOVE. 

BY  the  term  sensitiveness,  I  have  designated  the  capacity    • 
of  our  nature  to  derive  happiness  from  thg_varjoiis  objects  -^ 
and  qualities  of  the  world  around  us.     Though  intimately 
associated  with  those  powers  by  which  we  obtain  a  knowl- 
edge of  external  objects,  it  differs  from  them.     When  a 
desire  for  gratification  is  excited  by  its  appropriate  objects, 
it  is  termed  appetite,  passion,  &c. 

As  our  means  of  gratification  are  various,  and  are  also 
attended  by  different  effects,  there  is  evidently  an  opportu- 
nity for  a  choice  between  them.  By  declining  a  gratifica- 
tion at  present,  we  may  secure  one  of  greater  value  at  some 
future  time.  That  which  is,  at  present,  agreeable,  may  be 
of  necessity  followed  by  pain ;  and  that  which  is,  at  pres- 
ent, painful,  may  be  rewarded  by  pleasure  which  shall  far 
overbalance  it. 

Now,  it  must  be  evident,  to  every  one  who  will  reflect, 
that  my  happiness,  at  any  one  period  of  my  existence,  is 
just  as  valuable  as  my  happiness  at  the  present  period. 
No  one  can  conceive  of  any  reason,  why  the  present  mo-  | 
ment  should  take  the  precedence,  in  any  respect,  of  any 
other  moment  of  my  being.  Every  moment  of  my  past 
life  was  once  present,  and  seemed  of  special  value  ;  but,  in 
the  retrospect,  all  seem,  so  far  as  the  happiness  of  each  is 
concerned,  of  equal  value.  Each  of  those  to  come  may, 
in  its  turn,  claim  some  pre-eminence ;  though,  now,  we 
plainly  discover  in  anticipation,  that  no  one  is  more  than 
another  entitled  to  it.  Nay,  if  there  be  any  difference,  it  is 
manifestly  in  favor  of  the  most  distant  future,  in  comparison 
with  the  present.  The  longer  we  exist,  the  greater  is  our 
capacity  for  virtue  and  happiness,  and  the  wider  is  our 
sphere  of  existence.  To  postpone  the  present  for  the 


OF     SELF-LOVE.  105 

future,  seems,  therefore,  to  be  the  dictate  of  wisdom,  if  we 
calmly  consider  the  condition  of  our  being. 

But,  it  is  of  the  nature  of  passion,  to  seize  upon  the 
present  gratification,  utterly  irrespective  of  consequences, 
and  utterly  regardless  of  other  or  more  excellent  gratifica- 
tions, which  may  be  obtained  by  self-denial.  He  whose 
passions  are  inflamed,  looks  at  nothing  beyond  the  present 
gratification.  Hence,  he  is  liable  to  seize  upon  a  present 
enjoyment,  to  the  exclusion  of  a  much  more  valuable  one 
in  future,  and  even  in  such  a  manner  as  to  entail  upon 
himself  poignant  and  remediless  misery.  And,  hence,  in 
order  to  be  enabled  to  enjoy  all  the  happiness  of  which  his 
present  state  is  capable,  the  sensitive  part  of  man  needs  to 
be  combined  with  another,  which,  upon  a  comparison  of 
the  present  with  the  future,  shall  impel  him  towards  that 
mode  either  of  gratification  or  of  self-denial,  which  shall 
most  promote  his  happiness  upon  the  whole. 

Such  is  self-love.  We  give  this  name  to  that  part  of 
our  constitution,  by  which  we  are  incited  to  do  or  to  for- 
bear, to  gratify  or  to  deny  our  desires,  simply  on  the  ground 
of  obtaining  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  for  ourselves, 
taking  into  view  a  limited  future,  or  else  our  entire  future 
existence.  When  we  act  from  simple  respect  to  present 
gratification,  we  act  from  passion.  When  we  act  from  a 
respect  to  our  whole  individual  happiness,  without  regard 
to  the  present,  only  as  it  is  a  part  of  the  whole,  and  with- 
out any  regard  to  the  happiness  of  others,  only  as  it  will 
contribute  to  our  own,  we  are  then  said  to  act  from  self- 
love. 

The  difference  between  these  two  modes  of  impulsion 
may  be  easily  illustrated. 

Suppose  a  man  destitute  of  self-love,  and  actuated  only 
by  passion.  He  would  seize  without  reflection,  and  enjoy 
without  limit,  every  object  of  gratification  which  the  present 
moment  might  offer,  without  regard  to  its  value  in  compar- 
ison with  others,  which  might  be  secured  by  self-denial,  and 
without  any  regard  to  the  consequences  which  might  follow 
present  pleasure,  be  they  ever  so  disastrous. 

On  the  contrary,  we  may  imagine  a  being  destitute  of 


106  OF     SELF-LOVE. 

passions,  and  impelled  only  by  self-love  ;  that  is,  by  a  desire 
for  his  own  happiness,  on  the  whole.  In  this  case,  so  far 
as  I  see,  he  would  never  act  at  all.  Having  no  desires  to 
gratify,  there  could  be  no  gratification  ;  and,  hence,  there 
could  be  no  happiness.  Happiness  is  the  result  of  the 
exercise  of  our  sensitiveness  upon  its  corresponding  objects. 
But  we  have  no  sensitiveness  which  corresponds  to  any 
object  in  ourselves  ;  nor  do  ourselves  present  any  object  to 
correspond  to  such  sensitiveness.  Hence,  the  condition  of  a 
being,  destitute  of  passions,  and  actuated  only  by  self-love, 
would  be  an  indefinite  and  most  painful  longing  after  hap- 
piness, without  the  consciousness  of  any  relation  to  external 
objects  which  could  gratify  it.  Nor  is  this  an  entirely 
imaginary  condition.  In  cases  of  deep  melancholy,  and 
of  fixed  hypochondria,  tending  to  derangement,  I  think 
every  one  must  have  observed  in  others,  and  he  is  happy 
if  he  have  not  experienced  in  himself,  the  tendencies  to 
precisely  such  a  state.  The  very  power  of  affection,  or 
sensitiveness,  seems  paralyzed.  This  state  of  mind  has,  I 
think,  been  ascribed  to  Hamlet  by  Shakspeare,  in  the  fol- 
lowing passage : 

"  I  have,  of  late  (but  wherefore  I  know  not),  lost  all 
my  mirth,  foregone  all  custom  of  exercises  ;  and,  indeed,  it 
goes  so  heavily  with  my  dispositions,  that  this  goodly  frame, 
the  earth,  seems  to  me  a  sterile  promontory  ;  this  most 
excellent  canopy,  the  air — look  you — this  brave  overhang- 
ing firmament ;  this  majestical  roof,  fretted  with  golden 
fire  ;  why,  it  appears  no  other  thing  to  me,  than  a  foul  and 
pestilent  congregation  of  vapors.  Man  delights  me  not, 
nor  woman  neither,  though  by  your  smiling  you  seem  to 
say  so." — Hamlet,  Act  ii,  Sc.  2. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  self-love  is  not,  in  itself, 
a  faculty,  or  part  of  our  constitution,  in  itself,  productive 
of  happiness ;  but  rather  an  impulse,  which,  out  of  several 
forms  of  gratification  which  may  be  presented,  inclines  us 
to  select  that  which  will  be  the  most  for  our  happiness, 
considered  as  a  whole.  This  seems  the  more  evident,  from 
the  obvious  fact,  that  a  man,  actuated  by  the  most  zealous 
self-love,  derives  no  more  happiness  from  a  given  gratifica- 


OF    SELF-LOVE.  107 

tion,  than  any  other  man.  His  pleasure,  in  any  one  act  of 
enjoyment,  is  not  in  the  ratio  of  his  self-love,  but  of  his 
sensitiveness. 

From  these  remarks,  we  can  easily  determine  the  rank 
to  which  self-love  is  entitled. 

1.  Its  rank  is  superior  to  that  of  passion.     As  our  hap- 
piness, as  a  whole,  is  of  more  consequence  than  the  happi- 
ness of  any  separate  moment,  so  the  faculty  which  impels 
us  towards  our  happiness  upon  the  whole,  was  manifestly 
intended  to  control  that  which  impels  toward  our  happiness 
for    a   moment.     If   happiness    be   desirable,   the   greatest 
amount  of  it  is  most  desirable  ;  and,  as  we  are  provided 
with  a  constitution,  by  which  we  are  forewarned  of  the 
difference,  and  impelled  to  a  correct  choice,  it  is  the  design 
of  our  Creator  that  we  should  obey  it. 

2.  Its  rank  is  .inferior  to  that  of  conscience.     We   are 
made  not  only  Sensitive  beings,  that  is,  beings,  .capable  of 
happiness,  hut  also  moral  beings;  that  is,  beings  capable,  of 
virtue,     The  latter  is  manifestly  the  most  important  object 
of  our  being,  even  in  so  far  as  our  own  happiness  is  con- 
cerned ;  for,  by  the  practice  of  virtue,  without  respect  to 
our  own  temporal  happiness,  we  secure  our  moral  happi- 
ness, the  most  valuable  of  any  of  which  even  at  the  present 
we  are  capable ;  while,  by  acting  for  own  happiness,  when 
these  seern  to  come  into  competition,  we  lose  that  which  is 
most  valuable,  and  can  be  by  no  means  certain  of  obtain- 
ing the  other.     That  is  to  say,  when  our  own  happiness 
ami  our  duty  seem  to  r-.nrno  into  pnlligipn,,  WP  ai'Q  hound  to 
discard  the  consideration  of  our  own  happiness v_ancLtQ_  do 
what  we  believe  to  be  right. 

This  may  be  illustrated  by  an  example. 

Suppose  that  two  courses  of  action  are  presented  to  our 
choice.  The  one,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  will  promote  our 
individual  happiness  ;  the  other  will  fulfil  a  moral  obligation. 
Now,  in  this  case  we  may  act  in  either  of  these  ways  : 

1.  We  may  seek  our  own  happiness,  and  violate  our 
obligations.  In  this  case,  we  certainly  lose  the  pleasure  of 
virtue,  and  suffer  the  pain  of  remorse,  while  we  must  be 
uncertain  whether  we  shall  obtain  the  object  of  our  desires. 


108  OF    SELF-LOVE. 

2.  We  may  perform  the  act  which  conscience  indicates, 
but  from  our  self-love  as  a  motive.     Here,  we  shall  gain 
whatever  reward,  by  the  constitution  under  which  we  are 
placed,  belongs  to  the  action  ;  but  we  lose  the  pleasure  of 
virtue. 

3.  We  may  perform  the  act  indicated   by  conscience, 
and  from  the  simple  impulse  of  duty.     In  this  case,  we 
obtain  every  reward  which  could  be  obtained  in  the  pre- 
ceding case,  and,  in  addition,  are  blessed  with  the  appro- 
bation of  conscience.     Thus,  suppose  I  deliberate  whether 
I  shall  spend  a  sum  of  money  in  self-gratification,  or  else 
in  an  act  of  benevolence,  which  is  plainly    my   duty.     If 
I  pursue  the  former  course,   it  is  very  uncertain  whether 
I  actually  secure  the   gratification  which    I    seek,    while 
I  lose    the    pleasure    of   rectitude,  and   am    saddened  by 
the    pains  of  remorse.      The  pleasure   of  gratification    is 
soon  overf  but  the  pain  of  guilt  is  enduring.     Or,  agam, 
I  may  perform  the  act  of  benevolence   from  love  of  ap- 
plause,   or   some  modification  of  self-love.     I  here  obtain 
with  more  certainty  the  reputation  which  I  seek,  but  lose 
the  reward  of  conscious  virtue.     Or,  thirdly,  if  I  do  the 
act  without  any  regard  to  my  own  happiness,  and  simply 
from  love  to  God  and  man,  I  obtain  all  the  rewards  which 
attach  to  the  action  by  the  constitution  under  which  I  am 
placed,  and  also  enjoy   the   higher   rewards  of  conscious 
rectitude. 

This  subordination  of  motives  seems  clearly  to  be  re- 
ferred to  by  our  Savior :  "  There  is  no  man,  that  hath 
left  house,  or  brethren,  or  sisters,  or  father,  or  mother,  or 
wife,  or  children,  or  lands,  for  my  sake  and  the  gospel's, 
but  he  shall  receive  an  hundred  fold  now,  in  this  time,  and, 
in  the  world  to  come,  life  everlasting."  That  is  to  say,  a 
man  does  not  obtain  the  reward  of  virtue,  even  in  self- 
denial,  unless  he  disregard  the  consideration  of  himself,  and 
act  from  simple  love  to  God.  To  the  same  purport  is  the 
often  repeated  observation  of  our  Savior  :  "  Whosoever  will 
save  his  life  shall  lose  it ;  and  whosoever  will  lose  his  life, 
for  my  sake,  shall  find  it."  There  are  many  passages  of 
Scripture  which  seem  to  assert,  that  the  very  turning-point 


OF     SELF-LOVE.  1G9 

of  moral  character,  so  far  as  our  relations  to  God  are  con- 
cerned, consists  in  yielding  up  the  consideration  of  our  own 
happiness,  as  a  controlling  motive,  and  subjecting  it,  with- 
out reserve,  to  the  higher  motive,  the  simple  will  of  God. 
If  these  remarks  be  true,  we  see, 

1.  That,  when  conscience  speaks,  the  voice  of  self-love 
must  be  silent.     That  is  to  say,  we  have  no  right  to  seek 
our  own  happiness. jn,_,anjjm_aaQer-  .at  varianca  .with,  .moral 
obligation,.     Nevertheless,  from   several  courses  of  action, 
either  of  which  is  innocent,  we  are  at  liberty  to  choose  that 
which  will  most  conduce  to  our  own  happiness.     In  such 
a  case,  the  consideration  of  our  happiness  is  justly  ultimate. 

2.  The  preceding  chapter  has  shown  us  that  man  was 
designed  to  be  made  happy  by  the  gratification  of  his  de- 
sires.    The   present    chapter   teaches  us,  that,  when   the 
gratification  of  desire  is  at  variance  with  virtue,  a  greater 
happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  self-denial.     Or,  in  other 
words,  our  greatest  happiness  is  to  be  obtained,  not  by  the 
various  modes  of  self-gratification,  but  by  simply  seeking 
the  good  of  others,  and  in  doing  the  will  of  God,  from  the 
heart. 

3.  And,  hence,  we  may  arrive  at  the  general  principle, 
that   every   impulse   or   desire  is  supreme  within  its  own 
assigned  limits ;  but  that,  when  a  lower  comes  into  compe- 
tition with  a  higher  impulsion,  the  inferior  accomplishes  its 
own  object  most  perfectly,  by  being  wholly  subject  to  the 
superior.     Thus,  desire,  or  the  love  of  present  gratification, 
may,  within  its  own  limits,  be  indulged.     But,  when  this 
present  gratification  comes  into  competition  with  self-love, 
even  passion  accomplishes  its  own  object  best ;  that  is,  a 
man    actually   attains  to  more  enjoyment,    by    submitting 
present  desire  implicitly  to  self-love.     And  so  self-love  is 
ultimate  within  its  proper  limits ;  but  when  it  comes  into 
competition  with  conscience,  it   actually  qrpnmp1i«ghpq  it<? 
own  object  best^  by  being  entirely  subject  to  that  which 
the  CreatoHias~constituted  its  superior. 

4.  The  difference  between  self-love,  as  an  innocent  part 
of  our  constitution,  and   selfishness,  a  vicious  disposition, 
may  be  easily  seen.     Self-love  properly  directs  our  choice 

10 


110  OF     SELF-LOVE. 

of  objects,  where  both  are  equally  innocent.  Selfishness  is 
a  similar  disposition  to  promote  our  own  happiness,  upon 
the  whole:  but  it  disposes  us  to  seek  it  in  objects  over 
which  we  have  no  just  control ;  that  is,  which  are  not  inno- 
cent, and  which  we  could  not  enjoy,  without  violating  our 
duties,  either  to  God  or  to  our  neighbor. 


Ill 


CHAPTER    SIXTH. 


IMPERFECTION  OF  CONSCIENCE  ,    NECESSITY  OF   SOME  ADDITION- 
AL MORAL  LIGHT. 

IT  has  been  already  remarked,  that  a  distinction  may  be 
very  clearly  observed  between  right  and  wrong,  and  guilt 
and  innocence.  Right  and  wrong  depend  upon  the  rela- 
tions under  which  we  are  created,  and  the  obligations  re- 
sulting from  them,  and  are  in  their  nature  immutable.  Guilt 
and  innocencxe  have  respect  to  the  individual,  and  are 
modified,  moreover,  by  the  amount  of  his  knowledge  of 
his  duty,  and  are  not  decided  solely  by  the  fact  that  the 
action  was  or  was  not  performed. 

It  is,  moreover,  to  be  observed,  that  the  results  of  these 
two  attributes  of  actions  may  be  seen  to  differ.  Thus,  every 
right  action  is  followed,  in  some  way,  with  pleasure  or 
benefit  to  the  individual ;  and  every  wrong  one,  by  pain  or 
discomfort,  irrespective  of  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the 
author  of  the  act.  Thus,  in  the  present  constitution  of 
things,  it  is  evident  that  a  nation  which  had  no  knowledge 
of  the  wickedness  of  murder,  revenge,  uncleanness,  or  theft, 
would,  if  it  violated  the  moral  law  in  these  respects,  suffer 
the  consequences  which  are  attached  to  these  actions  by  our 
Creator.  And,  on  the  contrary,  a  nation  which  practised 
forgiveness,  mercy,  honesty,  and  purity,  without  knowing 
them  to  be  right,  would  enjoy  the  benefits  which  are  con- 
nected with  such  actions. 

Now,  whatever  be  the  object  of  this  constitution,  by 
which  happiness  or  misery  are  consequent  upon  actions  as 
right  or  wrong,  whether  it  be  as  a  monition,  or  to  inform 
us  of  the  will  of  God  concerning  us,  one  thing  seems  evi- 
dent,— it  is  not  to  punish  actions  as  innocent  'or  guilty: 
for  the  happiness  or  misery  of  which  we  speak,  affect  men 


112  IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

simply  in  consequence  of  the  action,  and  without  any  re- 
gard to  the  innocence  or  guilt  of  the  actor. 

Let  us  now  add  another  element.  Suppose  a  man  to 
know  the  obligations  which  bind  him  to  his  Creator ;  and, 
also,  what  is  his  Creator's  will  respecting  a  certain  action ; 
and  that  he  then  deliberately  violates  this  obligation. 
Every  man  feels  that  this  violation  of  obligation  deserves 
punishment  on  its  own  account ;  and,  also,  punishment 
in  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  obligation  violated. 
Hence,  the  consequences  of  any  action  are  to  be  considered 
in  a  two-fold  light ;  first,  the  consequences  depending  upon 
the  present  constitution  of  things ;  and,  secondly,  those 
which  follow  the  action,  as  innocent  or  guilty  ;  that  is,  as 
violating  or  not  violating  our  obligations  to  our  Creator. 

These  two  things  are  plainly  to  be  considered  distinct 
from  each  other.  Of  the  one,  we  can  form  some  estimate  ; 
of  the  other,  none  whatever.  Thus,  whatever  be  the  design 
of  the  constitution,  by  which  pain  should  be  consequent 
upon  wrong  actions,  irrespective  of  guilt ;  whether  it  be  to 
admonish  us  of  dangers,  or  to  intimate  to  us  the  will  of  our 
Creator  ;  we  can  have  some  conception  how  great  it  \vould 
probably  be.  But,  if  we  consider  the  action  as  guilty ;  that 
is,  as  violating  the  known  will  of  our  Creator;  no  one  can 
conceive  how  great  the  punishment  of  such  an  act  ought  to 
be,  for  no  one  can  conceive  how  vast  is  the  obligation 
which  binds  a  creature  to  his  God :  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  any  one  conceive  how  vast  would  be  the  reward,  if  this 
obligation  were  perfectly  fulfilled. 

As,  then,  every  moral  act  is  attended  with  pleasure  or 
pain,  and  as  every  one  also  exposes  us  to  the  punishments 
or  rewards  of  guilt  or  innocence,  both  of  which  manifestly 
transcend  our  power  of  conception ;  and,  if  such  be  our 
constitution,  that  every  moment  is  rendering  our  moral 
condition  either  better  or  worse ;  specially,  if  this  world  be 
a  state  of  probation,  tending  to  a  state  where  change  is 
impossible ;  it  is  manifestly  of  the  greatest  possible  impor- 
tance that  we  should  both  know  our  duty,  and  be  furnished 
with  all  suitable  impulsions  to  perform  it.  The  constitu- 
tion under  which  man  is  formed,  in  this  respect,  has  been 
explained  at  the  close  of  the  chapter  on  virtue.  And  were 


IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  113 

the  intellect  and  conscience  of  man  to  be  in  a  perfect  state, 
and  were  he  in  entire  harmony  with  the  universe  around 
him,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  his  happiness,  in  the 
present  state,  would  be  perfectly  secured. 

It  would  not,  however,  be  certain  that,  with  intellectual 
and  moral  powers  suited  to  his  station,  man  would  be  in  no 
need  of  farther  communication  from  his  Maker.  Although 
his  feeling  of  obligation,  and  his  desire  to  discharge  it,  might 
be  perfect,  yet  he  might  not  be  fully  aware  of  the  manner 
in  which  this  obligation  should  be  discharged.  Thus,  though 
our  first  parents  were  endowed  with  a  perfect  moral  consti- 
tution, yet  it  was  necessary  that  God  should  make  to  them 
a  special  revelation  respecting  some  portion  of  his  will. 
Such  might  also  be  the  case  in  any  other  instance  of  a  per- 
fect moral  constitution,  in  a  being  of  limited  capacity. 

How  much  more  evidently  is  additional  light  necessary, 
when  it  is  remembered  that  the  moral  constitution  of  man 
seems  manifestly  to  be  imperfect  ?  This  may  be  observed 
in  several  respects : 

1.  There  are  many  obligations  under  which  man  is  cre- 
ated, both  to  his  fellow-creatures  and  to  God,  which  his 
unassisted  conscience  does  not  discover.     Such  are  the  ob- 
ligations to  universal  forgiveness,  to  repentance,  and  many 
others. 

2.  When  the  obligations  are  acknowledged,  man  fre- 
quently errs  in  respect  to  the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  be 
discharged.     Thus,  a  man  may  acknowledge  his  obligations 
to  God,  but  may  suppose  that  God  will  be  pleased  with  a 
human  sacrifice.     A  man  may  acknowledge  his  obligation  to 
love  his  children,  but  may  believe  that  this  obligation  may 
best  be  discharged  by  putting  them  to  death.     Now,  it  is 
manifest,  that,  in  both  these  cases,  a  man  must  suffer  all  the 
present  evils  resulting  from  such  a  course,  just  as  much  as 
though  he  knowingly  violated  these  obligations. 

3.  When  men  both  know  the  obligations  under  which 
they  are  created,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  be 
discharged,  they  wilfully  disobey  the  monitions  of  conscience 
We  act  according   to  the   impulsions   of  blind,  headlong 
passion,  regardless  of  our  own  best  good,  arid  of  the  welfare 
of  others,  in  despite  of  what  we  know  to  be  the  will  of  our 

10* 


114  IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

Maker.  It  is  the  melancholy  fact,  that  men  do  deliberately 
violate  the  commands  of  God,  for  the  sake  of  the  most 
transient  and  trifling  gratification.  Hence  the  hackneyed 
confession  : 

Video,  proboque  meliora; 
Deteriora  sequor. 

And  hence  it  is  evident  that  not  only  are  men  exposing 
themselves  to  the  pains  attendant  upon  wrong  actions  dur 
ing  the  present  life  ;  but  they  are  also  exposing  themselves 
to  the  punishments,  how  great  and  awful  soever  these  may 
be,  which  are  incurred  by  violating  our  obligations  to  oui 
Creator  and  our  Judge.  The  state  of  human  nature  in  these 
respects  I  suppose  to  be  vividly  set  forth  by  St.  Paul  in  the 
Epistle  to  the  Romans,  ch.  vii,  v.  7 — 25. 

If  such  be  our  state,  it  is  manifest  that  under  such  a 
moral  constitution  as  we  have  above  described,  our  condition 
must  be  sufficiently  hopeless.  Unless  something  be  done, 
it  would  seem  that  we  must  all  fail  of  a  large  portion  of  the 
happiness,  to  which  we  might  otherwise  in  the  present  life 
attain ;  and,  still  more,  must  be  exposed  to  a  condemnation 
greater  than  we  are  capable  of  conceiving. 

Under  such  circumstances,  it  surely  is  not  improbable, 
that  a  benevolent  Deity  should  make  use  of  some  additional 
means,  to  inform  us  of  our  duty,  and  thus  warn  us  of  the 
evils  which  we  were  bringing  upon  ourselves.  Still  less  is 
it  improbable,  that  a  God,  delighting  in  right,  should  take 
some  means  to  deliver  us  from  the  guilty  habits  which  we 
have  formed,  and  restore  us  to  that 'love  and  practice  of 
virtue,  which  can  alone  render  us  pleasing  to  him.  That 
God  was  under  any  obligation  to  do  this,  is  not  asserted ; 
but  that  a  being  of  infinite  compassion  and  benevolence 
should  do  it,  though  not  under  any.  obligation,  is  surely  not 
improbable. 

Should  a  revelation  be  made  to  remedy  the  defects  of 
man's  moral  state,  we  can  form  some  conceptions  of  what 
might  be  expected  in  order  to  accomplish  such  a  result. 

1.  Our  defective  knowledge  of  moral  obligation  might 
be  remedied,  by  a  clear  view  of  the  attributes  of  God,  and 
of  the  various  relations  which  we  sustain  to  him. 

2.  Our  ignorance  of  the  mode  in  which  our  obligations 


IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  115 

should  be  discharged,  might  be  dispelled,  either  by  a  more 
expanded  view  of  the  consequences  of  actions,  or  by  direct 
precept. 

3.  In  order  to  overcome  our  temper  of  disobedience,  I 
know  not.  what  means  might  be  employed.  A  reasonable 
one  would  seem  to  be,  a  manifestation  of  the  character  of 
the  Deity  to  us,  in  some  new  relation,  creating  some  new 
obligations,  and  thus  opening  a  new  source  of  moral  motives 
within  the  soul  of  man. 

The  first  and  second  of  these  objects  are  accomplished, 
as  I  suppose,  by  the  discoveries  of  natural  religion,  and  by 
the  promulgation  of  the  moral  law,  under  the  Old  Testament 
dispensation.  The  third  is  accomplished,  by  the  revelation 
of  the  facts  of  the  New  Testament,  ^ind  specially,  by  the 
revelation  of  God,  as  the  author  of  a  -new  and  a  remedial 
dispensation. 

Hence,  we  see  that  the  sources  of  moral  light,  irrespec- 
tive of  conscience,  are, 

1.  The  precepts  of  natural  religion. 

2.  The  precepts  and  motives  of  the  sacred  Scriptures. 
From  what  has  been  remarked,  in  the  present  chapter,  a 

few  inferences  naturally  arise,  which  I  will  insert  in  this 
place. 

It  is  mentioned  above,  that  the  evil  consequences  of 
doing  wrong,  are  manifestly  of  two  kinds.  First,  those 
connected  with  an  action  as  right  or  wrong,  and  arising 
from  the  present  constitution  of  things  ;  and,  secondly,  those 
resulting  from  the  action  as  innocent  or  guilty  ;  that  is,  as 
wilfully  violating,  or  not,  the  obligations  due  to  our  Maker. 

Now,  fronr this  plain  distinction,  we  see, 

1.  *That  no  sin  can  be  of  trifling  consequence.     The 
least  as  well  as  the  greatest,  being  a  violation  of  an  obliga- 
tion more  sacred  and  awful  than  we  can  conceive,  must 
expose  us  to  punishment  more  dreadful  than  we  can  com- 
prehend.    If  it  be  said,  the  thing  in  itself  is  a  trifle,  the 
answer  is  obvious :  How  wicked  must  it  be,  for  the  sake  of 
a  trifle,  to  violate  so  sacred  and  solemn  an  obligation  as  that 
which  binds  us  to  our  Creator  ! 

2.  Hence  we  see  how  unfounded  is  the  assertion  some- 
times made,  that  God  could  not,  for  the  momentary  actions 


1  16  IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE. 

of  this  short  life,  justly  inflict  upon  us  any  severe  or  long 
enduring  punishment.  If  an  act,  whether  long  or  short,  be 
a  violation  of  our  obligations  to  God ;  if  ill-desert  be  ac- 
cording to  the  greatness  of  the  obligation  violated  ;  and  if 
no  one  can  pretend  to  comprehend  the  vastness  of  the  ob- 
ligations which  bind  the  creature  to  the  Creator ;  then,  no 
one  can,  a  priori,  pretend  to  decide  what  is  the  punishment 
justly  due  to  every  act  of  wilful  wickedness.  It  is  evident 
that  no  one  can  decide  this  question  but  he  who  fully  knows 
the  relation  between  the  parties ;  that  is,  the  Creator 
himself. 

3.  Since  every  impure,  revengeful,  deceitful  or  envious 
thought  is  a  violation  of  our  obligations  to  our  Maker,  and, 
much  more,  the  words  and  actions  to  which  these  thoughts 
give  rise ;  and  since  even  the  imperfect  conscience  of  every 
individual  accuses  him  of  countless  instances,  if  not  of  habits, 
of  such  violation :  if  the  preceding  observations  be  just,  it 
is  manifest  that  our  present  moral  condition  involves  the 
elements  of  much  that  is  alarming.     It  surely  must  be  the 
duty  of  every  reasonable  man,  to  inquire,  with  the  deepest 
solicitude,  whether  any  way  of  escape  from  punishment,  and 
of  moral  renovation,  have  been  revealed  by  the  Being  against 
whom  we  have  sinned ;  and,  if  any  such  revelation  have 
been  made,  it  must  be  our  most  solemn  duty  to  conform  our 
lives  to  such  principles  as  shall  enable  us  to  avail  ourselves 
of  its  provisions. 

4.  The  importance  of  this  duty  will  be  still  more  clearly 
evident,  if  we  consider,  that  the  present  is  a  state  of  proba- 
tion, in  which  alone  moral  change  is  possible ;  and  which 
must  speedily  terminate  in  a  state,  by  necessity,  unchange- 
able ;  for  which,  also,  the  present  state  therefore  offers  us 
the  only  opportunity  of  preparation.     To  neglect  either  to 
possess  ourselves  of  all  the  knowledge  in  our  power  on  this 
subject,  or  to  neglect  to  obey  any  reasonable  precepts  which 
afford  the  least  probability  of  improving  our  condition  for  the 
future,  seems  a  degree  of  folly  for  which  it  is  really  impos- 
sible to  find  an  adequate  epithet. 

5.  Nor  does  it  render  this  folly  the  less  reprehensible, 
for  a  man  gravely  to  assert,  that  we  do  not  know  any  thing 
about  the  future  world,  and,  therefore,  it  is  needless  to  in- 


IMPERFECTION    OF    CONSCIENCE.  117 

quire  respecting  it.  This  is  to  assert,  ivithout  inquiry, 
what  could  only  be  reasonably  asserted  after  the  most  full 
and  persevering  inquiry.  No  man  can  reasonably  assert 
that  we  know  nothing  respecting  the  other  world,  until  he 
has  examined  every  system  of  religion  within  his  knowl- 
edge, and,  by  the  fair  and  legitimate  use  of  his  understand- 
ing, shown  conclusively  that  none  of  them  throw  any  light 
upon  the  subject.  By  what  right,  therefore,  can  a  man 
utter  such  an  assertion,  who,  at  the  outset,  declares  that 
he  will  examine  none  of  them?  What  should  we  think 
of  the  man  who  declared  that  he  would  not  study  astron- 
omy, for  that  no  one  knew  more  about  the  heavens  than  he 
did  himself?  Yet  many  men  neglect  to  inform  themselves 
on  the  subject  of  religion  for  no  better  reason.  It  is  very 
remarkable,  that  men  do  not  perceive  the  absurdity  of  an 
assertion  respecting  religion,  which  they  would  immediately 
perceive,  if  uttered  respecting  any  thing  else. 


118 


CHAPTER    SEVENTH. 

OF   NATURAL  RELIGION. 

IN  the  preceding  chapter,  I  have  endeavored  to  illustrate 
the  nature  of  our  moral  constitution,  and  to  show  that,  in 
our  present  state,  conscience,  unassisted,  manifestly  fails  to 
produce  the  results  which  seem  to  have 'been  intended; 
and  which  are  necessary  to  our  attaining  the  happiness 
which  is  put  within  our  power ;  and  to  our  avoiding  the 
misery  to  which  we  are  exposed.  That  some  additional 
light  will  be  granted  to  us,  and  that  some  additional  moral 
power  will  be  imparted,  seems  clearly  not  improbable. 
This  I  suppose  to  have  been  done  by  the  truths  of  natural 
and  revealed  religion.  In  the  present  chapter,  I  shall  treat 
of  natural  religion  under  the  following  heads  : 

1.  The  manner  in  which  we  may  learn  our  duty,  by  the 
light  of  nature. 

2.  The  extent  to  which  our  knowledge  of  duty  can  be 
carried  by  this  mode  of  teaching. 

3.  The  defects  of  the  system  of  natural  religion. 


SECTION   1. 

OF  THE  MANNER  IN  WHICH  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  BY  THE 
LIGHT  OF  NATURE. 

In  treating  upon  this  subject,  it  is  taken  for  granted, 
I.  That  there  is  an  intelligent  and  universal  First  Cause, 
who  made  us  as  we  are,  and  made  all  things  around  us 
capable  of  affecting  us,  both  as  individuals  and  as  societies, 
as  they  do. 


HOW  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY,  ETC.      119 

2.  That  He  had  a  design  in  so  making  us,  and  in  con- 
stituting the  relations    around  us  as  they  are  constituted; 
and  that  a  part  of  that  design  was  to  intimate  to  us  his  will 
concerning  us. 

3.  That  we  are  capable  of  observing  these  relations,  and 
of  knowing  how  various  actions  affect  us  and  affect  others. 

4.  And  that  we  are  capable  of  learning  the  design  with 
which  these  various  relations  were  constituted  ;    and,  spe- 
cially, that  part  of  the  design  which  was  to  intimate  to  us 
the  will  of  our  Creator. 

The  application  of  these  self-evident  principles  to  the 
subject  of  duty  is  easy.  We  know  that  we  are  so  made  as 
to  derive  happiness  from  some  courses  of  conduct,  and  to 
suffer  unhappiness  from  others.  Now,  no  one  can  doubt 
that  the  intention  of  our  Creator  in  these  cases  was  that  we 
should  pursue  the  one  course,  and  avoid  the  othen  Or, 
again,  we  are  so  made,  that  we  are  rendered  unhappy,  on 
the  whole,  by  pursuing  a  course  of  conduct  in  some  partic 
ular  manner,  or  beyond  a  certain  degree.  This  is  an  inti- 
mation of  our  Creator,  respecting  the  manner  and  the 
degree  in  which  he  designs  us  to  pursue  that  course  of 
conduct. 

Again,  as  has  been  said  before,  society  is  necessary,  not 
merely  to  the  happiness,  but  to  the  actual  existence,  of  the 
race  of  man.  Hence,  it  is  necessary,  in  estimating  the 
tendency  of  actions  upon  our  own  happiness,  to  extend  our 
view  beyond  the  direct  effect  of  an  action  upon  ourselves. 
Thus,  if  we  cannot  perceive  that  any  evil  would  result  to 
ourselves  from  a  particular  course  of  action,  yet,  if  it  would 
tend  to  injure  society,  specially  if  it  would  tend  to  destroy 
society  altogether,  we  may  hence  arrive  at  a  clear  indica- 
tion of  the  will  of  our  Creator  concerning  it.  As  the  de- 
struction of  society  would  be  the  destruction  of  the  individ- 
ual, it  is  as  evident  that  God  does  not  intend  us  to  do  what 
would  injure  society,  as  that  He  does  not  intend  us  to  do 
what  would  injure  our  own  bodies,  or  diminish  our  individ- 
ual happiness.  And  the  principle  of  limitation  suggested 
above,  applies  in  the  same  manner  here  :  that  is,  if  a  course 
of  conduct,  pursued  in  a  certain  manner,  or  to  a  certain 
extent,  be  beneficial  to  society ;  and  if  pursued  in  another 


120  HOW   WE    MAY   LEARN   OUR 

manner,  or  beyond  a  certain  extent,  is  injurious  to  it ;  the 
indication  is,  in  this  respect,  clear,  as  to  the  will  of  our 
Maker  respecting  us. 

To  apply  this  to  particular  cases.  Suppose  a  man  were  in 
doubt,  whether  or  not  drunkenness  were  agreeable  to  the  will 
of  his  Maker.  Let  us  suppose  that  intemperate  drinking  pro- 
duces present  pleasure,  but  that  it  also  produces  subsequent 
pain ;  and  that,  by  continuance  in  the  habit,  the  pleasure 
becomes  less,  and  the  pain  greater;  and  that  the  pain 
affects  various  powers  of  the  mind,  and  different  organs  of 
the  body.  Let  a  man  look  around  him,  and  survey  the 
crime,  the  vice,  the  disease,  and  the  poverty,  which  God 
has  set  over  against  the  momentary  gratification  of  the 
palate,  and  the  subsequent  excitement  which  it  produces. 
Now,  whoever  will  look  at  these  results,  and  will  consider 
that  God  had  a  design  in  creating  things  to  affect  us  as  they 
do,  must  be  as  fully  convinced  that,  by  these  results,  He  in- 
tended to  forbid  intemperance,  as  though  He  had  said  so 
by  a  voice  from  heaven.  The  same  principle  may  be 
applied  to  gluttony,  libertinism,  or  any  other  vice. 

Another  example  may  be  taken  from  the  case  of  re- 
venge. Revenge  is  that  disposition  which  prompts  us  to 
inflict  pain  upon  another,  for  the  sake  of  alleviating  the 
feeling  of  personal  degradation  consequent  upon  an  injury. 
Now,  suppose  a  man,  inflamed  and  excited  by  this  feeling 
of  injury,  should  inflict,  upon  the  other  party,  pain,  until  his 
excited  feeling  was  gratified :  the  injured  party  would  then 
manifestly  become  the  injurer;  and,  thus,  the  original 
injurer  would  be,  by  the  same  rule,  entitled  to  retaliate. 
Thus,  revenge  and  retaliation  would  go  on  increasing  until 
the  death  of  one  of  the  parties.  The  duty  of  vengeance 
would  then  devolve  upon  the  surviving  friends  and  relatives 
of  the  deceased,  and  the  circle  would  widen  until  it  in- 
volved whole  tribes  or  nations.  Thus,  the  indulgence  of 
this  one  evil  passion  would,  in  a  few  generations,  render 
the  thronged  city  an  unpeopled  solitude.  Nor  is  this  a 
mere  imaginary  case.  The  Indians  of  North  America  are 
known  to  have  considered  the  indulgence  of  revenge  not 
merely  as  innocent,  but  also  as  glorious,  and  in  some  sense 
obligatory.  The  result  was,  that,  at  the  time  of  the  discov- 


DUTY   BY   THE    LIGHT    OF    NATURE.  121 

ery  of  this  continent,  they  were  universally  engaged  in 
wars ;  and,  according  to  the  testimony  of  their  oldest  and 
wisest  chiefs,  their  numbers  were  rapidly  diminishing.  And, 
hence,  he  who  observes  the  effects  of  revenge  upon  society, 
must  be  convinced,  that  he  who  formed  the  constitution 
under  which  we  live,  must  have  intended,  by  these  effects, 
to  have  forbidden  it,  as  clearly  as  though  he  had  made  it 
known  by  language.  He  has  given  us  an  understanding, 
by  the  simplest  exercise  of  which,  we  arrive  at  this  con- 
clusion. 

It  is  still  further  to  be  observed,  that,  whenever  a  course 
of  conduct  produces  individual,  it  also  produces  social 
misery ;  and  whenever  a  course  of  conduct  violates  the 
social  laws  of  our  being,  it  of  necessity  produces  individual 
misery.  And,  hence,  we  see  that  both  of  these  indications 
are  combined,  to  teach  us  the  same  lesson  ;  that  is,  to  inti- 
mate to  us  what  is,  and  what  is  not,  the  will  of  God 
respecting  our  conduct. 

Hence,  we  see  that  two  views  may  be  taken  of  an 
action,  when  it  is  contemplated  in  the  light  of  nature  :  first, 
as  affecting  ourselves  ;  and,  secondly,  as  affecting  both 
ourselves  and  society,  but  specially  the  latter.  It  is  in  this 
latter  view  that  we  introduce  the  doctrine  of  general  con- 
sequences. We  ask,  in  order  to  determine  what  is  our 
duty,  What  would  be  the  result,  if  this  or  that  action  were 
universally  practised  among  men  ?  Or,  how  would  it  affect 
the  happiness  of  individuals,  and  of  the  whole  ?  By  the 
answer  to  these  questions,  we  ascertain  what  is  the  will  of 
God  in  respect  to  that  action,  or  that  course  of  action.  When 
once  the  will  of  God  is  ascertained,  conscience,  as  we  have 
shown,  teaches  us  that  we  are  under  the  highest  obligation 
to  obey  it.  Thus,  from  the  consideration  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness,  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  our 
duty,  not  directly,  but  indirectly.  The  feeling  of  moral 
obligation  does  not  arise  from  the  simple  fact  that,  such  a 
course  of  conduct  will,  or  will  not,  produce  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness ;  but,  from  the  fact  that  this  tendency 
shows  us  what  is  the  will  of  our  Creator  ;  and  we  are,  by 
the  principles  of  our  nature,  under  the  highest  possible  obli- 
gation to  obey  that  will. 
11 


122  HOW    WE    MAY    LEARN    OUR 

It  must  be  evident  that  a  careful  observation  of  the 
results  and  tendencies  of  actions,  and  of  different  courses 
of  conduct,  will  teach  us,  in  very  many  respects,  the  laws 
of  our  moral  nature  ;  that  is,  what,  in  these  respects,  is  the 
will  of  our  Creator.  Now,  these  laws,  thus  arrived  at, 
and  reduced  to  order  and  arrangement,  form  the  system  of 
natural  religion.  So  far  as  it  goes,  every  one  must  confess 
such  a  system  to  be  valuable  ;  and  it,  moreover,  rests  upon 
as  sure  and  certain  a  basis  as  any  system  of  laws  whatever. 

To  all  this,  however,  I  know  but  of  one  objection  that 
can  be  urged.  It  is,  that  pain  is  not,  of  necessity,  punitive, 
or  prohibitory  ;  and  that  it  may  be  merely  monitoiy  or 
advisory.  Thus,  if  I  put  my  hand  incautiously  too  near 
the  fire,  I  am  admonished  by  the  pain  which  I  feel  to  with- 
draw it.  Now,  this  pain  is,  manifestly,  only  monitory,  and 
intended  merely  to  warn  me  of  danger.  It  is  not,  of  neces- 
sity, prohibitory  ;  for,  I  may  hold  my  hand  so  near  to  the 
fire  as  to  produce  great  pain,  for  some  necessary  purpose, — 
as,  for  instance,  for  the  sake  of  curing  disease, — and  yet 
not  violate  my  obligations  to  my  Creator,  nor  in  any 
measure  incur  his  displeasure. 

Now,  the  fact  thus  stated  may  be  fully  admitted,  without 
in  the  least  affecting  the  argument.  It  is  evident,  that 
many  of  the  pains  to  which  we  are  at  present  exposed,  are, 
in  their  nature,  intended  to  warn  us  of  approaching  harm, 
as  in  the  instance  just  mentioned  ;  or,  they  may  be  intima- 
tions of  mischief  actually  commenced,  of  which  we  could 
not  be  otherwise  aware, — as  in  the  case  of  internal  diseases. 
And,  it  is  manifest,  that,  such  being  their  nature  and  design, 
they  must  be  intimately  connected  with,  and  either  accom- 
pany or  precede,  that  injury  of  which  they  are  intended  to 
forewarn  or  to  inform  us  ;  and  it  is  natural  to  expect  that 
they  would  cease  or  tend  to  cessation,  as  soon  as  they  have 
accomplished  the  object  for  which  they  were  intended. 
And  such,  I  think,  will  in  general  be  found  to  be  the  fact, 
with  respect  to  those  pains  which  are  in  their  nature  mon- 
itory. 

But  I  think  it  will  be  evident,  to  every  one  who  will 
observe,  that  many  of  the  pains  endured  under  the  present 
constitution,  are  not  of  this  kind. 


DUTY   BY    THE    LIGHT    OF    NATURE.  123 

Thus,  for  example  : 

1.  There  are  many  pains  which  are  inflicted  in  conse- 
quence of  actions  of  which  we  were  forewarned  by  con- 
science.    It  would  seem  that  the  design  of  these   pains 
could  not  be  monitory,  inasmuch  as  monition  is  performed 
by  another  faculty. 

2.  There  are  many  pains  which,  from  the  nature  of  our 
constitution,  are  not  inflicted  until  after  the  act  has  been 
performed,  and  the  evil  accomplished.     This  is  the  case 
with  drunkenness,  and  many  other  vices.     Here,  the  pain 
cannot  be  intended  as  a  premonition ;  for  it  is  not  inflicted 
in  its  severity  until  after  the  injury  has  actually  been  done. 

3.  Not  only  does  the  pain,  in  many  cases,  occur  after- 
wards ;  it  frequently  does  not  occur  until  a  long  time  after 
the  offence.     Months,  and  even  years,  may  elapse,  before 
the  punishment  overtakes  the  criminal.     This  is  very  fre- 
quently the  case  with  youthful  crimes,  which,  ordinarily, 
exhibit  their  result  not  until  manhood,  or  even  old  age. 
Now,  pain   must  here  be  intended  to  signify   something 
else  besides  warning. 

4.  We  find  that  the   punishment,  in  many  cases,  bears 
no  sort  of  proportion  either  to  the  benefit  obtained  by  the 
individual,  or  even  to  the  injury,  in  the  particular  instance, 
inflicted  upon  society.     This  is  manifest  in  very  many  in- 
stances of  lying,  forgery,  small  theft,  and  the  like,  in  which, 
by  a  single  act  of  wrong,  a  person  ruins  a  reputation  which 
it  had  taken  a  whole  life  to  establish.     Now,  in  such  a  case 
as  this,  it  is  evident  that  the  purpose  of  warning  could  not 
be  intended ;  for  this  end  could  be  accomplished,  at  vastly 
less  expense  of  happiness,  in  some  other  way. 

5.  We  find  that  the  tendency  of  many  instances  of  pun- 
ishment, is  not  to  leave  the  offender  in  the  same  state  as 
before,  but  rather  in  a  worse  state.     His  propensities  to  do 
wrong  are  rendered  stronger,  and  his  inducement  to  do  well 
weaker ;  and  thus  he  is   exposing  himself  to  greater  and 
greater   punishments.     The  tendency,  therefore,  is  not  to 
recovery,  but  to  more  fatal  moral  disease. 

6.  Although   a   man,  by  reformation,   may   frequently 
regain  the  standing  which  he  has  lost,  yet  there  are  mani- 
fest  indications,  in  the   present  constitution,  that,  after   a 


124      HOW  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY,  ETC. 

given  amount  of  trial  has  been  granted,  a  decisive  punish- 
ment is  inflicted  which  extinguishes  for  ever  all  hope,  if 
not  all  possibility,  of  recovery.  A  man  may  waste  par* 
of  his  youth  in  idleness,  and  may  by  diligence  regain  the 
time  which  he  had  lost.  But  he  soon  arrives  at  a  point, 
beyond  which  such  opportunity  is  impossible.  Thus  also 
in  morals,  a  man  may  sometimes  do  wrong,  and  return  to 
virtue,  and  escape  present  punishment ;  but  every  instance 
of  crime  renders  the  probability  of  escape  less ;  and  he  at 
last  arrives  at  a  point,  beyond  which  nothing  can  avert  the 
infliction  of  the  merited  and  decisive  calamity. 

7.  We  find  that  some  actions  produce  misery  which 
extends  to  other  beings  besides  those  who  are  actually  con- 
cerned in  committing  them. 

This  takes  place  sometimes  by  example,  and  at  other 
times  the  pain  is  inflicted  upon  those  who  could  not  be 
infected  by  the  example.  Illustrations  of  this  are  seen  in 
cases  of  disease  propagated  by  hereditary  descent,  in  misery 
arising  from  the  misconduct  of  rulers,  in  the  suffering  of  men 
from  flagitious  crimes  of  relatives  and  acquaintances.  And 
in  consequence  of  the  constitution  under  which  we  exist, 
these  miseries  are  frequently  transmitted  down  beyond  any 
assignable  limit.  Thus,  the  condition  of  the  Jews  is  by 
themselves  and  others  frequently  believed  to  be  the  result 
of  some  crime  committed  by  their  forefathers,  either  at  or 
before  the  time  of  Christ.  The  sad  effects  of  the  persecu- 
tion of  Protestantism  in  Spain  and  Portugal,  at  the  time  of 
the  Reformation,  can  be  clearly  traced  in  all  the  subsequent 
history  of  these  countries. 

Now,  all  these  considerations  seem  clearly  to  indicate, 
that  there  are  pains  inflicted  upon  man  for  other  purposes 
except  warning  ;  and  that  they  are  of  the  nature  of  punish- 
ment ;  that  is,  of  pain  inflicted  after  crime  has  been  volun- 
tarily committed,  in  spite  of  sufficient  warning,  and  inflicted 
by  way  of  desert,  as  what  the  offence  really  merits,  and 
what  it  behooves  a  righteous  governor  to  award  transgres- 
sion. 

Nor  will  it  avail,  to  object  that  these  inflictions  are  in- 
tended to  be  warnings  to  others.  This  is  granted ;  but  this 
by  no  means  prevents  their  being  also  punishments  in  the 


HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY,  ETC.    125 

sense  in  which  we  have  considered  them.  Such  is  the  case 
m  all  punishments  inflicted  by  society.  They  are  intended 
to  be  a  warning  to  others  ;  but  this  hinders  not  their  being 
also  in  the  strictest  sense  punishments ;  that  is,  inflictions 
of  pain  as  the  just  desert  of  crime,  and  as  clear  indications 
of  the  will  of  society  respecting  the  action  of  which  they 
are  the  result. 

From  what  has  been  said,  I  think  we  may  safely  con- 
clude : 

1.  That  God  has  given  to  man  a  moral  and  an  intellectual 
constitution,  by  which  he  may  be  admonished  of  his  duty. 

2.  That  He  allows  man  to  act  freely,  and  to  do  either 
right  or  wrong,  as  he  chooses. 

3.  That  He,  in  the  present  life,  has  connected  rewards 
with  the  doing  of  right,  and  punishments  with  the  doing  of 
wrong  ;  and  that  these  rewards  and  punishments  affect  both 
the  individual  and  society. 

4.  And  hence  that,  from  an  attentive  observation  of  the 
results  of  actions  upon  individuals,  and  upon  society,  we 
may  ascertain  what  is  the  will  of  God  concerning  us. 

5.  And  for  all  the  opportunities  of  thus  ascertaining  his 
will  by  his  dealings  with  men — that  is,  by   the  light  of 
nature — God  holds  all  his  creatures  responsible. 


SECTION    II. 

HOW    PAR    WE    MAY    DISCOVER    OUR    DUTY    BY    THE    LIGHT    OP 
NATURE. 

IT  has  been  shown  that  we  may,  by  observing  the  results 
of  our  actions  upon  individuals,  and  upon  society,  ascertain 
what  is  the  will  of  our  Creator  concerning  us.  In  this 
manner  we  may  discover  much  moral  truth,  which  would 
be  unknown,  were  we  left  to  the  guidance  of  conscience 
unassisted;  and  we  may  derive  many  motives  to  virtue 
which  would  otherwise  be  inoperative. 

I.  By  the  light  of  nature  we  discover  much  moral 
11* 


126          HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR 

truth    which   could   never    be    discovered   by   conscience 
unassisted. 

1 .  Conscience  indicates  to  us  our  obligations  to  others 
when  our  relations  to  them  are  discovered ;  and  impels  us 
toward  that   course  of  conduct  which    the   understanding 
points  out  as  corresponding  with  these    obligations.     But 
there  are  many  obligations  which  conscience  seems  not  to 
point  out  to  men,  and  many  ways  of  fulfilling  these  obligations 
whicli    the   understanding  does    not   clearly   indicate.     In 
these   respects,   we   may   be  greatly    assisted    by  natural 
religion. 

Thus,  I  doubt  whether  the  unassisted  conscience  would 
teach  the  wrong  of  polygamy  or  of  divorce.  The  Jews, 
even  at  the  time  of  our  Savior,  had  no  conception  that  a 
marriage  contract  was  obligatory  for  life.  But  any  one 
who  will  observe  the  effects  of  polygamy  upon  families  and 
societies,  can  have  no  doubt  that  the  precept  of  the  gospel 
on  this  subject  is  the  moral  law  of  the  system  under  which 
we  are.  So,  I  do  not  know  that  unassisted  conscience 
would  remonstrate  against  what  might  be  called  reasonable 
revenge,  or  the  operation  of  the  Lex  Talionis.  But  he 
who  will  observe  the  consequences  of  revenge,  and  those  of 
forgiveness  of  injuries,  will  have  no  difficulty  in  deciding 
which  course  of  conduct  has  been  indicated  as  his  duty  by 
his  Maker. 

2.  The  extent  of  obligations,  previously  known  to  exist, 
is  made  known  more  clearly  by  the  light  of  nature.     Con- 
science might  teach  us  the  obligations  to  love  our  friends, 
or   our   countrymen,   but   it  might   not  go    farther.     The 
results  of  different  courses  of  conduct  would  clearly  show 
that  our  Creator  intended  us   to  love  all   men,  of  every 
nation,  and  even  our  enemies. 

3.  It  is  by  observing  the  results  of  our  actions  that  we 
learn  the  limitations  which  our  Creator  has  affixed  to  our 
desires,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  chapter  on  happiness. 
The  simple  fact  that  gratification  of  our  desires,  beyond  a 
certain  limit,  will   produce  more  misery   than   happiness, 
addresses  itself  to  our  self-love,  and  forms  a  reason  why  that 
limit  should  not  be  transgressed.     The  fact  that  this  limit 
was  fixed  by  our  Creator,  and  that  he  has  thus  intimated  to 


DUTY   BY   THE    LIGHT    OF    NATURE.  127 

us  his  will,  addresses  itself  to  our  conscience,  and  places  us 
under  obligation  to  act  as  he  has  commanded,  on  pain  of 
his  displeasure. 

4.  In  many  cases  where  the  obligation  is  acknowledged, 
we  might  not  be  able,  without  the  light  of  natural  religion, 
to  decide  in  what  manner  it  could  best  be  discharged. 
Thus,  a  man  who  felt  conscious  of  his  obligations  as  a 
parent,  and  wished  to  discharge  them,  would  derive  much 
valuable  information  by  observing  what  mode  of  exhibiting 
paternal  love  had  produced  the  happiest  results.  He  would 
hence  be  able  the  better  to  decide  what  was  required  of 
him. 

In  this  manner  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  much  valuable 
knowledge  of  moral  truth  might  be  acquired,  beyond  what 
is  attainable  by  unassisted  conscience.  But  this  is  not  all. 

II.  Natural  religion  presents  additional  motives  to  the 
practice  of  virtue. 

1.  It  does  this,  in  the  first  place,  by  more  clearly  setting 
before  us  the  rewards  of  virtue,  and  the   punishments  of 
vice.     Conscience  forewarns  us  against  crime,  and  inflicts 
its  own  peculiar  punishment  upon  guilt ;  but,  natural  reli- 
gion informs  us  of  the  additional  consequences,  independent 
of  ourselves,  which  attach  to  moral  action,  according  to  the 
constitution  under  which  we  are  created.     Thus,  conscience 
might  forewarn  a  man  against  dishonesty,  and  might  inflict 
upon  him  the  pains  of  remorse,  if  he  had  stolen ;  but  her 
monition  would   surely  derive  additional    power   from   an 
observation  of  the  effect  which  must  be  produced  upon  indi- 
viduals and  societies  by  the  practice  of  this  immorality; 
and,  also,  by  the  contrary  effects  which  must  arise  from  the 
opposite  virtue. 

2.  Still  further.     Natural  religion  presents  us  with  more 
distinct  and  affecting  views  of  the  character  of  God  than 
could  be  obtained  without  it.     One  of  the  first  aspirations 
of  a  human  soul  is  after  an  Intelligent  First  Cause ;  and 
the  most  universal  dictate  of  conscience  is,  that  this  First 
Cause  ought  to  be  obeyed.     Hence,  every  nation,  how 
rude  soever  it  be,  has  its  gods,  and  its  religious  services. 
But  such  a  notion  of  the  Deity  is  cold  and  inoperative, 
when  compared  with  that  which  may  be  derived  from  an 


128    HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY,  ETC. 

intelligent  observation  of  the  laws  of  nature,  physical  and 
moral,  which  we  see  pervading  the  universe  around  us.  In 
every  moral  law  which  has  been  written  on  the  page  of 
this  world's  history,  we  discover  a  new  lineament  of  the 
character  of  the  Deity.  Every  moral  attribute  of  God 
which  we  discover,  imposes  upon  us  a  new  obligation,  and 
presents  an  additional  motive  why  we  should  love  and 
serve  Him.  Hence  we  see  that  the  knowledge  of  God, 
derived  from  the  study  of  nature,  is  adapted  to  add  greatly 
to  the  impulsive  power  of  conscience. 

We  see,  then,  how  large  a  field  of  moral  knowledge  is 
spread  open  before  us,  if  We  only,  in  a  suitable  manner, 
apply  our  understandings  to  the  works  of  God  around  us. 
He  has  arranged  all  thirjgs,  for  the  purpose  of  teaching  us 
these  lessons,  and  He  has  created  our  intellectual  and 
moral  nature  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  learning  them. 
If,  then,  we  do  not  use  the  powers  which  He  has  given  us, 
for  the  purpose  for  which  He  has  given  them,  He  holds  us 
responsible  for  the  result.  Thus  said  the  prophet :  "  Be- 
cause they  regard  not  the  works  of  the  Lord,  neither  con- 
sider the  operation  of  His  hands,  therefore,  He  shall  de- 
stroy them,  and  not  build  them  up."  Thus,  the  Scriptures, 
elsewhere,  declare  all  nten  to  be  responsible  for  the  correct 
use  of  all  the  knowledge  of  duty  which  God  had  set  before 
them.  St.  Paul,  Rom.  i,  19,  20,  asserts,  '-'That  which 
may  be  known  of  God,  is  manifest  in  (or  to)  them,  for 
God  hath  showed  it  to  them :  so  that  (or  therefore)  they 
are  without  excuse."  Thus,  he  also  declares,  "  They  that 
sin  without  law,  (that  is,  without  a  written  revelation,)  shall 
perish  without  law."  And  thus  we  come  to  the  general 
conclusion,  that  natural  religion  presents  to  all  men  a  dis- 
tinct and  important  means  of  knowing  the  character  and 
will  of  God,  and  the  obligations  and  duties  of  man ;  and 
that,  for  this  knowledge,  all  men  are  justly  held  responsible. 


DEFECTS    OF    THE    SYSTEM,    ETC.  129 

SECTION   III. 

DEFECTS   OF  THE   SYSTEM   OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

I.  Without  any  argument  on  the  subject,  the  insufficiency 
of  natural  religion,  as  a  means  of  human  reformation,  might 
be  readily  made  manifest  by  facts. 

1 .  The  facts  on  which  natural  religion  rests,  and  the  in- 
tellectual power  to  derive  the  moral  laws  from  the  facts, 
have  been  in  the  possession  of  man  from  the  beginning. 
Yet,(  the  whole  history  of  man  has  exhibited  a  constant 
tendency  to   moral  deterioration^  This  is  proved  by  the 
fact,  that  every  people,  not  enlightened  by  revelation,  con- 
sider the  earliest  period  of  their  history  as  the  period  of 
their  greatest  moral  purity.     Then,  the  gods  and  men  held 
frequent  intercourse* ;  this  intercourse,  in  consequence  of  the 
sins  of  men,  has  since  been  discontinued.     That  was  the 
golden  age ;  the  subsequent  ages  have  been  of  brass,  or  of 
iron.     The  political  history  of  men  seems  to  teach  the  same 
lesson.     In  the  early  ages  of  national  existence,  sparseness 
of  population,  mutual   fear,   and  Universal   poverty,  have 
obliged  men  to  lay  the  foundations  of  society  in  principles  of 
justice,  in  order  to  secure  national  existence.     But,  as  soon 
as,  under  such  a  constitution,  wealth  was  increased,  popula- 
tion become  dense,  and  progress  in  arts  and  arms  have  ren- 
dered a  nation  fearless,  the  anti-social  tendencies  of  vice 
have  shown  themselves  too  powerful  for  the  moral  forces  by 
which  they  have  been  opposed.     The  bonds  of  society  have 
been  gradually  dissolved,  and  a  nation,  rich  in  the  spoils  of 
an  hundred  triumphs,  becomes  the  prey  of  some  warlike  and 
more  virtuous  horde,  which  takes  possession  of  the  spoil, 
merely  to  pursue  the  same  career  to  a  more  speedy  termi- 
nation. 

2.  The  systems  of  religion  of  the  heathen  may  be  fairly 
considered  as  the  legitimate  result  of  all  the  moral  forces 
which  are  in  operation  upon  man,  irrespective  of  revelation. 
They  show  us,  not  what  man  might  have  learned  by  the 
proper  use  of  his  faculties  in  the  study  of  duty,  but  what  he 


J30  DEFECTS    OF    THE    SYSTEM 

has  always  actually  learned.  Now,  these  systems,  so  fai 
from  having  any  tendency  to  make  man  better,  have  a 
manifest  tendency  to  make  him  worse.  Their  gods  were 
of  the  most  profligate  and  demoralizing  character.  Had 
natural  religion  succeeded  in  instilling  into  the  minds  of  men 
true  ideas  of  virtue  and  duty,  their  imaginations,  in  forming 
conceptions  of  deities,  would  have  invested  them  with  far 
different  attributes. 

3.  The^thical  systems  of  philosophers  Jit  is  true,  not  un- 
frequently  presented  sublime  and  pure  conceptions  of  Deity. 
But,  as  instruments  of  moral  reformation,  they  wTere  clearly 
inoperative.     They   were    extremely   imperfect   in. .....every 

thing  which  relates  to  our  duties  to  man,  and,  specially,  in 
every  thing  which  relates  to  our  duty  to  God  ;  they  offered 
no  sufficient  motives  to  obedience  ;  they  were  established 
on  subtle  reasonings,  which  could  not  be  comprehended  by 
the  common  people  ;  and  they  imposed  no  obligation  ..upon 
their  disciples  to  disseminate  them  among  others.     Hence, 
Jiey  were  never  extensively  known,  beyond  the  small  circle 
of  meditative  students  ;  and,  by  these,  they  were  considered 
rather  a.s  matters  of  doubtful  speculation,  than  of  practical 
benefit ;    adapted  rather  to  the  cultivation    of  intellectual 
acuteness,  than  to  the    reformation   of  moral  conduct.     I 
think  that  any  one,  on  reading  the  ethical  disquisitions  of  the 
ancients,  must  be  struck  with  the  fact,  that  honest,  simple, 
and  ardent  love  of  truth  seems  to  have  furnished  no  motive 
whatever  to  their   investigations ;    and  that  its  place  was 
supplied  by  mere  curiosity,  or  love  of  the  new,  the  refined, 
and  even  the  paradoxical. 

And,  hence,  as  might  be  expected,  these  ethical  systems 
made  no  converts  from  vice  to  virtue.  From  the  era  of 
which  of  the  systems  of  ancient  ethics,  can  any  reformation 
be  dated  ?  Where  are  their  effects  recorded  in  the  moral 
history  of  man  ?  Facts  have  abundantly  proved  them  to 
be  utterly  destitute  of  any  power  over  the  conscience,  or 
of  any  practical  influence  over  the  conduct. 

4.  Nor  can  this  failure  be  attributed  to  any  want  of  intel- 
lectual cultivation.     During  a  large  portion  of  the  period 
of  which  we  have  spoken,  the  human  mind  hat1,  in  many 
respects,  attained  to  as  high  a  state  of  perfection  as  it  has 


OF    NATURAL    RELIGION.  131 

attained  at  any  subsequent  age.  Eloquence,  poetry, 
rhetoric,  nay,  some  of  the  severer  sciences,  were  studied 
with  a  success  which  has  never  since  been  surpassed.  This 
is  universally  confessed.  Yet  what  progress  did  the  classic 
ages  make  in  pOiorals  ?  And  hence,  we  think,  it  must  be  ^ 
admitted  that/the  human  mind,  even  under  the  most  favor- 
able circumstances,  has  never,  when  unassisted  by  revela- 
tion, deduced  from  the  course  of  things  around  us  any  such 
principles  of  duty,  or  motives  to  the  performance  of  it,  as 
were  sufficient  to  produce  any  decided  effect  upon  the  moral 
character  of  man. 

And  hence  were  we  unable  to  assign  the  cause  of  this 
failure ;  yet  the  fact  of  the  failure  alone  is  sufficient  to 
prove  the  necessity  of  some  other  means  for  arriving  at  a 
knowledge  of  duty,  than  is^ftfiorded  by  the  light  of  nature. 

II.  But,  secondly,  the  p.nnspis)  of  .tbis.  insufficiency  may, 
in  many  respects,  be  pointed  out.  Among  them  are  ob- 
viously the  following : 

1.  The  mode  of  teaching  natural  religion    is    by  ex 
rience.     We  can  form  no  opinion  respecting  the  results  o 
two  opposite  courses  of  action,  until  they  be  both  before  us. 
Hence,  we  cannot  certainly  know  what  the  law  is,  except 
by  breaking  it.     Hence,  the  habit   of   violation   must,  in 
some  sense,  be  formed,  before  we  know  what  the  law  is 
which  we  violate.     Consequently,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  natural  religion  must  always  be  much  behind  the  age, 
and  must  always  utter  its  precepts  to  men  who  are,  in  some 
manner,  fixed  in  the  habit  of  violating  them. 

2.  There  are  many  moral  laws  in  which  the  connection 
between  the  transgression  and  the  punishment  cannot  be 
shown,   except  in  the  more  advanced  periods  of  society. 
Such  is  the  fact,  in  respect  to  those  laws  which  can  be 
ascertained  only  by  extended  and  minute  observation ;  and, 
of  course,  a  state  of  society  in  which  knowledge  is  widely 
disseminated,  and  the  experience  of  a  large  surface,  and  for 
a  long  period,  may  be  necessary  to  establish  the  fact  of  the 
connection  between  this  particular  violation  and  this  par- 
ticular result.     In  the  mean  time,  mankind  will  be  suffering 
all   the   consequences  of  vice ;    and  the   courses  of  con- 


132  DEFECTS    OF    THE    SYSTEM 

duct  which  are  the  causes  of  misery,  will  be  interweaving 
themselves  with  the  whole  customs,  and  habits,  and  in- 
terests, of  every  class  of  society.  Thus,  it  too  often  hap- 
pens, that  the  knowledge  is  with  great  difficulty  acquired ; 
and,  when  acquired,  unfortunately  comes  too  late  to  effect 
a  remedy. 

3.  A  still  more  radical  deficiency,  however,  in  natural 
religion,  is,  that  it  is,  from  its  nature,  incapable  of  teaching 
facts.     It   can   teach  only  laws    and  tendencies.     From 
observing  what  has  been  done,  and  how  it  has  been  done,  it 
can  infer  that,  if  the  same  thing  were  done  again,  it  would 
be  done  in  the  same  manner,  and  would  be  attended,  in  all 
places,  and  at  all  times,  if  under  the  same  conditions,  with 
the  same  results.     But,  as  to  a  fact,  that  is,  whether   an 
action  were  actually  performed  at  some  other  place  or  time, 
or  whether  it  ever  would  be,  natural  religion  can  give  us 
no  information.     Thus,  we  know  by  experience,  that,  if  a 
man    fall  from    a  precipice,   he   will   be    destroyed ;    but, 
whether  a  man  ever  did  so  fall,  much  less  whether  A  or  B 
did  fall  from  it,  we  can  never  be  informed  by  general  prin- 
ciples.    Thus,  from  the  fact  that  we  see  guilt  punished  in 
this  world,  we  infer,  from   natural   religion,   that   it  will 
always  be  punished  in  this  world ;  we  infer,  though  not  so 
certainly,  that  it  will  also  be  punished  in  another  world,  if 
there  be  another  world ;  but  of  the  fact  whether  there  be 
another  world,  natural  religion  can  give  us  no  certain  in- 
formation;    much   less,   can   it    give   us   any   information 
respecting   the   question  whether  God  has   actually  done 
any    thing   to   remedy   the   evils   of  sin,   and  vary   those 
sequences  which,  without  a  remedy,  experience  shows  us  to 
be  inevitable. 

4.  Hence,  natural  religion    must  derive  all  its  certain 
motives  from  the   present  world.     Those  from  the  other 
world  are,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  in  their  nature  contingent 
and  uncertain.     And,  hence,  it  loses   all  that  power  over 
man,  which  would  be  derived  from  the  certain  knowledge 
of  our  existence  after  death,  of  the  nature  of  that  existence, 
and  of  what  God  has  done  for  our  restoration  to  virtue  and 
happiness.     All  these  being  facts,  can  never  be  known, 


OF    NATURAL    RELIGION.  133 

except  by  language,  that  is,  by  revelation.  They  must 
always  remain  in  utter  incertitude,  so  long  as  we  are  left  to 
the  teachings  of  natural  religion. 

We  see,  then,  that  natural  religion  is  obliged  to  meet  the 
impulsions  from  this  world,  solely  by  impulsions  from  this 
world.  Nay,  more,  she  is  obliged  to  resist  the  power  of 
the  present,  of  passion  strengthened  and  confirmed  by  habit, 
by  considerations  drawn  from  the  distant,  the  future,  and 
what  may  seem  to  be  the  uncertain.  Hence,  its  suc- 
cess must  be  at  best  but  dubious,  even  when  its  power  is 
exerted  upon  those  least  exposed  to  the  allurements  of  vice 
Who  does  not  see  that  it  is  utterly  vain,  to  hope  for  suc- 
cess from  such  a  source,  in  our  attempts  to  reform  men  i^ 
general  ?  Every  one,  who  is  at  all  acquainted  with  the 
history  of  man,  must  be  convinced,  that  nothing  less  power- 
ful than  the  whole  amount  of  motive  derived  from  the 
knowledge  of  an  endless  existence,  has  ever  been  found  a 
sufficient  antagonist  force,  to  the  downward  and  headlong 
tendencies  of  appetite  and  passion. 

And  hence,  from  the  fact  of  the  recorded  failure  of  natu- 
ral religion,  as  a  means  of  reformation,  and  from  the  defects 
inherent  in  its  very  nature,  as  a  means  of  moral  improve- 
ment, there  seems  clearly  to  exist  a  great  need  of  some 
additional  moral  force,  to  correct  the  moral  evils  of  our 
nature.  It  is  surely  not  improbable  that  some  additional 
means  of  instruction  and  improvement  may  have  been 
granted  to  our  race  by  a  merciful  Creator. 
12 


134 


CHAPTER    EIGHTH. 

RELATION  BETWEEN  NATURAL  AND  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

/ 

IF  what  we  have  said  be  true,  the  defeots  of  natural 
religion  would  lead  us  to  expect,  that  some  other  means  of 
moral  instruction  would  be  afforded  us.  And,  indeed,  this 
is  the  conclusion  at  which  some  of  the  wisest  of  the  heathen 
philosophers  arrived,  from  a  consideration  of  that  utter 
ignorance  of  futurity  in  which  they  were  of  necessity 
plunged,  by  the  most  attentive  study  of  natural  religion. 
They  felt  convinced,  that  the  Deity  would  not  have  con- 
structed a  system  of  moral  teaching,  which  led  to  imper- 
vious darkness,  unless  He  intended,  out  of  that  very  dark- 
ness, at  some  period  or  other,  to  manifest  light. 

But  still  more,  I  think  that  an  attentive  observation  of 
what  natural  religion  teaches,  and  of  its  necessary  and  inhe- 
rent defects,  would  afford  us  some  grounds  of  expectation, 
respecting  the  nature  of  that  revelation  which  should  be 
made.  If  we  can  discover  the  moral  necessities  of  our 
race,  and  can  also  discover  in  what  respects,  and  for  what 
reason,  the  means  thus  far  employed  have  failed  to  relieve 
them,  we  may  with  certainty  predict  some  of  the  character- 
istics which  must  mark  any  system,  which  should  be  de- 
vised to  accomplish  a  decided  remedy. 

For  example : 

1.  It   is  granted  that  natural   religion  does   teach    us 
some  unqestionable  truths.     Now,  no  truth  can  be  incon- 
sistent with  itself.     And  hence  it  might  be  expected,  that 
whenever  natural  and  revealed  religion  treated  upon  the  same 
subjects,   they   would   teach   in   perfect   harmony.      The 
second  instructor  may  teach  more  than  the  first ;  but  so 
far  as  they  give  instruction  on  the  same  subjects,  if  both 
teach  the  truth,  they  must  both  teach  the  same  lesson. 

2.  It  is  natural  to  expect  that  a  revelation  would  give 


RELATION    BETWEEN    NATURAL,    ETC.  135 

us  much  information  upon  the  subject  of  duty,  which  could 
not  be  learned  by  the  light  of  nature.  Thus,  it  might  be 
expected  to  make  known  more  clearly  to  us,  than  we  could 
otherwise  learn  them,  the  obligations  by  which  we  are 
bound  to  our  fellow-men,  and  to  God  ;  and  also  the  manner 
in  which  those  obligations  are  to  be  discharged. 

3.  That  it  would  present  us  with  motives  to  virtue,  in 
addition  to  those  made  known  by  the  light  of  nature.     We 
have  seen  that  the  motives  of  natural  religion  are  derived 
from  this  world,  and  are  in  their  nature  insufficient.     We 
should  expect  that  those  in  a  revelation  would  be  drawn 
from  some  other  source.     And  still  more,  as  natural  religion 
may  be  considered  to  have   exhausted  the  motives  of  this 
world,  it  is  surely  not  unreasonable  to  expect,  that  a  revela- 
tion, leaving  this  world,  would  draw  its  motives  principally, 
if  not  entirely,  from  another,  if  it  revealed  to  us  the  fact 
that  another  world  existed. 

4.  We  should  not  expect  that  the  Deity  would  employ 
a  second  and  additional  means,  to  accomplish  what  could 
be  done  by  any  modification  of  the  means  first  employed. 
Hence,  if  a  revelation  were  made  to  men,  we  might  reason- 
ably expect,  that  it  would  make  known  to  us  such  truths 
as  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  communicated 
by  natural  religion. 

These  are.  I  think,  just  anticipations.  At  any  rate,  I 
think  it  must  be  admitted,  that  if  a  system  of  religion,  pur- 
porting to  be  a  revelation  from  heaven,  met  all  these  expec- 
tations, its  relations  to  natural  religion  not  only  would  pre- 
sent no  argument  against  its  truth,  but  would  create  a  strong 
a  priori  presumption  in  its  favor. 

Now  these  expectations  are  all  fully  realized  in  the 
system  of  religion  contained  in  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old 
and  New  Testaments. 

1.  The  truths  of  revealed  religion  harmonize  perfectly 
with  those  of  natural  religion.  The  difference  between  them 
consists  in  this, — that  the  one  teaches  plainly,  what  the  other 
'teaches  by  inference  ;  the  one  takes  up  the  lesson  where 
the  other  leaves  it,  and  adds  to  it  other  and  vitally  important 
precepts.  Nay,  so  perfect  is  the  harmony  between  them, 
that  it  may  safely  be  asserted  that  not  a  single  precept  of 


136  RELATION    BETWEEN    NATURAL 

natural  religion  exists,  which  is  not  also  found  in  the  Bible , 
and  still  more,  that  the  Bible  is  every  day  directing  us  to 
new  lessons,  taught  us  by  nature,  which,  but  for  its  infor- 
mation, would  never  have  been  discovered.  So  complete  is 
this  coincidence,  as  to  afford  irrefragable  proof  that  the 
Bible  contains  the  moral  laws  of  the  universe ;  and,  hence, 
that  the  Author  of  the  universe — that  is,  of  natural  religion 
— is  also  the  Author  of  the  Scriptures. 

2.  The   Holy  Scriptures,   as  has  just  been  intimated, 
give  us  much  information  on  questions  of  duty,  which  could 
not  be  obtained  by  the  light  of  nature.     Under  this  remark 
may  be  classed  the  scriptural  precepts  respecting  the  do- 
mestic relations ;  respecting  our  duties  to  enemies,  and  to 
men  in  general ;  and  especially  respecting  our  obligations 
to  God,  and  the  manner  in  which  He  may  most  acceptably 
be  worshipped. 

3.  The  Scriptures  present  motives  to  the  practice  of  vir- 
tue, additional,  generically  different  from  those  of  natural 
religion,  and  of  infinitely  greater  power. 

1.  The   motives  to  virtue,  from   consequences   in    this 
world,  are  strengthened  by  a  clearer  development  of  the 
indissoluble  connection  between  moral  cause  and  effect, 
than  is  made  known  by  natural  religion. 

2.  In  addition  to  these  motives,  we  are  assured  of  our 
existence  after  death;  and  eternal  happiness  and  eternal 
misery  are  set  forth  as  the  desert  of  virtue  and  vice. 

3.  The  Scriptures  reveal  to  us  the  Deity  as  assuming 
new  relations  to  us,  and  devising  a  most  merciful  way  for 
our  redemption :  by  virtue  of  this  new  relation,  establishing 
a  new  ground  of  moral  obligation  between  the  race  of  man 
and  himself,  and  thus  adding  a  power  to  the  impulsion  of 
conscience,  of  which  natural  religion  must,  in  the  nature  of 
the  case,  be  destitute. 

4.  It  is  manifest,  that  much  of  the  above  knowledge, 
which  the  Scriptures  reveal,  is  of  the  nature  of  fact ;  and, 
therefore,  could  not  be  communicated  to  us  by  experience, 
or  in  the  way  of  general  laws,  but  must  be  made  known  by 
language,  that  is,  by  revelation. 

Thus,  the  existence  of  a  state  of  being  after  death,  the 
doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  of  a  universal  and  impartial 


AND    REVEALED    RELIGION.  137 

judgment,  of  an  endless  state  of  rewards  and  punishments, 
of  a  remedial  dispensation,  by  which  the  connection  be- 
tween guilt  and  punishment  may  be  conditionally  severed ; 
the  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  and  the  way  in  which  a 
man  may  avail  himself  of  the  benefits  of  this  remedial  dis- 
pensation ; — all  these  are  manifestly  of  great  practical  im- 
portance in  a  scheme  of  moral  reformation ;  and  yet,  all  of 
them  being  of  the  nature  of  facts,  they  could  be  made 
known  to  man  in  no  other  way  than  by  language. 

Now,  as  these  seem  clearly  to  be  just  anticipations  re- 
specting any  system  which  should  be  designed  to  supply 
the  evident  defects  of  natural  religion,  and  as  all  these  an- 
ticipations are  realized  in  the  system  of  religion  contained 
in  the  Scriptures,  each  one  of  these  anticipations  thus 
realized  furnishes  a  distinct  a  priori  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  truth  of  revealed  religion.  We  do  not  pretend  that 
any,  or  that  all  of  these  considerations,  prove  the  Scriptures 
to  be  a  revelation  from  God.  This  proof  is  derived  from 
other  sources.  What  we  would  say,  is  this :  that,  from 
what  we  know  of  God's  moral  government  by  the  light  of 
nature,  it  is  manifestly  probable  that  he  would  give  us  some 
additional  instruction,  and  that  that  instruction  would  be, 
in  various  important  respects,  analogous  to  that  contained 
in  the  Holy  Scriptures.  And  we  hence  conclude,  that 
although  it  were  granted — which,  however,  need  not  be 
granted — that,  were  there  no  antecedent  facts  in  the  case,  it 
might  seem  unlikely  that  God  would  condescend  to  make  a 
special  revelation  of  his  will  to  men  ;  yet,  when  the  antece- 
dent facts  are  properly  considered,  this  presumption,  if  it 
ever  could  be  maintained,  is  now  precisely  reversed,  and 
that  there  now  exists  a  fair  presumption  that  such  a  revela- 
tion would  actually  be  made.  And  hence  we  conclude, 
that  a  revelation  of  the  will  of  God  by  language  is  not,  as 
many  persons  suppose,  an  event  so  unlikely,  that  no  evi- 
dence can  be  conceived  sufficiently  strong  to  render  it 
credible  ;  but,  that  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  event,  from  all 
that  we  know  of  God  already,  essentially  probable ;  and 
that  it  is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  as  fairly  within  the  limits  of 
evidence  as  any  other  event,  and  when  proved,  on  the 
ordinary  principles  of  evidence,  is  as  much  entitled  to 
12* 


138  RELATION   BETWEEN   NATURAL,    ETC. 

belief  as  any  other  event.  And  hence  we  conceive  that 
when  men  demand,  in  support  of  the  truth  of  revealed 
religion,  evidence  unlike  to  that  which  is  demanded  in  sup- 
port of  any  other  event, — that  is,  evidence  of  which  they 
themselves  cannot  define  the  nature, — they  demand  what  is 
manifestly  unreasonable,  and  proceed  upon  a  presumption 
wholly  at  variance  with  all  the  known  facts  in  the  case. 


139 


CHAPTER    NINTH. 

THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 

THIS  would  seem  to  be  the  place  in  which  to  present  the 
proof  of  the  authenticity  of  the  Holy  Scriptures,  as  a 
revelation  from  God.  This,  however,  being  only  a  par- 
ticular exemplification  of  the  general  laws  of  evidence,  it 
belongs  to  the  course  of  instruction  in  Intellectual  Phi- 
losophy. It  must  therefore  be  here  omitted.  We  shall,  in 
the  remainder  of  these  remarks,  take  it  for  granted,  that 
the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testament  contain  a 
revelation  from  God  to  man,  and  that  these  books  contain  all 
that  God  has  been  pleased  to  reveal  unto  us  by  language  ; 
and,  therefore,  all  which  is  recorded  in  language  that  is 
ultimate  in  morals,  and  that  is,  by  its  own  authority,  binding 
upon  the  conscience.  Taking  this  for  granted,  we  shall  in 
the  present  chapter  consider,  1st,  what  the  Scriptures  con- 
tain ;  and,  2d,  how  we  may  ascertain  our  duty  from  the 
Scriptures. 


SECTION   I. 

A  VIEW  OP  THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 

The  Holy  Scriptures  are  contained  in  two  separate 
volumes,  entitled  the  Old  and  the  New  Testament.  These 
volumes  have  each  a  distinct  object,  and  yet  their  objects 
are  in  perfect  harmony ;  and,  together,  they  contain  all 
that  could  be  desired  in  a  revelation  to  the  human  race. 

The  design  of  the  Old  Testament  mainly  is,  to  reveal  a 
system  of  simple  law  ;  to  exhibit  the  results  of  such  a  system 


140  A   VIEW    OF    THE    HOLY    SCRIPTURES. 

upon  the  human  race,  and  to  direct  the  minds  of  men  to  the 
remedial  dispensation  which  was  to  follow.  In  accomplish- 
ing this  design,  it  contains  several  distinct  parts. 

1.  An  account  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  of  the  crea- 
tion and  fall  of  man,  and  a  brief  history  of  the  race  of  man 
until  the  deluge.     The  cause  of  this  deluge  is  stated  to  be, 
the  universal  and  intense  wickedness  of  man. 

2.  The  account  of  the  separation  of  a  particular  family, 
the  germ  of  a  nation,  designed  to  be  the  depositaries  of  the 
revealed  will  of  God  ;  and  the  history  of  this  nation,  from 
the  call  of  Abraham  until  the  return  from  the  captivity  in 
Babylon,  a  period  of  about  fifteen  hundred  years. 

3.  The  system  of  laws  which  God  gave  to  this  nation. 
These  laws  may  be  comprehended  under  three  classes : 

Moral  laws,  or  those  which  arise  from  the  immutable 
relations  existing  between  God  and  man. 

Civil  laws,  or  those  enacted  for  the  government  of  civil 
society  ;  adapted  specially  to  the  Jewish  Theocracy,  or  that 
form  of  government  in  which  God  was  specially  recognised 
as  King. 

Ceremonial  laws.  These  were  of  two  kinds :  First, 
those  which  were  intended  to  keep  this  nation  separate  from 
other  nations ;  and,  second,  those  intended  to  prefigure 
events  which  were  to  occur  under  the  second  or  new  dis- 
pensation. 

4.  Various  events  in  their  history,  discourses  of  prophets 
and  inspired  teachers,  prayers,  odes  of  pious  men ;  all  tend- 
ing to  illustrate  what  are  the  effects  of  a  system  of  moral  law 
upon  human  nature,  even  when  placed  under  the  most  fa- 
vorable circumstances ;  and  also,  to  exhibit  the  effects  of 
the  religious  principle  upon  the  soul  of  man  under  every 
variety  of  time  and  condition. 

The  result  of  all  this  series  of  moral  means  seems  to  be 
this.  God,  in  various  modes,  suited  to  their  condition,  made 
known  his  will  to  the  whole  human  race.  They  all,  with 
the  exception  of  a  single  family,  became  so  corrupt,  that  he 
destroyed  them  by  a  general  deluge.  He  then  selected  a 
single  family,  and  gave  them  his  written  law,  and,  by  pecu- 
liar enactments,  secluded  them  from  all  other  nations,  that 
the  experiment  might  be  made  under  the  most  favorable 


A    VIEW    OF    THE    HOLY    SCRIPTURES.  141 

circumstances.  At  the  same  time,  the  effects  of  natural  re- 
ligion were  tried  among  the  heathen  nations  that  surrounded 
them.  The  result  was,  a  clear  demonstration  that,  under 
the  conditions  of  being  in  which  man  was  created,  any  ref- 
ormation was  hopeless,  and  that,  unless  some  other  condi- 
tions were  revealed,  the  race  would  perish  by  its  own  vicious 
and  anti-social  tendencies,  and  enter  the  other  world  to  reap 
the  reward  of  its  guilt  for  ever.  While  this  is  said  to  be  the 
main  design  of  the  Old  Testament,  it  is  not  to  be  under- 
stood that  this  is  its  whole  design.  It  was  intended  to  be 
introductory  to  the  new  dispensation,  and,  also,  to  teach 
those,  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  the  way  of  salvation. 
Hence,  allusions  to  the  principal  events  in  the  new  dispen- 
sation, are  every  where  to  be  met  with.  Hence,  also,  as- 
surances of  pardon  are  made  to  the  penitent,  and  God  is 
represented  as  ready  to  forgive  ;  though  the  procuring  cause 
of  our  pardon  is  not  explicitly  stated  ;  but  only  alluded  to 
in  terms  which  could  not  be  fully  understood,  until  the 
remedial  dispensation  was  accomplished. 

The  design  of  the  New  Testament  is,  to  reveal  to  the 
race  of  man  the  new  conditions  of  being,  under  which  it  is 
placed,  by  virtue  of  a  remedial  dispensation. 

In  pursuance  of  this  design,  the  New  Testament  con- 
tains,— 

1.  A  narrative  of  the  life  and  death,  resurrection  and  as- 
cension, the  acts  and  conversations,  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth  ;  a 
Being  in  whom  the  divine  and  human  natures  were  mys- 
teriously united ;  who  appeared  on  earth  to  teach  us  what- 
ever was  necessary  to  be  known  of  our  relations  to  God  ; 
and,  by  his  obedience  to  the  law,  and  voluntary  sufferings 
and  death,  to  remove  the  obstacles  to  our  pardon,  which, 
under  the  former  dispensation,  existed  in  consequence  of 
the  holiness  of  God. 

2.  A  brief  narrative  of  the  facts  relating  to  the  progress 
of  the  Christian  religion,  for  several  years  after  the  ascension 
of  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

3.  The   instructions  which  his  immediate  followers,  or 
apostles,  by  divine  inspiration,  gave  to  the  men  of  their  own 
time,  and  which  were  rendered  necessary  in  consequence 


142  HOW    WE    ARE    TO    ASCERTAIN 

of  their  ignorance  of  the  principles  of  religion,  or  the  weak- 
ness of  their  virtue,  and  the  imperfection  of  their  faith. 

The  whole  of  this  volume,  taken  together,  teaches  us 
the  precepts,  the  sanctions,  and  the  rewards  of  the  law  of 
God,  with  as  great  distinctness  as  we  could  desire ;  and 
also  a  way  of  salvation,  on  different  grounds  from  that  re- 
vealed both  by  natural  religion  and  by  the  Old  Testament ; 
a  way  depending  for  merit,  upon  the  doings  and  sufferings 
of  another,  but  yet  available  to  us  on  no  other  conditions 
than  those  of  supreme,  strenuous,  and  universal  moral  effort 
after  perfect  purity  of  thought,  and  word  and  action. 

This,  being  a  remedial  dispensation,  is,  in  its  nature, 
fixed.  We  have  no  reason  to  expect  any  other ;  nay,  the 
idea  of  another  would  be  at  variance  with  the  belief  of  the 
truth  of  this.  And,  hence,  the  Scriptures  of  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments  contain  all  that  God  has  revealed  to  us 
by  language  respecting  his  will.  What  is  contained  here 
alone,  is  binding  upon  the  conscience.  Or,  in  the  words 
of  Chillingworth,  "  THE  BIBLE,  THE  BIBLE,  THE  RELIGION 
OF  PROTESTANTS." 


SECTION    II. 

IN  WHAT  MANNER  ARE  WE  TO    ASCERTAIN    OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE 
HOLY  SCRIPTURES? 

Taking  it  for  granted  that  the  Bible  contains  a  revelation 
of  the  will  of  God,  such  as  is  stated  in  the  preceding  sec- 
tion, it  will  still  be  of  importance  for  us  to  decide  how  we 
may  ascertain,  from  the  study  of  it,  what  God  really  requires 
of  us.  Much  of  it  is  mere  history,  containing  an  unvarnished 
narration  of  the  actions  of  good  and  of  bad  men.  Much  of 
it  has  reference  to  a  less  enlightened  age,  and  to  a  particu- 
lar people,  set  apart  from  other  people,  for  a  special  and 
peculiar  purpose.  Much  of  it  consists  of  exhortations  and 
reproofs,  addressed  to  this  people,  in  reference  to  the  laws 


OUR   DUTY    FROM    THE    SCRIPTURES.  143 

then  existing,  but  which  have  been  since  abrogated.  Now, 
amidst  this  variety  of  instructions,  given  to  men  at  different 
times,  and  of  different  nations,  it  is  desirable  that  the  prin- 
ciples be  settled,  by  which  we  may  decide  what  portion  of 
this  mass  of  instruction  is  binding  upon  the  conscience, 
at  the  present  moment.  My  object,  in  the  present  section, 
is  to  ascertain,  as  far  as  possible,  the  principles  by  which 
we  are  to  be  guided  in  such  a  decision. 

When  a  revelation  is  made  to  us  by  language,  it  is  taken 
for  granted,  that  whatever  is  our  duty,  will  be  signified  to 
us  by  a  command ;  and  hence,  what  is  not  commanded,  is 
not  to  be  considered  by  us  as  obligatory.  Did  we  not 
establish  this  limitation,  every  thing  recorded,  as,  for  in- 
stance, all  the  actions  both  of  good  and  of  bad  men,  might 
be  regarded  as  authority  ;  and  thus  a  revelation,  given  for 
the  purpose  of  teaching  us  our  duty,  might  be  used  as  an 
instrument  to  confound  all  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong. 

The  ground  of  moral  obligation,  as  derived  from  a  reve 
lation,  must,  therefore,  be  a  command  of  God. 

Now,  a  command  seems  to  involve  three  ideas : 

1.  That  an  act  be  designated.     This  may  be,  by  the 
designation  of  the  act  itself,  as,  for  instance,  giving  bread  to 
the  hungry  ;  or  else  by  the  designation  of  a  temper  of  mind, 
as  that  of  universal  love,  under  which  the  above  act,  and 
various  other  acts,  are  clearly  comprehended. 

2.  That  it  be  somehow  signified  to  be  the  mil  of  God, 
that  this  act  be  performed.     Without  this  intimation,  every 
act  that  is  described,  or  even  held  up  for  our  reprobation, 
might  be  quoted  as  obligatory. 

3.  That  it  be  signified,  that  we  are  included  within  the 
number  to  whom  the  command  is  addressed.     Otherwise, 
all   the   commandments,  to  the   patriarchs   and    prophets, 
whether  ceremonial,  symbolical,  or  individual,  would   be 
binding  upon  every  one  who  might  read  them.     And  hence, 
in  general,  whosoever  urges  upon  us  any  duty,  as  the  com- 
mand of  God,  revealed  in  the  Bible,  must  show  that  God 
has,  somewhere,  commanded  that  action  to  be  done,  and 
that  he  has  commanded  us  to  do  it. 


144  HOW   WE    ARE    TO    ASCERTAIN 

This  principle  will  exclude, — 

1.  Every  thing  which  is  merely  history.     Much  of  the 
Bible  contains  a  mere  narrative  of  facts.     For  the  truth  of 
this  narrative,  the  veracity  of  the  Deity  is  pledged.     We 
may  derive  from  the  account  of  God's  dealings,  lessons  of 
instruction  to  guide  us  in  particular  cases;  and,  from  the 
evil  conduct  of  men,  matter  of  warning.      But  the  mere 
fact,  that  any  thing  has  been  done,  and  recorded  in  the 
Scripture)   by   no   means   places   us   under   obligation   to 
do  it. 

2.  It  excludes  from  being  obligatory  upon  all,  what  has 
been  commanded,  but  which  can  be  shown  to  have  been 
intended  only  for  individuals,  or  for  nations,  and  not  for  the 
whole  human  race.     Thus  many  commands  are  recorded  ii 
the  Scriptures,  as  having  been  given  to  individuals.     Such 
was   the   command   to  Abraham,  to  offer  up  his  son;  to 
Moses,  to  stand  before  Pharaoh  ;  to  Samuel,  to  anoint  Saul 
and  David  ;  and  a  thousand  others.     Here,  evidently,  the 
Divine  direction  was  exclusively  intended  for  the  individual 
to  whom  it  was  given.     No  one  can  pretend  that  he  is 
commanded  to  offer  up  his  son,  because  Abraham  was  so 
commanded. 

Thus,  also,  many  of  the  commands  of  God  in  the  Old 
Testament  were  addressed  to  nations.  Such  were  the 
directions  to  the  Israelites  to  take  possession  of  Canaan ;  to 
make  war  upon  the  surrounding  nations ;  to  keep  the  cere- 
monial law ;  and  so  of  various  other  instances.  Now  of 
such  precepts,  it  is  to  be  observed,  1.  They  are  to  be 
obeyed  only  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner  in  which  they 
were  commanded.  Thus,  the  Jews,  at  present,  would  have 
no  right,  in  virtue  of  the  original  command,  to  expel  the 
Mahometans  from  Palestine ;  though  the  command  to 
Joshua  was  a  sufficient  warrant  for  expelling  the  Canaan- 
ites,  at  the  time  in  which  it  was  given.  2.  They  are  of 
force  only  to  those  to  whom  they  were  given.  Thus,  sup- 
posing the  ceremonial  law  was  not  abolished;  as  it  was 
given  specially  to  Jews,  and  to  no  one  else,  it  would  bind 
no  one  but  Jews  now.  Supposing  it  to  be  abolished,  it  cf 
course  now  binds  no  one.  For  if,  when  in  force,  it  was  ob- 


OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES.        145 

ligatoiy  on  no  one  but  the  Jews,  and  was  nothing  to  any  one 
else ;  when  it  is  abolished,  as  to  them,  it  is  nothing  to  any 
one.  Such  is  the  teaching  of  St.  Paul  on  this  subject. 

3.  It  would  exclude  whatever  was  done  by  inspired  men, 
if  it  was  done  without  the  addition  of  being  somehow  com- 
manded. Thus,  the  New  Testament  was  manifestly  in- 
tended for  the  whole  human  race,  and  at  all  times ;  and  ' 
was  written  by  men  who  were  inspired  by  God  to  teach  us 
His  will.  But  still,  their  example  is  not  binding  per  se : 
that  is,  we  are  not  under  obligation  to  perform  an  act,  simply 
because  they  have  done  it.  Thus,  Paul  and  the  other  apos- 
tles kept  the  Feast  of  Pentecost ;  but  this  imposes  no  such 
obligation  upon  us.  Paul  circumcised  Timothy ;  but  this 
imposes  no  obligation  upon  us  to  do  likewise:  for  upon 
another  occasion  he  did  not  circumcise  Titus.  The  ex- 
amples of  inspired  men  in  the  New  Testament  would, 
unless  exception  be  made,  prove  the  lawfulness  of  an  act ; 
but  it  could  by  no  means  establish  its  obligatoriness. 

This  principle  will  include  as  obligatory, — 

1 .  Whatever  has  been  enjoined  as  the  will  of  God  upon 
man  as  man,  in  distinction  from  what  has  been  enjoined 
upon  men  as  individuals  or  as  nations.  The  command 
may  be  given  us,  1.  By  God  himself,  as  when  he  proclaimed 
his  law  from  Mount  Sinai ;  or,  2.  By  the  Mediator  Christ 
Jesus ;  or,  3.  By  any  persons  divinely  commissioned  to 
instruct  us  in  the  will  of  God ;  as  prophets,  apostles,  or 
evangelists.  This  includes,  as  obligatory  on  the  conscience, 
simply  what  is  proved  to  be  intended,  according  to  the 
established  principles  of  interpretation.  But  it  by  no 
means  includes  any  thing  which  man  may  infer  from  what 
is  thus  intended.  Any  idea  which  man  adds  to  the  idea 
given  in  the  Scriptures,  is  the  idea  of  man,  and  has  no 
more  obligation  on  the  conscience  of  his  fellow  men,  than 
any  other  idea  of  man. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  granting  that  nothing  but  a  Divine 
command  is  obligatory  on  the  conscience,  yet,  as  general 
and  particular  commandments  in  the  Scriptures  are  fre- 
quently, in  a  considerable  degree,  blended  together,  how 
may  we  learn  to  distinguish  that  part  which  is  obligatory 
13 


146  HOW    WE    ARE   TO    ASCERTAIN 

upon  us,  from  that  which  is  in  its  nature  local  and  peculiar? 
In  attempting  to  answer  this  question,  I  would  suggest, — 

That  the  distinction  of  nations  or  individuals  is  nowhere 
adverted  to  in  the  New  Testament.  Its  instructions  are 
clearly  intended  for  men  of  all  ages  and  nations  ;  and  hence 
they  never  involve  any  thing  either  local  or  peculiar,  but  are 
universally  binding  upon  all.  The  question  must  therefore 
refer  to  the  Old  Testament. 

If  we  confine  ourselves,  then,  to  the  Old  Testament,  this 
question  may  be  decided  on  the  following  principles  : 

1.  In  by  far  the  greater  number  of  cases,  we  shall   be 
able  to  decide,  by  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  Jewish 
commonwealth ;  a  temporary  or   preparatory  dispensation, 
which  was  to  cease  when  that  to  which  it  was  preparatory 
had  appeared. 

2.  The    New  Testament,  being  thus  intended   for  the 
whole  human  race,  and  being  a  final  revelation  of  the  will 
of  God  to  man,  may  be  supposed  to  contain  all  the  moral 
precepts,  both  of  natural  religion  and  of  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, together  with  whatever  else  it  was  important  to  our 
salvation  that  we  should  know.     If,  then,  a  revelation  has 
been  made  in  the  Old  Testament,  which  is  repeated  in  the 
New  Testament,  we  shall  be  safe  in  making  the  later  reve- 
lation the  criterion,  by  which  we  shall  judge  respecting  the 
precepts  of  the  earlier.     That  is  to  say,  no  precept  of  the 
Old  Testament,  which  is  not  either  given  to  man  as  man, 
or  which  is  not  either  repeated,  or  its  obligations  acknowl- 
edged, under  the  new  dispensation,  is  binding  upon  us  at 
the  present  day.     This  principle  is,   I  think,    avowed,  in 
substance,  by  the  Apostle  Paul,  in  various  places  in  his 
Epistles.     While  he  repeatedly  urges  the  moral  precepts 
of  the  Old  Testament,    as  of  unchanging   obligation,    he 
speaks  of  every  thing  else,  so  far  as  moral  obligation  is 
concerned,  as  utterly  annihilated. 

Such,  then,  are  the  means  afforded  to  us  by  our  Creator, 
for  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  our  duty.  They  are,  first, 
natural  religion  ;  second,  the  Old  Testament,  or  a  dispen- 
sation of  law ;  third,  the  Gospel,  a  remedial  dispensation, 
or  a  dispensation  of  grace. 


OUR    DUTY   FROM    THE    SCRIPTURES.  147 

The  relation  existing  between  our  moral  power,  and 
these  means  of  moral  cultivation,  may,  I  suppose,  be  stated 
somewhat  as  follows : 

1.  By  conscience,  we  attain  a  feeling  of  moral  obliga- 
tion towards  the  various  beings  to  whom  we  are  related. 
The  elements  of  this  feeling  are  developed  as  soon  as  we 
come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
those  beings,  and  the  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  them. 
Such  elements  are,  the  feeling  of  obligation  of  reciprocity 
to  man,  and  of  universal  love  and  obedience  to  our  Creator. 

2.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  relations  in  which  we  stand 
to  other  beings,  created  and  uncreated,  as  well  as  to  teach 
us  His  character  and  His  will  concerning  us,  God  has  given 
us  other  means  of  instruction. 

1.  He  has  so  arranged  and  governed  all  the  events  of 
this  world,  as  to  illustrate   His  character  by  His  dealings 
with  men ;  and  He  has  given  us  powers,  by  which  we 
may,  if  we  will,  acquire  the  knowledge  thus  set  before  us. 
The  fact  that  we  may  acquire  this  knowledge  of  the  will 
of  God,  and  that  we  are  so  constituted  as  to  feel  that  we 
ought  to  do  the  will  of  God,  renders  us  responsible  for 
obedience  to  all  the  light  which  we  may  acquire. 

2.  In  the   utter   failure  of  this  mode  of  instruction  to 
reclaim  men,  God  has  seen  fit  to  reveal  His  will  to  us  by 
language.     Here  the  truth  is  spread  before  us,  without  the 
necessity  of  induction  from  a  long  and  previous  train  of 
reasoning.      This  knowledge  of  the   will    of    God,   thus 
obtained,  renders  man  responsible  for  the  additional  light 
thus  communicated. 

In  the  same  manner,  when  this  means  failed  to  pro- 
duce any  important  moral  result,  a  revelation  has  been 
made,  instructing  us  still  farther  concerning  our  duties  to 
God,  His  character  and  will ;  and,  above  all,  informing  us 
of  a  new  relation  in  which  the  Deity  stands  to  us,  and  of 
those  new  conditions  of  being  under  which  we  are  placed. 
And  we  are,  in  consequence  of  our  moral  constitution, 
rendered  responsible  for  a  conduct  corresponding  to  all  this 
additional  moral  light,  and  consequent  moral  obligation. 

Now,  if  it  be  remembered  that  we  are  under  obligations 


- 


148  HOW    WE    ARE    TO    ASCERTAIN 

greater  than  we  can  estimate,  to  obey  the  will  of  God,  by 
what  manner  soever  signified,  and  that  we  are  under  obli- 
gation, therefore,  to  obey  Him,  if  he  had  given  us  no  other 
intimation  of  His  will,  than  merely  the  monition  of  con- 
science, unassisted  by  natural  or  revealed  religion,  how 
greatly  must  that  obligation  be  increased,  when  these  addi- 
tional means  of  information  are  taken  into  the  account ! 
And,  if  the  guilt  of  our  disobedience  be  in  proportion  to  the 
knowledge  of  our  duty,  and  if  that  knowledge  of  our  duty 
be  so  great  that  we  cannot  readily  conceive  how,  con- 
sistently with  the  conditions  of  our  being,  it  could  have 
been  greater,  we  may  judge  how  utterly  inexcusable  must 
be  every  one  of  our  transgressions.  Such  does  the  Bible 
represent  to  be  the  actual  condition  of  man ;  and  hence  it 
every  where  treats  him  as  under  a  just  and  awful  condem- 
nation ;  a  condemnation  from  which  there  is  no  hope  of 
escape,  but  by  means  of  the  special  provisions  of  a  reme- 
dial dispensation. 

It  belongs  to  theology  to  treat  of  the  nature  of  this 
remedial  dispensation.  We  shall,  therefore,  attempt  no 
exhibition,  either  of  its  character  or  its  provisions,  beyond 
a  simple  passing  remark,  to  show  its  connections  with  our 
present  subject. 

The  law  of  God,  as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures,  repre- 
i  sents  our  eternal  happiness  as  attainable  upon  the  simple 
ground  of  perfect  obedience,  and  perfect  obedience  upon 
the  principles  already  explained.  But  this,  in  our  present 
state,  is  manifestly  unattainable.  A  single  sin,  both  on  the 
ground  of  its  violation  of  the  conditions  on  which  our 
future  happiness  was  suspended,  as  well  as  by  the  effects 
which  it  produces  upon  our  whole  subsequent  moral  char 
acter,  and  our  capacity  for  virtue,  renders  our  loss  of  hap- 
pmess  inevitable.  Even  after  reformation,  our  moral  at- 
tainment must  fall  short  of  the  requirements  of  the  law 
of  God,  and  thus  present  no  claim  to  the  Divine  favor. 
For  this  reason,  our  salvation  is  made  to  depend  upon  the 
obedience  and  merits  of  another.  But  we  are  entitled  to 
hope  for  salvation  upon  the  ground  of  the  merit  of  Christ, 
solely  upon  the  condition  of  yielding  ourselves  up  in  entire 


OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES.        149 

obedience  to  the  whole  law  of  God.  "  He  that  saith,  I 
know  Him,  and  keepeth  not  His  commandments,  is  a  liar, 
and  the  truth  is  not  in  him."  John  ii,  4.  And  hence  a 
knowledge  of  the  law  of  God  is  of  just  as  great  importance 
to  us,  under  a  remedial  dispensation,  as  under  a  dispensa- 
tion of  law ;  not  on  the  ground  that  we  are  to  be  saved 
by  keeping  it  without  sin ;  but  on  the  ground  that,  unless 
the  will  of  God  be  the  habitually  controlling  motive  of  all 
our  conduct,  we  are  destitute  of  the  elements  of  that  char- 
acter, to  which  the  blessings  of  the  remedial  dispensation 
are  promised.  Hence,  under  the  one  dispensation,  as  well 
as  under  the  other,  though  on  different  grounds,  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  law  of  God  is  necessary  to  our  happiness  both 
here  and  hereafter. 
13* 


BOOK    SECOND. 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


153 


PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 


IN  the  preceding  pages,  it  has  been  my  design  to  illus- 
trate the  moral  constitution  of  man,  and  to  point  out  the 
sources  from  which  that  truth  emanates,  which  is  addressed 
to  his  moral  constitution.  My  design,  in  the  present  book, 
Is,  to  classify  and  explain  some  of  the  principal  moral  laws 
under  which  God  has  placed  us,  in  our  present  state.  We 
shall  derive  these  laws  from  natural  or  from  revealed  religion, 
or  from  both,  as  may  be  most  convenient  for  our  purpose. 

The  Scriptures  declare  that  the  whole  moral  law  is  con- 
tained in  the  single  word,  LOVE. 

The  beings  to  whom  man  is  related  in  his  present  state, 
are,  so  far  as  this  subject  is  concerned,  God  his  Creator,  and 
man  his  fellow-creature.     Hence,  the  moral  obligations  of  J 
men  are  of  two  kinds :    first,  LOVE  TO  GOD,  or  PIETY  ; 
second,  LOVE  TO  MAN,  or  MORALITY. 

This  book  will,  therefore,  be  divided  into  two  parts,  in 
which  those  two  subjects  will  be  treated  of  in  their  order. 


154 


PART    1. 

LOVE    TO    GOD,    OR   PIETY. 

CHAPTER   FIRST. 

THE    GENERAL   OBLIGATION    TO    SUPREME    LOVE    TO    GOD. 

THE  scriptural  precept  on  this  subject,  inay  be  found 
recorded  in  various  passages.  It  is  in  these  words :  "  Thou 
shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart,  and  with 
all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy  mind,  and  with  all  thy 
strength."  See  Matthew  xxii,  37  ;  Mark  xii,  30  •  Luke 
x,  27. 

In  order  to  illustrate  this  precept,  I  shall  consider,  first, 
the  relation  which  exists  between  us  and  the  Deity ;  sec- 
ondly, the  rights  and  obligations  which  that  relation  imposes ; 
and,  thirdly,  the  facts  in  our  constitution  which  show  that 
these  are  manifestly  the  law  of  our  being. 

I.  The  relation  which  exists  between  God  and  us. 

1.  He  is  our  Creator  and  Preserver.  A  few  years  since, 
and  we  had  no  existence.  Within  a  few  more  years,  and 
this  whole  system,  of  which  we  form  a  part,  had  no  exist- 
ence. Over  our  own  existence,  neither  we,  nor  any  created 
thing,  has  any  more  than  the  semblance  of  power.  We  are 
upheld  in  being  by  the  continued  act  of  Omnipotence.  Not 
only  we,  ourselves,  but  every  faculty  which  we  and  which 
all  creatures  enjoy,  was  created,  and  is  continually  upheld, 
by  the  same  Creator.  Nor  this  alone  ;  all  the  circum- 
stances by  which  we  are  surrounded,  and  all  the  modifica- 
tions of  external  nature,  of  what  sort  soever  they  may  be, 
whether  physical,  intellectual,  social,  or  moral,  are  equally 
created  and  sustained  by  God,  and  derive  their  powers  to 


OBLIGATION   TO   THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  155 

render  us  happy,  or  wise,  or  good,  purely  from  his  provident 
care,  and  from  the  exertion  of  his  omnipotent  and  omni- 
present goodness.  The  relation,  therefore,  existing  between 
the  Deity  and  us,  is  that  of  dependence,  more  profound, 
universal,  and  absolute,  than  we  are  able  adequately  to  com- 
prehend, upon  a  Being,  absolutely  and  essentially  inde- 
pendent, omniscient,  omnipotent,  and  all-providing. 

2.  The  Deity  has  revealed  himself  to  us,  as  a  Being  in 
whom  are  united,  by  the  necessity  of  his  existence,  every 
perfection  of  which  the  human  mind  can  conceive,  and  every 
perfection  that  can  possibly  exist,  how  much  soever  they 
may  transcend  the  powers  of  our  conception.     To  Him  be- 
long, from  the  necessity  of  His  being,  almighty  power,  om- 
niscient   wisdom,   unchanging   veracity,  inflexible  justice, 
transcendent  purity,  illimitable  benevolence,  and  universal 
love.     Not  only  does  He  treasure  up  within  Himself  all 
that  can  be  conceived  of  every  perfection,  but  He  is  the 
exhaustless  fountain,  from  which  emanates  all  of  these  at- 
tributes,  that   exists   throughout   this   wide   creation.     As 
every  object  that  we  see  in  nature,  is  seen  only  by  its  re- 
flecting rays  of  the  sun,  so  every  exhibition  of  goodness 
which  we  behold  in  creatures,  is  nothing^  but  the  reflection 
of  the  perfections  of  Him  who  is  the  Father  of  Lights,  with 
whom  is  neither  variableness  nor  the  shadow  of  a  turning. 
The  relation,  therefore,  in  this  respect,  which  exists  between 
us  and  the  Creator,  is  that  which  exists  between  beings  whom 
He  has  formed  to  admire  and  love  all  these  perfections,  and 
the  Uncreated  Being,  in  whom  they  all  exist,  in  a  degree  in- 
finitely surpassing  all  that  it  is  in  our  power  to  conceive. 

3.  This  creative  power,  and  this  incomprehensible  wis- 
dom, have   been    exerted  in  obedience  to  all  these  tran- 
scendent moral  perfections,  for  the  production  of  our  best 
good,  our   highest   temporal  and  eternal  happiness  ;    nay, 
they  have  been  as  fully  exerted  in  behalf  of  our  race,  as 
though  there  were  no  other  race  in  existence ;  and  in  be- 
half of  each  one  of  us,  as  though  each  individual  were  the 
only  being  created,  within  this  illimitable  universe.     And 
upon  all  this  exertion  of  goodness  towards  us,  we  have  not 
the  semblance  of  a  claim ;  for  God  was  under  no  manner 
of  obligation  to  create  us,  much  less,  to  create  us  capable 


156  OBLIGATION   TO   THE    LOVE    OF    COD. 

of  that  happiness  which  we  enjoy.  The  relation,  therefore, 
in  this  respect,  existing  between  us  and  the  Deity,  is  that 
between  beings  who,  without  any  claim  whatever,  are,  at 
every  moment,  receiving  the  results  of  the  exercise  of  every 
conceivable  perfection,  from  a  Being  who  is  moved  thus  to 
conduct  towards  them,  by  nothing  but  His  own  independent 
goodness. 

II.  From  these  relations,  existing  between  creatures  ana 
the  Creator,  there  arise  various  rights  of  the  Creator,  and 
various  obligations  of  the  creature. 

Every  one,  who  will  reflect  upon  this  subject,  must  be 
convinced,  that,  inasmuch  as  these  relations  are  entirely 
beyond  the  range  of  human  analogies,  and  also  manifestly 
beyond  the  grasp  of  finite  conception,  they  must  involve 
obligations,  in  their  very  nature  more  profound  and  univer- 
sal, than  we  can  adequately  comprehend  ;  and  that,  there- 
fore, no  conception  of  ours  can  possibly  transcend  their 
solemnity  and  awfulness.  As,  in  our  present  state,  we  are 
so  little  able  to  understand  them,  or  even  to  inquire  after 
them,  we  see  the  need  of  instruction  concerning  them,  from 
Him,  who  alone,  of  all  beings  that  exist,  can  fathom  their 
depth,  or  measure  their  immensity.  Let  us,  therefore,  in- 
quire, What  are  the  claims  which,  in  his  revealed  word,  God 
asserts  over  us,  and  what  are  the  obligations  which,  in  his 
sight,  bind  us  to  Him  ? 

1.  By  virtue  of  his  relation  to  us  as  Creator,  he  asserts 
over  us  the  right  of  unlimited  possession.  Inasmuch  as  we 
are  his  creatures.,  we  are  his  in  the  highest  and  most  exten- 
sive sense,  in  which  we  can  conceive  of  the  idea  of  posses- 
sion. Neither  we  ourselves,  nor  any  thing  which  we  seem 
to  possess,  are  our  own.  Even  our  wills  are  not  our  own, 
but  he  claims  that  we  shall  only  will  precisely  what  He 
ivills.  Our  faculties,  of  what  sort  soever,  are  not  our  own. 
He  claims  that,  from  the  commencement  of  our  existence, 
they  be  used  precisely  in  the  manner,  for  the  purposes, 
and  within  the  limits,  that  He  shall  direct.  Not  only  does 
God  assert  this  right  in  his  word,  but  we  find  that  he  ac- 
tually exercises  it.  Without  regard  to  what  we  will,  He 
does  his  pleasure,  in  the  armies  of  heaven  and  among  the 
inhabitants  of  the  earth.  He  takes  from  us  health,  posses- 


OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  157 

sions,  friends,  faculties,  life,  and  He  giveth  not  account  of 
any  of  his  matters.  That  is,  he  manifestly  acts  upon  the 
principle,  that  He  is  the  Sovereign  and  rightful  Proprietor, 
both  of  ourselves,  and  of  all  that  we  seem  to  ourselves  to 
possess. 

And,  thus,  on  the  other  hand,  God  asserts  that  we  are  all 
under  obligations,  greater  and  more  solemn  than  we  can 
possibly  conceive,  to  render  to  Him  that  entire  obedience 
and  submission,  which  his  essential  right  over  us  renders 
manifestly  his  due. 

This  right,  and  the  correspondent  obligation,  have  re- 
spect to  two  classes  of  duties.  The  first  class,  is  that  which 
respects  simply  our  relations  to  him,  and  which  would  be 
obligatory  upon  us,  although  each  one  of  us  were  the  only 
created  being  in  the  universe.  The  second  class  of  duties 
respects  our  fellow-creatures.  If  we  could  suppose  moral 
creatures  to  exist  without  a  Creator,  there  would  yet  be 
duties  which,  from  their  constitution  as  moral  creatures., 
they  would  owe  to  each  other.  But,  inasmuch  as  every 
creature  is  the  creature  of  God,  He  has  made  the  duties 
which  they  owe  to  each  other,  a  part  of  their  duty  to  Him. 
That  is  to  say,  he  requires  us,  who  are  his  creatures,  and 
who  are  under  universal  obligations  to  him,  to  treat  our 
fellow-creatures,  who  are  also  his  creatures,  and  under  his 
protection,  in  such  a  manner  as  he  shall  direct.  He  is  the 
Father  of  us  all,  and  he  requires  that  every  one  of  his 
children  conduct  himself  towards  others,  who  are  also  his 
children,  as  he  shall  appoint.  And,  hence,  the  duties 
which  are  required  of  us  to  our  fellow-creatures,  are  required 
of  us  under  a  twofold  obligation.  First,  that  arising  from 
our  relation  to  God,  and,  secondly,  that  arising  from  our 
relation  to  our  fellows.  And,  hence,  there  is  not  a  single 
act  which  we  are  under  obligation  to  perform,  which  we 
are  not  also  under  obligation  to  perform  from  the  principle 
of  obedience  to  our  Creator.  Thus  the  obligation  to  act 
religiously,  or  piously,  extends  to  the  minutest  action  of  our 
lives,  and  no  action  of  any  sort  whatever  can  be,  in  the 
full  acceptation  of  the  term,  virtuous,  that  12,  be  entitled 
to  the  praise  of  God,  which  does  not  involve  in  its  motives 
the  temper  of  filial  obedience  to  the  Deity.  And  still  more , 
14 


158  OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

as  tliis  obligation  is  infinitely  superior  to  any  other  that  can 
be  conceived,  an  action  performed  from  the  conviction  of 
any  other  obligation,  if  this  obligation  be  excluded,  fails,  in 
infinitely  the  most  important  respect ;  and  must,  by  the 
whole  amount  of  this  deficiency,  expose  us  to  the  condem- 
nation of  the  law  of  God,  whatever  that  condemnation 
may  be. 

And,  once  more,  we  are  taught,  in  the  Scriptures,  that 
the  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  the  Deity,  places  us 
under  such  obligations,  that,  while  our  whole  and  uninter- 
rupted service  is  thus  due  to  God,  we  can,  after  it  is  all 
performed,  in  no  manner  bring  him  under  any  obligation  to 
us.  This  I  suppose  to  be  the  meaning  intended  by  our 
Savior,  in  the  parable,  Luke  xvii,  7 — 10  :  "But  which  of 
you,  having  a  servant,  (a  slave,)  ploughing  or  feeding 
cattle,  will  say  unto  him,  by  and  by,  when  he  is  come  from 
the  field,  Go  and  sit  down  to  meat ;  and  will  not  rather 
say  unto  him,  Make  ready  wherewith  I  may  sup,  and  gird 
thyself  and  serve  me,  until  I  have  eaten  and  drunken  ;  and 
afterwards  thou  shalt  eat  and  drink?  Doth  he  thank  that 
servant  because  he  hath  done  the  things  that  were  com- 
manded him  1  I  suppose  not.  So,  likewise  ye,  when  ye 
have  done  all  the  things  which  are  commanded  you,  say, 
We  are  unprofitable  servants,  we  have  done  that  which  was 
our  duty  to  do."  That  is,  the  obligation  of  the  servant  is 
not  fulfilled  by  doing  any  one  thing,  but  only  by  occupying 
his  whole,  time,  and  exerting  his  whole  power,  to  its  full 
extent,  in  doing  whatever  is  commanded  him.  And  when 
all  this  is  done,  such  is  the  relation  between  the  parties, 
that  he  has  placed  the  Master,  God,  under  no  obligation ; 
he  has  only  discharged  a  duty ;  he  has  merely  paid  a  debt ; 
nor  is  it  possible,  from  the  nature  of  the  relation,  that  he 
should  ever  do  any  thing  more.  Such,  I  think,  every  one 
will  acknowledge,  upon  reflection,  to  be  the  relation  exist- 
ing between  us  and  our  Creator. 

And,  hence,  we  see,  that  a  failure  in  duty  to  God,  on 
the  part  of  the  creature,  must  be  remediless.  At  every 
moment,  he  is  under  obligation  to  the  full  amount  of  his 
ability ;  and,  when  this  whole  amount  of  obligation  is  dis- 
charged, he  has  then  simply  fulfilled  his  duty.  Hence,  no 


OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  159 

act  can  have  any  retrospective  effect ;  that  is,  it  cannot 
supply  the  deficiencies  of  any  other  act.  This  would  be 
the  case,  even  if  his  moral  powers  were  not  injured  by  sin. 
But,  if  we  add  this  other  element,  and  reflect,  that,  by  sin, 
our  moral  powers  are  permanently  injured ;  that  is,  our 
capacity  for  virtue  is  diminished,  according  to  the  laws  of 
our  constitution  ;  by  how  much  more  is  it  evident,  that, 
under  a  system  of  mere  law,  a  single  failure  in  our  duty  to 
God  must  be  of  necessity  fatal !  What  shall  we  then  say 
of  a  life,  of  which  every  act  is,  when  strictly  considered,  by 
confession,  a  moral  failure  ? 

2.  God  has  revealed  himself  to  us  as  a  Being  endowed 
with  every  attribute  of  natural  and  moral  excellence  ;  and, 
in  virtue  of  the  relation  which,  on  this  account,  he  sustains 
to  us,  a  new  form  of  obligation  is  imposed  upon  us. 

We  are  evidently  formed  to  love  whatever  is  beautiful, 
and  to  admire  whatever  is  great  in  power,  or  excellent  in 
wisdom.  This  is  too  evident  to  need  illustration.  But 
we  are  so  made  as  to  love  and  admire  still  more  the  cause 
from  which  all  these  emanate.  We  admire  the  tragedies  of 
Shakspeare,  and  the  epic  of  Milton,  but  how  much  more 
the  minds  in  which  these  works  were  conceived,  and  by 
which  they  were  executed.  Now,  all  that  we  see  in 
creation,  whether  of  beauty,  or  loveliness,  or  grandeur3  is 
the  work  of  the  Creator.  It  all  existed  in  His  conceptions, 
before  it  existed  in  fact.  Nor  this  alone.  The  powers  by 
which  we  perceive,  and  are  affected  by,  these  exhibitions, 
all  proceed  from  Him,  and  both  the  external  qualities  and 
the  internal  susceptibilities  are  upheld  by  his  all-sustaining 
energy.  Thus,  every  feeling  of  love  or  of  admiration 
which  we  exercise,  involves,  from  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  the  obligation  to  exercise  these  feelings,  in  a  higher 
degree  towards  Him  who  is  the  author  of  all.  But,  as  He 
is  the  author,  not  only  of  whatever  is  lovely  or  glorious  that 
we  see,  but  of  all  that  we  have  ever  seen ;  not  only  of  all 
that  we  have  ever  seen,  but  of  all  that  has  ever  existed ; 
not  only  of  all  that  has  ever  existed,  but  of  all  that  ever  can 
exist ;  by  how  much  are  we  under  obligation  to  love  Him 
better  than  all  things  else  that  we  know !  and  by  how 


160  OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

much  more  than  any  individual  form  of  excellence,  with 
which  it  is  possible  for  us  ever  to  become  acquainted ! 

Again,  God  reveals  himself  to  us  as  the  possessor  of 
every  moral  attribute,  in  infinite  perfection.  In  him  are 
united  infinitely  more  than  we  or  other  created  beings  can 
conceive,  of  justice,  holiness,  mercy,  compassion,  goodness 
and  truth.  Now,  we  are  manifestly  formed  to  love  and 
Pjdmire  actions  emanating  from  such  attributes,  as  they  are 
exhibited  on  earth,  and  specially  the  moral  characters  of 
those  by  whom  such  actions  are  performed.  We  are  not 
only  formed  to  do  this,  but  we  are  specially  formed  to  do 
it.  We  are  created  with  an  impulsion  to  exercise  these 
affections,  and  we  are  conscious  that  it  is  the  highest  impul- 
sion of  our  nature.  Now,  whatever  we  see  of  moral  excel- 
lence on  earth,  springs  from  Him,  as  its  first  and  original 
cause.  He  created  the  circumstances  under  which  it 
exists,  and  created,  with  all  its  powers,  the  being  by 
whom  it  is  displayed.  Nor  this  alone.  He  possesses, 
essentially,  and  in  an  infinite  degree,  and  without  the  possi- 
bility of  imperfection,  every  moral  attribute.  If,  then,  the 
highest  impulsion  of  our  nature  teaches  us  to  love  and 
venerate  these  attributes,  even  as  they  are  displayed  in 
their  imperfection  on  earth,  by  how  much  more  are  we 
under  obligation  to  love  these  attributes,  as  they  are  pos- 
sessed by  our  Father  who  is  in  heaven  !  If  a  single  act  of 
justice  deserves  our  veneration,  how  much  more  should  we 
venerate  that  justice  which  has  governed  this  universe 
without  the  shadow  of  a  spot,  from  eternity !  If  a  single 
act  of  purity  deserves  our  regard,  with  what  awe  should  we 
adore  the  holiness  of  Him,  in  whose  sight  the  heavens  are 
unclean  !  If  a  single  act  of  benevolence  deserve  our  love, 
with  what  affection  should  we  bow  before  Him,  who,  from 
eternity,  has  been  pouring  abroad  a  ceaseless  flood  of  bless- 
edness, over  the  boundless  universe  by  which  He  is  sur- 
rounded ! 

And  yet  more,  I  think  it  is  manifest  that  we  are  so  con- 
stituted as  to  be  under  obligations  to  love  such  attributes  as 
I  have  mentioned,  entirely  aside  from  the  consideration  of 
their  connection  with  ourselves.  We  admire  justice  and 


OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  161 

benevolence  in  men  who  existed  ages  ago,  and  in  countries 
with  which  we  have  no  interests  in  common.  And  thus 
these  obligations  to  love  and  adore  these  attributes  in  the 
Deity,  would  exist  in  full  force,  irrespective  of  the  fact  of 
our  receiving  any  benefit  from  them.  And  our  Creator 
might,  and  justly  would,  require  of  us  all  these  affections 
of  which  I  have  spoken,  did  these  moral  attributes  exist  in 
some  other  being  besides  himself.  The  obligation  is  sus- 
tained upon  the  simple  consideration,  that  we  are  constituted 
such  moral  beings  as  we  are,  and  that  another  Being  exists, 
endowed  with  attributes,  in  this  particular  manner,  corre- 
sponding to  our  moral  constitution.  By  how  much  is  this 
obligation  increased,  by  the  consideration  that  He,  in  whom 
these  attributes  exist,  stands  to  us  in  the  relation  of  Creator ! 

3.  As,  by  the  constitution  of  our  moral  nature,  we  are 
under  obligation  to  love  whatever  is  morally  excellent,  irre- 
spective of  any  benefit  which  we  may  derive  from  it  our- 
selves, so,  when  this  moral  excellence  is  intentionally  the 
source  of  happiness  to  us,  we  are  under  the  additional 
obligation  to  gratitude,  or  a  desire  to  do  something  which 
shall  please  Him,  from  whom  our  happiness  has  proceeded. 
This  obligation  is  so  manifestly  recognized  as  one  of  the 
instinctive  impulses  of  our  nature,  that,  whilst  we  merely 
esteem  him  who  acts  in  obedience  to  it,  the  neglect  of  it, 
without  the  exhibition  of  the  positively  opposite  temper,  is 
always  met  by  the  feeling  of  intense  moral  reprobation. 

Now,  since  whatever  of  favor  we  receive  from  others,  is 
derived  from  them  merely  as  second  causes,  it  all  originates, 
essentially,  from  the  First  and  All-pervading  Cause.  What- 
ever gratitude  we  feel,  therefore,  towards  creatures,  is 
really,  and  in  the  highest  possible  sense,  due  to  God,  from 
whom  it  all  really  emanates. 

But  how  small  is  that  portion  of  the  happiness  which  we 
enjoy,  which  is  conferred  by  the  favor  of  our  fellows  I 
Immeasurably  the  greater  part  is  the  direct  gift  of  our 
Creator.  The  obligation  to  gratitude,  is  in  proportion  to 
the  amount  of  benefits  conferred,  and  the  disinterestedness 
of  the  goodness  from  which  they  have  proceeded.  By  these 
elements,  let  us  estimate  the  amount  of  obligation-  of  ; 
itude  to  God. 

14* 


162  OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

As  the  Deity  is  essentially  independent  of  all  his  crea- 
tures, and  as  He  has  created  us  from  nothing,  and  as  He 
has  created,  also,  all  the  circumstances  under  which  we 
exist,  He  can  be  under  no  sort  of  obligation  to  us,  nor  can 
our  relation  to  Him  ever  be  of  any  other  sort,  than  that  of 
the  recipients  of  favor,  which  we  can  by  no  possibility 
merit. 

Under  such  circumstances,  a  sensation  of  happiness,  for 
a  single  moment,  even  if  it  terminated  with  that  single 
moment,  would  be  a  course  for  gratitude  so  long  as  it  could 
be  remembered.  How  much  more,  if  this  form  of  happi- 
ness continued  throughout  our  whole  extent  of  being! 
The  enjoyment  of  one  form  of  happiness,  say  of  that  de- 
rived from  a  single  sense,  would  deserve  our  gratitude  ;  how 
much  more  that  derived  from  all  our  senses,  and  specially 
that  derived  from  the  combination  of  them  all !  The 
enjoyment  of  ever  so  transient  a  sensation  of  intellectual 
happiness,  would  deserve  our  gratitude ;  how  much  more 
that  of  a  permanent  constitution,  which  was  a  source  of 
perpetual  intellectual  happiness,  and  specially  a  constitution 
involving  a  great  variety  of  forms  of  intellectual  happiness  ! 
Thus,  also,  a  single  emotion  of  moral  happiness  would 
deserve  our  gratitude ;  how  much  more  a  constitution 
formed  for  perpetual  moral  happiness  !  And  yet  more,  if 
these  forms  of  happiness,  taken  singly,  would  be  each  a 
cause  of  perpetual  and  increasing  gratitude,  how  much 
more  a  constitution,  by  which  the  very  relations  which  they 
sustain  to  each  other,  become  a  source  of  additional  and 
increased  happiness !  Add  to  this,  that  the  external  world 
is  itself  adjusted  to  all  these  powers  and  susceptibilities  of 
man,  and  each  adjustment  is  manifestly  intended  for  our 
best  good.  And  add  to  this,  that  such  are  the  conditions 
of  being  under  which  we  are  placed,  that,  if  we  only  use 
these  powers  according  to  the  will  of  God,  and  to  the 
nature  which  He  has  given  us,  that  is,  in  such  a  way  as  to 
promote  our  highest  happiness  here,  we  shall  be  advanced 
to  a  state  of  happiness  more  excellent  and  glorious  than 
any  of  which  we  can  conceive ;  and  we  shall  be  fixed  in  it 
unchangeably  and  for  ever.  Now,  if  a  single  act  of  disin- 
terested goodness,  and  undeserved  favor,  deserve  our  grali- 


OBLIGATION   TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  163 

tude  for  ever,  what  limits  can  be  set  to  the  intensity  of 
that  grateful  adoration,  which  should,  throughout  our  whole 
bein^,  pervade  our  bosoms,  towards  Him  from  whom  every 
blessing  is  perpetually  flowing,  in  so  exhaustless  a  flood  of 
unfathomable  goodness  ! 

Such,  then,  are  the  obligations  to  love  and  gratitude, 
which,  in  addition  to  that  of  obedience,  we  owe  to  our 
Creator.  But  it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that  these  forms 
of  obligation  reciprocally  involve  each  other.  For  if 
we  possess  that  temper  of  entire  obedience,  which  springs 
from  a  recognition  of  the  universal  right  of  the  Creator 
over  us,  we  shall  dedicate  our  affections  to  Him,  as  entirely 
as  our  will ;  that  is,  we  shall  love  only  what  he  commands, 
and  just  as  he  has  commanded ;  that  is,  we  shall  not  only 
do  his  will,  but  we  shall  love  to  do  it,  not  only  on  account 
of  what  he  is  in  himself,  but  also  on  account  of  what  he 
is  and  always  has  been  to  us.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  if 
we  love  his  character  and  attributes  as  they  deserve,  we 
shall  love  to  perform  actions  which  are  in  harmony  with 
those  attributes  ;  that  is,  which  spring  from  the  same  dis- 
positions in  ourselves.  In  other  words,  we  shall  love  to 
act  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  will  of  God.  And  still 
more,  if  we  are  penetrated  with  a  proper  conviction  of  the 
obligations  of  gratitude  under  which  we  are  placed,  we 
shall  love  to  please  our  Supreme  Benefactor ;  and  the  only 
way  in  which  we  can  do  this,  is,  by  implicitly  obeying  his 
commands. 

It  was  remarked,  in  a  former  part  of  this  work,  that  hap- 
piness consists  in  the  exercise  of  our  sensitiveness  upon  its 
appropriate  objects.  Now,  that  man  has  moral  sentiments, 
that  is,  that  he  is  formed  to  derive  happiness  from  the  con- 
templation of  moral  qualities,  and  specially  from  the  love 
of  those  beings  in  whom  these  moral  qualities  reside,  is  too 
evident  to  need  argument.  It  is  also  evident,  that  this  is 
the  highest  and  most  exalted  form  of  happiness  of  which 
he  is  susceptible.  But  created  beings,  and  the  moral 
qualities  of  created  beings,  are  not  the  objects  adapted  to 
his  moral  sensitiveness.  This  power  of  our  being,  finds  its 
appropriate  object  in  nothing  less  than  in  supreme,  and 
unlimited,  and  infinite  moral  perfection.  And  yet  more, 


164  OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

the  moral  susceptibility  of  happiness  expands  by  exercise, 
and  the  uncreated  object  to  which  it  is  directed,  is,  by 
necessity,  unchangeable,  eternal  and  infinite.  A  provision 
is  thus  made  for  the  happiness  of  man,  eternal  and  illimit- 
able ;  that  is  to  say,  not  only  is  it  evident,  from  the  con- 
stitution of  man,  that  he  is  made  to  love  God,  but  also  that 
he  is  made  to  love  Him  infinitely  more  than  any  thing  else ; 
to  be  happier  from  loving  Him  than  from  loving  any  thing 
else  ;  and,  also,  to  be  more  and  more  intensely  happy,  from 
loving  Him,  throughout  eternity. 

Thus,  in  general,  from  the  relations  which  we  sustain  to 
God,  we  are  under  more  imperative  obligations  than  we 
are  able  to  conceive,  to  exercise  towards  him  that  temper 
of  heart,  which  is,  perhaps,  in  the  language  of  men,  best 
expressed  by  the  term,  a  filial  disposition ;  that  is,  a  dis- 
position to  universal  obedience,  pervaded  by  the  spirit  of 
supreme  and  grateful  affection.  This  temper  of  heart  is 
that  generically  denominated  in  the  Scriptures,  faith.  In 
the  New  Testament,  it  is  somewhat  modified  by  the  rela- 
tions in  which  we  stand  to  God,  in  consequence  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  remedial  dispensation. 

Now,  all  these  dispositions  would  be  required  of  us,  if 
we  were  sinless  beings,  and  possibly  no  others  would  be 
required.  The  same  are  manifestly  our  duty,  after  we  have 
sinned ;  for  our  sin  changes  neither  the  character  of  God, 
nor  His  claim  upon  our  obedience  and  affection.  A  child 
who  has  done  wrong,  is  not  under  any  the  less  imperative 
obligation  to  exercise  a  filial  disposition  towards  a  parent. 
But,  suppose  a  creature  to  have  sinned,  it  is  manifest,  that 
he  would  be  under  obligations  to  exercise  another  moral 
disposition.  He  ought  to  regret  his  fault,  not  on  account 
of  its  consequences  to  himself,  but  on  account  of  the  viola- 
tion of  moral  obligation,  which  is  the  essence  of  its  guilti- 
ness. Acknowledging  its  utter  wrongfulness,  justifying 
God,  and  taking  all  the  blame  of  his  act  upon  himself,  he 
ought  to  hate  his  own  act,  and  from  such  feelings  to  the 
act,  as  well  as  from  the  temper  of  filial  obedience  to  God, 
commence  a  life  of  moral  purity.  Such  is  repentance. 
This  is  the  temper  of  heart,  which  the  Scriptures  teach  us. 
that  God  requires  of  us  as  sinners. 


OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD.  165 

III.  Such,  then,  is  the  obligation  under  which,  by  our 
creation,  we  stand  to  God.  It  would  be  easy  to  show  that 
this  is  the  only  principle  of  action  suited  to  our  nature, 
under  the  present  constitution. 

For,  1.  As  we  live  under  a  constitution  of  law,  that  is, 
under  which  every  action  is  amenable  to  law,  and  since  to 
every  action  is  affixed,  by  omnipotent  power  and  unsearch- 
able wisdom,  rewards  or  punishments,  both  in  this  life 
and  also  in  the  other,  and,  as  these  consequences  can, 
by  no  power  of  ours,  be  severed  from  the  action,  it  is  man- 
ifest, that  we  can  attain  to  happiness,  and  escape  from 
misery,  only  by  perfectly  obeying  the  will  of  our  Creator. 
And  yet  more,  since  we  are  creatures,  endowed  with  will, 
and  the  power  of  choice,  we  never  can  be  completely 
happy,  unless  we  act  as  we  choose ;  that  is,  unless  we 
obey  because  we  love  to  obey.  Hence,  from  the  elements 
of  our  constitution,  it  is  evident,  we  can  be  happy  on  no 
other  principles  than  those  of  perfect  obedience  to  God, 
and  obedience  emanating  from,  and  pervaded  by,  love. 

2.  The  same  truth  is  evident,  from  a  consideration  of  the 
relations  which  every  individual  sustains  to  the  whole  race 
of  man.  It  manifestly  enters  into  the  constitution  under 
which  we  exist,  that  every  individual  shall  have  a  power 
over  society,  both  for  good  and  for  evil,  so  far  as  we  can 
see,  in  its  nature  illimitable.  That  such  is  the  fact  will  be 
evident  to  every  one  who  will  reflect  for  a  moment  upon 
the  results  emanating  from  the  lives  of  St.  Paul,  Luther, 
Howard,  Clarkson,  or  Wilberforce ;  and  of  Alexander, 
Julius  Caesar,  Voltaire,  Lord  Byron,  or  Napoleon.  Now, 
it  is  only  necessary  to  recollect,  that  the  being,  possessed  of 
this  power,  is  by  nature  utterly  ignorant  of  the  future  ; 
wholly  incapable,  even  during  life,  and  much  more  after 
death,  of  controlling  and  directing  the  consequences  of  his 
actions ;  and  still  more,  that  he  is  fallible, — that  is,  liable 
not  only  to  err  from  ignorance,  but  also  from  a  wrong 
moral  bias  ;  and  we  must  be  convinced  that  the  exercise 
of  this  power  could  never  be  safe  for  his  fellows,  unless  it 
were  under  the  supreme  direction  of  a  Being  who  knew 
the  end  from  the  beginning,  and  who  was  by  his  very 
nature  incapable  of  wrong. 


166  OBLIGATION    TO    THE    LOVE    OF    GOD. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  will  follow,  that  our  duty  to 
God  forbids, — 

1.  Idolatry, — that  is,  rendering  divine  homage  to  any 
other  being  than  the  Deity. 

2.  Rendering  obedience  to  any  creature,  in  opposition  to 
the  will  of  the  Creator. 

3.  Yielding  obedience  to  our  own  will,  or  gratifying  our 
own  desires,  in  opposition  to  His  will. 

4.  Loving  any  thing  which  He  has  forbidden. 

5.  Loving  any  thing  which  He  has  allowed  us  to  love, 
in  a  manner  and  to  a  degree  that  He  has  forbidden. 

6.  Loving  any  thing  created  in  preference  to  Him. 

Each  of  these  topics  is  susceptible  of  extended  illustra- 
tion. As,  however,  they  are  discussed  in  full  in  works  on 
theology,  to  which  science  they  more  particularly  belong, 
we  shall  leave  them  with  this  simple  enumeration. 

In  treating  of  the  remainder  of  this  subject,  we  shall, 
therefore,  consider  only  the  means  by  which  the  love  of 
God,  or  piety,  may  be  cultivated.  These  are  three :  1st.  A 
spirit  of  devotion.  2d.  Prayer.  3d.  The  observance  of 
the  Sabbath. 


167 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 

THE    CULTIVATION    OF    A    DEVOTIONAL    SPIRIT. 

FROM  what  has  already  been  said,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
relation  which  we  sustain  to  God,  imposes  upon  us  the  obli- 
gation of  maintaining  such  an  habitual  temper  towards  Him, 
as  shall  continually  incite  us  to  do  whatever  will  please  Him. 
It  is  natural  to  suppose  that  our  Creator  would  have  placed 
us  under  such  circumstances  as  would,  from  their  nature, 
cultivate  in  us  such  a  temper.  Such  we  find  to  be  the  fact. 
We  are  surrounded  by  objects  of  knowledge,  which  not 
merely  by  their  existence,  but  also  by  their  ceaseless 
changes,  remind  us  of  the  attributes  of  God,  and  of  the  ob- 
ligations under  which  we  are  placed  to  Him.  A  devotion- 
al spirit  consists  in  making  the  moral  use  which  is  intended, 
of  all  the  objects  of  intellection  that  come  within  our  expe- 
rience or  our  observation. 

1.  Our  existence  is  dependent  on  a  succession  of 
changes,  which  are  taking  place  at  every  moment  in  our- 
selves, over  which  we  have  no  power  whatever,  but  of 
which,  each  one  involves  the  necessity  of  the  existence  and 
the  superintending  power  of  the  Deity.  The  existence  of 
the  whole  material  universe  is  of  the  same  nature.  Now, 
each  of  these  changes  is,  with  infinite  skill,  adapted  to  the 
relative  conditions  of  all  the  beings  whom  they  affect ;  and 
they  are  subjected  to  laws  which  are  most  evident  expres- 
sions of  almighty  power,  of  unsearchable  wisdom,  and  of 
exhaustless  goodness.  Now,  were  we  merely  intellectual 
beings,  it  would  not  be  possible  for  us  to  consider  any  thing 
more  than  these  laws  themselves ;  but,  inasmuch  as  we  are 
intellectual,  and  also  moral  beings,  we  are  capable  not  only 
of  considering  the  laws,  but  also  the  attributes  of  the  Creator 
from  whom  such  laws  are  the  emanations.  As  every  thing 
which  we  can  know  teaches  a  lesson  concerning  God.  if  we 


168  THE    CULTIVATION    OF 

connect  that  lesson  with  every  thing  which  we  learn,  every 
thing  will  be  resplendent  with  the  attributes  of  Deity.  By 
using  in  this  manner,  the  knowledge  which  is  every  where 
spread  before  us,  we  shall  habitually  cultivate  a  devout  tem- 
per of  mind.  Thus,  "  the  heavens  will  declare  unto  us  the 
glory  of  God,  and  the  firmament  will  show  his  handy-work ; 
thus  day  unto  day  will  utter  speech,  and  night  unto  night 
show  forth  knowledge  of  Him." 

2.  Nor  is  this  true  of  physical  nature  alone.  The  whole 
history  of  the  human  race  teaches  us  the  same  lesson.  The 
rewards  of  virtue,  and  the  punishments  of  vice,  as  they  are 
beheld  in  the  events  which  befall  both  individuals  and 
nations,  all  exhibit  the  attributes  of  the  Deity.  It  is  He 
that  C;  stilleth  the  noise  of  the  seas,  the  noise  of  their  waves, 
and  the  tumult  of  the  people."  "  The  Lord  reigneth,  let 
the  earth  rejoice  ;  let  the  multitude  of  isles  be  glad  thereof. 
Clouds  and  darkness  are  round  about  him  ;  righteousness 
and  judgment  are  the  habitation  of  his  throne."  His  for- 
bearance and  long-suffering,  and  at  the  same  time  His  in- 
flexible justice,  His  love  of  right,  and  His  hatred  of  wrong, 
are  legibly  written  in  every  page  of  individual  and  national 
history.  And  hence  it  is,  that  every  fact  which  we  wit- 
ness in  the  government  of  moral  beings,  has  a  twofold  chain 
of  connections  and  relations.  To  the  mere  political  econ- 
omist or  the  statesman,  it  teaches  the  law  by  which  cause 
and  effect  are  connected.  To  the  pious  man  it  also  teaches 
the  attributes  of  that  Being,  who  has  so  connected  cause 
and  effect;  and  who,  amidst  all  the  intricate  mazes  of 
human  motive  and  social  organization,  carries  forward  His 
laws  with  unchanging  certainty  and  unerring  righteousness. 
Now,  it  is  by  observing  not  merely  the  law,  but  the  moral 
lesson  derived  from  the  law ;  it  is  by  observing  not  merely 
the  connections  of  events  with  each  other,  but,  also,  their 
connection  with  the  Great  First  Cause,  that  a  devotional 
spirit  is  to  be  cultivated. 

And,  hence,  we  see  that  knowledge  of  eveiy  kind,  if  suit- 
ably improved,  has,  in  its  very  nature,  a  tendency  to  devo- 
tion. If  we  do  not  thus  use  it,  we  sever  it  from  its  most  im- 
portant connections.  We  act  simply  as  intellectual,  and  not 
as  moral  beings.  We  act  contrary  to  the  highest  and  most 


A    DEVOTIONAL    SPIRIT.  169 

noble  principles  of  our  constitution.  And,  hence,  we  see  how 
progress  in  knowledge  really  places  us  under  progressive 
obligations  to  improvement  in  piety.  This  should  be  borne 
in  mind  by  every  man,  and  specially  by  every  educated 
man.  For  this  improvement  of  our  knowledge,  God  holds 
us  accountable.  "  Because  they  regard  not  the  works  of 
the  Lord,  nor  consider  the  operations  of  his  hand,  there- 
fore will  He  destroy  them." 

3.  But  if  such  are  the  obligations  resting  upon  us,  from 
our  relation  to  the  works  of  Nature  and  Providence,  how 
much  are  these  obligations  increased  by  our  knowledge  of 
God,  as  it  is  presented  to  us  by  revelation !     I  suppose  that 
a  person   acquainted  with  the  laws  of  optics,  who  had  al- 
ways stood  with  his  back  to  the  sun,  might  acquire  much 
important  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  light,  and  of  the  path 
of  the  sun  through  the  heavens,  by  reasoning  from  the  re- 
flection of  that  light,  observed  in  the  surrounding  creation. 
But  how  uncertain  would  be  this  knowledge,  compared  with 
that  which  he  would  acquire,  by  looking  directly  upon  the 
sun,   and  tracing   his  path  by  his  own  immediate  obser- 
vation !     So  of  revelation.     Here,  we  are  taught  by  lan- 
guage, that  truth,  which  we  otherwise  could  learn  only  by 
long  and  careful  induction.     God  has  here  made  known  to 
us  His  attributes  and  character ;  here  He  has  recorded  His 
law ;  here  He  has  written  a  portion  of  the  history  of  our 
race,  as  a  specimen  of  His  providential  dealings  with  men  ; 
and  here  He  has,  more  than  all,  revealed  to  us  a  remedial 
dispensation,  by  which  our  sins  may  be  forgiven,  and  we 
be  raised  to  higher  and  more  glorious  happiness  than  that 
which  we  have  lost.     It  surely  becomes  us,  then,  specially 
to  study  the  Bible,  not  merely  as  a  book  of  antiquities,  or 
a  choice  collection  of  poetry,  or  an  inexhaustible  storehouse 
of  wisdom ;  but  for  the  more  important  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining the  character  of  God,  and  our  relations  to  Him,  and 
of  thus  cultivating  towards  Him  those  feelings  of  filial  and 
reverential  homage,  which  are  so  manifestly  our  duty,  and 
which  such  contemplations  are  in  their  nature  so  adapted  to 
foster  and  improve. 

4.  A  devout  temper  is  also  cultivated  by  the  exercise  of 
devotion.     The  more  we  exercise  the  feeling  of  veneration, 

15 


170  THE    CULTIVATION    OF 

of  love,  of  gratitude,  and  of  submission  towards  God,  the 
more  profound,  and  pervading,  and  intense,  and  habitual, 
will  these  feelings  become.  And,  unless  the  feelings  them- 
selves be  called  into  exercise,  it  will  be  in  vain  that  we  are 
persuaded  that  we  ought  to  exercise  them.  It  is  one  thing 
to  be  an  admirer  of  devotion,  and  another  thing  to  be  really 
devout.  It  becomes  us,  therefore,  to  cultivate  these  feelings, 
by  actually  exercising  towards  God  the  very  tempers  of 
mind  indicated  by  our  circumstances,  and  our  progressive 
knowledge.  Thus,  submission  to  His  will,  thankfulness  for 
His  mercies,  trust  in  His  providence,  reliance  on  His  power, 
and  sorrow  for  our  sins,  should  be,  not  the  occasional  exer- 
cise, but  the  habit  of  our  souls. 

5.  By  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  a  most  intimate 
connection  exists  between  action  and  motive  ;  between  the 
performance  of  an  action  and  the  principle  from  which  it 
emanates.     The  one  cannot  long  exist  without  the  other. 
True  charity  cannot  long  exist  in  the  temper,  unless  we 
perform  acts  of  charity.     Meditation  upon   goodness  will 
soon  become  effete,  unless  it  be  strengthened  by  good  works. 
So  the  temper  of  devotion  will  be  useless  ;  nay,  the  profes- 
sion of  it  must,  of  necessity,  be  hypocritical,  unless  it  produce 
obedience  to  God.     By  this  alone  is  its  existence  known  ; 
by  this  alone  can  it  be  successfully  cultivated.     The  more 
perfectly  our  wills  are  subjected  to  the  will  of  God,  and  our 
whole  course  of  conduct  regulated  by  His  commands,  the 
more  ardent  will  be  our  devotion,  and  the  more  filial  the 
temper  from  which  our  actions  proceed. 

6.  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  observe,  that  as  penitence 
is  a  feeling  resulting  from  a  conviction  of  violated  obligation, 
it  is  to  be  cultivated,  not  merely  by  considering  the  character 
of  God,  but  also  our  conduct  towards  Him.     The  contrast 
between  His  goodness  and  compassion,  and  our  ingratitude 
and  rebellion,  is  specially  adapted  to  fill  us  with  humility 
and  self-abasement,  and  also  with  sorrow  for  all  our  past 
transgressions.     Thus  said  the  prophet :  "  Wo  is  me,  for  I 
am  a  man  of  unclean  lips ;  and  I  dwell  in  the  midst  of  a 
people  of  unclean  lips ;    for  mine  eyes  have  seen  the  Kins', 
the  Lord  of  Hosts!" 

Lastly.     It  is  surely  unnecessary  to  remark,  that  such  a 


A   DEVOTIONAL    SPIRIT.  171 

life  as  this  is  alone  suited  to  the  character  of  man.  If  God 
have  made  us  capable  of  deriving  our  highest  happiness 
from  Him,  and  have  so  constituted  the  universe  around  us  as 
perpetually  to  lead  us  to  this  source  of  happiness,  the  most 
unreasonable,  ungrateful,  and  degrading,  not  to  say  the  most 
guilty,  course  of  conduct  which  we  can  pursue,  must  be,  to 
neglect  and  abuse  this,  the  most  noble  part  of  our  constitu- 
tion, and  to  use  the  knowledge  of  the  world  around  us  for 
every  other  purpose  than  that  for  which  it  was  created. 
Let  every  frivolous,  thoughtless  human  being  reflect  what 
must  be  his  condition,  when  he,  whose  whole  thoughts  are 
limited  by  created  things,  shall  stand  in  the  presence  of 
Him,  "  before  whose  face  the  heavens  and  the  earth  shall 
flee  away,  and  there  be  no  place  left  for  them !" 


172 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 


OF  PRAYER. 


IN  the  present  chapter,  we  shall  treat  of  the  nature,  the 
obligation,  and  the  utility,  of  prayer. 

I.   The  nature  of  prayer. 

(  Prayer  is  the  direct  intercourse  of  the  spirit  of  man  with  the 
spiritual  and  unseen  Creator  J  "  God  is  a  spirit,  and  those 
that  worship  Him,  must  worship  Him  in  spirit  and  in  truth." 

It  consists  in  the  expression  of  our  adoration,  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  our  obligations,  the  offering  up  of  our 
thanksgivings,  the  confession  of  our  sins,  and  in  supplica 
tion  for  the  favors,  as  well  temporal  as  spiritual,  which  we 
need ;  being  always  accompanied  with  a  suitable  temper 
of  mind. 

This  temper  of  mind  presupposes, — 

1.  A  solemn  conviction  of  the  character  and  attributes 
of  God,  and  of  the  relations  which  He  sustains  to  us. 

2.  A  conviction  of  the  relations  which  we  sustain  to 
Him,  and  of  our  obligations  to  Him. 

3.  An  affecting  view  of  our  sinfulness,  helplessness,  and 
misery. 

4.  Sincere  gratitude  for  all  the  favors  which  we  have 
received. 

5.  A  fixed   and  undissembled   resolution   to   obey  the 
commands  of  God  in  future. 

6.  Unreserved  submission  to  all  His  will. 

7.  Unshaken  confidence  in  His  veracity. 

8.  Importunate  desires   that  our  petitions,  specially  for 
spiritual  blessings,  should  be  granted. 

9.  A  soul  at  peace  with  all  mankind. 

Illustrations  of  all  these  dispositions,  from  the  prayers 
recorded  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  as  well  as  the  precepts  by 
which  they  are  enforced,  might  be  easily  adduced.  I  pre"- 


OF    PRAYER.  173 

sume,  however,  they  are  unnecessary.  I  will  only  remark, 
that  it  is  not  asserted  that  all  these  dispositions  are  always 
to  be  in  exercise  at  the  same  time,  but  only  such  of  them 
as  specially  belong  to  the  nature  of  our  supplications. 

Inasmuch  as  we  are  dependent  on  God,  not  only  for 
all  the  blessings  which  we  derive  directly  from  His  hands, 
but  also  for  all  those  which  arise  from  our  relations  to  each 
other,  it  is  manifestly  proper  that  we  confess  our  sins,  and 
supplicate  His  favor,  not  only  as  individuals,  but  as 
societies.  Hence,  prayer  may  be  divided  into  individual, 
domestic  and  social. 

Individual  Prayer.  As  the  design  of  this  institution  is, 
to  bring  us,  as  individual*,  into  direct  communion  with 
God,  to  confess  our  personal  infirmities,  and  to  cultivate 
personal  piety,  it  should  be  strictly  in  private.  We  are 
commanded  to  pray  to  our  Father  in  secret.  It  should, 
moreover,  be  solemn,  unreserved,  and,  in  general,  accom- 
panied with  the  reading  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  As, 
moreover,  this  direct  communion  with  the  unseen  Creator, 
is  intended  to  be  the  great  antagonist  force  to  the  con- 
stant pressure  of  the  things  seen  and  temporal,  it  should  be 
habitual  and  frequent. 

Domestic  Prayer.  As  the  relation  sustained  by  parents 
and  children,  is  the  source  of  many  and  peculiar  blessings ; 
as  the  relation  involves  peculiar  responsibilities,  in  the  ful- 
filment of  which  we  all  need  special  guidance  and  direction, 
there  is  a  peculiar  propriety  in  the  acknowledgment  of  God, 
in  connection  with  this  relation.  The  importance  of  this 
duty  is  specially  urged  upon  us,  by  its  effect  upon  the 
young.  It  associates  with  religion  all  the  recollections  of 
childhood,  and  all  the  sympathies  of  home.  It  gives  to 
parental  advice  the  sanction  of  religion,  and,  in  after  life, 
recalls  the  mind  to  a  conviction  of  duty  to  God,  with  all 
the  motives  drawn  from  a  father's  care  and  a  mother's 
tenderness. 

Social  Prayer.     Inasmuch   as  all  our   social   and  civil 

blessings  are  the  gift  of  God,  it  is  meet  that  we  should,  as 

societies,  meet  to  acknowledge  them.     This  is  one  of  the 

most  important  duties  of  the  Sabbath  day.     It  will,  tli  ere- 

15* 


174  or  PRAYEH. 

fore,  be  more  fully  treated  of,  under  that  branch  of  the 
subject. 

Since  prayer  is  the  offering  up  of  our  desires,  Sic.,  with 
a  suitable  temper  of  heart,  it  is  manifest  that  the  question 
whether  a  form  of  prayer,  or  extemporary  prayer,  should 
be  used,  is  merely  one  of  expediency,  and  has  no  connec- 
tion with  morals.  We  are  under  obligation  to  use  that 
which  is  of  the  greatest  spiritual  benefit  to  the  individual. 
Private  prayer  should,  however,  I  think,  be  expressed  in 
the  words  of  the  supplicant  himself. 

II.   The  duty  of  prayer. 

The  duty  of  prayer  may  be  seen  from  the  conditions  of 
our  being,  and  from  the  Holy  Scriptures. 

I.  The  conditions  of  our  being. 

1.  We  are  utterly  powerless,  ignorant   of  the   future, 
essentially  dependent  at  the  present  and  for  the  future,  and 
are  miserably  sinful.     We  need  support,  direction,  happi- 
ness, pardon  and  purification.     These  can  come  from  na 
other  being  than  God,  who  is  under  no  obligation  to  confer 
them  upon  us.     What  can  be  more  manifestly  proper,  than 
that  we  should  supplicate  the  Father  of  the  universe  for 
those  blessings  which  are  necessary,  not  only  for  our  hap- 
piness, but  for  our  existence,  and  that  we  should  receive 
every  favor  with  a  devout  acknowledgment  of  the  terms  on 
which  it  is  bestowed  ? 

2.  Inasmuch  as  we  are  sinners,  and  have  forfeited  the 
blessings  which  we  daily  receive,  what  can  be  more  suita- 
ble, than   that  we  should   humbly  thank  that  Almighty 
power,  from  whom  comes  such  an  inexhaustible  supply  of 
goodness,  to   us  so  utterly  undeserving?  and   what   more 
obligatory,  than  to  ask  the  pardon  of  our  Creator,  for  those 
sins  of  omission  and  of  commission,  with  which  we   are 
every  hour  justly  chargeable  ? 

3.  Specially  is  this  our  duty,  when  we  reflect,  that  this 
very  exercise  of  habitual  reliance  upon  God,  is  necessary 
to  our  happiness  in  our  present  state,  and  that  the  temper 
which  it  presupposes,  is  essential  to  our  progress  in  virtue. 

That  such  is  the  dictate  of  our  moral  constitution,  is 
evident  from  the  fact,  that  all  men  who  have  any  notion 


OF    PRAYER.  175 

of  a  Supreme  Being,  under  any  circumstances,  acknowl- 
edge it  as  a  duty,  and,  in  some  form  or  other,  profess  to 
practise  it.  And  besides  this,  all  men,  even  the  most 
abandoned  and  profligate,  when  in  danger,  pray  most 
eagerly.  This  has  been  the  case  with  men  who,  in  health 
and  safety,  scoff  at  religion,  and  ridicule  the  idea  of  moral 
obligation.  But  it  is  evident,  that  it  can  be  neither  more 
proper  nor  more  suitable  to  pray  when  we  are  in  danger, 
than  to  pray  at  any  other  time  ;  for  our  relations  to  God 
are  always  the  same,  and  we  are  always  essentially  de- 
pendent upon  him  for  every  thing,  both  temporal  and 
spiritual,  that  we  enjoy  at  the  present,  or  hope  for  in  the 
future.  It  is  surely  as  proper  to  thank  God  for  those 
mercies  which  we  receive  every  moment,  as  to  deprecate 
those  judgments  by  which  we  are  occasionally  alarmed. 

II.  The  duty  of  prayer,  as  taught  in  the  Scriptures. 

The  Scriptures  treat  of  prayer,  as  a  duty  arising  so  im- 
mediately out  of  our  relations  to  God,  and  our  obligations 
to  Him,  as  scarcely  to  need  a  positive  precept.  Every 
disposition  of  heart  which  we  are  commanded  to  exercise 
towards  God,  presupposes  it.  Hence,  it  is  generally  re- 
ferred to,  incidentally,  as  one  of  which  the  obligation  is 
already  taken  for  granted.  Precepts,  however,  are  not 
wanting,  in  respect  to  it.  I  here  only  speak  of  the  general 
tendency  of  the  Scripture  instructions. 

1.  It  is  expressly  commanded  :  "  Pray  without  ceasing." 
"  In  every  thing  giving  thanks,  for  this  is  the  will  of  God, 
in   Christ   Jesus,  concerning  you."     "  In  all  things,  by 
prayer  and  supplication,  let  your  request  be  made  known 
unto   God."    Phil,  iv,  6.     "I   exhort   that    supplications 
and  prayers,  intercessions  and  giving  of  thanks,  be  made 
for  all  men ;  for  this  is  good  and  acceptable  in  the  sight  of 
God,  our  Savior."   1  Tim.  ii,  1 — 3. 

2.  God  declares  it  to  be  a  principal  condition  on  which 
He  will  bestow  favors .  "  If  any  man  lack  wisdom,  let  him 
aslc  of  God,  who  giveth  to  all  men  liberally,  and  upbraideth 
not,  and  it  shall  be  given  him"    James  i,  5.     "  Ask,  and 
it  shall  be  given  you ;  seek,  and  ye  shall  find  ;  knock,  and 
it  shall   be  opened   unto  you:  for  every  one  that  asketh 
receiveth,  and   he  that  seeketh   findeth,  and  to  him  that 


176  OF    PRAYER. 

knocketh  it  shall  be  opened.  Or,  what  man  is  there  of 
you,  whom,  if  his  son  ask  bread,  will  he  give  him  a  stone  ; 
or,  if  he  ask  a  fish,  will  he  give  him  a  serpent?  If  ye, 
then,  being  evil,  know  how  to  give  good  gifts  to  your  chil- 
dren, how  much  more  shall  your  Father,  that  is  in  heaven, 
give  good  things  to  them  that  ask  him!"  Matthew  vii, 
7 — 11.  Now,  it  is  too  obvious  to  need  a  remark,  that 
God  would  not  have  connected  so  important  consequences 
with  prayer,  unless  He  meant  to  inculcate  it  as  a  universal 
duty. 

3.  The  Scriptures  make  the  habit  of  prayer  the  mark 
of  distinction  between  the  righteous  and  the  wicked ;  be- 
tween  the  enemies  and  the  friends  of  God.     Thus,  the 
wicked  say  :  "  What  is  the  Almighty,  that  we  should  serve 
Him  ?  or,  what  profit  shall  we  have,  if  we  call  upon  Him  ?" 
Job  xxi,    15.     "  The   wicked,   through   the  pride  of  his 
countenance,  will  not  seek  after  God.     God  is  not  in  all 
his  thoughts."    Psalms  x,  4.     On  the  contrary,  righteous 
persons,  those  whom  God  approves,  are  specially  designated 
as  those  who  call  upon  Him. 

4.  Examples  of  the  prayers  of  good  men,  are,  in  the 
Scriptures,  very  abundant.     In  fact,  a  large  portion  of  the 
Bible  is  made  up  of  the  prayers  and  praises  of  those  whom 
God  has  held  up  for  our  imitation.     To  transcribe  these, 
would  be  to  transcribe  a  large  portion  of  the  sacred  books. 

5.  The  Bible  abounds  with  examples  recorded  by  God, 
of  special  answers   to   prayer  of  every  kind  that  can  be 
conceived.     There  are  examples  of  the  successful  prayer 
of  individuals  for  temporal  and  for  spiritual  blessings,  both 
for  v themselves    and    for  others;  of  individual   prayers  for 
nations,  and  of  nations  for  themselves  ;  of  individuals  for 
societies,  and  of  societies  for  individuals  ;  and,  indeed,  of 
men  in  all  the  circumstances  in  which  they  can  be  placed, 
for   every    blessing,  and   under  every  variety   of  relation. 
Now,  what  God  has,  at  so  great  length,  and  in  so  great  a 
variety  of  ways,  encouraged  us  to  do,  must  be  not  only  a 
privilege,  but  a  duty. 

In  a  word,  the  Bible  teaches  us,  on  this  subject,  that  our 
relation  to  God  is  infinitely  nearer,  and  more  universal,  than 
that  in  which  we  can  possibly  stand  to  any  other  being. 


OF    PRATER.  177 

He  allows  us,  with  the  simplicity  and  confidence  of 
children,  to  unbosom  all  our  cares,  to  make  known  all  our 
wants,  and  express  all  our  thanks,  with  unreserved  freedom 
to  Him.  He  assures  us,  that  this  exercise,  and  the  temper 
from  which  it  springs,  and  which  it  cultivates,  is  most  ac- 
ceptable to  Him.  And,  having  thus  condescended  to 
humble  Himself  to  our  situation,  He  holds  us  as  most 
ungrateful,  proud,  insolent  and  sinful,  if  we  venture  to 
undertake  any  business,  or  receive  any  favor,  without  hold- 
ing direct  and  child-like  communion  with  Him. 

6.  Under  the  remedial  dispensation,  a  special  encourage- 
ment is  given  to  prayer.  We  are  there  taught,  that  though 
we  are  unworthy  of  the  blessings  which  we  need,  yet 
we  may  ask  and  receive,  for  the  sake  of  the  Mediator. 
"  Whatsoever  ye  shall  ask  the  Father  in  my  name,  He 
will  give  it  you."  The  death  of  Christ  is  also  held  forth 
as  our  special  ground  of  confidence  in  prayer  :  "  He  that 
spared  not  His  own  Son,  but  gave  Him  up  for  us  all,  how 
shall  He  not,  with  Him,  freely  give  us  all  things  ?"  And, 
yet  more,  we  are  informed,  that  it  is  the  special  office  of 
the  exalted  Mediator,  to  intercede  for  us  before  the  throne 
of  God.  Greater  encouragements  than  these,  to  prayer, 
could  not  possibly  be  conceived. 

III.  The  utility  of  prayer. 

This  may  be  shown, — 

1.  From  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God  :  He  would 
not  require  any  thing  of  us  which  was  not  for  our  good. 

2.  The  utility  of  prayer  is  seen  from  the  tempers  of 
mind   which   it   presupposes.      We   have   already   shown 
what  these  tempers  of  mind  are.     Now,  it  must  be  evident 
to  every  one,  that  the  habitual  exercise  of  these  dispositions 
must  be,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  in  the  highest  degree, 
beneficial  to  such  creatures  as  we. 

3.  The 'utility  of  prayer  is  also  evident  from  its  connec- 
tion with  our  reception  of  favors  from  God. 

1.  In  the  government  of  this  world,  God  establishes 
such  connections  between  cause  and  effect,  or  antecedent 
and  consequent,  as  he  pleases.  He  has  a  perfect  right  to 
do  so.  The  fact,  that  one  event  is  the  antecedent  of 
another,  involves  not  the  supposition  of  any  essential  power 


178  OF    PRAYER. 

in  the  antecedent,  but  merely  the  supposition  that  God  has 
placed  it  in  that  relation  to  something  that  is  to  follow. 

2.  The  bestowment  of  favors  is  one  event.     God  has 
ti  right  to  ordain   whatever   antecedent   to   this   event  he 
chooses.     We  are  not  competent  to  say,  of  any  event,  that 
it  cannot  be  the  antecedent  to  the  bestowment  of  favors, 
any  more  than  that  rain  cannot  be  the  antecedent  to  the 
growth  of  vegetation. 

3.  Since,  then,  any  event  whatever  may  be  the  ante- 
cedent to  any  other  event  whatever,  we  are,  surely,  not 
competent  to  say  that  prayer  cannot  be  the  antecedent  to 
the  bestowment  of  favors,  any  more   than   to  say   this  of 
any  thing  else.     It  is,  surely,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  as  good 
as  any  other  antecedent,  if  God  saw  fit  so  to  ordain. 

4.  But,  since  Goo1  is  a  moral  Governor,  and  must,  there- 
fore, delight  in   and  reward   virtuous   tempers,  there  is  a 
manifest  moral  propriety  in  his  making  these   tempers   the 
antecedent  to  his  bestowment  of  blessings.     Nay,  we  can- 
not conceive  how  he  would  be  a  righteous  moral  Governor, 
unless  he  did  do  so.     And,  hence,  we  see,  that  the  suppo- 
sition  that   God  bestows   blessings   in    answer  to   prayer, 
which  he  would  not  bestow  on  any  other  condition,  is   not 
only  not  at  variance  with  any  of  his  natural  attributes,  but 
that  it  is  even  demanded  by  his  moral  attributes. 

5.  But,  inasmuch  as  God  has  revealed  to  us  the  fact, 
that  this  is  the  condition   on  which  he  bestows  the  most 
valuable  of  his  gifts,  and  as  he  has  bound   himself,  by  his 
promise,  to  reward  abundantly  all  who  call  upon  him,  the 
utility  of  prayer,  to  creatures  situated  as  we  are,  is  as  man- 
ifest as  our  necessities  are  urgent,  both  for  time  and  for 
eternity. 

4.  And,  finally,  there  can  be  no  clearer  evidence  of 
the  goodness  of  God,  than  just  such  a  constitution  as  this. 
God  promises  favors  in  answer  to  prayer ;  but  prayer,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  one  of  the  most  efficient  means  of  pro- 
moting our  moral  perfection  ;  that  is,  our  highest  happi- 
ness ;  that  is  to  say,  God  promises  us  favors,  on  conditions, 
which,  in  themselves,  involve  the  greatest  blessings  which 
we  could  possibly  desire.  Bishop  Wilson  beautifully 
remarks,  "  How  good  is  God,  who  will  not  only  give  us 


OF    PKAYER.  179 

what  we  pray  for,  but  will  reward  us  jor  going  to  him,  and 
laying  our  wants  before  him  !" 

That  a  man  will,  however,  receive  every  thing  he  asks 
for,  and  just  as  he  asks  for  it,  is  by  no  means  asserted,  in 
an  unlimited  sense ;  but  only  that  which  he  prays  for,  in  a 
strict  sense.  True  prayer  is  the  offering  up  of  our  desires, 
in  entire  subjection  to  the  will  of  God  ;  that  is,  desiring 
that  he  will  do  what  we  ask^  if  He,  in  His  infinite  wisdom 
and  goodness,  sees  that  it  will  be  best.  Now,  if  we  ask 
thus,  our  prayer  will  be  granted,  for  thus  He  has  promised 
to  do  for  us.  Hence,  our  prayers  respecting  temporal 
blessings,  are  answered  only  contingently ;  that  is,  under 
this  condition;  but  our  prayers  respecting  spiritual  bless- 
ings, are  answered  absolutely ;  for  God  has  positively 
^  promised  to  give  His  ifoly  Spirit  to  them  that  ask  Him. 

If  God  have  allowed  us  thus  to  hold  the  most  intimate 
and  unreserved  communion  with  Him ;  and  if  He  have 
promised,  on  this  condition,  to  support  us  by  His  power, 
to  teach  us  by  His  wisdom,  to  purify  us  by  His  Spirit,  and 
to  work  in  us  all  those  tempers  which  He  sees  will  best  pre- 
pare us  for  the  highest  state  of  future  felicity,  what  can  be 
more  ennobling  and  more  lovely  than  a  prayerful  life  ?  and 
what  more  ungrateful  and  sinful,  than  a  life  of  thoughtless 
irreverence  and  impiety  ?  Is  not  the  single  fact,  of  living 
without  habitual  prayer,  a  conclusive  evidence  that  we 
have  not  the  love  of  God  in  us  ;  that  we  are  living  in  habit- 
ual violation  of  every  obligation  that  binds  us  to  our  Maker ; 
and  that  we  are,  therefore,  under  the  solemn  condemnation 
of  His  most  holv  law  ? 


180 


CHAPTER  FOURTH, 
y 

THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH. 

THIS  is  the  second  special  means  appointed  by  oui 
Creator,  for  the  purpose  of  cultivating  in  us  suitable  moral 
dispositions.  We  shall  treat,  first,  of  the  original  institu- 
tion of  the  Sabbath  ;  secondly,  of  the  Mosaic  Sabbath ; 
thirdly,  of  the  Christian  Sabbath. 

Although  the  Sabbath  is  a  positive  institution,  and, 
therefore,  the  proof  of  its  obligation  is  to  be  sought  for 
entirely  from  revelation,  yet  there  are  indications,  in  the 
present  constitution,  that  periods  of  rest  are  necessary,  both 
for  man  and  for  beast.  The  recurrence  of  night,  and  the 
necessity  of  repose,  show  that  the  principle  of  rest 
enters  into  the  present  system,  as  much  as  that  of  labor. 
And,  besides,  it  is  found  that  animals  which  are  allowed  one 
day  in  seven  for  rest,  live  longer,  and  enjoy  better  health, 
than  those  which  are  worked  without  intermission.  The 
same  may,  to  a  considerable  degree,  be  said  of  man.  The 
late  Mr.  Wilberforce  attributed  his  length  of  life,  and  the 
superiority  of  health  which  he  enjoyed  over  his  political  con- 
temporaries, mainly  to  his  resolute  and  invariable  observ- 
ance of  the  Sabbath  day ;  a  duty  which,  unfortunately,  they 
too  frequently  neglected. 

I  shall  not  go  into  the  argument  on  this  subject  in  detail, 
as  the  limits  of  the  present  work  will  not  admit  of  it,  but 
shall  merely  give  what  seem  to  me  the  results.  To  those 
who  wish  to  examine  the  question  of  the  obligation  of  the 
Sabbath  at  large,  I  would  recommend  the  valuable  treatise 
of  Mr.  J.  J.  Gurney,  on  the  history,  authority,  and  use  of 
the  Sabbath ;  from  which  much  of  the  present  article  is 
merely  an  abridgment. 

I.   Of  the  original  institution  of  the  Sabbath. 

First.  The  Divine  authority  for  the  institution  of  the  Sab- 


THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH.  181 

bath,  is  found  in  Genesis  ii,  1 — 3.  "  Thus,  the  heavens 
and  the  earth  were  finished,  and  all  the  hosts  of  them ;  and 
on  the  seventh  day,  God  ended  his  work  which  He  had 
made,  and  He  rested  on  the  seventh  day  from  all  his  works 
which  He  had  made.  And  God  blessed  the  seventh  day, 
and  sanctified  it ;  because  that  in  it  He  had  rested  from  all 
his  work  which  God  had  created  and  made." 
Now,  concerning  this  passage,  we  remark, — 

1.  It  was  given  to  our  first  parents ;  that  is,  to  the  whole 
human  race. 

2.  God  blessed  it ;  that  is,  bestowed  upon  it  a  peculiar 
blessing,  or  made  it  a  source  of  peculiar  blessings  to  man. 
Such,  surely,  must  be  that  day,  which  is  given  in  order  to 
cultivate  in  ourselves  moral  excellence,  and  prepare  us  for 
the  happiness  of  heaven.     He  sanctified  it ;  that  is,  set  it 
apart  from  a  common  to  a  sacred  and  religious  use. 

3.  The  reason  is  a  general  one :   God  rested.     This  has 
no  reference  to  any  peculiar  people,  but  seems  in  the  light 
of  an  example  from  God  for  all  the  human  race. 

4.  The  nature  of  the  ordinance  is  general.     God  sanc- 
tified it ;  that  is,  the  day.     The  act  refers  not  to  any  par- 
ticular people,  but  to  the  day  itself. 

5.  The  object  to  be  accomplished  is   general,  and   can 
apply  to  no  one  people  more  than  to  another.     If  it  be 
rest,  all  men  equally  need  it.     If  it  be  moral  cultivation, 
surely  no  people  has  ever  existed  who  did  not  require  such 
a  means  to  render  them  better. 

Secondly.  There  are  indications  that  the  hebdomadal 
division  of  time  was  observed  by  the  patriarchs  before  the 
time  of  Moses,  and  that  the  Sabbath  was  regarded  as  the 
day  for  religious  worship, 

1.  Genesis  iv,  3.  "  And  in  process  of  time,  it  came  to 
pass  that  Cain  brought  of  the  fruit  of  the  ground  an  offer- 
ing to  the  Lord."  The  words  rendered  "in  process  of 
time,"  literally  signify  "  at  the  end  of  days ; "  or,  "  at  the 
cutting  off  of  days ; "  that  is,  as  I  think  probable,  at  the 
close,  as  we  should  say,  of  a  section  of  days ;  a  very  nat- 
ural expression  for  the  end  of  a  week.  If  this  be  the 
meaning  it  would  seem  to  refer  to  the  division  of  time  just 
16 


182  THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH. 

previously  mentioned,  and  also  to  the  use  of  this  day  foi 
religious  worship. 

2.  Noah  seems  to  have  observed  the  same  hebdomadal 
division  of  time.     The  command  to  enter  into  the  ark,  was 
given   seven   days   before   the   flood    came.     Genesis   vii, 
4 — 10.     So,  he  allowed  seven  days  to  elapse  between  the 
times  of  sending  forth  the  dove.     Genesis  viii,   10 — 12. 
Now,  I  think  that  these  intimations  show  that  this  division 
of  time  was  observed  according  to  the  original  command ; 
and  we  may  well  suppose  that  with  it  was  connected  the 
special   time  for   religious   worship.     Thus,   also,   Joseph 
devoted  seven  days,  or  a  whole  week,  to  the  mourning  for 
his  father. 

3.  The  next  mention  of  the  Sabbath,  is  shortly  after  the 
Israelites  had  left  Egypt,  and  were  fed  with  manna  in  the 
wilderness.     Exodus  xvi,  22 — 30.     As  the  passage  is  of 
considerable  length,  I  need  not  quote  it.     I  would,  how- 
ever, remark, — 

1.  It  occurs  before  the  giving  of  the  law  ;  and,  therefore, 
the  obligatoriness  of  the  Sabbath  is  hereby  acknowledged, 
irrespective  of  the  Mosaic  law. 

2.  When   first   alluded  to,  it   is   spoken   of  as   a  thing 
known.       God,   first,   without   referring   to   the   Sabbath, 
informs  Moses  that  on  the  sixth  day,  the  Israelites  should 
gather  twice  as  much  manna  as  on  any  other  day.     From 
this,  it  seems  that  the  division  of  time  by  weeks  was  known  ; 
and  that  it  was  taken  for  granted,  that  they  would  know 
the  reason  for  the  making  of  this  distinction.     In  the  whole 
of  the  narration,  there  is  no  precept  given  for  the  keeping 
of  the  day  ;  but  they  are  reproved  for  not  suitably  keeping 
it,  as  though  it  were  an  institution  with  which  they  ought  to 
have  been  familiar. 

Besides  these,  there  are  many  indications  in  the  earliest 
classics,  that  the  Greeks  and  Romans  observed  the  heb- 
domadal division  of  time ;  and,  also,  that  the  seventh  day 
was  considered  peculiarly  sacred.  This  seems  to  have 
been  the  case  in  the  time  of  Hesiod.  The  same  is  sup- 
posed to  have  been  the  fact  in  regard  to  the  northern  na- 
tions of  Europe,  from  which  we  are  immediately  descended. 


THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH.  183 

The  inference  which  seems  naturally  to  arise  from  these 
facts,  is,  that  this  institution  was  originally  observed  by  the 
whole  human  race ;  and  that  it  was  transmitted,  with 
different  degrees  of  care,  by  different  nations,  until  the 
period  of  the  commencement  of  our  various  historical 
records. 

From  the  above  facts,  I  think  we  are  warranted  in  the 
conclusion,  that  the  seventh  day,  or  perhaps,  generally,  the 
seventh  part  of  time,  was  originally  set  apart  for  a  religious 
purpose  by  our  Creator,  for  the  whole  human  race ;  that  it 
was  so  observed  by  the  Hebrews,  previously  to  the  giving 
of  the  law  ;  and  that,  probably,  the  observance  was,  in  the 
infancy  of  our  race,  universal. 

II.   The  Mosaic  Sabbath. 

The  precept  for  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  at  the 
giving  of  the  law,  is  in  these  words:  "Remember  the 
Sabbath  day,  to  keep  it  holy.  Six  days  shalt  thou  labor, 
and  do  all  thy  work ;  but  the  seventh  is  the  Sabbath  of  the 
Lord  thy  God ;  in  it,  thou  shalt  not  do  any  work,  thou, 
nor  thy  son,  nor  thy  daughter,  nor  thy  man-servant,  nor 
thy  maid-servant,  nor  thy  cattle,  nor  thy  stranger  that  is 
within  thy  gates ;  for  in  six  days  the  Lord  made  heaven 
and  earth,  the  sea,  and  all  that  in  them  is,  and  rested  the 
seventh  day.  Wherefore  the  Lord  blessed  the  seventh 
day,  and  hallowed  it."  Exodus  xx,  11. 

Now,  concerning  this  precept,  there  are  several  things 
worthy  of  remark :  v 

1.  It  is  found  in  the  law  of  the  ten  commandments,  which 
is  always  referred  to  in  the  Scriptures,  as  containing  the 
sum  of  the  moral  precepts  of  God  to  man.  Our  Savior  and 
the  Apostles,  who  made  the  most  decided  distinction  between 
moral  and  ceremonial  observances,  never  allude  to  the  law 
of  the  ten  commandments  in  any  other  manner  than  as  ol 
permanent  and  universal  obligation.  Now,  I  know  of  no 
reason  which  can  be  assigned,  why  this  precept  should  be 
detached  from  all  the  rest,  and  considered  as  ceremonial, 
when  the  whole  of  these,  taken  together,  are  allowed,  by 
universal  consent,  to  have  been  quoted  as  moral  precepts 
by  Christ  and  his  Apostles.  Besides,  our  Savior  expressly 
declares,  that  "  the  Sabbath  was  made  for  MAN,"  that  is 


184       THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH. 

for  man  in  general,  for  the  whole  human  race ;  and  conse- 
quently, that  it  is  binding  upon  the  whole  race,  that  is,  that 
it  is  a  precept  of  universal  obligation. 

2.  The  reasons  given  for  observing  it,  are  the  same  as 
those  given  at  the  time  of  its  first  institution.     Inasmuch  as 
these    reasons    are,  in    their   nature,    general,   we   should 
naturally  conclude  that  the  obligation  which  it  imposes,  is 
universal. 

3.  This  commandment  is  frequently  referred  to  by  the 
prophets,  as  one  of  high  moral  obligation  ;  the  most  solemn 
threatenings  are  uttered  against  those  who  profane  it ;  and 
the  greatest  rewards  promised  to  those  who  keep  it.     See 
Isaiah  Ivi,  2 — 6 ;  Jeremiah  xvii,  24,  25 ;  Nehemiah  xiii, 
15—21. 

4.  In  addition  to  rest  from  labor,  the  meeting  together 
*    for  worship,  and  the  reading  of  the  Scriptures,  was  made  a 

part  of  the  duty  of  the  Sabbath  day.  Six  days  shall  work 
be  done ;  but  the  seventh  is  the  Sabbath  of  rest ;  a  holy 
convocation.  Leviticus  xxiii,  3.  Thus,  also,  Moses,  of 
old  time,  hath,  in  every  city,  them  that  preach  him,  being 
read  in  the  synagogues  every  Sabbath  day.  Acts  xv,  21. 

Besides  this  reenaction  of  the  Sabbath  day,  in  the  Mosaic 
law,  there  were  special  additions  made  to  its  observance, 
,  which  belong  to  the  Jews  alone,  and  which  were  a  part  of 
their  civil  or  ceremonial  law.  With  this  view,  other  rea- 
sons were  given  for  observing  it,  and  other  rites  were  added. 
Thus,  for  instance, — 

1.  It  was  intended  to  distinguish  them  from  the  sur- 
3      rounding  idolatrous  nations.     Exodus  xxxi,  12 — 17. 

2.  It  was  a  memorial  of  their  deliverance   from  Egypt. 
Deuteronomy  v,  15. 

3.  And,  with  these  views,  the  principle  of  devoting  the 
seventh  part  of  time,  was   extended   also  to  years ;  every 
seventh  year  being  a  year  of  rest. 

/         4.  The  violation  of  the  Sabbath  was  punished  with  death 

*      by  the  civil  magistrate. 

Now,  whatever  is  in  its  nature  local,  and  designed  for  a 
particular  purpose,  ceases,  whenever  that  purpose  is  accom- 
plished. Hence,  these  civil  and  ceremonial  observances 
cease,  with  the  termination  of  the  Jewish  polity  ;  while  that 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH.       185 

which  is  moral  and  universal,  that  which  "  was  made  for 
man  "  and  not  specially  for  the  Jews,  remains  as  though 
the  ceremonial  observances  had  never  existed.  I  think 
that  this  view  of  the  subject  is  also  confirmed  by  the  ex- 
ample and  precept  of  Christ,  who  gave  directions  concern- 
ing the  manner  in  which  the  Sabbath  was  to  be  kept,  and 
also  was  himself  accustomed  to  observe  the  day  for  the 
purposes  of  religious  worship.  "  As  his  custom  was,  he 
went  into  the  synagogue  on  the  Sabbath  day,  and  stood  up 
to  read"  Luke  iv,  16.  See  also  Matthew  xii,  2 — 13. 
When  our  Lord,  also,  in  teaching  the  mode  in  which  the 
Sabbath  is  to  be  kept,  specifies  what  things  it  is  lawful  to 
do  on  the  Sabbath  day,  he  clearly  proceeds  upon  the  prin- 
ciple that  it  was  lawful  to  do  things  on  other  days,  which  it 
would  not  be  lawful  to  do  on  the  Sabbath  day. 

III.     The  Christian  Sabbath. 

We  shall  consider  here,  1st,  The  day  on  which  the 
Christian  Sabbath  is  to  be  kept ;  2d.  The  manner  in 
which  it  is  to  be  kept. 

FIRST.  The  day  on  which  the  Christian  Sabbath  is  to 
be  kept. 

First.  There  are  indications,  from  the  facts  which  trans- 
Dired  on  that  day,  that  it  was  to  be  specially  honored  under 
the  new  dispensation. 

1.  Our  Savior  arose  on  that  day  from  the  dead,  having 
accomplished  the  work  of  man's  redemption. 

2.  On  this  day  he  appeared  to  his  Apostles,  a  week  from 
his  resurrection,  at  which  time  he  had  his  conversation  with 
Thomas. 

3.  On  this  day,  also,  occurred  the  feast  of  Pentecost,  when 
the  Spirit  was  in  so  remarkable  a  manner  poured  out,  and 
when  the  new  dispensation  emphatically  commenced. 

Second.  That  the  primitive  Christians,  in  the  days  of  the 
Apostles,  were  accustomed  to  observe  this  day,  as  their  day 
of  weekly  worship,  is  evident  from  several  passages  in  the 
New  Testament,  and  also  from  the  earliest  ecclesiastical 
records. 

1.  That  the  early  disciples,  in  all  places,  were  accus- 
tomed   to   meet   statedly,   to   worship   and   celebrate   the 
^  Lorcl's  Supper,  is  evident  from  1  Corinthians  xi,  1,  14,  20, 
16* 


1S6  THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH 

23,  4p.     And  that  these  meetings  were  on  the  first  day  of 
the  week,  may  be  gathered  from  1  Corinthians  xvi,  1,  2. 

2.  That  these  meetings  were  held  on  the  first  day  of  the 
week,  is  also  further  evident  from  Acts  xx,  6 — 1 1  ;  where 
we  arc  informed,  that  in  Troas  the  Christians  met  on  the 
first  day  of  the  week  to  brealc  bread,  (that  is,  to  celebrate 
the  L'ord's  Supper,)  and  to   receive   religious  instruction. 
From  these  passages,  we  see  that  this  custom  had  already 
become  universal,  not  merely  in  the  neighborhood  of  Jeru- 
salem, but  throughout  the  regions  in  which  the  Christian 
religion  was  promulgated. 

3.  Again,  (Revelations  i,   10,)  it  is  observed  by  John, 
"  I  was  in  the  Spirit  on  the  Lord's  day"     From  this  re- 
mark, it  is  probable  that  John  kept  this  day  with  peculiar 
solemnity.     It  is  certain  that  the  day  had  already  obtained 
a  particular  name  ;  a  name  by  which  it  has  continued  to  be 
distinguished  in  every  subsequent  age. 

Besides  these  allusions  to  the  day  from  the  New  Testa- 
ment, there  are  various  facts,  bearing  upon  the  subject,  from 
uninspired  historians. 

1.  The  early  fathers  frequently  refer  to  this  day,  as  the 
day  set  apart  for  religious  worship ;  and  allude  to  the  differ- 
ence between  keeping  this  day,  and  keeping  the  seventh, 
or  Jewish  Sabbath,  specially  on  the  ground  of  its  being  the 
day  of  our  Savior's  resurrection. 

2.  Pliny,  in   his   letter   to   Trajan,    remarks   that   the 
Christians  "  were  accustomed,  on  a  stated  day,  to  meet  be- 
fore day-light,  and  to  repeat  among  themselves  a  hymn  to 
Christ,  as  to  a  God,  and  to  bind  themselves,  by  a  sacred 
obligation,  not  to  commit  any  wickedness,  but,  on  the  con- 
trary, to  abstain  from  thefts,  robberies  and  adulteries  ;  also, 
not  to  violate  their  promise,  or  deny  a  pledge ;  after  which, 
it  was  their  custom  to  separate,  and  meet  again  at  a  pro- 
miscuous and  harmless  meal."     It  is  needless  here  to  remark 
the  exact  "coincidence  between  this  account  from  the  pen  of 
a  heathen  magistrate,  with  the  account  given  of  the  keeping 
of  the  day,  in  the  passages  where  it  is  mentioned  in  the  New 
Testament.  ^         v. 

3.  That^jhis  stated  day  was  the  first  day  of  the  week,  or 
the  Lord's  day,  is  evident  from  another  testimony.     So  well 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH.       187 

known  was  the  custom  of  the  early  Christians  on  this  sub- 
ject, that  the  ordinary  question,  put  by  their  persecutors  to 
the  Christian  martyrs,  was,  "Hast  thou  kept  the  Lord's 
day  ? "  Dominicum  servasti  1  To  which  the  usual  an- 
swer was,  "  I  am  a  Christian  :  I  cannot  omit  it."  Chris- 
tiarms  sum  :  intermittere  non  possum. 

4.  It  is,  however,  manifest,  that  the  Jews,  who  were 
strongly  inclined  to  blend  the  rites  of  Moses  with  the  Chris- 
tian religion,  at  first  kept- the  seventh  day  ;  or,  what  is  very 
probable,  at  first  kept  both  days.     T^he  Apostles  declared 
that  the  disciples  of  Jesus  were  not   uncTer   obligation  to 
observe  the  seventh  day.     See  Colossians  ii,  16,  17.     Now, 
as  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath  is  a  precept  given  to  the 
whole  human  race  ;  as  it  is  repeated,  in  the  Mosaic  law,  as 
a  moral  precept ;  as  the  authority  of  this  precept  is  recog- 
nized both  by  the  teaching  and  example  of  Christ  and  his 
Apostles ;  as  the  Apostles  teach  that  the  keeping  of  the 
seventh,  day  is  not  obligatory ;  and  as  they  did  keep  the 
first  day  as  a  day  of  religious  worship ;  it  seems  reasonable 
to  conclude  that  they  intended  to  teach,  that  the  first  day 
was  that  which  we  are,  as  Christians,  to  observe. 

5.  From  these  considerations,  we  feel  warranted  to  con- 
clude that  the  first  day  of  the  week  was  actually  kept  by 
the  inspired  Apostles,  as  the   Christian    Sabbath.     Their 
example  is  sufficient  to  teach  us  that  the  keeping  of  this 
day  is  acceptable  to  God ;  and  we  are,  on  this  ground,  at 
liberty  to  keep  it  as  the  Sabbath.   .  If,  however,  any  other 
person  be  dissatisfied  with   these  reasons,  and  feel  under 
obligation  to  observe  the  seventh  day,  I  see  no  precept  in 
the  word  of  God  to  forbid  him. 

6.  If,  however,  as  seems  to  me  to  be  the  case,  both  days 
are  allowable ;  that  is,  if  I  have  sufficient  reason  to  believe 
that  either  is  acceptable  to  God ;  but  if,  by  observing  the 
first  day,  I  can  enjoy  more  perfect  leisure,  and  suffer  less 
interruption,  and  thus  better  accomplish  the  object  of  the 
day;    and   if,   besides,  I   have   the   example   of  inspired 
Apostles  in  favor  of  this  observance ;  I  should  decidedly 
prefer  to  observe  the  first  day.     Nay,  I  should  consider  the 
choice  of  that  day  as  obligatory.     For,  if  I  am  allowed  to 
devote  either  day  to  the  worship  of  God,  it  is  surely  obliga- 


188  THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH. 

tory  on  me  to  worship  God  on  that  day  on  which  I  can 
best  accomplish  the  very  object  for  which  the  day  was  set 
apart. 

If  it  be  asked,  when  this  day  is  to  begin,  I  answer,  that 
I  presume  we  are  at  liberty  to  commence  this  day  at  the 
same  time  that  we  commence  other  days ;  for  the  obvious 
reason,  that  thus  we  can  generally  enjoy  the  quiet  of  the 
Sabbath  with  less  interruption. 

SECONDLY.  Of  the  manner  in  which  the  Christian  Sab- 
lath  is  to  be  observed. 

The  design  for  which  the  Sabbath  was  instituted,  I  sup- 
pose to  be,  to  set  apart  a  portion  of  our  time  for  the  unin- 
terrupted worship  of  God,  and  the  preparation  of  our  souls 
for  eternity ;  and,  also,  to  secure  to  man  and  beast  one  day 
in  seven,  as  a  season  of  rest  from  labor. 

Hence,  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  forbids, — 

1.  All  labor  of  body  or  mind,  of  which  the  immediate 
object  is  not  the  worship  of  God,  or  our  own  religious  im 
provement.     The  only  exceptions  to  this  rule,  are  works  ot 
necessity  or  of  mercy.     The  necessity,  however,  must  be 
one  which  is  imposed  by  the  providence  of  God,  and  not 
by  our  own  will.     Thus,  a  ship,  when  on  a  voyage,  may 
sail  on  the  Sabbath,  as  well  as  on  any  other  day,  without 
violating  the  rule.     The  rule,  however,  would  be  violated 
by  commencing  the  voyage  on  the  Sabbath,  because  here  a 
choice  of  days  is  in  the  power  of  the  master. 

2.  The  pursuit  of  pleasure,  or  of  any  animal,  or  merely 
intellectual   gratification.     Hence,  the   indulgence   of  oui 
appetites  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent  us  from   free   and 
buoyant  spiritual   contemplation,  riding   or  journeying   foi 
amusement,    the    merely   social    pleasure    of  visiting,    the 
reading  of  books  designed  for  the  gratification  of  the  taste 
or  of  the  imagination,  are  all,  by  the  principles  of  the  com- 

'       mand,  forbidden. 

3.  The  labor  of  those  committed  to  our  charge. 

1.  The  labor  of  servants.  Their  souls  are  of  as  much 
value  as  our  own,  and  they  need  the  benefit  of  this  law  as 
much  as  ourselves.  Besides,  if  this  portion  of  their  time 
be  claimed  by  our  Creator,  we  have  no  right  to  purchase  it, 
nor  have  they  a  right  to  negotiate  it  away.  Works  of 


THE    OBSERVANCE    OF    THE    SABBATH.  189 

necessity  must,  of  course,  be  performed ;  but  these  should 
be  restricted  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  a  conscientious 
regard  to  the  object  and  design  of  the  day. 

2.  Brutes  are,  by  the  fourth  commandment,  included  in 
the  law  which  ordains  rest  to  all  the  animate  creation. 
They  need  the  repose  which  it  grants,  and  they  are  en- 
titled to  their  portion  of  it. 

On  the  contrary,  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  enjoins  the  em- 
ployment of  the  day  in  the  more  solemn  and  immediate 
duties  of  religion. 

1.  Reading  the  Scriptures,  religious  meditation,  prayer 
in  private^  and  also  the  special  instruction  in  religion  of 
those  committed  to  our  charge.     And,  hence,  it   enjoins 
such    domestic  arrangements  as  are  consistent  with  these 
duties. 

2.  Social  worship.     Under   the   Mosaic    and  Chiistian 
dispensation,  this  was  an  important  part  of  the  duties  of  the 
day.     As  the  setting  apart  of  a  particular  day  to  be  univer- 
sally observed,  involves  the  idea  of  social  as  well  as  per- 
sonal religion,   one  of  the  most  obvious  duties  which  it 
imposes,  is  that  of  social  worship  ;  that  is,  of  meeting  to- 
gether in  societies,  to  return  thanks  for  our  social  mercies, 
to    implore  the  pardon  of  God    for  our  social    sins,  and 
beseech  His  favor  for  those  blessings  which  we  need  as 
societies,  no  less  than  as  individuals. 

The  importance  of  the  religious  observance  of  the  Sab- 
bath, is  seldom  sufficiently  estimated.  Every  attentive 
observer  has  remarked,  that  the  violation  of  this  command, 
by  the  young,  is  one  of  the  most  decided  marks  of  incipient 
moral  degeneracy.  Religious  restraint  is  fast  losing  its 
hold  upon  that  young  man,  who,  having  been  educated  in 
the  fear  of  God,  begins  to  spend  the  Sabbath  in  idleness, 
or  in  amusement.  And  so,  also,  of  communities.  The 
desecration  of  the  Sabbath  is  one  of  those  evident  indica- 
tions of  that  criminal  recklessness,  that  insane  love  of 
pleasure,  and  that  subjection  to  the  government  of  appetite 
and  passion,  which  forebodes,  that  the  "  beginning  of  the 
end  "  of  social  happiness,  and  of  true  national  prosperity, 
has  arrived. 

Hence,  we  see  how  imperative  is  the  duty  of  parents. 


190       THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH. 

and  of  legislators,  on  this  subject.  The  head  of  every 
family  is  obliged,  by  the  command  of  God,  not  only  to 
honor  this  day  himself,  but  to  use  all  the  means  in  his 
power  to  secure  the  observance  of  it,  by  all  those  committed 
to  his  charge.  He  is,  thus,  promoting  not  only  his  own, 
but  also  his  children's  happiness ;  for  nothing  is  a  more 
sure  antagonist  force  to  all  the  allurements  of  vice,  as 
nothing  tends  more  strongly  to  fix  in  the  minds  of  the 
young  a  conviction  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God, 
than  the  solemn  keeping  of  this  day.  And,  hence,  also, 
legislators  are  false  to  their  trust,  who,  either  by  the  enact- 
ment of  laws,  or  by  their  example,  diminish,  in  the  least 
degree,  in  the  minds  of  a  people,  the  reverence  due  to  that 
day  which  God  has  set  apart  for  Himself. 

The  only  question  which  remains,  is  the  following  : 

Is  it  the  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate  to  enforce  the  ob- 
servance of  the  Sabbath  ? 

We  are  inclined  to  think  not,  and  for  the  following 
reasons :  ^ 

vl.  The  duty  arises  solely  from  our  relations  to  God,  and 
not  from  our  relations  to  man.  Now,  our  duties  to  God 
are  never  to  be  placed  within  the  control  of  human  legis- 
lation. 

2.  If  the  civil  magistrate  has  a  right  to  take  cognizance 
of  this  duty  to  God,  he  has  a  right  to  take  cognizance  of 
every  other.     And,  if  he  have  a  right  to  take  cognizance 
of  the  duty,  he  has  a  right  to  prescribe  in  what  manner  it 
shall  be  discharged ;  or,  if  he  see  fit,  to  forbid  the  observ- 
ance of  it  altogether.     The  concession  of  this  right  would, 
therefore,  lead  to  direct  interference  with  liberty  of  con- 
science. 

3.  The  keeping  of  the  Sabbath  is  a  moral  duty.     Hence, 
if  it  be  acceptably  observed,  it  must  be  a  voluntary  service. 
But  the  civil  magistrate  can  never  do  any  thing  more  than 
produce  obedience  to  the  external  precept ;  which,  in  the 
sight  of  God,  would  not  be  the  keeping  of  the  Sabbath  at 
all.     Hence,  to  allow  the  civil   magistrate  to  enforce  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath,  would  be  to  surrender  to  him 
the  control  over  the  conscience,  without  attaining  even  the 
object  for  which  the  surrender  was  made. 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH.       191 

4.  It  is,  however,  the  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate,  to 
protect  every  individual  in  the  undisturbed  right  of  wor- 
shipping God  as  he  pleases.     This   protection,  every  in- 
dividual has  a  right  to  claim,  and  society  is  under  obligation 
to  extend  it.     And,  also,  as  this  is  a  leisure  day,  and  is 
liable  to  various  abuses,  the  magistrate  has  a  right  to  pre- 
vent any  modes  of  gratification  which  would  tend  to  disturb 
the  peace  of  society.     This  right  is  acknowledged  in  reg- 
ulations respecting  other  days  of  leisure  or  rejoicing ;  and 
there  can  be  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  exercised  in 
respect  to  the  Sabbath. 

5.  And,  lastly,  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  applies  equally 
to  societies,  and  to  individuals.     An  individual  is  forbidden 
to  labor  on  the  Sabbath,  or  to  employ  another  person  to 
labor  for  him.     The  rule  is  the  same,  when  applied  to  any 
number  of  individuals  ;   that  is,  to  a  society.     Hence,  a 
society  has  no  right  to  employ  persons  to  labor  for  them. 
The  contract  is  a  violation  of  the  Sabbatical  law.     It  is  on 
this  ground  that  I  consider  the  carrying  of  the  mail  on  this 
day  a  social  violation  of  the  Christian  Sabbath. 


192 


PART    II. 


DUTIES    TO    MAN. RECIPROCITY    AND     BENEVO- 
LENCE. 

DIVISION    I. 

THE  DUTY  OF    RECIPROCITY.— GENERAL  PRINCIPLE  ILLUSTRATED, 
AND  THE  DUTIES  OF  RECIPROCITY  CLASSIFIED. 

IT  has  oeen  already  observed,  that  our  duties,  to  both 
God  and  man,  are  all  enforced  by  the  obligation  of  love  to 
God.  By  this  we  mean,  that,  in  consequence  of  our  moral 
constitution,  we  are  under  obligation  to  love  our  fellow-men, 
because  they  are  our  fellow-men  ;  and  we  are  also  under 
obligation  to  love  them,  because  we  have  been  commanded 
to  love  them  by  our  Father  who  is  in  heaven.  The  nature 
of  this  obligation  may  be  illustrated  by  a  familiar  example. 
Every  child  in  a  family  is  under  obligation  to  love  its 
parent.  And  every  child  is  bound  to  love  its  brother,  both 
because  he  is  its  brother,  and,  also,  because  this  love  is  a 
duty  enforced  by  the  relation  in  which  they  both  stand  to 
their  common  parent. 

The  relation  in  which  men  stand  to  each  other,  is  essen- 
tially the  relation  of  equality ;  not  equality  of  condition, 
but  equality  of  right. 

Every  human  being  is  a  distinct  and  separately  account- 
able individual.  To  each  one,  God  las  given  just  such 
means  of  happiness,  and  placed  him  under  just  such  cir- 
cumstances for  improving  those  means  of  happiness,  as  it 
has  pleased  him.  To  one  he  has  given  wealth  ;  to  another, 
intellect ;  to  another,  physical  strength  ;  to  another,  health  ; 
and  to  all  in  different  degrees.  In  all  these  respects,  the 


THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY.  193 

human  race  presents  a  scene  of  the  greatest  possible  diver- 
sity. So  far  as  natural  advantages  are  concerned,  we  can 
scarcely  find  two  individuals,  who  are  not  created  under 
circumstances  widely  dissimilar. 

But,  viewed  in  another  light,  all  me^  are  placed  under 
circumstances  "of  perfect  equality.  Each  separate  indi- 
vidual is  created  with  precisely  the  same  right  to  use  the 
advantages  with  which  God  has  endowed  him,  as  every 
other  individual.  This  proposition  seems  to  me  in  its 
nature  so  self-evident,  as  almost  to  preclude  the  possibility 
of  argument.  The  only  reason  that  I  can  conceive,  on 
which  any  one  could  found  a  plea  for  inequality  of  light, 
must  be  inequality  of  condition.  But  this  can  manifestly 
create  no  diversity  of  right.  I  may  have  been  endowed 
with  better  eye-sight  than  my  neighbor ;  but  this  evidently 
gives  me  no  right  to  put  out  his  eyes,  or  to  interfere  with 
his  right  to  derive  from  them  whatever  of  happiness  the 
Creator  has  placed  within  his  power.  I  may  have  greater 
muscular  strength  than  my  neighbor ;  but  this  gives  me  no 
right  to  break  his  arms,  or  to  diminish,  in  any  manner,  his 
ability  to  use  them  for  the  production  of  his  own  happiness. 
Besides,  this  supposition  involves  direct  and  manifest  con- 
tradiction. For  the  principle  asserted  is,  that  superiority 
of  condition  confers  superiority  of  right.  But  if  this  be 
true,  then  every  kind  of  superiority  of  condition  must  confer 
correspondent  superiority  of  right.  Superiority  in  muscular 
strength  must  confer  it,  as  much  .as  superiority  of  intellect, 
or  of  wealth ;  and  must  confer  it  in  the  ratio  of  that  supe- 
riority. In  that  case,  if  A,  on  the  ground  of  intellectual 
superiority,  have  a  right  to  improve  his  own  means  of 
happiness,  by  diminishing  those  which  the  Creator  has 
given  to  B,  B  would  have  the  same  right  over  A,  on  the 
ground  of  superiority  of  muscular  strength ;  while  C  would 
have  a  correspondent  right  over  them  both,  on  the  ground 
of  superiority  of  wealth ;  and  so  on  indefinitely ;  and  these 
rights  would  change  every  day,  according  to  the  relative 
situation  of  the  respective  parties.  That  is  to  say,  as  right 
is,  in  its  nature,  exclusive,  all  the  men  in  the  universe  have 
an  exclusive  right  to  the  same  thing ;  while  the  right  of 
every  one  absolutely  annihilates  that  of  every  other. 
17 


194  THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY. 

What  is  the  meaning  of  such  an  assertion,  I  leave  it  for 
others  to  determine. 

But  let  us  look  at  man  in  another  point  of  light. 

1.  We  find  all  men  possessed  of  the  same  appetites  and 
passions,  that  is,  of  the  same   desire  for  external  objects, 
and  the  same  capacity  for  receiving  happiness  from  the  grat- 
ification  of  these    desires.     We  do  not  say  that  all  men 
possess  them  all  in  an  egual  degree  ;  but r only  that  all  men 
actually  possess  them  all,  and  that  their  happiness  depends 
upon  the  gratification  of  them. 

2.  These  appetites  and  passions  are  created,  so  far  as 
they  themselves  are  exclusively  concerned,  without  limit. 
Gratification  generally  renders  them  both  more  intense  and 
more  numerous.     Such  is  the  case  with  the  love  of  wealth, 
the  love  of  power,  the   love  of  sensual  pleasure,  or  with 
any  of  the  others. 

3.  These  desires  may  be  gratified  in  such  a  manner,  as 
not  to  interfere  with  the  right  which  every  other  man  has 
over   his  own  means  of  happiness.     Thus,  I  may  gratify 
my  love  of  wealth,  by  industry  and  frugality,  while  I  con- 
duct myself  towards  every  other  man  with  entire  honesty. 
I  may  gratify  my  love  of  science,  without  diminishing,  in 
any  respect,  the  means  of  knowledge  possessed  by  another. 
And,  on  the  other  hand,  I  am  created  with  the  physical  power 
to  gratify  my  desires,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interfere  with 
the  right  which  another  has  over  the  means  of  happiness 
which  God  has  given  him.     Thus,  I  have  a  physical  power 
to  gratify  my  love  of  property,  by  stealing  the  property  of 
another,  as  well  as  to  gratify  it  by   earning   property  for 
myself.     I  have,  by  the  gift  of  speech,  the  physical  power 
to  ruin  the  reputation  of  another,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying 
my  own  love  of  approbation.     I  have  the  physical  power 
to  murder  a  man,  for  the  sake  of  using  his  body  to  gratify 
my  love  of  anatomical  knowledge.     And  so  of  a  thousand 
cases. 

4.  And,  hence,  we  see  that  the  relation  in  which  human 
beings  stand  to  each  other,  is  the  following :  Every  indi- 
vidual is  created  with  a  desire  to  use  the  means  of  happi- 
ness which  God  has  given  him,  in  such  a  manner  as  he 
thinks  will  best  promote  that  happiness  ;  and  of  this  manner 


THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY.  195 

he  is  the  sole  judge.  Every  individual  is  endowed  with 
the  same  desires,  which  he  may  gratify  in  such  a  manner 
as  will  not  interfere  with  his  neighbor's  means  of  happiness  ; 
but  each  individual  has,  also,  the  physical  power  of  so  grat- 
ifying his  desires,  as  will  interfere  with  the  means  of  happi- 
ness which  God  has  granted  to  his  neighbor. 

5.  From  this  relation,  it  is  manifest  that  every  man  is 
under  obligation  to  pursue  his  own  happiness,  in  such  man- 
ner only  as  will  leave  his  neighbor  in  the  undisturbed  exer- 
cise of  that  common  right  which  the  Creator  has  equally 
conferred  upon  both,  that  is,  to  restrain  his  physical  power 
of  gratifying  his  desires  within  such  limits  that  he  shall  in- 
terfere with  the  rights  of  no  other  being ;  because  in  no 
other  manner  can  the  evident  design  of  the  Creator,  the 
common  happiness  of  all,  be  promoted. 

That  this  is  the  law  of  our  being,  may  be  shown  from 
several  considerations : 

1.  By  violating  it,  the  happiness  of  the  aggressor  is  not 
increased,  while  that  of  the  sufferer  is  diminished  ;  while,  by 
obeying  it,  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  of  which  our 
condition  is  susceptible,  is  secured ;  because,  by  obeying  it, 
every  one  derives  the  greatest  possible  advantage  from  the 
gifts  bestowed  upon  him  by  the  Creator. 

2.  Suppose  any  other  rule  of  obligation ;  that  is,  that  a 
man  is  not  under  obligation  to  observe,  with  this  exactitude, 
the  rights  of  his  neighbor.     Where  shall  the  limit  be  fixed  ? 
If  violation  be  allowed  in  a  small  degree,  why  not  in  a  great 
degree  ?  and  if  he  may  interfere  with  one  right,  why  not 
with  all  ?     And,  as  all  men  come  under  the  same  law,  this 
principle  would  lead  to  the  same  absurdity  as  that  of  which 
we  have  before  spoken ;  that  is,  it  would  abolish  the  very 
idea  of  right;  and,  as  every  one  has  an  equal  liberty  of  vio- 

'"^  lation,  would  surrender  the  whole  race  to  the  dominion  of 
unrestrained  desire. 

3.  If  it  be  said  that  one  class  of  men  is  not  under  the  ob- 
ligation to  observe  this  rule  in  its  conduct  towards  another 
class  of  men,  then  it  will  be  necessary  to  show  that  the 
second  class  are  not  men,  that  is,  human  beings  ;  for  these 
principles  apply  to  men,  as  men  ;  and  the  simple  fact,  that 
a  being  is  a  man,  places  him  within  the  reach  of  these  obli- 


196  THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY. 

gallons,  and  of  their  protection.  Nay,  more,  suppose  the 
inferior  class  of  beings  were  not  truly  men ;  if  they  were  in- 
telligent moral  agents,  I  suppose  that  we  should  be  under 
the  same  obligation  to  conduct  ourselves  towards  them  upon 
the  principle  of  reciprocity.  I  see  no  reason  why  an  angel 
would  have  a  right,  by  virtue  of  his  superior  nature,  to 
interfere  with  the  means  of  happiness  which  God  has  con- 
ferred upon  man.  By  parity  of  reasoning,  therefore,  supe- 
riority of  rank  would  give  to  man  no  such  power  over  an 
inferior  species  of  moral  and  intelligent  beings. 

And,  lastly,  if  it  be  true  that  the  Creator  has  given  to 
every  separate  individual,  control  over  those  means  of  hap- 
piness which  He  has  bestowed  upon  him,  then  the  simple 
question  is,  Which  is  of  the  highest  authority,  this  grant  of 
the  Creator,  or  the  desires  and  passions  of  the  creature  ?  for 
these  are  really  the  notions  which  are  brought  into  collision. 
That  is  to  say,  ought  the  grant  of  God,  and  the  will  of 
God,  to  limit  my  desires  ;  or  ought  my  desires  to  vitiate  the 
grant,  and  set  at  defiance  the  will  of  God  ?  On  this  ques- 
tion, a  moral  and  intelligent  creature  can  entertain  but  one 
opinion. 

Secondly.  Let  us  examine  the  teaching  of  the  Holy 
Scriptures  on  this  subject^. 

The  precept  in  the-lE&We  is  in  these  words  :  "  Thou  shalt 
love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

Two  questions  are  here  to  be  considered.  First,  To  whom 
does  this  command  apply ;  or,  in  other  words,  Who  is  my 
neighbor?  and,  secondly,  What  is  implied  in  the  precept? 

1 .  The  first  of  these  questions  is  answered  by  our  Savior 
himself,  in  the  parable  of  the  good  Samaritan.    Luke  x, 
25 — 37.     He  there  teaches  us,  that  we  are  to  consider  as 
our  neighbor,  not  our  kinsman,  or  our  fellow-citizen,  or  those 
to  whom  we  are  bctund  by  the  reception  of  previous  kind- 
ness, but   the   stranger,  the  alien,  the  hereditary  national 
enemy  ;  that  is,  man,  as  man  ;  any  human  being  to  whom 
we  may  in  any  manner  do  good.     Every  man  is  our  neigh- 
bor, and,  therefore,  we  are  under  obligation  to  love  every 
man  as  ourselves. 

2.  What  is  the  import  of  the  command  to  love  such  a  one 
as  ourselves  ? 


THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY.  197 

The  very  lowest  meaning  that  we  can  assign  to  this 
precept,  is  as  follows.  I  have  already  stated  that  God  has 
bestowed  upon  every  man  such  means  of  happiness,  as,  in 
his  own  sovereign  pleasure,  he  saw  fit ;  and  that  he  has 
given  to  every  man  an  equal  right  to  use  those  means  of 
happiness  as  each  one  supposes  will  best  promote  his  own 
well-being.  Besides  this,  every  one  has  an  instinctive 
desire  thus  to  use  them.  He  cannot  be  happy  unless  this 
desire  be  gratified,  and  he  is  painfully  conscious  of  injury,  if 
this  right  be  interfered  with.  In  this  manner,  he  loves 
himself.  Now,  in  the  same  manner  he  is  commanded  to 
love  his  neighbor.  That  is,  he  is,  by  this  precept,  obliged 
to  have  the  same  desire  that  his  neighbor  should  enjoy, 
unmolested,  the  control  over  whatever  God  has  bestowed 
upon  him,  as  he  has  to  enjoy,  unmolested,  the  same  control 
himself;  and  to  feel  the  same  consciousness  of  injury  when 
another  man's  rights  are  invaded,  as  when  his  own  rights 
are  invaded.  With  these  sentiments,  he  would  be  just  as 
unwilling  to  violate  the  rights  of  another,  as  he  would  be  to 
suffer  a  violation  of  his  own.  That  this  view  of  the  sub- 
iect  exhausts  the  command,  we  by  no  means  assert ;  but 
we  think  it  evident  that  the  language  is  capable  of  a  no  less 
comprehensive  meaning. 

The  same  precept  is  expressed  in  other  places,  under 
another  form  of  language:  "All  things  whatsoever  ye 
would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  even  so  unto 
them  ;  for  this  is  the  law  and  the  prophets."  Matthew 
vii,  12. 

The  words  here,  as  in  the  former  case,  are  used  to  de- 
note a  principle  of  universal  obligation  :  "All  things  what- 
soever ye  would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  even 
so  unto  them." 

The  precept  itself  teaches  us  to  estimate  the  rights  of 
others  by  the  consciousness  of  individual  right  in  our  own 
bosoms.  Would  we  wish  to  know  how  delicate  a  regard 
we  are  bound  to  entertain  towards  the  control  which  God 
has  given  to  others  over  the  means  of  happiness  which  He 
has  granted  to  them,  let  us  decide  the  question  by  asking 
how  tender  and  delicate  is  the  regard  which  we  would  wish 
17* 


198  THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY. 

them  to  entertain  towards  us  under  similar  circumstances. 
The  decision  of  the  one  question,  will  always  be  the  decis- 
ion of  the  other.  And  this  precept  goes  a  step  farther. 
It  renders  it  obligatory  on  every  man  to  commence  such  a 
course  of  conduct,  irrespectively  of  whatever  may  be  the 
conduct  of  others  to  himself.  It  forbids  us  to  demand 
more  than  the  law  of  reciprocity  allows ;  it  commands  us 
always  to  render  it;  and,  still  more,  if  we  complain  to 
another  of  his  violation  of  the  law,  it  renders  it  imperative 
on  us,  while  we  urge  upon  him  a  change  of  conduct,  to 
commence  by  setting  him  the  example.  And  it  really,  if 
carried  out  to  the  utmost,  would  preclude  our  claim  upon 
him,  until  we  had  ourselves  first  manifested  towards  him 
the  very  disposition  which  we  demand  towards  ourselves. 
The  moral  beauty  of  this  precept  will  be  at  once  seen  by 
any  one  who  will  take  the  trouble,  honestly,  to  generalize 
it.  He  will  immediately  perceive  that  it  would  always 
avert  injury  at  the  very  outset;  and,  by  rendering  both 
parties  more  virtuous,  would  tend  directly  to  banish  injury, 
and  violence,  and  wrong,  from  the  earth. 

Thirdly.  This  law  of  universal  reciprocity  applies  with 
the  same  force  to  communities  as  to  individuals. 

Communities  are  composed  of  individuals,  and  can  have, 
in  respect  to  each  other,  no  other  rights  than  those  of  the 
individuals  who  constitute  them.  If  it  be  wrong  for  one  man 
to  injure  another  man,  it  must  be  equally  wrong  for  two 
men  to  injure  two  other  men  ;  and  so  of  any  other  number. 
And,  moreover,  the  grant  of  the  Creator  is  in  both  cases 
under  the  same  circumstances.  God  has  bestowed  upon 
nations  physical  and  intellectual  advantages,  in  every  pos- 
sible degree  of  diversity.  But  He  has  granted  to  them  all 
an  equal  right  to  use  those  advantages  in  such  manner  as 
each  one  may  suppose  will  best  conduce  to  the  promotion 
of  his  own  happiness. 

Hence  it  will  follow, — 

1.  That  the  precept  applies  as  universally  to  nations  as 
to  individuals.  Whenever  societies  of  men  treat  with  each 
other ;  whether  powerful  with  weak,  or  polite  with  rude, 
civilized  with  savage,  or  intelligent  with  ignorant ;  whether 


THE    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY.  199 

friends  with  friends,  or  enemies  with  enemies ;  all  are  bound, 
by  the  law  of  reciprocity,  to  love  each  other  as  themselves, 
and  to  do  unto  others,  in  all  things,  whatsoever  they  would 
desire  others  to  do  unto  them. 

2.  And  hence,  also,  the  precept  itself  is  as  obligatory 
upon  nations  as  upon  individuals.  Every  nation  is  bound 
to  exhibit  as  sensitive  a  regard  for  the  preservation  inviolate 
of  the  rights  of  another  nation,  as  it  exhibits  for  the  preser- 
vation inviolate  of  its  own  rights.  And  still  more,  every 
nation  is  under  the  same  obligation  as  every  individual,  to 
measure  the  respect  and  moderation  which  it  displays  to 
others,  by  the  respect  and  moderation  which  it  demands  for 
itself;  and  is  also,  if  it  complain  of  violation  of  right,  to  set 
the  first  example  of  entire  and  perfect  reciprocity  and 
fidelity.  Were  this  course  pursued  by  individuals,  and 
nations,  the  causes  of  collision  would  manifestly  cease,  and 
the  appeal  to  arms  would  soon  be  remembered  only  as  one 
of  the  strange  infatuations  of  by-gone,  barbarous  and  blood- 
thirsty ages.  Chicanery,  and  intrigue,  and  overreaching, 
are  as  wicked  and  as  disgraceful  in  the  intercourse .  of 
nations  and  societies,  as  in  that  of  individuals ;  and  the  tool 
of  a  nation  or  of  a  party,  is  as  truly  contemptible  as  the 
tool  of  an  individual.  The  only  distinction  which  I  per- 
ceive, is,  that,  in  the  one  case,  the  instrument  of  dishonesty 
is  ashamed  of  his  act,  and  dare  not  wear  the  badge  of  his 
infamy ;  while,  in  the  other  case,  even  the  ambiguous 
virtue  of  shame  has  been  lost,  and  the  man  glories  in  the 
brand  which  marks  him  for  a  villain. 


200  THE    DUTY   OF    RECIPROCITY. 


CLASSIFICATION    OF    THE    DUTIES    ARISING    FROM    THE    LAW    OF 
RECIPROCITY. 

The   duties   of  reciprocity  may  be  divided  into  three 
classes : 

Class  1.  DUTIES  TO  MEN,  AS  MEN. 

Class  2.  DUTIES  ARISING  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF 

THE   SEXES. 

Class  3.  DUTIES  ARISING  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF 
CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

Class  1.  DUTIES  TO  MEN,  AS  MEN. 
This  includes  Justice  and  Veracity. 

I.  Justice,  as  it  regards,  1.  Liberty. 

2.  Property. 

3.  Character. 

4.  Reputation. 

II.  Veracity.     1.  Of  the  past  and  present. 

2.  Of  the  future. 
Class  2.  DUTIES  ARISING  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF 

THE  SEXES. 

Including,  1.  General  duty  of  chastity. 

2.  The  law  of  marriage. 
\3.  The  duties  and  rights  of  parents. 
4.  The  duties  and  rights  of  children. 
Class  3.  DUTIES  ARISING  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF 
CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

1.  The  nature  of  civil  society. 

2.  The  mode  in  which  the  authority  of  civil  society  is 
maintained. 

3.  Of  forms  of  government. 

4.  Duties  of  magistrates. 

5.  Duties  of  citizens. 


201 


CLASS    FIRST. 

JUSTICE    AND    VERACITY. 

JUSTICE. 

Justice,  when  used  in  a  judicial  sense,  signifies  that  tem- 
per of  mind  which  disposes  a  man  to  administer  rewards  and 
punishments  according  to  the  character  and  actions  of  the 
object. 

It  is  also  used  to  designate  the  act  by  which  this  admin- 
istration is  effected.  Thus,  we  speak  of  a  judge,  who 
administers  justice. 

In  the  present  case,  however,  it  is  used  in  a  more  ex- 
tensive signification.  It  is  here  intended  to  designate  that 
temper  of  mind  which  disposes  us  to  leave  every  other 
being  in  the  unmolested  enjoyment  of  those  means  of 
happiness  bestowed  upon  him  by  his  Creator.  It  is,  also, 
frequently  used  for  the  exhibition  of  this  conduct  in  out- 
ward act.  Thus,  when  a  man  manifests  a  proper  respect 
for  the  rights  of  others,  we  say,  he  acts  justly  ;  when  he, 
in  any  manner,  violates  these  rights,  we  say,  he  acts  un- 
justly. 

The  most  important  means  of  happiness  which  God  has 
placed  in  the  power  of  the  individual,  are,  first,  HIS  OWN 
PERSON  ;  second,  PROPERTY  ;  third,  CHARACTER  ;  fourth, 

REPUTATION. 


202 


CHAPTER    FIRST. 

PERSONAL    LIBERTY. 
SECTION    I. 

OF  THE  NATURE    OF    PERSONAL   LIBERTY. 

EVERY  human  being  is,  by  his  constitution,  a  separate, 
and  distinc/t,  and  complete  system,  adapted  to  all  the  pur- 
poses of  self-government,  and  responsible,  separately,  to 
God,  for  the  manner  in  which  his  powers  are  employed. 
Thus,  every  individual  possesses  a  body,  by  which  he  is 
connected  with  the  physical  universe,  and  by  which  that 
universe  is  modified  for  the  supply  of  his  wants ;  an  under- 
standing, by  which  truth  is  discovered,  and  by  which  means 
are  adapted  to  their  appropriate  ends  ;  passions  and  de- 
sires, by  which  he  is  excited  to  action,  and  in  the  gratifica- 
tion of  which  his  happiness  consists  ;  conscience,  to  point 
out  the  limit  within  which  these  desires  may  be  rightfully 
gratified;  and  a  will,  which  determines  him  to  action.  The 
possession  of  these  is  necessary  to  a  human  nature,  and  it 
also  renders  every  being  so  constituted,  a  distinct  and  inde* 
'  pendent  individual.  He  may  need  society,  but  every  one 
•o  needs  it  equally  with  evert/  other  one  ;  and,  hence,  all  enter 
into  it  upon  terms  of  strict  and  evident  reciprocity.  If  the 
individual/use  these  powers  according  to  the  laws  imposed 
by  his  Creator,  his  Creator  holds  him  guiltless.  If  he  use 
them  in  such  manner  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  use  of  the 
same  powers  which  God  has  bestowed  upon  his  neighbor, 
he  is,  as  it  respects  his  neighbor,  whether  that  neighbor  be 
an  individual  or  the  community,  to  be  held  guiltless.  So 
long  as  he  uses  them  within  this  limit,  he  has  a  right,  so  far 
as  his  fellow-men  are  concerned,  to  use  them,  in  the  most 
unlimited  sense,  suo  arbitrio,  at  his  own  discretion.  His 


NATURE    OF    PERSONAL    LIBERTY.  203 

will  is  ins  sufficient  and  ultimate  reason.  He  need  assign 
no  other  reason  for  his  conduct,  than  his  own  free  choice. 
Within  this  limit,  he  is  still  responsible  to  God ;  but,  within 
this  limit,  he  is  not  responsible  to  man,  nor  is  man  respon- 
sible for  him. 

1.  Thus,  a  man  has  an  entire  right  to  use  his  own  body 
as  he  will,  provided  he  do  not  so  use  it  as  to  interfere  with 
the  rights  of  his  neighbor.  He  may  go  where  he  will, 
and  stay  where  he  please  ;  he  may  work,  or  be  idle ;  he 
may  pursue  one  occupation,  or  another,  or  no  occupation  at 
all ;  and  it  is  the  concern  of  no  one  else,  if  he  leave  in- 
violate the  rights  of  every  one  else ;  that  is,  if  he  leave 
every  one  else  in  the  undisturbed  enjoyment^oj  those  means 
of  happiness  bestowed  upon  him  by  the  Creator. 

It  seems  almost  trifling  to  argue  a  point,  which  is,  in  its 
nature,  so  evident  upon  inspection.  If,  however,  any  ad- 
ditional proof  be  required,  the  following  considerations  will 
9  readily  suggest  themselves.  It  is  asserted  that  every  indi- 
vidual has  an  equal  and  ultimate  right  /  with  every  other 
individual,  to  the  use  of  his  body,  his  mind,  and  all  the 
other  means  of  happiness  with  which  God  has  endowed 
him.  But  suppose  it  otherwise.  Suppose  that  one  in- 
dividual has  a  right  to  the  body,  or  mind,  or  means  of 
happiness,  of  another.  That  is,  suppose  that  A  has  a 
right  to  use  the  body  of  B  according  to  his,  that  is,  A's,  will. 
Now,  if  this  be  true,  it  is  true  universally ;  hence,  A  has 
the  control  over  the  body  of  B,  and  B  has  control  over  the 
body  of  C,  C  of  that  of  D,  &ic.,  and  Z  again  over  the 
body  of  A  ;  that  is,  every  separate  will  has  the  right  of  con- 
trol over  some  other  body  or  intellect  besides  its  own,  and 
has  no  right  of  control  over  its  own  body  or  intellect. 
Whether  such  is  the  constitution  of  human  nature,  or,  if 
it  be  not,  whether  it  would  be  an  improvement  upon  the 
present  constitution,  may  be  easily  decided. 

And,  if  it  be  said,  that,  to  control  one  man's  body  by 
another  man's  will  is  impossible,  for  that  every  man  acts  as 
he  will,  since  he  cannot  do  any  thing  unless  he  will  do  it, 
it  may  be  answered,  that  the  term  will  is  used  here  in  a 
different  sense  from  that  intended  in  the  preceding  para- 
graph. Every  one  must  see,  that  a  man,  who,  out  of  the 


204  NATURE    OF    PERSONAL    LIBERTY. 

various  ways  of  employing  his  body,  set  before  him  by  his 
Creator,  chooses  that  which  he  prefers,  is  in  a  very  differ- 
ent condition  from  him  who  is  debarred  from  all  choice, 
excepting  that  he  may  do  what  his  fellow-man  appoints, 
or  else  must  suffer  what  his  fellow-man  chooses  to  inflict. 
Now,  the  true  condition  of  a  human  being  is  that  in  which 
his  will  is  influenced  by  no  other  circumstances  than  those 
which  arise  from  the  constitution  under  which  his  Creator 
has  placed  him.  And  he  who  for  his  own  pleasure  places 
his  fellow-man  under  any  other  conditions  of  existence,  is 
guilty  of  the  most  odious  tyranny,  and  seems  to  me  to 
arrogate  to  himself  the  authority  of  the  Most  High  God. 

But  it  may  be  said  that,  in  this  case,  the  individual  may 
become  chargeable  to  the  community.  To  this  I  answer, 
not  unless  the  community  assume  the  charge.  If  every 
man  be  left  to  himself,  but  is  obliged  to  respect  the  rights  of 
others  ;  if  he  do  not  labor,  a  remedy  is  provided  in  the  laws 
of  the  system, — he  will  very  soon  starve  ;  and,  if  he  prefer 
starvation  tolabor,  he  has  no  one  to  blame  but  himself.  While 
the  law  of  reciprocity  frees  him  from  the  control  of  society, 
it  discharges  society  from  any  responsibility  for  the  result  of 
his  actions  upon  himself.  I  know  that  society  undertakes 
to  support  the  indigent  and  helpless,  and  to  relieve  men  in 
extreme  necessity.  This,  however,  is  a  conventional  ar- 
rangement, into  which  men,  who  choose,  have  a  right  to 
enter ;  and,  having  entered  into  it,  they  are  bound  by  its 
provisions.  If  they  become  responsible  for  the  support  of 
the  individual's  life,  they  have  a  right  over  his  power  of 
labor  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  cover  that  responsibility. 
And  he  who  has  become  a  member  of  such  a  society,  has 
surrendered  voluntarily  his  control  over  his  body,  to  this 
amount.  But  as  he  has  done  it  voluntarily,  such  a  con- 
vention proceeds  upon  the  concession,  that  the  original 
right  vests  in  the  individual. 

2.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  the  use  of  the  intellect. 

If  the  preceding  observations  are  just,  it  will  follow,  that 
every  man,  within  the  limit  before  suggested,  has  a  right  to 
use  his  intellect  as  he  will.  He  may  investigate  whatever 
subjects  he  will,  and  in  what  manner  soever  he  will,  and 
may  come  to  such  conclusions  as  his  investigations  may 


NATURE    OF    PERSONAL    LIBERTY.  205 

teach,  and  may  publish  those  conclusions  to  those  who  are 
willing  to  hear  them,  provided  he  interfere  with  the  happi- 
ness of  no  other  human  being.  The  denial  of  this  right, 
would  lead  to  the  same  absurdities  as  in  the  former  case. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  individual  may,  by  so  doing,  in- 
volve himself  in  error,  and  thus  diminish  his  own  happi- 
ness, the  answer  is  at  hand,  namely,  for  this  the  constitution 
of  things  provides  its  appropriate  and  adequate  punishment. 
He  who  imbibes  error,  suffers,  in  his  own  person,  the  con- 
sequences of  error,  which  are  misfortune  and  loss  of 
respect.  And,  besides,  as,  for  his  happiness,  society  is  not 
in  this  case  responsible  :  there  can  be  no  reason,  derived 
from  the  consideration  of  his  happiness,  why  society  should  in- 
terfere with  the  free  use  of  this  instrument  of  happiness,  which 
the  Creator  has  intrusted  solely  to  the  individual  himself. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  has  not  society  a  right  to  oblige 
men  to  acquire  a  certain  amount  of  intellectual  cultivation  ? 
I  answer,  men  have  a  right  to  form  a  society  upon  such 
conditions  as  they  please  ;  and,  of  course,  so  to  form  it, 
that  it  shall  be  necessary,  in  order  to  enjoy  its  privileges, 
for  the  individual  to  possess  a  certain  amount  of  knowledge. 
Having  formed  such  a  society,  every  one  is  bound  by  its 
provisions,  so  long  as  he  remains  a  member  of  it ;  and  the 
enforcing  of  its  provisions  upon  the  individual,  is  no  more 
than  obliging  him  to  do  what  he,  for  a  sufficient  considera- 
tion, voluntarily  contracted  to  do.  And  society  may  right- 
fully enforce  this  provision  in  either  of  two  ways :  it  may 
either  withhold  from  every  man  who  neglects  to  acquire 
this  knowledge,  the  benefits  of  citizenship ;  or  else  it  may 
grant  these  benefits  to  every  one,  and  oblige  every  one  to 
possess  the  assigned  amount  of  knowledge.  In  this  case, 
there  is  no  violation  of  reciprocity  ;  for  the  same  require- 
ments are  made  of  all,  and  every  one  receives  his  full 
equivalent,  in  the  results  of  the  same  law  upon  others. 
More  than  this,  the  individual  could  not  justly  require.  He 
could  not  justly  demand  to  be  admitted  to  rights  which 
presuppose  certain  intellectual  attainments,  and  which  can 
only  be,  with  safety  to  others,  enjoyed  by  those  who  have 
made  these  attainments,  unless  he  be  willing  to  conform  to 
the  condition  necessary  to  that  enjoyment. 
18 


206  NATURE    OF    PERSONAL    LIBERTY. 

3.  I  have  thus  far  considered  man  only  in  his  relations  to 
the  present  life.  So  far  as  I  have  gone,  I  have  endeavored 
to  show  that,  provided  tlie  individual  interfere  not  with  the 
rights  of  others,  he  has  a  right  to  use  his  own  body  and 
mind  as  he  thinks  will  best  promote  his  own  happiness ; 
that  is,  as  he  will.  But,  if  he  have  this  right,  within  these 
limits,  to  pursue  his  present  happiness,  how  much  more 
incontrovertible  must  be  his  right  to  use  his  body  and  mind 
in  such  manner,  as  he  supposes  will  best  promote  his 
•j  eternal  happiness !  And,  besides,  if,  for  the  sake  of  his 
own  happiness,  he  have  a  right  to  the  unmolested  enjoy- 
ment of  whatever  God  has  given  him,  how  much  more  is 
he  entitled  to  the  same  unmolested  enjoyment,  for  the  sake 
of  obeying  God,  and  fulfilling  the  highest  obligation  of 
which  he  is  susceptible  ! 

We  say,  then,  that  every  man,  provided  he  does  not  in- 
terfere with  the  rights  of  his  neighbor,  has  a  right,  so  far  as 
his  neighbor  is  concerned,  to  worship  God,  or  not  to  wor- 
ship him ;  and  to  worship  him  in  any  manner  that  he  will ; 
and '  that,  for  the  abuse  of  this  liberty,  he  is  accountable 
only  to  God. 

If  it  be  said,  that,  by  so  doing,  a  man  may  ruin  his  own 
soul,  the  answer  is  obvious;  for  this  ruin,  the  individual 
himself,  and  not  society,  is  responsible.  And,  moreover, 
as  religion  consists  in  the  temper  of  heart,  which  force  can- 
not affect, — and  not  in  external  observance,  which  is  all 
that  force  can  affect, — no  application  of  force  can  change 
^  our  relations  to  God,  or  prevent  the  ruin  in  question.  All 
application  of  force  must  then  be  gratuitous  mischief. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said, — all  men  are  created 
with  an  equal  right  to  employ  their  faculties,  of  body  or 
of  mind,  in  such  manner  as  will  promote  their  own  hap- 
piness, either  here  or  hereafter ;  or,  which  is  the  same  thing, 
every  man  has  a  right  to  use  his  own  powers,  of  body  or  of 
mind,  in  such  manner  as  he  will ;  provided  he  do  not  use 
them  in  such  manner  as  to  interfere  with  the  rights  of  his 
neighbor. 

The  exceptions  to  this  law  are  easily  defined. 

I.  The  first  exception  is  in  the  case  of  infancy. 

By  the  law  of  nature,  a  parent  is  under  obligation  to 


NATURE    OF    PERSONAL    LIBERTY.  207 

support  his  child,  and  is  responsible  for  his  actions.  He 
has,  therefore,  a  right  to  control  the  actions  of  the  child,  so 
long  as  this  responsibility  exists.  He  is  under  obligation  to 
render  that  child  a  suitable  member  of  the  community  ;  and 
this  obligation  he  could  not  discharge,  unless  the  physical 
and  intellectual  liberty  of  the  child  were  placed  within  his 
power. 

2.  As  the  parent  has  supported  the  child  during  infancy, 
he  has,  probably,  by  the  law  of  nature,  a  right  to  his  ser- 
vices during  youth,  or   for   so.  long  a  period  as  may  be 
sufficient   to   insure    an    adequate    remuneration.     When, 
however,  this  remuneration  is  received,  the  right  of  the 
parent  over  the  child  ceases  for  ever. 

3.  This  right  he  may,  if  he  see  fit,  transfer  to  another,  as 
in  the  case  of  apprenticeship.     But  he  can  transfer  the  right 
for  no  longer  time  than  he  holds  it.     He  can,  therefore, 
negotiate  it  away  for  no  period  beyond  that  of  the  child's 
minority. 

4.  A  man  may  transfer  his  right  over  his  own  labor  for 
a  limited  time,  and  for  a  satisfactory  equivalent.     But  this 
transfer  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  the  original  right 
vests  in  himself,  and  it  is,  therefore,  no  violation  of  that  right. 
He  has,  however,  no  right  to  transfer  the  services  of  any 
other  person   except  his  child  ;   nor  of  his  child,  except 
under  the  limitations  above  specified. 

In  strict  accordance  with  these  remarks,  is  the  memorable 
sentence  in  the  commencement  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, "  We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident :  that 
all  men  are  created  equal ;  that  they  are  endowed  by  their 
Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights  ;  that  among  these 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  That  the 
equality  here  spoken  of  is  not  of  the  means  of  happiness,  but 
in  the  right  to  use  them  as  we  will,  is  too  evident  to  need 
illustration. 


MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

SECTION    II. 

MODES  IN  WHICH   PERSONAL    LIBERTY   MAY    BE  VIOLATED. 

Personal  liberty  may  be  violated  in  two  ways  :  1.  By  the 
individual ;  2.  By  society. 

PART  FIRST.  Of  the  violation  of  personal  liberty  by  the 
INDIVIDUAL.  The  most  common  violation  of  personal  liberty, 
under  this  head,  is  that  which  exists  in  the  case  of  Domes- 
tic Slavery. 

Domestic  slavery  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  the 
master  has  a  right  to  control  the  actions,  physical  and  in- 
tellectual, of  the  slave,  for  his  own,  that  is,  the  master's, 
individual  benefit ;  and,  of  course,  that  the  happiness  of  the 
master,  when  it  comes  in  competition  with  the  happiness 
of  the  slave,  extinguishes  in  the  latter  the  right  to  pursue  it. 
It  supposes,  at  best,  that  the  relation  between  master  and 
slave,  is  not  that  which  exists  between  man  and  man,  but 
is  a  modification,  at  least,  of  that  which  exists  between 
man  and  the  brutes. 

Now,  this  manifestly  supposes  that  the  two  classes  of 
beings  are  created  with  dissimilar  rights :  that  the  master 
possesses  rights  which  have  never  been  conceded  by  the 
slave  ;  and  that  the  slave  has  no  rights  at  all  over  the  means 
of  happiness  which  God  has  given  him,  whenever  these 
means  of  happiness  can  be  rendered  available  to  the  service 
of  the  master.  It  supposes  that  the  Creator  intended  one 
human  being  to  govern  the  physical,  intellectual  and  moral 
actions  of  as  many  other  human  beings  as  by  purchase  he 
can  bring  within  his  physical  power ;  and  that  one  human 
being  may  thus  acquire  a  right  to  sacrifice  the  happiness  of 
any  number  of  other  human  beings,  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
moting his  own. 

Slavery  thus  violates  the  personal  liberty  of  man  as  a 
physical,  intellectual,  and  moral  being. 

1.  It  purports  to  give  to  the  master  a  right  to  control  the 
physical  labor  of  the  slave,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  happiness 
of  the  slave,  nor  upon  terms  mutually  satisfactory  to  the 


LIBERTY    MAY    BE    VIOLATED.  209 

parties,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  happiness  of  the  master. 
It  subjects  the  amount  of  labor,  and  the  kind  of  labor,  and 
the  remuneration  for  labor,  entirely  to  the  will  of  the  one 
party,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  will  of  the  other  party. 

2.  But  if  this  right  in  the  master  over  the  slave  be  con- 
ceded, there  are  of  course  conceded  with  it  all  other  rights 
necessary  to  insure  its  possession.     Hence,  inasmuch  as  the 
slave  can  be  held  in  this  condition  only  while  he  remains  in 
a  state  of  comparative  mental  imbecility,  it  supposes  the 
master  to  have  the  right  to  control  his  intellectual  develop- 
ment, just  as  far  as  may  be  necessary  to  secure  entire  sub- 
jection.    Thus,  it  supposes  the  slave  to  have  no  right  to 
use  his  intellect  for  the  production  of  his  own  happiness  ; 
but,  only  to  use  it  in  such  manner  as  may  be  consistent 
with  his  master's  profit. 

3.  And,  moreover,  inasmuch  as  the  acquisition   of  the 
knowledge  of  his  duty  to  God  could  not  be  freely  made 
without  the  acquisition  of  other  knowledge,  which  might, 
if  universally  diffused,  endanger  the  control  of  the  master, 
slavery  supposes  the  master  to  have  the  right  to  determine 
how  much  knowledge  of  his  duty  a  slave  shall  obtain, 
the  manner  in  which  he  shall  obtain  it,  and  the  manner  in 
which  he  shall  discharge   that  duty  after  he   shall   have 
obtained  a  knowledge  of  it.     It  thus  subjects  the  duty  of 
man  to  God,  entirely  to  the  will  of  man ;  and  this  for  the 
sake  of  pecuniary  profit.     It  renders  the  eternal  happiness 
of  the  one  party  subservient  to  the  temporal  happiness  of 
the  other.     And  this  principle  is  commonly  recognized  by 
the  laws  of  all  slave-holding  countries. 

If  argument  were  necessary  to  show  that  such  a  system 
as  this  must  be  at  variance  with  the  ordinance  of  God,  it 
might  be  easily  drawn  from  the  effects  which  it  produces 
both  upon  morals  and  upon  national  wealth. 

1.  Its  effects  must  be  disastrous  upon  the  morals  of  both 
parties.  By  presenting  objects  on  whom  passion  may  be 
satiated  without  resistance  and  without  redress,  it  tends  to 
cultivate  in  the  master,  pride,  anger,  cruelty,  selfishness  and 
licentiousness.  By  accustoming  the  slave  to  subject  his 
moral  principles  to  the  will  of  another,  it  tends  to  abolish  in 
him  all  moral  distinctions ;  and  thus  fosters  in  him  lying, 
18* 


210  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

deceit,  hypocrisy,  dishonesty,  and  a  willingness  to  yield 
himself  up  to  minister  to  the  appetites  of  his  master.  That 
in  all  slave-holding  countries  there  are  exceptions  to  this 
remark,  and  that  there  are  principles  in  human  nature 
which,  in  many  cases,  limit  the  effects  of  these  tendencies, 
may  be  gladly  admitted.  Yet,  that  such  is  the  tendency 
of  slavery,  as  slavery,  we  think  no  reflecting  person  can 
for  a  moment  hesitate  to  allow. 

2.  The  effects  of  slavery  on  national  wealth,  may  be 
easily  seen  from  the  following  considerations : 

1.  Instead  of  imposing  upon  all  the  necessity  of  labor, 
it  restricts  the  number   of  laborers,  that  is,  of  producers, 
within  the  smallest  possible  limit,  by  rendering  labor  dis- 
graceful. 

2.  It  takes  from  the  laborers   the   natural  stimulus   to 
labor,  namely,  the    desire  in  the  individual  of  improving 
his   condition  ;    and   substitutes,  in   the    place  of  it,   that 
motive  which  is  the  least  operative  and  the  least  constant, 
namely,  the  fear  of  punishment  without  the  consciousness 
of  moral  delinquency. 

3.  It  removes,  as  far  as  possible,  from  both  parties,  the 
disposition   and   the   motives   to  frugality.      Neither   the 
master   learns   frugality  from   the   necessity  of  labor,  nor 
the  slave  from  the  benefits  which  it  confers.     And  hence, 
while  the  one  party  wastes  from  ignorance  of  the  laws  of 
acquisition,  and  the  other  because  he  can  have  no  motive 
to  economy,  capital  must  accumulate  but  slowly,  if  indeed 
it  accumulate  at  all. 

And  that  such  are  the  tendencies  of  slavery,  is  manifest 
from  observation.  No  country,  not  of  great  fertility,  can 
long  sustain  a  large  slave  population.  Soils  of  more  than 
ordinary  fertility  cannot  sustain  it  long,  after  the  first  rich- 
ness of  the  soil  has  been  exhausted.  Hence,  slavery  in 
this  country  is  acknowledged  to  have  impoverished  many 
of  our  most  valuable  districts ;  and,  hence,  it  is  continually 
migrating  from  the  older  settlements,  to  those  new  and 
untilled  regions,  where  the  accumulated  manure  of  centuries 
of  vegetation  has  formed  a  soil,  whose  productiveness  may, 
for  a  while,  sustain  a  system  at  variance  with  the  laws  of 
nature.  Many  of  our  free  and  of  our  slave-holding  States 


LIBERTY  MAY  BE  VIOLATED.  211 

were  peopled  at  about  the  same  time.  The  slave-holding 
States  had  every  advantage,  both  in  soil  and  climate,  over 
their  neighbors.  And  yet  the  accumulation  of  capital  has 
been  greatly  in*  favor  of  the  latter.  If  any  one  doubt 
whether  this  difference  be  owing  to  the  use  of  slave  labor, 
let  him  ask  himself  what  would  have  been  the  condition  of 
the  slave-holding  States,  at  this  moment,  if  they  had  been 
inhabited,  from  the  beginning,  by  an  industrious  yeomanry ; 
each  one  holding  his  own  land,  and  each  one  tilling  it  with 
the  labor  of  his  own  hands. 

But  let  us  inquire  what  is  the  doctrine  of  revelation  on 
this  subject. 

The  moral  precepts  of  the  Bible  are  diametrically 
opposed  to  slavery.  They  are,  Thou  shalt  love  thy 
neighbor  as  thyself,  and  all  things  whatsoever  ye  would 
that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  even  so  unto  them. 

1.  The  application  of  these  precepts  is  universal.     Our 
neighbor  is  every  one  whom  we  may  benefit.     The  obliga- 
tion respects    all  things  whatsoever.     The   precept,  then, 
manifestly,  extends  to  men,  as  men,  or  men  in  every  con- 
dition ;  and  if  to  all  things  whatsoever,  certainly  to  a  thing 
so  important  as  the  rigrit  to  personal  liberty. 

2.  Again.     By  this  precept,  it  is  made  our  duty  to  cherish 
as  tender  and  delicate  a  respect  for  the  right  which  the 
meanest  individual  possesses  over  the  means  of  happiness 
bestowed  upon  him  by  God,  as  we  cherish  for  our  own 
right  over  our  own  means  of  happiness,  or  as  we  desire  any 
other  individual  to  cherish  for  it.     Now,  were  this  precept 
obeyed,  it  is  manifest  that  slavery  could  not  in  fact  exist  for 
a  single  instant.     The  principle  of  the  precept  is  absolutely 
subversive  of  the  principle  of  slavery.     That  of  the  one  is  O 
the  entire  equality  of  right ;  that  of  the  other,  the  entire 
absorption  of  the  rights  of  one  in  the  rights  of  the  other. 

If  any  one  doubt  respecting  the  bearing  of  the  Scripture 
precept  upon  this  case,  a  few  plain  questions  may  throw 
additional  light  upon  the  subject.  For  instance, — 

1.  Do  the  precepts  and  the  spirit  of  the  Gospel  allow 
me  to  derive^  my  support  from  a  system,  which  extorts 
labor  from  my  fellow-men,  without  allowing  them  any  voice 
m  the  eauivalent  which  they  shall  receive ;  and  which  can 


212  MODES    IN   WHICH    PERSONAL 

only  be  sustained  by  keeping  them  in  a  state  of  mental 
degradation,  and  by  shutting  them  out,  in  a  great  degree, 
from  the  means  of  salvation  ? 

2.  Would   the   master  be  willing  that  another  person 
should  subject  him  to  slavery,  for  the  same  reasons,  and  on 
the  same  grounds,  that  he  holds  his  slave  in  bondage  ? 

3.  Would  the  gospel  allow  us,  if  it  were  in  our  power, 
to  reduce  our  fellow-citizens  of  our  own  color  to  slavery  ? 
But  the  gospel  makes  no  distinction  between  men  on  the 
ground  of  color  or  of  race.     God  has  made  of  one  blood  all 
the   nations  that  dwell  on   the  earth.     I  think  that  these 
questions  will  easily  ascertain  the  gospel  principles  on  this 
subject. 

But  to  this  it  is  objected,  that  the  gospel  never  forbids 
slavery  ;  and,  still  more,  that,  by  prescribing  the  duties  of 
masters  and  servants,  it  tacitly  allows  it.  This  objection 
is  of  sufficient  importance  to  deserve  attentive  consid- 
eration. 

The  following  will,  I  think,  be  considered  by  both  par- 
ties a  fair  statement  of  the  teaching  of  the  New  Testament 
on  this  subject.  The  moral  principles  of  the  gospel  are 
directly  subversive  of  the  principles  of  slavery  ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  gospel  neither  commands  masters  to  manumit 
their  slaves,  nor  authorizes  slaves  to  free  themselves  from 
their  masters  ;  and,  also,  it  goes  further,  and  prescribes  the 
duties  suited  to  both  parties  in  their  present  condition. 

First.  Now,  if  this  be  admitted,  it  will,  so  far  as  I  see, 
be  sufficient  for  the  argument.  For  if  the  gospel  be  dia- 
metrically opposed  to  the  principle  of  slavery,  it  must  be 
opposed  to  the  practice  of  slavery  ;  and,  therefore,  were  the 
principles  of  the  gospel  fully  adopted,  slavery  could  not 
exist. 

Secondly.  1.  I  suppose  that  it  will  not  be  denied,  that  God 
has  a  right  to  inform  us  of  his  will  in  any  manner  that  he 
pleases  ;  and  that  the  intimation  of  his  will,  in  what  manner 
soever  signified,  is  binding  upon  the  conscience. 

2.  Hence,  God  may  make  known  to  us  his  will  either 
directly  or  indirectly ;  and  if  that  will  be  only  distinctly  sig- 
nified, it  is  as  binding  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 
Thus,  he  may,  in  express  terms,  forbid  a  certain  course  of 


LIBERTY    MAY   BE    VIOLATED.  £13 

conduct ;  this  is  forbidding  it  directly ;  or  else  he  may 
command  certain  duties,  or  impose  certain  obligations,  with 
which  that  course  of  conduct  is  manifestly  inconsistent; 
this  is  forbidding  it  indirectly.  It  is  sufficient,  in  either 
case,  in  order  to  constitute  the  obligation,  that  the  will  of 
God  be  known. 

3.  The  question,  then,  resolves  itself  into  this  :  Has  God 
imposed  obligations  upon  men  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  existence  of  domestic  slavery  ?     That  he  has,  may,  I 
think,  be  easily  shown. 

a.  He  has  made  it  our  duty  to  proclaim  the  gospel  to 
all  men,  without  respect  to  circurrjstance  or  condition.     If 
it  be  our  duty  to  proclaim  the  gospel  to  every  creature,  it 
must  be  our  duty  to  give  to  every  creature  every  means  for 
attaining  a  knowledge  of  it ;  and,  yet  more  imperatively, 
not  to  place  any  obstacles  in  the  way  of  their  attaining  that 
knowledge. 

b.  He  has  taught  us,  that  the  conjugal  relation  is  estab- 
lished by  himself;  that  husband  and  wife  are  joined  together 
by  God  ;  and  that  man  may  not  put  them  asunder.     The 
marriage  contract  is   a  contract  for  life,  and  is  dissoluble 
only  for  one  cause,  that  of  conjugal  infidelity.     Any  system 
that  interferes  with  this  contract,  and  claims  to  make  it  any 
thing  else  than  what  God  has  made  it,  is  in  violation  ol 
his  law. 

c.  God  has  established  the  parental  and  filial  relations, 
and  has  imposed  upon  parents  and  children  appropriate  and 
peculiar  duties.     The  child  is  bound  to  honor  and  obey 
the  parent ;  the  parent  to  support  and  educate  the  child, 
and  to  bring  him  up  in  the  nurture  and  admonition  of  the 
Lord.     With   these   relations   and  obligations,  no   created 
being   has   a  right  to   interfere.     A  system  which  claims 
authority  to  sever  these  relations,  and  to  annihilate  these 
obligations,  must  be  at  variance  with  the  will  of  God. 

4.  That  the  Christian  religion  does  establish  these  rela- 
tions, and  impose  these  obligations,  will  not,  I  think,  be 
disputed.     Now,  they  either  are,  or  are  not,  inconsistent 
with  the  existence  of  domestic  slavery.     If  they  are  incon- 
sistent with  the  existence  of  slavery,  then  slavery  is  indi- 
rectly forbidden  by  the  Christian  religion.     If  they  are  not 


214  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

inconsistent  with  it,  then,  that  interference  with  them, 
which  slavery  exercises,  is  as  uncalled  for  as  it  would  be 
in  any  other  case ;  and  is  the  infliction  of  just  so  much 
gratuitous,  inexcusable,  and  demoralizing  misery.  And,  as 
we  have  before  said,  what  is  indirectly  forbidden  in  the 
I  Scripture,  is  as  truly  forbidden  as  though  it  were  directly 
forbidden. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  Why  was  this  manner  of  forbidding 
it  chosen  in  preference  to  any  other?  I  reply  that  this 
question  we  are  not  obliged  to  answer.  It  is  enough  for  us 
*•*  to  show  that  it  is  forbidden.  It  is  this  which  establishes 
the  obligation,  and  this  obligation  cannot  be  in  the  least 
affected  by  the  reason  which  may  be  given,  for  the 
manner  in  which  God  has  seen  fit  to  reveal  it. 

The  reason  may  be,  that  slavery  is  a  social  evil ;  and 
that,  in  order  to  eradicate  it,  a  change  must  be  effected  in 
the  society  in  which  it  exists,  and  that  this  change  would 
De  better  effected  by  the  inculcation  of  the  principles  them- 
selves which  are  opposed  to  slavery,  than  by  the  inculca- 
tion of  a  direct  precept.  Probably  all  social  evils  are  thus 
most  successfully  remedied. 

We  answer,  again,  this  very  course  which  the  gospel  takes 
on  this  subject,  seems  to  have  been  the  only  one  that  could 
have^  been  taken,  in  order  to  effect  the  universal  abolition  of 
slavery.  The  gospel  was  designed,  not.  for  one  race,  or  for 
o  one  time,  but  for  all  ravces,  and  for  all  times.  It  looked 
not  at  the  abolition  of  this  form  of  evil  for. that  age  alone, 
but  for  its  universal  abolition.  Hence/  the  important 
object  of  its  Author  was,  to  gain  it  a  lodgment  in  every  part 
of  the  known  world ;  so  that,  by  its  universal  diffusion 
among  all  classes  of  society,  it  might  quietly  and  peacefully 
modify  and  subdue  the  evil  passions  of  men ;  and  thus, 
without  violence,  work  a  revolution  in  the  whole  mass  of 
mankind.  In  this  manner  alone  could  its  object,  a  univer- 
sal moral  revolution,  have  been  accomplished.  For,  if  it  had 
forbidden  the  evil,  instead  of  subverting  the  principle ;  if  it 
had  proclaimed  the  unlawfulness  of  slavery,  and  taught 
slaves  to  resist  the  oppression  of  their  masters ;  it  would 
instantly  have  arrayed  the  two  parties  in  deadly  hostility, 
throughout  the  civilized  world:  its  announcement  would 


LIBERTY   MAY   BE    VIOLATED.  215 

have  been  the  signal  of  servile  war;  and  the  very  name  of 
the  Christian  religion  would  have  been  forgotten  amidst  the 
agitations  of  universal  bloodshed.  The  fact,  under  these 
circumstances,  that  the  gospel  does  not  forbid  slavery,  af- 
fords no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  does  not  mean  to  pro- 
hibit it ;  much  less  does  it  afford  ground  for  belief,  that 
Jesus  Christ  intended  to  authorize  it. 

3.  It  is  important  to  remember  that  two  grounds  of  moral 
obligation  arew  distinctly  recognized  in  the  gospel.  The 
first  is  our  duty  to  man,  as  man ;  that  is,  on  the  ground  of 
the  relation  which  men  sustain  to  each  other :  the  second 
is  our  duty  to  man,  as  a  creature  of  God ;  that  is,  on  the 
ground  of  the  relation  which  we  all  sustain  to  God.  On 
this  latter  ground,  many  things  become  our  duty  which 
would  not  be  so  on  the  former.  It  is  on  this  ground,  that 
we  are  commanded  to  return  good  for  evil,  to  pray  for  them 
that  despitefully  use  us,  and  when  we  are  smitten  on  one 
cheek,  to  turn  also  the  other.  To  act  thus  is  our  duty, 
not  because  our  fellow-man  has  a  right  to  claim  this  course 
of  conduct  of  us,  nor  because  he  has  a  right  to  inflict  injury 
upon  us,  but  because  such  conduct  in  us  will  be  well  pleasing 
to  God.  And  when  God  prescribes  the  course  of  conduct 
which  will  be  well  pleasing  to  him,  he  by  no  means  ac- 
knowledges the  right  of  abuse  in  the  injurious  person,  but 
expressly  declares,  Vengeance  is  mine,  and  I  will  repay  it, 
saith  the  Lord.  Now,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  it  is  precise- 
ly upon  this  latter  ground,  that  the  slave  is  commanded  to 
obey  his  master.  It  is  never  urged,  like  the  duty  of  obe- 
dience to  parents,  because  it  is  right ;  but  because  the  cul- 
tivation of  meekness  and  forbearance  under  injury,  will  be 
well  pleasing  unto  God.  Thus,  servants  are  commanded 
to  be  obedient  to  their  own  masters,  "  in  singleness  of 
heart,  as  unto  Christ ;"  "  doing  the  will  of  God  from  the 
heart,  with  good  will  doing  service  as  to  the  Lord,  and  not 
to  men."  Eph.  vi,  5 — 7.  "  Servants  are  commanded  to 
count  their  masters  worthy  of  all  honor,  that  the  name  of 
God  and  his  doctrine  be  not  blasphemed."  1  Tim.  vi,  1. 
"Exhort  servants  to  be  obedient  to  their  own  masters," 
&tc.,  "  that  they  may  adorn  the  doctrine  of  God  our  Savior 
in  all  things"  Titus  iii,  9.  The  manner  in  which  the 


216  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

duty  of  servants  or  slaves  is  inculcated,  therefore,  affords 
no  ground  for  the  assertion,  that  the  gospel  authorizes  one 
man  to  hold  another  in  bondage,  any  more  than  the  com- 
mand to  honor  the  king,  when  that  king  was  Nero,  author- 
ized the  tyranny  of  the  emperor  ;  or  than  the  command  to 
turn  the  other  cheek,  when  one  is  smitten,  justifies  the 
infliction  of  violence  by  an  injurious  man.* 

In  a  word,  if  the  gospel  rule  of  conduct  be  directly  at 
variance  with  the  existence  of  slavery ;  if  the  relations 
which  it  establishes,  and  the  obligations  which  it  enforces, 
are  inconsistent  with  its  existence ;  if  the  manner  in  which 
it  treats  it,  is  the  only  manner  in  which  it  could  attempt  its 
utter  and  universal  extermination ;  and  if  it  inculcates  the 
duty  of  slaves  on  principles  which  have  no  connection  with 
the  question  of  the  right  of  masters  over  them ;  I  think  it 
must  be  conceded  that  the  precepts  of  the  gospel  in  no 
manner  countenance,  but  are  entirely  opposed  to,  the  in- 
stitution of  domestic  slavery. 

Before  closing  this  part  of  the  subject,  it  may  be  proper 
to  consider  the  question,  What  is  the  duty  of  masters  and 
slaves,  under  a  condition  of  society  in  which  slavery  now7 
exists  ? 

I.  As  to  masters. 

If  the  system  be  wrong,  as  we  have  endeavored  to  show, 
if  it  be  at  variance  with  our  duty  both  to  God  and  to  man, 
it  must  be  abandoned.  If  it  be  asked,  When  ?  I  ask  again, 
When  shall  a  man  begin  to  cease  doing  wrong  ?  Is  not  the 
answer  always,  Immediately  1  If  a  man  is  injuring  us,  do 
we  ever  doubt  as  to  the  time  when  he  ought  to  cease? 
There  is  then  no  doubt  in  respect  to  the  time  when  we 
ought  to  cease  inflicting  injury  upon  others. 

But  it  may  be  said,  immediate  abolition  would  be  the 
greatest  possible  injury  to  the  slaves  themselves.  They  are 
not  competent  to  self-government. 

This  is  a  question  of  fact,  which  it  is  not  within  the  prov- 
ince of  moral  philosophy  to  decide.  It  very  likely  may  be 

*  I  have  retained  the  above  paragraph,  though  I  confess  that  the  re- 
marks of  Professor  Taylor,  of  the  Union  Theological  Seminary  of  Vir- 
ginia, have  led  me  seriously  to  doubt  whether  the  distinction  to  which 
it  alludes  is  sustained  by  the  New  Testament. 


LIBERTY    MAY   BE    VIOLATED.  217 

so.  So  far  as  I  know,  the  facts  are  not  sufficiently  known 
to  warrant  a  full  opinion  on  the  subject.  We  will,  there- 
fore, suppose  it  to  be  the  case,  and  ask,  What  is  the  duty 
of  masters  under  these  circumstances  1 

1.  The  situation  of  the  slaves,  in  which  this  obstacle  to 
their  emancipation  consists,  is  not  by  their  own  act.,  but  by 
the    act  of  their  masters ;  and,  therefore,  the  masters   are 
bound  to  remove  it.     The  slaves  were  brought  here  with- 
out their  own  consent,  they  have  been  continued   in  their 
present  state  of  degradation  without  their  own  consent,  and 
they  are  not  responsible  for  the  consequences.     If  a  man 
have  done  injustice  to  his  neighbor,  and  have  also  placed 
impediments  in  the  way  of  remedying   that  injustice,  he  is 
as  much  under  obligation  to  remove  the  impediments  in  the 
way  of  justice,  as  he  is  to  do  justice.     Were  it  otherwise, 
a  man  might,  by  the  accumulation  of  injury,  at  last  render 
the  most  atrocious  injury  innocent  and  right. 

2.  But  it  may  be  said,  this  cannot  be  done,  unless  the 
slave  is  held  in  bondage  until  the  object  be  accomplished. 
This  is  also  a  question  of  fact,  on  which  I  will  not  pretend 
to  decide.     But  suppose  it  to  be  so,  the   question  returns, 
What  then  is  the  duty  of  the  master  ?     I  answer,  supposing 
such  to  be  the  fact,  it  may  be  the  duty  of  the  master  to  hold 
the  slave  ;  not,  however,  on  the  ground  of  right  over  him, 
but  of  obligation  to  him,  and  of  obligation  to  him   for  the 
purpose  of  accomplishing  a  particular  and  specified  good. 
And,  of  course,  he  who  holds  him  for  any  other  purpose,  holds 
him  wrongfully,  and  is  guilty  of  the  sin  of  slavery.     In  the 
mean  while,  he  is  innocent  in  just  so  far  as  he,  in  the  fear  ol 
God,  holds  the  slave,  not  for  the  good  of  the  master,  but  for 
the  good  of  the  slave,  and  with  the  entire  and  honest  intention 
of  accomplishing  the  object  as  soon  as  he  can,  and  of  libera- 
ting the  slave  as  soon  as  the  object  is  accomplished.     He 
thus  admits  the  slave  to  equality  of  right.     He  does  unto 
another  as  he  would  that  another  should  do  unto  him ;  and, 
thus  acting,  though  he  may  inform  hold  a  fellow-creature 
m  bondage,  he  is  in  fact  innocent  of  the  crime  of  violation 
of  liberty.     This  opinion,  however,  proceeds  upon  the  sup- 
position that  the  facts  are  as  above   stated.     As   to   the 
question  of  fact,  I  do  not  feel  competent  to  a  decision. 

19 


218  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

IT.  The  duty  of  slaves  is  also  explicitly  made  known  in 
the  Bible.  They  are  bound  to  obedience,  fidelity,  sub- 
mission, and  respect  to  their  masters,  not  only  to  the  good 
and  kind,  but  also  to  the  unkind  and  froward ;  not,  how- 
ever, on  the  ground  of  duty  to  man,  but  on  the  ground  of 
duty  to  God.  This  obligation  extends  to  every  thing  but 
matters  of  conscience^  When  a  master  commands  a  slave 
to  do  wrong,  the  slave  ought  not  to  obey.  The  Bible 
does  not,  as  I  suppose,  authorize  resistance  to  injury  ;  but  it 
commands  us  to  refuse  obedience  in  such  a  case,  and  suffer 
the  consequences,  looking  to  God  alone,  to  whom  ven- 
geance belongeth.  Acting  upon  these  principles,  the  slave 
may  attain  to  the  highest  grade  of  virtue,  and  may  exhibit 
a  sublimity  and  purity  of  moral  character,  which,  in  the 
condition  of  the  master,  is  absolutely  unattainable. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  Christian  religion  not  only  forbids 
slavery,  but  that  it  also  provides  the  only  method  in  which, 
after  it  has  once  been  established,  it  may  be  abolished,  and 
that  with  entire  safety  and  benefit  to  both  parties.  By  in- 
stilling the  right  moral  dispositions  into  the  bosom  of  the 
master  and  of  the  slave,  it  teaches  the  one  the  duty  of  re- 
ciprocity, and  the  other  the  duty  of  submission  ;  and  thus, 
without  tumult,  without  disorder,  without  revenge,  but,  by 
the  real  mo^al  improvement  of  both  parties,  restores  b/>th  to 
the  relation  towards  each  other  intended  by  their  Creator. 

Hence,  if  any  one  will  reflect  on  these  facts,  and  remem- 
ber the  moral  law  of  the  Creator,  and  the  terrible  sanctions 
by  which  his  laws  are  sustained,  and  also  the  provision 
which  in  the  gospel  of  reconciliation,  He  has  made  for  re- 
moving this  evil  after  it  has  once  been  established  ;  he  must, 
I  think,  be  convinced  of  the  imperative  obligation  which 
rests  upon  him  to  remove  it  without  thq  delay  of  a  moment. 
The  Judge  of  the  whole  earth  will  do  justice.  He  hears 
the  cry  of  the  oppressed,  and  he  will,  in  the  end,  terribly 
vindicate  right.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  let  those  who 
suffer  wrongfully,  bear  their  sufferings  with  patience,  com- 
mitting their  souls  unto  him  as  unto  a  faithful  Creator. 

PART  II.  The  right  of  personal  liberty  may  be  violated 
by  SOCIETY. 

As  the  right  to  use  the  means  of  happiness  which  God 


LIBERTY    MAY    BE    VIOLATED.  219 

nas  given  him  in  such  manner  as  he  will,  provided  he  do 
not  violate  the  corresponding  rights  of  others,  is  conferred 
upon  the  individual  by  his  Creator,  it  is  manifest  that  no 
being  but  the  Creator  can  rightly  restrict  it.  The  individual 
is  just  as  truly,  in  this  sense,  independent  of  society,  as  he 
is  of  individuals.  Society  is  composed  of  individuals,  and 
can  have  no  other,  rights  than  the  individuals  of  which  it  is 
composed,  only  in  just  so  far  as  the  individual  voluntarily, 
and  for  an  equivalent,  has  conceded  to  it,  in  given  and  lim- 
ited respects,  some  of  the  rights  of  which  he  was  originally 
possessed.  Whenever  society  interferes  with  these  original 
rights,  unless  in  the  cases  in  which  they  have  been  volun- 
tarily ceded,  then  the  right  of  personal  liberty  is  violated. 
Thus,  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  above  quoted,  after 
having  asserted  the  universality  of  the  equality  of  nien, 
by  virtue  of  their  creation,  and  that  they  are  endowed  by 
their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable  rights,  among  which 
are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  proceeds  to 
state,  "  that,  to  secure  these  rights,  governments  were  insti- 
tuted among  men,  deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  con- 
sent of  the  governed ;"  (that  is,  by  the  concession  of  the 
individual  to  society  ;)  "  that,  when  any  form  of  government 
becomes  destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the  right  of  the  people 
to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  a  new  government, 
laying  its  foundation  in  such  principles,  and  organizing  its 
powers  in  such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to 
effect  their  safety  and  happiness." 

SOCIETY  may  violate  the  personal  rights  of  the  individual. 

1.  By  depriving  him  unjustly  of  his  physical  liberty,  or 
any  of  his  means  of  physical  happiness.     This  is  done,  first, 
whenever  any  individual  is  imprisoned  or  punished,  except 
for  crime. 

2.  Whenever,   although  he   may  have  been   guilty  of 
crime,  he  is  imprisoned  or  punished  without  a  fair  and  im- 
partial trial ;  for,  as  every  man  is  presumed  to  be  innocent 
until  he  shall  have  been  proved  to  be  guilty,  to  imprison  or 
molest  him  without  such  proof  is  to  imprison  or  molest  him 
while  he  is  innocent.     This   remark,  however,   does   not 
apply  to  the  detention  of  prisoners  in  order  to  trial.     The 
detention  in  this  case  is  not  for  the  purposes  of  punishment, 


220  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

but  simply  to  prevent  escape,  and  as  a  necessary  means  for 
the  execution  of  justice.  It  is  also  no  injustice  ;  for  it  is  a 
power  over  their  persons  which  the  individuals  have,  for 
mutual  good,  conceded  to  society. 

3.  Inasmuch  as  every  individual  has  the  right  to  go  where 
he  pleases,  under  the  limitations  above  specified,  this  right 
is  violated,  not  merely  by  confining  him  to  a  particular 
place,  but  also  by  forbidding  his  going  to  any  particular 
place  within  the  limits  of  the  society  to  which  he  belongs, 
or  by  forbidding  him  to  leave  it  when  and  how  he  pleases. 
As  his  connection  with  the  society  to  which  he  belongs  is  a 
voluntary  act,  his  simple  will  is  an  ultimate  reason  why  he 
should  leave  it ;  and  the  free  exercise  of  this  will  cannot, 
without  injustice,  be  restrained. 

The  great  clause  in  the  Magna  Charta  on  this  general 
subject,  is  in  these  memorable  words :  "  Let  no  freeman 
be  imprisoned,  or  disseized,  or  outlawed,  or  in  any  manner 
injured  or  proceeded  against  by  us,  otherwise  than  by  the 
legal  judgment  of  his  peers,  or  by  the  law  of  the  land." 
And  the  full  enjoyment  of  this  right  is  guaranteed  to  every 
individual  in  this  country  and  in  Great  Britain,  by  the 
celebrated  act  of  Habeas  Corpus :  by  which,  upon  a 
proper  presentation  of  the  case  before  a  judge,  the  judge  is 
under  obligation,  if  there  be  cause,  to  command  the  person 
who  has  the  custody  of  another,  to  bring  him  immediately 
before  him  ;  and  is  also  obliged  to  set  the  prisoner  at  large, 
unless  it  appear  to  him  that  he  is  deprived  of  his  liberty  for 
a  satisfactory  reason. 

2.  Society  may  violate  the  rights  of  the  individual  by 
restraining  his  intellectual  liberty. 

I  have  before  stated  that  a  man  has  the  right  to  the  use 
of  his  intellect  in  such  manner  as  he  pleases,  provided  he 
interfere  not  with  the  rights  of  others.  This  includes,  first, 
the  right  to  pursue  what  studies  he  pleases  ;  and,  secondly, 
to  publish  them  when  and  where  he  pleases,  subject  to  the 
above  limitation. 

1.  This  right  is  violated,  first,  when  society,  or  govern- 
ment, which  is  its  agent,  prohibits  any  course  of  study  or 
investigation  to  which  the  inclination  of  the  individual  may 
determine  him. 


LIBERTY   MAY   BE    VIOLATED.  221 

2.  When  government  prohibits  him  from  publishing  these 
results,  and  from  attempting,  by  the  use  of  argument,  to 
make  as  many  converts  to  his  opinions  as  he  can,  in  both 
cases  within  the  limits  specified.  If  it  be  said,  that  men 
may  thus  be  led  into  error,  the  answer  is,  For  this  error  the 
individuals  themselves,  and  not  their  neighbor,  are  respon- 
sible ;  and,  therefore,  the  latter  has  no  authority  to  interfere. 

These  remarks  apply  to  those  cases  only,  in  which  the 
use  of  the  individual's  intellect  is  without  injury  to  the 
rights  of  others.  They,  however,  by  the  terms  of  the 
case,  exclude  those  modes  of  intellectual  employment, 
which  do  thus  interfere.  It  is  obvious,  that  a  man  has 
no  more  right  to  restrict,  by  the  use  of  his  intellect,  my 
just  control  over  the  means  of  happiness  bestowed  upon 
me,  than  by  the  use  of  his  body,  or  the  use  of  his  property. 
What  I  have  said,  therefore,  in  no  manner  precludes  the 
right  of  society  to  restrict  the  use  of  the  individual's  intel- 
lect, in  those  cases  where  this  violation  exists. 

But  when  this  violation  is  supposed  to  exist,  by  what 
rule  is  society  to  be  governed,  so  as,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  restraint,  to  avoid  infringement  of  the  law  of  intel- 
lectual liberty  ?  I  am  aware  that  the  decision  of  this  ques- 
tion is  attended  with  great  difficulties.  I  shall,  however, 
endeavor  to  suggest  such  hints  as  seem  to  me  to  throw 
light  upon  it,  in  the  hope  that  the  attention  of  some  one 
better  able  to  elucidate  it,  may  be  thus  more  particularly 
attracted  to  the  discussion. 

1.  Society  is  bound  to  protect  those  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual which   he  has   committed   to   its  charge.     Among 
these,  for  instance,  is  reputation.     As  the  individual  relin- 
quishes the  right  of  protecting  his  own  reputation,  as  well 
as  his  property,  society  undertakes  to  protect  it  for  him. 

2.  Society  has  the  right  to  prevent  its  own  destruction. 
As,  without  society,  individual  man  would,  almost  univer- 
sally, perish ;  so  men,  by  the  law  of  self-preservation,  have 
a  right  to  prohibit  those  modes  of  using  a  man's  mind,  as 
well  as  those  of  using  his  body,  by  which  society  would  be 
annihilated. 

3.  As  society  has  the  right  to  employ  its  power  to  pre- 
vent its  own  dissolution,  it  also  has  the  same  right  to  pro- 

19* 


222  MODES    IN    WHICH    PERSONAL 

tect  itself  from  causeless  injury.  A  man  has  no  more  right 
to  carry  on  a  trade  by  which  his  neighbor  is  annoyed,  than 
one  by  which  he  is  poisoned.  S_>,  if  the  employment  of  a 
man's  intellect  be  not  of  such  a  character  as  to  be  positively 
fatal,  yet,  if  it  be  positively  mischievous,  and  if  such  be 
its  manifest  tendency,  society  has  a  right  to  interfere  and 
prohibit  it. 

4.  It  is,  however,  a  general  principle,  that  society  is 
not  to  interfere,  while  the  individual  has  in  himself  the 
means  of  repelling,  or  of  rendering  nugatory,  the  injury. 
Whenever,  therefore,  although  the  publication  of  opinions 
be  confessedly  injurious,  the  injury  is  of  such  a  nature, 
that  every  individual  can  protect  himself  from  it,  society 
leaves  the  individual  to  the  use  of  that  power  which  he 
still  retains,  and  which  is  sufficient  to  remedy  the  evil. 

If  I  mistake  not,  these  principles  will  enable  us  to  dis- 
tinguish between  those  cases  in  which  it  is,  and  those  in 
which  it  is  not,  the  duty  of  society  to  interfere  with  the 
freedom  of  the  human  intellect. 

1.  Whenever  the  individual  possesses  within  himself  the 
means  of  repelling  the  injury,  society  should  not  interfere. 
As,  for  instance,  so  far  as  an  assertion  is  false,  and  false 
simply,  as  in  philosophical  or  mathematical  error,  men  have, 
in  their  own  understandings  and  their  instinctive  perception 
of  truth,  a  safeguard    against   injury.     And,  besides    this, 
when  discussion  is  free,  error  may  be  refuted  by  argument ; 
and  in  this  contest,  truth  has  always,  from  the  constitution 
of  things,  the  advantage.     It  needs  not,  therefore,  physical 
force  to  assist  it.     The  confutation  of  error  is  also  decisive. 
It  reduces  it  absolutely  to  nothing.     Whereas  the  forcible 
prohibition  of  discussion  leaves   things    precisely  as    they 
were,  and  gives  to  error  the  additional  advantage  of  the 
presumption,  that  it  could  not  be  answered  by  argument ; 
that  is,  that  it  is  the  truth. 

2.  But,  suppose  the  matter  made  public  is  also  injurious, 
and  is  either  false,  or,  if  true,  is  of  such  a  nature  as  directly 
to  tend  to  the  destruction  of.  individual  or  social  happiness, 
and  the  individual  has  not  in  himself  the  power  of  repelling 
the  injury.     Here,  the  facts  being  proved,  society  is  bound 
to  interfere,  and   impose   such  penalty,  and   render   such 


LIBERTY   MAY   BE    VIOLATED.  223 

redress,  as  shall,  if  possible,  remunerate  the  injured  party ; 
or,  at  least,  prevent  the  repetition  of  the  offence. 
Under  this  head,  several  cases  occur : 

1 .  If  a  man  use  his  intellect  for  the  purpose  of  destroy- 
ing his  neighbor's  reputation,  it  is  the  duty  of  society  to 
interfere.     There  is  here  a  manifest   injury,  inasmuch  as 
reputation  is  a  means  of  happiness,  and  as  much  the  prop- 
erty of  an  individual,  as  his  house  or  lands,  or  any  other 
result  of  his  industry.     He   has,  besides,  no  method  of 
redress  within  himself;  for  he  may  be  ruined  by  a  general 
assertion,  which  is  in  its  nature  incapable  of  being  disproved. 
As  if  A  asserted  that  B  had  stolen ;  this,  if  believed,  would 
ruin  B  ;  but  he  could  not  disprove  it,  unless  he  could  sum- 
mon all  the  men  with  whom,  in  his  whole  life,  he  had 
ever  had  any  pecuniary  transactions.     Besides,  if  he  could 
do  this,  he  could  never  convey  the  facts  to  all  persons  to 
whom  A  had  conveyed  the  scandal.     Were  such  actions 
allowed,  every  one  might  be  deprived  of  his  reputation, 
one  of  his  most  valuable  means  of  happiness.     It  is  the 
duty  of  society,  therefore,  in  this  case,  to  guard  the  rights 
of  the  individual,  by  granting  him  redress,  and  preventing 
the  repetition  of  the  injury. 

2.  Inasmuch  as  men  are  actuated  by  various  passions, 
which  are  only  useful  when  indulged  within   certain  re- 
straints, but  which,  when  indulged  without  these  restraints, 
are  destructive  of  individual  right,  as  well  as  of  society 
itself ;  society  has  a  right  to  prohibit  the  use  of  intellect  for 
the  purpose  of  exciting  the  passions  of  men  beyond  those 
limits.     As  he  is   guilty  who  robs  another,  so  is  he  also 
guilty  who  incites  another  to  robbery ;  and  still  more,  he  who 
incites,  not  one  man,  but  a  multitude  of  men,  to  robbery. 
Hence,  society  has  a  right  to  prohibit  obscene  books,  ob- 
scene pictures,  and  every  thin^  of  which  the  object  and 
tendency   is   to    promote    lasciviousness.      On   the   same 
ground,  it  has  a  right  to  prohibit  incendiary  and  seditious 
publications,  and  every  thing  which  would  provoke  the 
enmity  or  malice  of  men  against  each  other. 

The  reason  of  this  is,  first,  injury  of  this  kind  cannot  be 
repelled  by  argument,  for  it  is  not  addressed  to  the  reason ; 
and  the  very  mention  of  the  subject  excites  those  imagina- 


224  MODES    IN   WHICH    PERSONAL 

tions,  from  which  the  injury  to  society  arises.  As  the  evil 
is  susceptible  of  no  other  remedy  than  prohibition,  and  as 
the  welfare  of  society  requires  that  a  remedy  be  found, 
prohibition  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  society. 

Another  ^eason,  applicable  to  most  publications  of  this 
sort,  is  found  in  the  nature  of  the  parental  relation.  The 
parent,  being  the  guardian  of  his  child's  morals,  has  the 
right  of  directing  what  he  shall  and  what  he  shall  not  read. 
Hence,  all  the  parents  of  a  community,  that  is,  society  at 
large,  have  a  right  to  forbid  such  books  as  shall,  in  their 
opinion,  injure  the  moral  character  of  their  children. 

3.  Again.  Society  may  be  dissolved;  not  merely  by  the 
excitation  of  unlawful  passion,  but  by  the  removal  of  moral 
restraint.  Every  one  must  see  that,  if  moral  distinctions 
were  abolished,  society  could  not  exist  for  a  moment.  Men 
might  be  gregarious,  but  they  would  cease  to  be  social. 
If  any  one,  therefore,  is  disposed  to  use  his  intellect  for 
the  purpose  of  destroying,  in  the  minds  of  men,  the  dis- 
tinction between  virtue  and  vice,  or  any  of  those  funda- 
mental principles  on  which  the  existence  of  society  depends, 
society  has  a  right  to  interfere  and  prohibit  him. 

This  right  of  society  is  founded,  first,  upon  the  right  of 
self-preservation  ;  and,  secondly,  upon  the  ground  of  com- 
mon sense.  Society  is  not  bound  to  make,  over  and  over 
again,  an  experiment  which  the  whole  history  of  man  has 
proved  always  to  end  in  licentiousness,  anarchy,  misery, 
and  universal  bloodshed.  Nor  can  any  man  claim  a  right 
to  use  his  mind  in  a  way  which  must,  if  allowed,  produce 
unmixed  misery  and  violation  of  right,  wherever  its  influence 
is  exerted. 

Besides,  in  this,  as  in  the  other  cases  specified,  society 
has  no  means  of  counteracting  the  injury  by  argument ; 
because  such  appeals  are  made,  not  to  the  reason  and  the 
conscience,  but  to  the  rapacious  'passions  of  men  ;  and, 
also,  because  those  persons  who  would  listen  to  such  sug- 
gestions, would  rarely,  if  ever,  be  disposed  to  read,  much 
less  to  examine  and  reflect  upon,  any  argument  that  could 
be  offered. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that  a  society  constituted  on 
these  principles,  might  check  the  progress  of  free  inquiry, 


LIBERTY   MAY   BE   VIOLATED.  225 

and,  under  the  pretext  of  injurious  tendency,  limit  the 
liberty  of  fair  discussion. 

To  this  it  may  be  answered, — 

It  is  no  objection  to  a  rule,  that  it  is  capable  of  abuse  ; 
for  this  objection  will  apply  to  all  laws  and  to  all  arrange- 
ments that  man  has  ever  devised.  In  the  present  imper- 
fect condition  of  human  nature,  it  is  frequently  sufficient 
that  a  rule  prevents  greater  evil  than  it  inflicts. 

It  is  granted  that  men  may  suppose  a  discussion  injuri- 
ous when  it  is  not  so,  and  may  thus  limit,  unnecessarily,  the 
freedom  of  inquiry.  But  let  us  see  in  what  manner  this 
abuse  is  guarded  against. 

The  security,  in  this  case,  is  the  trial  by  jury.  When 
twelve  men,  taken  by  lot  from  the  whole  community,  sit  in 
judgment,  and  specially  when  the  accused  has  the  right 
of  excepting,  for  cause,  to  as  many  as  he  will,  he  is  sure 
of  having,  at  least,  an  impartial  tribunal.  These  judges 
are  themselves  under  the  same  law  which  they  administer 
to  others.  As  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  they  would 
wish  to  abridge  their  own  personal  liberty,  it  is  not  to  be 
supposed  that  they  would  be  willing  to  abridge  it  for  the 
sake  of  interfering  with  that  of  their  neighbor.  The 
question  is,  therefore,  placed  in  the  hands  of  as  impartial 
judges  as  the  nature  of  the  case  allows.  To  such  a  tri- 
bunal, no  reasonable  man  can,  on  principle,  object.  To 
their  decision,  every  candid  man  would,  when  his  duty  to 
God  did  not  forbid,  readily  submit. 

Now,  as  it  must  be  granted  that  no  man  has  a  right  to 
use  his  intellect  to  the  injury  of  a  community,  the  only 
question  in  any  particular  case,  is,  whether  the  use  com- 
plained of  is  injurious,  and  injurious  in  such  a  sense  as  to 
require  the  interference  of  society.  It  surely  does  not 
need  argument  to  show  that  the  unanimous  decision  of 
twelve  men  is  more  likely  to  be  correct  than  the  decision 
of  one  man ;  and  specially  that  the  decision  of  twelve  men, 
who  have  no  personal  interest  in  the  affair,  is  more  likely  to 
be  correct,  than  that  of  one  man  who  is  liable  to  all  the 
influences  of  personal  vanity,  love  of  distinction,  and  pecu- 
niary emolument.  There  surely  can  be  no  question 
whether,  in  a  matter  on  which  the  dearest  interests  of 


226  MODES    IN   WHICH   PERSONAL 

others  are  concerned,  a  man  is  to  be  a  judge  in  his  own 
case,  or  whether  as  impartial  a  tribunal  as  the  ingenuity  of 
man  has  ever  devised,  shall  judge  for  him.  If  it  be  said 
that  twelve  impartial  men  are  liable  to  error,  and  by  con- 
sequence to  do  injustice,  it  may  be  answered,  How  much 
more  liable  is  one,  and  he  a  partial  man,  to  err  and  to  do 
injustice !  If,  then,  a  system  of  trial  of  this  sort,  not  only 
must  prevent  more  injury  than  it  inflicts,  but  is  free  from 
all  liability  to  injury,  except  such  as  results  from  the  ac- 
knowledged imperfections  of  our  nature,  the  fault,  if  it 
exist,  is  not  in  the  rule,  but  in  the  nature  of  man,  and 
must  be  endured  until  the  nature  of  man  be  altered. 

And  I  cannot  close  this  discussion  without  remarking, 
that  a  most  solemn  and  imperative  duty  seems  to  me  to 
rest  upon  judges,  legislators,  jurors  and  prosecuting  officers, 
in  regard  to  this  subject.  We  hear,  at  the  present  day, 
very  much  about  the  liberty  of  the  press,  the  freedom  of 
inquiry,  and  the  freedom  of  the  human  intellect.  All  these 
are  precious  blessings — by  far  too  precious  to  be  lost.  But 
"t  is  to  be  remembered,  that  no  liberty  can  exist  without 
restraint ;  and  the  remark  is  as  true  of  intellectual  as  of 
physical  liberty.  As  there  could  be  no  physical  liberty,  if 
every  one,  both  bad  and  good,  did  what  he  would,  so  there 
would  soon  be  no  liberty,  either  physical  or  intellectual,  if 
every  man  were  allowed  to  publish  what  he  would.  The  man 
who  publishes  what  will  inflame  the  licentious  passions,  or 
subvert  the  moral  principles  of  others,  is  undermining  the 
foundations  of  the  social  fabric ;  and  it  is  kindness  neither 
to  him  nor  to  society,  quietly  to  look  on  until  both  he  and 
we  are  crushed  beneath  the  ruins.  The  danger  to  liberty 
is  preeminently  greater,  at  the  present  day,  from  the  licen- 
tiousness than  from  the  restriction  of  the  press.  It  there- 
fore becomes  all  civil  and  judicial  officers  to  act  as  the 
guardians  of  society ;  and,  unawed  by  popular  clamor,  and 
unseduced  by  popular  favor,  resolutely  to  defend  the  people 
against  their  worst  enemies.  Whatever  may  be  the  form 
of  a  government,  it  cannot  long  continue  free,  after  it  has 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  distinction  between  the  liberty 
and  the  licentiousness  of  the  press.  And,  much  as  we 
may  execrate  a  profligate  writer,  let  us  remember  that  the 


LIBERTY  MAY  BE  VIOLATED.          227 

civil  officer  who,  from  pusillanimity,  refuses  to  exercise  the 
power  placed  in  his  hands  to  restrain  abuse,  deserves,  at 
least,  an  equal  share  of  our  execration. 

THIRDLY.  The  right  of  religious  liberty  may  be  vio- 
lated by  society. 

We  have  before  said,  that  every  individual  has  the  right 
to  pursue  his  own  happiness,  by  worshipping  his  Creator  in 
any  way  that  he  pleases,  provided  he  do  not  interfere  with 
the  rights  of  his  neighbor. 

This  includes  the  following  things  :  He  is  at  liberty  to 
worship  God  in  any  form  that  he  deems  most  acceptable 
to  Him,  to  worship  individually  or  socially,  and  to  promote 
that  form  of  worship  which  he  considers  acceptable  to 
God,  by  the  promulgation  of  such  sentiments  as  he  be- 
lieves to  be  true,  provided  he  leave  the  rights  of  his 
neighbors  unmolested  ;  and  of  this  liberty  he  is  not  to  be 
restricted,  unless  such  molestation  be  made  manifest  to  a 
jury  of  his  peers. 

As  a  man  is  at  liberty  to  worship  God  individually  or  in 
societies  collected  for  that  purpose,  if  his  object  can  be 
secured,  in  his  own  opinion,  by  the  enjoyment  of  any  of 
the  facilities  for  association  granted  to  other  men  for  inno- 
cent purposes,  he  is  entitled  to  them  just  as  other  men  are. 
The  general  principle  applicable  to  the  case,  I  suppose  to 
be  this :  A  man,  in  consequence  of  being  religious,  that  is, 
of  worshipping  God,  acquires  no  human  right  whatever  ; 
for  it  is,  so  far  as  his  fellow-men's  rights  are  concerned, 
the  same  thing,  whether  he  worship  God  or  not.  And,  on 
the  other  hand,  in  consequence  of  being  religious,  he  loses 
no  right,  and  for  the  same  reason.  And,  therefore,  as  men 
are  entitled  to  all  innocent  facilities  which  they  need  for 
prosecuting  an  innocent  object,  a  religious  man  has  the 
same  right  to  these  facilities  for  promoting  his  object ;  and 
it  is  the  business  of  no  one  to  inquire  whether  this  be  reli- 
gious, scientific,  mechanical,  or  any  other,  so  long  as  it  is 
merely  innocent. 

Now  this  right  is  violated  by  society, — 

1.  By  forbidding  the  exercise  of  all  religion;  as  in  the 
case  of  the  French  Revolution. 

2.  By  forbidding  or  enforcing  the  exercise  of  any  form 


228  MODES    IN   WHICH    PERSONAL 

of  religion.  In  so  far  as  an  act  is  religious,  society  has  no 
right  of  control  over  it.  If  it  interfere  with  the  rights  of 
others,  this  puts  it  within  the  control  of  society,  and  this 
alone,  and  solely  for  this  reason.  The  power  of  society  is, 
therefore,  in  this  case,  exercised  simply  on  the  ground  of 
injury  perpetrated  and  proved,  and  not  on  account  of  the 
truth  or  falseness,  the  goodness  or  badness,  of  the  religion 
in  the  sight  of  the  Creator. 

3.  By  inflicting  disabilities  upon  men,  or  depriving  them 
of  any  of  their  rights  as  men,  because  they  are  or  are  not 
religious.     This  violation  occurs  in  all  cases  in  which  society 
interferes  to  deny  to  religious  men  the  same  privileges  for 
promoting  their  happiness  by  way  of  religion,  as  they  enjoy 
for  promoting  their  happiness  in  any  other  innocent  way. 
Such  is  the  case  when  religious  societies  are  denied  the 
right  of  incorporation,  with  all  its  attendant  privileges,  for 
the  purposes  of  religious  worship,  and  the  promotion  of  their 
religious  opinions.     Unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  enjoy- 
ment of  such  privileges  interferes  with  the  rights  of  others, 
the  denial  of  them  is  a  violation  of  religious  liberty.     De- 
priving clergymen  of  the  elective  franchise,  is  a  violation  of 
a  similar  character. 

4.  By  placing  the  professors  of  any  peculiar  form  of 
religion  under  any  disabilities ;  as,  for  instance,  rendering 
them  ineligible  to  office,  or  in   any  manner  making  a  dis- 
tinction between  them  and  any  other  professors  of  religion, 
or  any  other  men.     As  society  has  no  right  to  inflict  dis- 
abilities upon  men,  on  the  ground  of  their  worshipping  God 
in  general,  by  consequence,  it  has  no  right  to  inflict  dis- 
abilities on  the  ground  of  worshipping  God  in  any  manner 
in  particular.     If  the  whole  subject  is  without  the  control 
of  society,  a  part  of  it  is  also  without  its  control.     Different 
modes    of  worship  may  be   more  or    less    acceptable  to 
God  ;  but  this  gives  to  no  man  a  right  to  interfere  with 
those  means  of  happiness,  which  God  has  conferred  upon 
any  other  man. 

The  question  may  arise  here,  whether  society  has  a  right 
to  provide  by  law  for  the  support  of  religious  instruction. 
I  answer,  If  the  existence  of  religious  instruction  be  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  society,  and  if  there  be  no  other 


LIBERTY  MAY  BE  VIOLATED.  229 

mode  of  providing  for  its  support,  but  by  legislative  enact- 
ment, then,  I  do  not  see  any  more  violation  of  principle  in 
such  enactment,  than  in  that  for  the  support  of  common 
schools  ;  provided  that  no  one  were  obliged  to  attend  unless 
he  chose,  and  that  every  one  were  allowed  to  pay  for  that 
form  of  worship  which  he  preferred.  There  are  other  ob- 
jections, however,  to  such  a  course,  aside  from  that  arising 
from  the  supposed  violation  of  civil  liberty. 

1.  It  cannot  be  shown  that  religious  teachers  cannot  be 
supported  without  legislative  aid.     The  facts  teach  a  differ- 
ent result. 

2.  The  religion  of  Christ  has  always  exerted  its  greatest 
power  when,  entirely  unsupported,  it  has  been  left  to  exert 
its  own  peculiar  effect  upon  the  consciences  of  men. 

3.  The  support  of  religion  by  law  is  at  variance  with  the 
genius  of  the  gospel.     The  gospel  supposes  every  man  to 
be  purely  voluntary  in  his  service  of  God,  in  his  choice   of 
the  mode  of  worship,  of  his  religious  teachers,  and  of  the 
compensation  which  he  will  make  to   them  for  their  ser- 
vices.    Now,  all  this  is  reversed  in  the  supposition  of  a 
ministry  supported  by  civil  power.     We  therefore  conclude 
that,  although  such  support  might  be  provided  without  in- 
terference with  civil  liberty,  it  could  not  be  done  without 
violation  of  the  spirit  of  the  gospel.     That  is,  though  the 
state  might  be  desirous  of  affording  aid  to  the  church,  the 
church  is  bound,  on  principle,  resolutely  and  steadfastly  to 
protest  against  in  any  manner  receiving  it. 

4.  And  I  think  that  the  facts  will  show  that  this  view  of 
the  subject  is  correct.     The  clergy,  as  a  profession,  are 
better  remunerated   by   voluntary   support   than   by  legal 
enactment.     When  the  people  arrange  the  matter  of  com- 
pensation with  their  clergymen  themselves,  there  are  no 
rich  and  overgrown  benefices,  but  there  are  also  but  few 
miserably  poor  curacies.     The  minister,  if  he  deserve  it, 
generally  lives  as  well  as  his  people.     If  it  be  said  that  high 
talent  should  be  rewarded  by  elevated  rank  in  this  profession, 
as  in  any  other,  I  answer,  that  such  seems  to  me  not  to  be 
the  genius  of  the  gospel.     The  gospel  presents  no  induce  • 
ments  of  worldly  rank  or  of  official  dignity,  and  it  scorns  t  > 
hold  out  such  motives  to  the  religious  teacher.     I  answer 

20 


230  MODES    IN   WHICH    PERSONAL,,    ETC. 

again,  official  rank  and  luxurious  splendor,  instead  of  adding 
to,  take  from,  the  real  influence  of  a  teacher  of  religion. 
They  tend  to  destroy  that  moral  hardihood  which  is  neces- 
sary to  the  success  of  him,  whose  object  it  is  to  render  men 
better ;  and,  while  they  surround  him  with  all  the  insignia 
of  power,  enervate  that  very  spirit  on  which  moral  power 
essentially  depends.  And,  besides,  a  religion  supported  by 
the  government,  must  soon  become  the  tool  of  the  govern- 
ment ;  or,  at  least,  must  be  involved  and  implicated  in  every 
change  which  the  'government  may  undergo.  How  utterly 
at  variance  this  must  be  with  the  principles  of  Him  who 
declared,  "  My  kingdom  is  not  of  tliis  world,"  surely  need 
not  be  illustrated. 


•••• 


231 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 

JUSTICE    IN    RESPECT    TO    PROPERTY. 
SECTION   I. 

THE  RIGHT  OF  PROPERTY. 

I.  DEFINITION  of  the  right  of  property. 

The  abstract  right  of  property  is  the  right  to  use  some- 
thing in  such  manner  as  I  choose. 

But,  inasmuch  as  this  right  of  use  is  common  to  all  men, 
and  as  one  may  choose  to  use  his  property  in  such  a  way 
as  to  deprive  his  neighbor  of  this  or  of  some  other  right,  the 
j  right  to  use  as  I  choose  is  limited  by  the  restriction,  that  V 
do  not  interfere  with  the  rights  of  my  neighbor.  The  right 
of  property,  therefore,  when  thus  restricted,  is  the  right  to 
use  something  as  I  choose,  provided  I  do  not  so  use  it  as  to 
interfere  with  the  rights  of  my  neighbor. 

Thus,  we  see  that,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  the 
right  of  property  is  exclusive ;  that  is  to  say,  if  I  have  a 
right  to  any  thing,  this  right  excludes  every  one  else  from 
any  right  over  that  thing ;  and  it  imposes  upon  every  one 
else  the  obligation  to  leave  me  unmolested  in  the  use  of  it. 
within  those  limits  to  which  my  right  extends. 

II.  On  what  the  right  of  property  is  founded. 

The  right  of  property  is  founded  on  the  will  of  God,  as 
made  known  to  us  by  natural  conscience,  by  general  conse- 
quences, and  by  revelation. 

Every  thing  which  we  behold  is  essentially  the  property 

v,  of  the  Creator  ;  and  he  has  a  right  to  confer  the  use  of  it 

upon  whomsoever,  and  under  what  restrictions  soever,  he 

pleases.     We  may  know  in  what  relations  he  wills  us  to 

stand  towards  the  things  around  us,  by  the  principles  which 


232  THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY. 

he  has  implanted  within  us,  and  by  the  result  produced  in 

individuals  and   communities  by  the   different  courses  of 

conduct  of  which  men  are  capable. 

Now  God  signifies  to  us  his  will  on  this  subject, — 
First.  By  the    decisions  of  natural   conscience.     This 

is  known  from  several  circumstances. 

1.  All  men,  as  soon  as  they  begin  to  think,  even  in  early 
youth   and  infancy,  perceive  this  relation.     They  imme- 
diately appropriate  certain  things  to  themselves  ;  they  feel 
injured,  if  their  control  over  those  things  is  violated,  and 
they  are   conscious  of  guilt,  if  they    violate  this  right  in 
respect  to  others. 

2.  The  relation  of  property  is  expressed  by  the  posses- 
sive  pronouns.     These    are   found  in  all  languages.     So 
universally   is   this    idea  diffused  over  the  whole  mass  of 
human  action  and  human  feeling,  that  it  would  be  scarcely 
possible  for  two  human  beings  to  converse  for  even  a  few 
minutes   on  any  subject,  or  in  any  language,  without  the 
frequent  use  of  the  words  which  designate  the  relation  of 
possession. 

3.  Not  only  do  men  feel  the  importance   of  sustaining 
each  other  in   the  exercise  of  the  right  of  property,  but 
they  manifestly  feel  that  he  who  violates  it  has  done  wrong ; 
that  is,  has   violated  obligation,  and  hence  deserves  pun- 
ishment, on  the  ground,  not  simply  of  the  consequences  of 
the  act,  but  of  the  guiltiness  of  the  actor.     Thus,  if  a  man 
steal,  other  men  are  not  satisfied  when  he  has  merely  made 
restitution,  although  this  may  perfectly  make  up  the  loss 
to  the  injured  party.     It  is  always  considered   that  some- 
thing more  is  due,  either  from  God  or  from  man,  as  a  pun- 
ishment for  the  crime.     Hence,  the  Jewish  law  enjoined 
tenfold  restitution  in  cases  of  theft,  and  modern  law  inflicts 
fines,  imprisonment,  and  corporal  punishment,  for  the  same 
offence. 

Secondly.  That  God  wills  the  possession  of  property,  is 
evident  from  the  general  consequences  which  result  from 
the  existence  of  this  relation. 

The  existence  and  progress  of  society,  nay,  the  very 
existence  of  our  race,  depends  upon  the  acknowledgment 
of  this  right. 


THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY.  233 

Were  not  every  individual  entitled  to  the  results  of  his 
labor,  and  to  the  exclusive  enjoyment  of  the  benefits  of 
these  results, — 

1.  No  one  would  labor  any  more  than  was  sufficient  for 
his  own  individual  subsistence,  because  he  would  have  no 
more  right  than  any  other  person   to  the  value  which  he 
had  created. 

2.  Hence,  there  would  be  no  accumulation ;  of  course, 
no  capital,  no  tools,  no  provision  for  the  future,  no  houses, 
and  no  agriculture.     Each  man,  alone,  would  be  obliged 
to   contend,  at  the  same  time,  with  the  elements,  with  wild 
beasts,  and  also  with  his  rapacious  fellow-men.     The  human 
race,  under  such  circumstances,  could  not  long  exist. 

3.  Under   such   circumstances,  the   race   of  man  must 
speedily   perish,  or   its   existence   be   prolonged,   even   in 
favorable  climates,  under  every  accumulation  of  wretched- 
ness.    Progress   would   be  out   of  the  question ;  and  the 
only  change  which  could  take  place,  would  be  that  arising 
from  the  pressure  of  heavier  and  heavier  penury,  as  the  spon- 
taneous productions  of  the  earth  became  rarer,  from  im- 
provident consumption,  without  any  correspondent  labor  for 
reproduction. 

4.  It  needs  only  to  be  remarked,  in  addition,  that  just 
in  proportion  as  the  right  of  property  is  held  inviolate,  just 
in  that  proportion  civilization  advances,  and  the  comforts 
and  conveniences  of  life  multiply.     Hence  it  is,   that,   in 
free   and  •  well   ordered  governments,  and  specially  during 
peace,  property  accumulates,  all  the  orders  of  society  enjoy 
the  blessings  of  competence,  the  arts  flourish,  science  ad- 
vances,   and  men  begin  to  form  some  conception  of  the 
happiness  of  which  the  present  system  is  capable.     And, 
on   the   contrary,   under  despotism,  when  law  spreads  its 
protection  over  neither  house,  land,  estate,  nor  life,  and 

ially  during   civil  wars,  industry  ceases,  capital  stag- 
.ates,  the  arts  decline,  the  people  starve,  population  dimin- 
ishes, and  men  rapidly  tend  to  a  state  of  barbarism. 

Thirdly.  The  Holy  Scriptures  treat  of  the  right  of  prop- 
erty as  a  thing  acknowledged,  and  direct   their   precepts 
against  every  act  by  which  it  is  violated,  and  also  agains.t 
the  tempers  of  mind  from  which  such  violation  proceeds 
20* 


234  THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY. 

The  doctrine  of  revelation  is  so  clearly  set  forth  on  this 
subject,  that  I  need  not  delay  for  the   sake   of  dwelling 
upon  it.     It  will  be  sufficient  to  refer  to  the  prohibitions  in 
the  decalogue  against  stealing  and  coveting,  and  to   the 
various   precepts    in   the   New  Testament  respecting   our 
duty  in  regard  to  our  neighbor's  possessions. 
I  proceed,  in  the  next  place,  to  consider, — 
III.  The  modes  in  which  the  right  of  property  may  be 
acquired.     These  may  be  divided  into  two  classes:  first, 
direct ;  second,  indirect. 
First.  Direct. 

1 .  By  the  immediate  gift  of  God. 

When  Go"d  has  given  me  a  desire  for  any  object,  and 
has  spread  this  object  before  me,  and  there  is  no  rational 
creature  to  contest  my  claim,  I  may  take  that  object,  and 
use  it  as  I  will,  subject  only  to  the  limitation  of  those  obli- 
gations to  Him,  and  to  my  fellow-creatures,  which  have 
been  before  specified.  On  this  principle  is  founded  my 
right  to  enter  upon  wild  and  unappropriated  lands,  to  hunt 
wild  game,  to  pluck  wild  fruit,  to  take  fish,  or  any  thing  of 
this  sort.  This  right  is  sufficient  to  exclude  the  right  of  any 
subsequent  claimant ;  for,  if  it  has  been  given  to  me,  that 
act  of  gift  is  valid,  until  it  can  be  shown  by  another  that 
it  has  been  annulled.  A  grant  of  this  sort,  however,  ap- 
plies only  to  an  individual  so  long  as  he  continues  the  locum 
tenens,  and  no  longer.  He  has  no  right  to  enter  upon  unap- 
propriated land,  and  leave  it,  and  then  claim  it  'afterward 
by  virtue  of  his  first  possession.  Were  it  otherwise,  any 
individual  might  acquire  a  title  to  a  whole  continent,  and 
exclude  from  it  all  the  rest  of  his  species. 

2.  By  the  labor  of  our  hands. 

Whatever  value  I  have  created  by  my  own  labor,  or  by 
the  innocent  use  of  the  other  means  of  happiness  which 
God  has  given  me,  is  mine.    This  is  evident  from  the  prin-  j 
ciple   already   so   frequently   referred  to  ;  namely,  that  Iv* 
have  a  right  to  use,  for  my  own  happiness,  whatever  God 
has  given  me,  provided  I  use  it  not  to  the  injury  of  another. 
Thus,  if  I  catch  a  deer,  or  raise  an  ear  of  corn  upon  land 
otherwise  unappropriated,  that  deer,  or  that  corn,  is  mine. 
No  reason  can  possibly  be  conceived,  why  any  other  being 


THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY.  235 

should  raise  a  claim  to  them,  which  could  extinguish,  or 
even  interfere  with  mine. 

This,  however,  is  not  meant  to  assert,  that  a  man  has  a 
right  to  any  thing  more  than  to  the  results  of  his  labor. 
He  has  no  right,  of  course,  to  the  results  of  the  labor  of 
another.  If,  by  my  labor,  I  build  a  mill,  and  employ  a 
man  to  take  the  charge  of  it,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  has 
a  right  to  all  the  profits  of  the  mill.  If  I,  by  my  labor 
and  frugality,  earn  money  to  purchase  a  farm,  and  hire  a 
laborer  to  work  upon  it,  it  does  not  follow  that  he  has  a 
right  to  all  the  produce  of  the  farm.  The  profit  is,  in  this 
case,  to  be  divided  between  us.  He  has  a  right  to  the 
share  which  fairly  belongs  to  his  labor,  and  I' have  a  right 
to  the  share  that  belongs  to  me,  as  the  proprietor  and  pos- 
sessor of  that  which  is  the  result  of  my  antecedent  labor. 
It  would  be  as  unjust  for  him  to  have  the  whole  profit,  as 
for  me  to  have  the  whole  of  it.  It  is  fairly  a  case  of  part- 
nership, in  which  each  party  receives  his  share  of  the 
result,  upon  conditions  previously  and  voluntarily  agreed 
upon.  This  is  the  general  principle  of  wages. 

Secondly.  The  right  of  property  may  be  acquired  in- 
directly. 

1.  By  exchange. 

Inasmuch  as  I  have  an  exclusive  right  to  appropriate, 
innocently,  the  possessions  which  I  have  acquired,  by  the 
means  stated  above,  and,  inasmuch  as  every  other  man  has 
the  same  right,  we  may,  if  we  choose,  voluntarily  exchange 
our  right  to  particular  things  with  each  other.  If  I  culti- 
vate wheat,  and  my  neighbor  cultivates  corn,  and  we,  both 
of  us,  have  more  of  our  respective  production  than  we 
wish  to  use  for  ourselves,  we  may,  on  such  terms  as  we 
can  agree  upon,  exchange  the  one  for  the  other.  Property 
held  in  this  manner  is  held  rightfully.  This  exchange  is 
of  two  kinds :  first,  barter,  where  the  exchange  on  both 
sides,  consists  of  commodities ;  and,  second,  bargain  and 
sale,  where  one  of  the  parties  gives,  and  the  other  receives, 
money  for  his  property. 

2.  By  gift. 

As  I  may  thus  rightfully  part  with,  and  another  party 
rightfully  receive,  my  property,  for  an  equivalent  rendered, 


236  THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY. 

so  I  may,  if  I  choose,  part  with  it  without  an  equivalent ; 
that  is,  merely  to  gratify  my  feelings  of  benevolence,  or 
affection,  or  gratitude.  Here,  I  voluntarily  confer  upon 
another  the  right  of  ownership,  and  he  may  rightfully 
receive  and  occupy  it. 

3.  By  will 

As  I  have  the  right  to  dispose  of  my  property  as  I 
please,  during  my  life-time,  and  may  exchange  it  or  give  it 
as  I  will,  at  any  time  previous  to  my  decease,  so  I  may 
give  it  to  another,  on  the  condition  that  he  shall  not  enter 
into  possession  until  after  my  death.  Property  acquired  in 
this  manner  is  held  rightfully. 

4.  By  inheritance. 

Inasmuch  as  persons  frequently  die  without  making  a 
will,  society,  upon  general  principles,  presumes  upon  the 
manner  in  which  the  deceased  would  have  distributed  his 
property,  had  he  made  a  will.  Thus,  it  is  supposed  that  he 
would  distribute  his  wealth  among  his  widow  and  children ; 
or,  in  failure  of  these,  among  his  blood  relations  ;  and  in 
proportions  corresponding  to  their  degree  of  consanguinity. 
Property  may  be  rightfully  acquired  in  this  manner. 

5.  By  possession. 

In  many  cases,  although  a  man  have  no  moral  right  to 
property,  yet  he  may  have  a  right  to  exclude  others  from 
it ;  and  others  are  under  obligation  to  leave  him  unmolested 
in  the  use  of  it.  Thus,  a  man  has  by  fraud  obtained  pos- 
session of  a  farm,  and  the  rightful  owners  have  all  died : 
now,  although  the  present  holder  has  no  just  title  to  the 
property,  yet,  if  it  were  to  be  taken  from  him  and  held  by 
another,  the  second  would  have  no  better  title  than  the 
first ;  and  a  third  person  would  have  the  same  right  to  dis- 
possess the  second,  and  in  turn  be  himself  dispossessed,  and 
so  on  for  ever ;  that  is,  there  would  be  endless  controversy, 
without  any  nearer  approximation  to  justice  ;  and  hence,  it 
is  better  that  the  case  be  left  as  it  was  in  the  first  instance ; 
that  is,  in  general,  possession  gives  a  right,  so  far  as  man  is 
concerned,  to  unmolested  enjoyment,  unless  some  one  else 
can  establish  a  better  title. 

6.  And  hence,  in  general,  I  believe  it  will  hold,  that 
while  merely  the  laws  of  society  do  not  give  a  man  any 


THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY.  237 

moral  right  to  property,  yet,  when  these  laws  have  once 
assigned  it  to  him,  this  simple  fact  imposes  a  moral  obliga- 
tion upon  all  other  men  to  leave  him  in  the  undisturbed 
possession  of  it.  I  have  no  more  right  to  set  fire  to  the 
house  of  a  man,  who  has  defrauded  an  orphan  to  obtain  it, 
than  I  have  to  set  fire  to  the  house  of  any  other  man. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said, — property  may  be 
originally  acquired  either  by  the  gift  of  God,  or  by  our  own 
labor :  it  may  be  subsequently  acquired  either  by  exchange, 
or  by  gift  during  life,  or  by  will ;  but,  in  these  cases  of 
transfer  of  ownership,  the  free  consent  of  the  original  owner 
is  necessary  to  render  the  transfer  morally  right ;  and,  lastly, 
where  the  individual  has  not  acquired  property  justly,  yet 
mere  possession,  though  it  alters  not  his  moral  right  to  pos- 
session, yet  it  is  a  sufficient  bar  to  molestation,  unless  some 
other  claimant  can  prefer  a  better  title.  These,  I  think, 
comprehend  the  most  important  modes  by  which  the  right 
of  property  can  be  acquired. 

That  principles  somewhat  analogous  to  these  are  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  of  God  is,  I  think,  evident  from 
observation  of  the  history  of  man.  The  more  rigidly  these 
principles  have  been  carried  into  active  operation,  the 
greater  amount  of  happiness  has  been  secured  to  the  indi- 
vidual, and  the  more  rapidly  do  nations  advance  in  civiliza- 
tion, and  the  more  successfully  do  they  carry  into  effect 
every  means  of  mental  and  moral  cultivation.  The  first 
steps  that  were  taken  in  the  recovery  of  Europe  from  the 
misery  of  the  dark  ages,  consisted  in  defining  and  estab- 
lishing the  right  of  property  upon  the  basis  of  equitable 
and  universal  law.  Until  something  of  this  sort  is  done, 
no  nation  can  emerge  from  a  state  of  barbarism.* 

And  hence  we  see  the  importance  of  an  able,  learned, 
upright,  and  independent  judiciary,  and  the  necessity  to 
national  prosperity  of  carrying  the  decisions  of  law  into 
universal  and  impartial  effect.  It  not  unfrequently  happens 
that,  for  the  purposes  of  party,  the  minds  of  the  people  are 
inflamed  against  the  tribunals  whose  duty  it  is  to  administer 
justice  ;  or  else,  on  the  other  hand,  for  the  same  purpose,  a 

*  Robertson's  Preliminary  Dissertation  to  the  History  of  Charles  V. 


238        MODES    IN   WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

flagrant  violation  of  justice  by  a  popular  favorite  is  looked 
upon  as  harmless.  Let  it  be  remembered,  that  society  must 
be  dissolved,  unless  the  supremacy  of  the  law  be  maintained. 
"  The  voice  of  the  law  "  will  cease  to  be  "  the  harmony  of 
the  world,"  unless  "  all  things,"  both  high  and  low,  "  do  her 
reverence."  How  often  has  even-handed  justice  commend- 
ed the  chalice  to  the  lips  of  the  demagogue  ;  and  he  has 
been  the  first  to  drink  of  that  cup  which  he  supposed  him- 
self to  be  mingling  for  others  ! 


SECTION    II. 


MODES  IN  WHICH    THE  RIGHT    OF   PROPERTY  MAY    BE    VIOLATED 
BY  THE  INDIVIDUAL. 

I  have  already  remarked,  that  the  right  of  property,  so 
far  as  it  extends,  is  exclusive  both  of  the  individual  and  of 
society.  This  is  true  in  respect  to  both  parties.  Thus, 
whatever  I  own,  I  own  exclusively  both  of  society  and  oi 
individuals  ;  and  whatever  either  individuals  or  society  own, 
they  own  exclusively  of  me.  Hence,  the  right  of  property 
is  equally  violated  by  taking  viciously  either  public  or  pri- 
vate property  ;  and  it  is  equally  violated  by  taking  viciously, 
whether  the  aggressor  be  the  public  or  an  individual.  And, 
moreover,  it  is  exclusive  to  the  full  amount  of  what  is 
owned.  It  is,  therefore,  as  truly  a  violation  of  the  right  of 
property,  to  take  a  little  as  to  take  much  ;  to  purloin  a  book 
or  a  penknife  as  to  steal  money  ;  to  steal  fruit  as  to  steal  a 
horse ;  to  defraud  the  revenue  as  to  rob  my  neighbor ;  to 
overcharge  the  public  as  to  overcharge  my  brother;  to 
cheat  the  post-office  as  to  cheat  my  friend. 

It  has  already  been  observed,  that  a  right  to  the  property 
of  another  can  be  acquired  only  by  his  own  voluntary 
choice.  This  follows,  immediately  from  the  definition  of 
the  right  of  property.  But,  in  order  to  render  this  choice 
of  right  available,  it  must  be  influenced  by  no  motives  pre- 
sented wrongfully  by  the  receiver.  Thus,  if  I  demand  a 


MAY   BE    VIOLATED   BY   THE    INDIVIDUAL.  239 

man's  purse  on  the  alternative  that  I  will  shoot  him  if  he 
deny  me,  he  may  surrender  it  rather  than  be  shot ;  but  I 
have  no  right  to  present  such  an  alternative,  and  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner  renders  it  no  less  a  violation  of  the  right 
of  property.  If  I  inflame  a  man's  vanity  in  order  to  induce 
him  to  buy  of  me  a  coach  which  he  does  not  want,  the 
transaction  is  dishonest ;  because  I  have  gained  his  will  by 
a  motive  which  I  had  no  right  to  use.  So,  if  I  represent  an 
article  in  exchange  to  be  different  from  what  it  is,  I  present 
a  false  motive,  and  gain  his  consent  by  a  lie.  And  thus,  in 
general,  as  I  have  said,  a  transfer  of  property  is  morally 
wrong,  where  the  consent  of  the  owner  is  obtained  by  means 
of  a  vicious  act  on  the  part  of  the  receiver. 
The  right  of  property  may  be  violated, — 

1.  By  taking  property  without  the  knowledge   of  the 
owner,  or  theft.     It  is  here  to  be  remembered,  that  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner  is  necessary  to  any  transfer  of  property. 
We  do  not  vary  the  nature  of  the  act  by  persuading  our- 
selves that  the  owner  will  not  care  about  it,  or  that  he 
would  have  no  objection,  or  that  he  will  not  know  it,  or  that 
it  will  never  injure  him  to  lose  it.     All  this  may  or  may  not 
be  ;  but  none  of  it  varies  the  moral  character  of  the  transac- 
tion.    The  simple  question  is,  Has  the  owner  consented  to 
the  transfer  1     If  he  have  not,  so  long  as  this  circumstance, 
essential  to  a  righteous  transfer,  is  wanting,  whatever  other 
circumstances  exist,  it  matters  not, — the  taking  of  another's 
property  is  theft. 

2.  By  taking  die  property  of  another,  by  consent  vio- 
lently obtained. 

Such  is  the  case  in  highway  robbery.  Here,  we  wick- 
edly obtain  control  over  a  man's  life,  and  then  offer  him 
the  alternative  of  death,  or  delivery  of  his  property.  Inas- 
much as  the  consent  is  no  more  voluntary  than  if  we  tied 
his  hands,  and  took  the  money  out  of  his  pocket,  the  viola- 
tion of  property  is  as  great.  And,  besides  this,  we  assume 
the  power  of  life  and  death  over  an  individual,  over  whom 
we  have  no  just  right  whatever.  In  this  case,  in  fact,  we 
assume  the  unlimited  control  over  the  life  and  possessions 
of  another,  and,  on  pain  of  death,  oblige  him  to  surrender 
his  property  to  our  will.  As,  in  this  case,  there  is  a  double 


240        MODES    IN   WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

and  aggravated  violation  of  right,  it  is,  in  all  countries,  con- 
sidered deserving  of  condign  punishment,  and  is  generally 
rendered  a  capital  offence. 

3.  By  consent  fraudulently  obtained,  or  cheating. 

This  may  be  of  two  kinds: 

1.  Where  no  equivalent  is  offered,  as  when  a  beggar 
obtains  money  on  false  pretences. 

2.  Where  the  equivalent  is  different  from  ivhat  it  pur- 
ports to  be ;  or  where  the  consent  is  obtained  by  an  im- 
moral act  on  the  part  of  him  who  obtains  it.     As  this  in- 
cludes by  far  the  greatest  number  of  violations  of  the  law 
of  property,  it  will  occupy  the  remainder  of  this  section, 
and  will  require  to  be  treated  of  somewhat  at  length. 

We  shall  divide  it  into  two  parts  : — 1.  Where  the  equiv- 
alent is  material ;  2.  Where  the  equivalent  is  immaterial. 

I.  WHERE  THE  EQUIVALENT  is  MATERIAL.  This  is  of 
two  kinds: — 1.  Where  the  transfer  is  perpetual ;  2.  Where 
the  transfer  is  temporary. 

FIRST.  Where  the  transfer  of  property  on  both  sides  is 
perpetual.  This  includes  the  law  of  buyer  and  seller. 

The  principal  laws  of  buyer  and  seller  will  be  seen  from 
a  consideration  of  the  relation  in  which  they  stand  to  each 
other.  The  seller,  or  merchant,  is  supposed  to  devote  his 
time  and  capital  to  the  business  of  supplying  his  neighbors 
with  articles  of  use.  For  his  time,  risk,  interest  of  money, 
and  skill,  he  is  entitled  to  an  advance  on  his  goods ;  and 
the  buyer  is  under  a  correspondent  obligation  to  allow  that 
advance,  except  in  the  case  of  a  change  in  the  market 
price,  to  be  noticed  subsequently. 

Hence,  1.  The  seller  is  under  obligation  to  furnish  goods 
of  the  same  quality  as  that  ordinarily  furnished -at  the  same 
prices.  He  is  paid  for  his  skill  in  purchasing,  and  of  course 
he  ought  to  possess  that  skill,  or  to  suffer  the  consequences. 
If  he  furnish  goods  of  this  quality,  and  they  are,  so  far  as 
his  knowledge  extends,  free  from  any  defect,  he  is  under 
obligation  to  do  nothing  more  than  to  offer  them.  He  is 
under  no  obligations  to  explain  their  adaptation,  and  direct 
the  judgment  of  the  buyer,  unless  by  the  law  of  benevo- 
lence. Having  furnished  goods  to  the  best  of  his  skill,  and 
of  the  ordinary  quality,  his  responsibility  ceases,  and  it  is 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL.  241 

the  business  of  the  buyer  to  decide  whether  the  article  is 
adapted  to  his  wants.  If,  however,  the  seller  have  pur- 
chased a  bad  article,  and  have  been  deceived,  he  has  no 
right  to  sell  it  at  the  regular  price,  on  the  ground  that  he 
gave  as  much  for  it  as  for  what  should  have  been  good. 
The  error  of  judgment  was  his,  and  in  his  own  profession  ; 
and  he  must  bear  the  loss  by  selling  the  article  for  what  it 
is  worth.  That  this  is  the  rule,  is  evident  from  the  con- 
trary case.  If  he  had,  by  superior  skill,  purchased  an 
article  at  much  less  than  its  value,  he  would  consider  him- 
self entitled  to  the  advantage,  and  justly.  Where  he  is 
entitled,  however,  to  the  benefit  of  his  skill,  he  must,  under 
correspondent  circumstances,  suffer  from  the  want  of  it. 
Hence  we  say,  that  a  seller  is  under  obligation  to  furnish 
goods  at  the  market  price,  and  of  the  market  quality,  but  is 
under  no  obligation  to  assist  the  judgment  of  the  buyer, 
unless  the  article  for  sale  is  defective,  and  then  he  is  under 
obligation  to  reveal  it. 

The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is,  when,  from  the  con- 
ditions of  the  sale,  it  is  known  that  no  guaranty  is  offered ; 
as  when  a  horse  is  sold  at  auction,  without  any  recommen- 
dation. Here,  every  man  knows  that  he  buys  at  his  own 
risk,  and  bids  accordingly. 

2.  Every  one  who  makes  it  his  business  to  sell,  is  not 
only  bound  to  sell,  but  is  also  at  liberty  to  sell,  at  the  mar- 
ket price.  That  he  is  bound  to  sell  thus,  is  evident  from 
the  fact  that  he  takes  every  means  to  persuade  the  public 
that  he  sells  thus  ;  he  would  consider  it  a  slander  were  any 
one  to  assert  the  contrary ;  and,  were  the  contrary  to  be 
believed,  his  custom  would  soon  be  ruined.  Where  a  belief 
is  so  widely  circulated,  and  so  earnestly  inculcated  by  the 
seller,  he  is  manifestly  under  obligation  to  fulfil  an  expecta- 
tion which  he  has  been  so  anxious  to  create. 

He  is  also  at  liberty  to  sell  at  the  market  price ;  that  is, 
as  he  is  obliged  to  sell  without  remuneration,  or  even  with 
loss,  if  the  article  fall  in  price  while  in  his  possession,  so  he 
is  at  liberty  to  sell  it  at  above  a  fair  remuneration,  if  the 
price  of  the  article  advances.  As  he  must  suffer  in  case  of 
the  fall  of  merchandise,  he  is  entitled  to  the  correspondent 
,  if  merchandise  rises  ;  and  thus  his  chance  on  both 
21 


242        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

sides  is  equalized.  Besides,  by  allowing  the  price  of  an 
article  to  rise  with  its  scarcity,  the  rise  itself  is  in  the  end 
checked  ;  since,  by  attracting  an  unusual  amount  of  prod- 
ucts to  the  place  of  scarcity,  the  price  is  speedily  reduced 
again  to  the  ordinary  and  natural  equilibrium  of  supply  and 
demand. 

It  should,  however,  be  remarked,  that  this  rule  applies 
mainly  to  those,  whose  occupation  it  is  to  traffic  in  the 
article  bought  and  sold.  A  dealer  in  china-ware  is  bound 
to  sell  china-ware  at  the  market  price  ;  but  if  a  man  insist 
upon  buying  his  coat,  he  is  under  no  such  obligation,  for 
this  is  not  his  business.  Should  he  put  himself  to  inconve- 
nience by  selling  his  apparel  to  gratify  the  whim  of  his 
neighbor,  he  may,  if  he  will,  charge  an  extra  price  for  this 
inconvenience.  The  rule  applies  in  any  other  similar  case. 
It  would,  however,  become  an  honest  man  fairly  to  state 
that  he  did  not  sell  at  the  market  price,  but  that  he  charged 
what  he  chose,  as  a  remuneration  for  his  trouble. 

3.  While  the  seller  is  under  no  obligation  to  set  forth 
the  quality  of  his  merchandise,  yet  he  is  at  liberty  to  do 
so,  confining  himself  to  truth.  He  has,  however,  no  right 
to  influence  the  will  of  the  buyer,  by  any  motives  aside  from 
those  derived  from  the  real  value  of  the  article  in  question. 

Thus,  he  has  no  right  to  appeal  to  the  fears,  or  hopes, 
or  avarice,  of  the  buyer.  This  rule  is  violated,  when,  in 
dealings  on  the  exchange,  false  information  is  circulated, 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  or  depressing  the  price  of  stocks. 
It  is  violated  by  speculators,  who  monopolize  an  article  to 
create  an  artificial  scarcity,  and  thus  raise  the  price,  while 
the  supply  is  abundant.  The  case  is  the  same,  when  a 
salesman  looks  upon  a  stranger  who  enters  his  store,  and 
deliberately  calculates  how  he  shall  best  influence,  and 
excite,  and  mislead  his  mind,  so  as  to  sell  the  greatest 
amount  of  goods  at  the  most  exorbitant  profit.  And,  in 
general,  any  attempt  to  influence  the  mind  of  the  purchaser, 
by  motives  aside  from  those  derived  from  the  true  character 
of  the  article  for  sale,  are  always  doubtful,  and  generally 
vicious. 

It  is  in  vain  to  reply  to  this,  that  if  this  were  not  done, 
men  could  not  support  their  families.  We  are  not  inquir- 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL. 

ing  about  the  support  of  families,  but  about  a  question  of 
right.  And  it  is  obvious  that,  were  this  plea  allowed,  it 
would  put  an  end  to  all  questions  of  morals  ;  for  there 
never  was  an  iniquity  so  infamous  as  not  to  find  multitudes 
who  were  ready  to  justify  it  on  this  plea.  But  we  alto- 
gether deny  the  validity  of  the  plea.  Were  men  to  qualify 
themselves  properly  for  their  business,  and  to  acquire  and 
exert  a  suitable  skill  in  the  management  of  it,  that  skill 
being  beneficially  exerted  for  the  community  at  large,  men 
would  find  it  for  their  interest  to  employ  it.  He  who  un 
derstood  his  own  profession  well,  and  industriously  ana 
honestly  put  his  talents  into  requisition,  never  stood  in  need 
of  chicanery,  in  order  to  support  either  himself  or  his  family. 

These  remarks  have  been  made  with  respect  to  the 
seller.  But  it  is  manifest  that  they  are  just  as  applicable 
to  the  buyer.  Both  parties  are  under  equally  imperative 
and  correspondent  obligations.  If  the  seller  be  bound  to 
furnish  an  article  of  ordinary  quality,  and  to  sell  it  at  the 
market  price,  that  is,  if  he  be  obliged  to  exert  his  skill  for 
the  benefit  of  the  buyer,  and  to  charge  for  that  skill  and 
capital  no  more  than  a  fair  remuneration,  then  the  buyer  is 
under  the  same  obligation  freely  and  willingly  to  pay  that 
remuneration.  It  is  disgraceful  to  him,  to  wish  the  seller  to 
labor  for  him  for  nothing,  or  for  less  than  a  fair  compensa- 
tion. If  the  seller  has  no  right  by  extraneous  considerations 
to  influence  the  motives  of  the  buyer,  the  buyer  has  no 
right,  by  any  such  considerations,  to  influence  the  motives 
of  the  seller.  The  buyer  is  guilty  of  fraud,  if  he  underrate 
the  seller's  goods,  or  by  any  of  the  artifices  of  traffic  in- 
duces him  to  sell  at  less  than  a  fair  rate  of  profit.  "  'Tis 
naught,  'tis  naught,  saith  the  buyer  ;  but  when  he  goeth  his 
way,  then  he  boasteth."  Such  conduct  is  as  dishonest  and 
dishonorable  now,  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Solomon. 

It  has  also  been  observed  above,  that  when  the  seller 
knows  of  any  defect  in  his  product,  he  is  bound  to  declare 
it.  The  same  rule,  of  course,  applies  to  the  buyer.  If  he 
know  that  the  value  of  the  article  has  risen,  without  the 
possibility  of  the  owner's  knowledge,  he  is  bound  to  inform 
him  of  this  change  in  its  value.  The  sale  is,  otherwise, 
fraudulent.  Hence,  all  purchases  and  sales  affected  in 


£44        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

consequence  of  secret  information,  procured  in  advance  of 
our  neighbor,  are  dishonest.  If  property  rise  in  value  by 
the  providence  of  God,  while  in  my  neighbor's  possession, 
that  rise  of  value  is  as  much  his,  as  the  property  itself;  and 
I  may  as  honestly  deprive  him  of  the  one,  without  an 
equivalent,  as  of  the  other. 

The  ordinary  pleas,  by  which  men  excuse  themselves  for 
violation  of  the  moral  law  of  property,  are  weak  and  wicked. 
Thus,  when  men  sell  articles  of  a  different  quality  from 
that  which  their  name  imports — as  when  wines  or  liquors 
are  diluted  or  compounded ;  when  the  ordinary  weight  or 
measure  is  curtailed  ;  or  where  employers  defraud  ignorant 
persons  of  their  wages,  as  I  am  told  is  sometimes  the  case 
with  those  who  employ  certain  classes  of  laborers — it  is 
common  to  hear  it  remarked,  "  The  competition  is  so  great, 
that  we  could  sell  nothing,  unless  we  adopted  these  methods ;" 
or  else,  a  The  practice  is  universal,  and  if  we  did  not  do 
thus,  other  persons  would,  and  so  the  evil  would  not  be 
diminished."  To  all  this,  it  is  sufficient  to  reply :  The 
law  of  God  is  explicit  on  this  subject.  "  Thou  shalt  love 
thy  neighbor  as  thyself;"  and  God  allows  of  no  excuses  for 
the  violation  of  his  commands  ;  "  He  hath  shewed  it  unto 
them;  therefore  they  are  without  excuse."  These  pleas 
are  either  true  or  false.  If  false,  they  ought  to  be  aban- 
doned. If  true,  then  the  traffic  itself  must  be  given  up  ;  for 
no  man  has  any  right  to  be  engaged  in  any  pursuit,  in  vio- 
lation of  the  laws  of  God. 

A.  bargain  is  concluded,  when  both  parties  have  signified 
to  each  other,  their  will  to  make  the  transfer  ;  that  is,  that 
each  chooses  to  part  with  his  own  property,  and  to  receive 
the  property  of  the  other  in  exchange.  Henceforth,  all  the 
risk  of  loss,  and  all  the  chances  of  gain,  are,  of  course, 
mutually  transferred ;  although  the  articles  themselves 
remain  precisely  as  they  were  before.  If  a  merchant  buy 
a  cargo  of  tea ;  after  the  sale,  no  matter  where  the  tea  is, 
the  chances  of  loss  or  gain  are  his,  and  they  are  as  much 
his  in  one  place  as  in  another. 

So,  if  the  article,  after  the  sale,  have  become  injured, 
before  I  take  actual  possession  of  it,  I  bear  the  loss ;  be- 
cause, the  right  of  ownership  being  vested  in  me,  I  could 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL.  245 

have  removed  it  if  I  chose,  and  no  one  had  a  right,  without 
my  direction,  to  remove  it. 

The  only  exception  to  this,  exists  in  the  case  where,  by 
custom  or  contract,  the  obligation  to  deliver,  is  one  of  the 
conditions  of  the  sale.  Here  the  seller,  of  course,  charges 
more  for  assuming  the  responsibility  to  deliver,  and  he  is  to 
bear  the  risk,  for  which  he  is  fairly  paid.  It  is  frequently 
a  question,  When  is  the  act  of  delivery  completed  ?  This 
must  be  settled  by  precedent ;  and  can  rarely  be  known  in 
any  country,  until  a  decision  is  had  in  the  courts  of  law. 
As  soon  as  such  a  case  is  adjudicated,  the  respective 
parties  govern  themselves  accordingly. 

SECONDLY,  when  the  transfer  of  property  is  temporary. 
In  this  case,  the  borrower  pays  a  stipulated  equivalent  for 
the  use  of  it. 

That  he  should  do  so  is  manifestly  just,  because  the 
property  in  the  hands  of  the  owner  is  capable  of  producing 
an  increase,  and  the  owner,  if  he  held  it,  would  derive  the 
benefit  of  that  increase.  If  he  part  with  this  benefit  for 
the  advantage  of  another,  it  is  just  that  the  other  should 
allow  him  a  fair  remuneration.  If  the  borrower  could  not, 
after  paying  this  remuneration,  grow  richer  than  he  would 
be  without  the  use  of  his  neighbor's  capital,  he  would  not 
borrow.  But,  inasmuch  as  he,  by  the  use  of  it,  can  be 
benefited,  after  paying  for  the  use,  no  reason  can  be  con- 
ceived why  he  should  not  pay  for  it. 

The  remuneration  paid  for  the  use  of  capital,  in  the  form 
of  money,  is  called  interest ;  when  in  the  form  of  land  or 
houses,  it  is  called  rent. 

The  principles  on  which  the  rate  of  this  remuneration  is 
justly  fixed,  are  these:  The  borrower  pays,  first,  for  the 
use  ;  and,  secondly,  for  the  risk. 

1.  For  the  use. 

Capital  is  more  useful,  that  is,  it  is  capable  of  producing 
a  greater  remuneration  at  some  times  than  at  others. 
Thus,  a  flour-mill,  in  some  seasons,  is  more  productive  than 
in  others.  Land,  in  some  places,  is  capable  of  yielding  a 
greater  harvest  than  in  others.  And  thus,  at  different  times, 
the  same,  property  may  be  capable  of  bringing  in  a  very 
different  income.  And,  in  general,  where  the  amount  of 
21  * 


246        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

capital  to  be  loaned  is  great,  and  the  number  of  those  who 
want  to  borrow,  small,  the  interest  will  be  low  ;  and  where 
the  number  of  borrowers  is  great,  and  the  amount  of  capi- 
tal small,  the  rate  of  interest  will  be  high.  The  reasons 
of  all  this  are  too  obvious  to  need  illustration. 

2.  For  the  risk. 

When  an  owner  parts  with  his  property,  it  is  put  under 
the  control  of  the  borrower,  and  passes,  of  course,  beyond 
the  control  of  the  owner.  Here,  there  arises  a  risk  over 
which  he  has  no  control.  It  varies  with  the  character  of 
the  borrower  for  prudence  and  skill,  and  with  the  kind  of 
business  in  which  he  is  engaged.  Property  in  ships  is 
exposed  to  greater  risk  than  property  in  land.  A  man 
would  consider  the  chance  of  having  his  property  returned 
much  better,  if  employed  in  the  building  of  dwelling-houses, 
than  in  the  manufacture  of  gun-powder.  Now,  as  all  these 
circumstances  of  risk  may  enter  more  or  less  into  every  loan, 
it  is  evident  that  they  must,  in  justice,  vary  the  rate  at 
which  a  loan  may  be  procured. 

Hence,  I  think  that  the  rate  of  interest,  of  every  sort, 
being  liable  to  so  many  circumstances  of  variation,  should 
not,  in  any  case,  be  fixed  by  law ;  but  should  be  left,  in 
all  cases,  to  the  discretion  of  the  parties  concerned. 

This  remark  applies  as  well  to  loans  of  money  as  to  loans 
of  other  property,  because  the  reasons  apply  just  as  much 
to  these  as  to  any  other.  If  it  be  said,  men  may  charge 
exorbitant  interest,  I  reply,  so  they  may  charge  exorbitant 
rent  for  houses,  and  exorbitant  hire  for  horses.  And,  I 
ask,  how  is  this  evil  of  exorbitant  charges  in  other  cases 
remedied  ?  The  answer  is  plain.  We  allow  a  perfectly 
free  competition,  and  then  the  man  who  will  not  loan  his 
property,  unless  at  an  exorbitant  price,  is  underbidden, 
and  his  own  rapacity  defeats  and  punishes  itself. 

And,  on  the  contrary,  by  fixing  a  legal  rate  of  interest, 
we  throw  the  whole  community  into  the  power  of  those 
who  are  willing  to  violate  the  law.  For,  as  soon  as  the 
actual  value  of  money  is  more  than  the  legal  value,  those 
who  consider  themselves  under  obligation  to  obey  the  laws 
of  the  land,  will  not  loan ;  for  they  can  employ  their 
property  to  better  advantage.  Hence,  if  all  were  obedient 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL.  247 

to  the  law,  as  soon  as  property  arrived  at  this  point  oi 
value,  loans  would  instantly  and  universally  cease.  But 
as  some  persons  are  willing  to  evade  the  law,  they  will  loan 
at  illegal  interest ;  and,  as  the  capital  of  those  who  are 
conscientious,  is  withdrawn  from  the  market,  and  an  arti- 
ficial scarcity  is  thus  produced,  those  who  are  not  conscien- 
tious have  it  in  their  power  to  charge  whatever  they  choose. 

Again,  when  we  pay  for  money  loaned,  we  pay,  first,  for 
the  use,  and,  second,  for  the  risk ;  that  is,  we  pay  literally 
a  premium  of  insurance.  As  both  of  these  vary  with  dif- 
ference of  time,  and  with  different  individuals,  there  is  a 
double  reason  for  variation  in  the  rate  of  interest.  When 
we  have  a  house  insured,  we  pay  only  for  the  risk ;  and, 
hence,  there  is  here  only  a  single  cause  of  variation.  But 
while  all  governments  have  fixed  the  rate  of  interest  by  law, 
they  have  never  fixed  the  rate  of  insurance ;  which,  -being 
less  variable,  is  more  properly  subject  to  a  fixed  rule. 
This  is  surely  inconsistent ;  is  it  not  also  unjust  ? 

Nevertheless,  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  disputes,  and  errors 
of  ignorance,  it  might  be  wise  for  society  to  enact,  by  law, 
what  shall  be  the  rate  of  interest,  in  cases  where  no  rate  is 
otherwise  specified.  This  is  the  extent  of  its  proper  juris- 
diction ;  and  doing  any  thing  further  is,  I  think,  not  only 
injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  community,  but  also  a  vio- 
lation of  the  right  of  property.  While,  however,  I  hold 
this  to  be  true,  I  by  no  means  hold  that,  the  laws  remain- 
ing as  they  are,  any  individual  is  justified  in  taking  or  giving 
more  than  the  legal  rate  of  interest.  When  conscience 
does  not  forbid,  it  is  the  business  of  a  good  citizen  to  obey 
the  laws  ;  and  the  faithful  obedience  to  an  unwise  law,  is 
generally  the  surest  way  of  working  its  overthrow. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  the  laws  which  gov- 
ern this  mode  of  transfer  of  property. 

The  loan  of  money. 

1 .  The  lender  is  bound  to  demand  no  more  than  a  fair 
remuneration  for  the  use  of  his  capital,  and  for  the  risk  to 
which  it  is  exposed. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  make  use  of  no  unlawful  means  to 
influence    the    decision   of  the  borrower.     The   principles 
here  are  the  same  as  those  which  should  govern  the  per- 


248        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

manent  exchange  of  property.  All  rumors  and  false  alarm?, 
and  all  combinations  of  capitalists  to  raise  by  a  monopoly 
the  price  of  money,  are  manifestly  dishonest ;  nor  are  they 
the  less  so,  because  many  persons  may  enter  into  them,  or 
because  they  have  the  skill  or  the  power  to  evade  the  laws 
of  the  land. 

3.  The  borrower  is  bound  to  pay  a  just  equivalent,  as 
I  have  stated  above  ;  and  he  is  equally  forbidden  to  use 
any  dishonest  motives  to   influence   the    decision   of  the 
lender. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  risk  of  the  property  is  one  part  of 
the  consideration  for  which  the  owner  receives  remunera- 
tion, and  as  this  is  in  every  case  supposed  to  be  a  specified 
quantity,  the  borrower  has  no  right  to  expose  the  property 
of  another  to  any  risk  not  contemplated  in  the  contract. 
Hence,  he  has  no  right  to  invest   it  in  a  more   hazardous 
trade,  or  to  employ   it   in  a  more   hazardous   speculation, 
than  that  for  which  he  borrowed   it ;  and  if  he    do,  he  is 
using  it  in  a  manner  for  which  he  has  paid  no  equivalent. 
He  is  also  under  obligation  to  take  all  the  care  to  avoid 
losses  which  he  would  take  if  the  property  were  his  own  ; 
and  to  use  the  same  skill  to  conduct  his  affairs  successfully. 

5.  He  is  also  bound  to  repay  the  loan  exactly  according 
to  the  terms  specified  in  the  contract.     This  requires  that  he 
pay  the  full  sum  promised,  and  that  he  pay  it  precisely  at 
the  time  promised.     A  failure,  in  either  case,  is  a  breach 
of  the  contract. 

The  question  is  often  asked,  whether  a  debtor  is  morally 
liberated  by  an  act  of  insolvency.  I  think  not,  if  he  ever 
afterwards  have  the  means  of  repayment.  It  may  be  said, 
this  is  oppressive  to  debtors ;  but,  we  ask,  is  not  the  con- 
trary principle  oppressive  to  creditors ;  and  are  not  the 
rights  of  one  party  just  as  valuable,  and  just  as  much 
rights,  as  those  of  the  other  ?  It  may  also  be  remarked, 
that,  were  this  principle  acted  upon,  there  would  be  fewer 
debtors,  and  vastly  fewer  insolvents.  The  amount  of 
money  actually  lost  by  insolvency,  is  absolutely  enormous ; 
and  it  is  generally  lost  by  causeless,  reckless  speculation, 
by  childish  and  inexcusable  extravagance,  or  by  gambling 
and  profligacy,  which  are  all  stimulated  into  activity  by 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL.  249 

the  facility  of  credit,  and  the  facility  with  which  debts 
may  be  cancelled  by  acts  of  insolvency.  The  more  rigidly 
contracts  are  observed,  the  more  rapidly  will  the  capital  of 
a  country  increase,  the  greater  will  be  the  inducements  to 
industry,  and  the  stronger  will  be  the  barriers  against  ex- 
travagance and  vice. 

Of  the  loan  of  other  property. 

The  principles  which  apply  in  this  case  are  very  similar 
to  those  which  have  been  already  stated. 

1.  The  lender  is  bound  to  furnish  an  article,  which,  so 
far  as  he  knows,  is  adapted  to   the  purposes  of  the  bor- 
rower.    That  is,  if  the  thing  borrowed  has  any  internal 
defect,  he  is   bound  to  reveal  it.     If  I  loan  a  horse  to  a 
man  who  wishes  to  ride  forty  miles  to-day,  which  I  know 
is  able  to  go  but  thirty,  it  is  a  fraud.     If  I  let  to  a  man  a 
house  which  I  know  to  be  in   the   neighborhood  of  a  nui- 
sance, or  to  be,  in  part,  uninhabitable   from   smoky    chim- 
neys, and  do  not  inform  him,  it  is  fraud.     The  loss  in   the 
value  of  the  property  is  mine,  and  I  have  no  right  to  trans- 
fer it  to  another. 

2.  So  the  lender  has  a  right  to  charge  the  market  price 
arising  from  the  considerations  of  use,  risk,  and  variation 
in   supply   and   demand.     This  depends   upon  the   same 
principles  as  those  already  explained. 

3.  The  borrower  is  bound  to  take  the  same  care  of  the 
property  of  another,  as  he  would  of  his  own ;  to  put  it  to 
no  risk  different  from  that  specified  or  understood  in  the 
contract ;  and  to  pay  the  price,  upon   the  principle    stated 
above.     Neither  party  has  any  right  to  influence  the  other 
by  any  motives  extraneous  to  the  simple  business  of  the 
transfer. 

4.  The  borrower  is  bound  to  return  the  property  loaned, 
precisely    according   to   the  contract.     This  includes  both 
time  and  condition.     He  must  return  it  at  the  time  speci- 
fied, and  in  the  condition  in  which  he  received  it,  ordinary 
wear  and  tear  only  excepted.     If  I  hire  a  house  for  a  year, 
and  so  damage  its  paper  and  paint,  that,  before  it  can  be 
let  again,  it  will  cost  half  the  price  of  the  rent  to  put  it  in 
repair,  it  is  a  gross  fraud.     I  have,  by  negligence,  or  other 
cause,  defrauded  the  owner  of  half  his  rent.     It  is  just  as 


250        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

immoral  as  to  pay  him  the  whole,  and  then  pick  his  pocket 
of  the  half  of  what  he  had  received. 

The  important  question  arises  here,  If  a  loss  happen 
while  the  property  is  in  the  hands  of  the  borrower,  on 
whom  shall  it  fall  ?  The  principle  I  suppose  to  be  this  : 

1.  If  it  happen  while  the  property  is  subject  to  the  use 
specified  in  the  contract,  the  owner  bears  it ;  because  it  is 
to  be  supposed  that  he  foresaw  the  risk,  and  received  re- 
muneration for  it.     As  he  was    paid  for  the  risk,  he,  of 
course,  has  assumed  it,  and  justly  suffers  it. 

2.  If  the  loss  happen  in  consequence  of  any  use  not 
contemplated  in  the  contract,  then  the  borrower  suffers  it. 
He  having    paid    nothing    for  insurance  against  this   risk, 
there  is  nobody  but  himself  to  sustain  it,  and  he  sustains  it 
accordingly.     Besides,  were  any  other  principle  adopted,  it 
must  put  an  end  to  the  whole  business  of  loaning  ;  for  no 
one  would  part  with  his  property  temporarily,  to  be  used 
in  any  manner  the  borrower  pleased,  and  be  himself  re- 
sponsible for  all  the  loss.     If  a  horse  die  while  I  am  using 
it  well,  and  for  the  purpose    specified,  the  owner  suffers. 
If  it  die  by  careless  driving,  I  suffer  the  loss.     He  is  bound 
to  furnish  a  good  horse,  and  I  a  competent  driver. 

3.  So,  on  the  contrary,  if  a  gain  arise  unexpectedly. 
If  this  gain  was  one  which  was  contemplated  in  the  con- 
tract, it  belongs  to  the  borrower.     If  not,  he  has  no   equi- 
table claim  to  it.     If  I  hire  a   farm,  I  am  entitled,  without 
any  additional  charge  for  rent,  to  all  the  advantages  arising 
from  the  rise  in  the  price  of  wheat,  or  from   my  own   skill 
in  agriculture.     But  if  a  mine  of  coal  be  discovered  on  the 
farm,  I  have  no  right  to  the  benefit  of  working  it ;  for  I 
did  not  hire  the  farm  for  this  purpose. 

The  case  of  insurance. 

Here  no  transfer  of  property  is  made,  and,  of  course, 
nothing  is  paid  for  use.  But  the  owner  chooses  to  transfer 
the  risk  of  use  from  himself  to  others,  and  to  pay,  for  their 
assuming  this  risk,  a  stipulated  equivalent.  The  loss  to 
society,  of  property  insured,  is  just  the  same  as  when  it  is 
uninsured.  A  town  is  just  as  much  poorer  when  property 
is  destroyed  that  is  insured,  provided  it  be  insured  in  the 
town,  as  though  no  insurance  were  effected.  The  only 


MAY    BE    VIOLATED    BY   THE    INDIVIDUAL.  251 

difference  is,  that  the  loss  is  equalized.  Ten  men  can 
more  easily  replace  one  hundred  dollars  apiece,  who  have 
nine  hundred  remaining,  than  the  eleventh  can  replace  his 
whole  property  of  one  thousand. 

The  rule  in  this  case  is  simple.  The  insured  is  bound 
fully  to  reveal  to  the  insurer  every  circumstance  within  his 
knowledge,  which  could  in  any  measure  affect  the  value  of 
the  risk  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  property  must  be,  so  far  as 
he  knows,  what  it  purports  to  be,  and  the  risks  none  other 
than  such  as  he  reveals  them.  If  he  expose  the  property 
to  other  risks,  the  insurance  is  void  ;  and  the  underwriter, 
if  the  property  be  lost,  refuses  to  remunerate  him ;  and  if 
it  be  safe,  he  returns  the  premium.  If  the  loss  occur  with- 
in the  terms  of  the  policy,  the  insurer  is  bound  fully  and 
faithfully  to  make  remuneration,  precisely  according  to  the 
terms  of  the  contract. 

As  to  the  rate  of  insurance,  very  little  need  be  said.  It 
varies  with  every  risk,  and  is  made  up  of  so  many  conflict- 
ing circumstances,  that  it  must  be  agreed  upon  by  the  par- 
ties themselves.  When  the  market  in  this  species  of  traffic 
is  unrestrained  by  monopolies,  the  price  of  insurance,  like 
that  of  any  other  commodity,  will  regulate  itself. 

II.  Next,  where  the  equivalent  is  IMMATERIAL,  as  where 
one  party  pays  remuneration  for  some  service  rendered  by 
the  other. 

The  principal  cases  here  are  these  :  That  of  master  and 
servant,  and  that  of  principal  and  agent. 

1.  Of  master  and  servant. 

1.  The  master  is  bound  to  allow  to  the  servant  a  fair  re- 
muneration.    This  is  justly  estimated  by  uniting  the  con- 
siderations of  labor,  skill,  and  fidelity,  varied  by  the  rise  and 
fall  of  the  price  of  such  labor  in  the  market.     As  this,  how- 
ever, would  be  liable  to  inconvenient  fluctuation,  it  is  gen- 
erally adjusted  by  a  rate  agreed  upon  by  the  parties. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  allow  him  all  the  privileges  to  which 
moral  law  or  established  usage  entitles  him,  unless  something 
different  from  the  latter  has  been  stipulated  in  the  contract ; 
and  he  is  at  liberty  to  require  of  him  service  upon  the  same 
principles. 

3.  The  servant  is  bound  to  perform  the  labor  assigned 


252        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

him  by  usage,  or  by  contract  (matters  of  conscience  only 
excepted),  with  all  the  skill  which  he  possesses,  making  the 
interests  of  the  employer  his  own.  If  either  party  fail, — 
that  is,  if  the  master  demand  service  for  which  he  does  not 
render  compensation,  or  if  the  servant  receive  wages  for 
which  he  does  not  render  the  stipulated  equivalent, — there 
is  a  violation  of  the  right  of  property.  Thus,  also,  there  is 
a  violation  of  right,  if  the  master  do  not  fulfil  the  terms  of 
the  contract,  just  as  it  was  made  ;  as,  for  instance,  if  he  do 
not  pay  a  servant  punctually.  When  the  service  is  perform- 
ed, the  wages  belong  to  the  servant,  and  the  master  has  no 
more  right  to  them  than  to  the  property  of  any  one  else. 
Thus  saith  St.  James  :  "  The  hire  of  your  laborers  that  have 
reaped  your  fields,  that  is  Icept  back  by  fraud,  crieth,  and 
the  cry  is  come  into  the  ears  of  the  Lord  of  Sabaoth." 
And,  on  the  contrary,  the  servant  is  bound  to  use  his  whole 
skill  and  economy  in  managing  the  property  of  his  master ; 
and  if  he  destroy  it  by  negligence,  or  fault,  he  ought  to 
make  restitution. 

2.  Of  principal  and  agent. 

It  frequently  happens  that,  in  the  transaction  of  business, 
duties  devolve  upon  an  individual,  which  are  to  be  dis- 
charged in  different  places  at  the  same  time.  In  other 
cases,  in  consequence  of  the  subdivision  of  labor,  he  requires 
something  to  be  done  for  him,  which  another  person  can  do 
better  than  himself.  In  both  cases,  either  from  necessity, 
or  for  his  own  convenience  and  interest,  he  employs  other 
men  as  agents. 

Agencies  are  of  two  kinds  ;  Jirst,  where  the  principal 
simply  employs  another  to  fulfil  his  own  (that  is,  the  prin- 
cipal's) will  Here,  the  principal's  will  is  the  rule,  both  as 
to  the  object  to  be  accomplished,  and  the  manner  in  which, 
and  the  means  whereby,  it  is  to  be  accomplished.  Sec- 
ondly. Where  the  principal  only  designates  the  objects  to 
be  accomplished,  reposing  special  trust  in  the  skill  and 
fidelity  of  the  agent  as  to  the  means  by  which  it  is  to  be 
accomplished.  Such  I  suppose  to  be  the  case  in  regard  to 
professional  assistance. 

The  laws  on  this  subject  respect,  fost,  the  relation  ex- 
isting between  the  principal  and  the  community  ;  and, 


MAY   BE    VIOLATED    BY    THE    INDIVIDUAL.  253 

secondly,  the  relation  existing  between  the  principal  and 
agent. 

I.  The  principal  is  bound  by  the  acts  of  the  agent,  while 
the  agent  is  employed  in  the  business  for  which  the  prin- 
cipal has  engaged  him ;  but  he  is  responsible  no  farther. 

Thus,  it  is  known  that  a  merchant  employs  a  clerk  to 
receive  money  on  his  account.  For  his  clerk's  transactions 
in  this  part  of  his  affairs  he  is  responsible  ;  but  he  would  not 
be  responsible,  if  money  were  paid  to  his  porter  or  coach- 
man, because  he  does  not  employ  them  for  this  purpose. 
Hence,  if  the  clerk  be  unfaithful,  and  secrete  the  money, 
the  merchant  suffers ;  if  the  coachman  receive  the  money, 
and  be  unfaithful,  the  payer  suffers.  It  is  the  merchant's 
business  to  employ  suitable  agents ;  but  it  is  the  business 
of  his  customers  to  apply  to  those  agents  only,  whom  he 
has  employed. 

An  important  question  arises  here,  namely,  When  is  it  to 
be  understood  that  a  principal  has  employed  an  agent  ?  It 
is  generally  held  that,  if  the  principal  acknowledge  himself 
responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  agent,  he  is  hereafter  held  to 
be  responsible  for  similar  acts,  until  he  gives  notice  to  the 
contrary. 

II.  Laws  arising  from  the  relation  subsisting  between  the 
principal  and  the  agent. 

1.  The  laws  respecting  compensation  are  the  same  as 
those  already  specified,  and,  therefore,  need  not  be  repeated. 

2.  The  agent  is  bound  to  give  the  same  care  to  the 
affairs  of  the  principal,  as  to  his  own.     He  is  another  self, 
and  should  act  in  that  capacity.     The  necessity  of  this  rule 
is  apparent  from  the  fact,  that  no  other  rule  could  be  de- 
vised, either  by  which  the  one  party  would  know  what 
justly  to  demand,  or  the  other  when  the  demands  of  justice 
were  fulfilled. 

Hence,  if  an  agent  do  not  give  all  the  care  to  the  affairs 
of  his  principal  that  he  would  do  to  his  own,  and  loss  occur, 
he  ought  to  sustain  it.  If  a  lawyer  lose  a  cause  through 
negligence,  or  palpable  ignorance,  he  ought,  in  justice,  to 
suffer  the  consequences.  He  receives  fees  for  conducting 
the  cause  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  and,  by  undertaking  to 
conduct  it,  puts  it  out  of  the  power  of  the  client  to  employ 
22 


254        MODES    IN    WHICH    THE    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY 

any  one  else.  Thus,  if  he  neglect  it,  and,  by  neglecting  it, 
his  client  is  worse  off  than  if  he  had  not  undertaken  it,  he 
accepts  fees  for  really  injuring  his  neighbor.  He  ought  to 
bear  the  loss  which  has  occurred  by  his  own  fault. 

A  question  frequently  arises  here  of  considerable  impor- 
tance. It  is,  When  is  he  obliged  to  obey  the  instructions 
of  his  principal ;  and  when  is  he  obliged  to  act  without 
regard  to  them?  Although  this  question  does  not  come 
under  the  right  of  property,  it  may  be  as  well  to  notice  it 
here  as  any  where  else. 

The  question,  I  suppose,  is  to  be  answered  by  deciding 
to  which  of  the  above  specified  kinds  of  agencies  the  case 
to  be  considered  belongs. 

1.  If  it  be  simple  agency,  that  is,  where  the  agent  un- 
dertakes m'erely  to  execute  the  will  of  the  principal,  and  in 
the  manner,  and  by  the  means,  specified  by  the  principal, 
he  must  obey  implicitly,  (conscience  only  excepted,)  unless 
some  fact  material  to  the  formation  of  a  judgment  has  come 
to  light  after  giving  the  order,  which,  if  known,  would  have 
necessarily  modified  the  intention  of  the  principal.     This  is 
the  law  of  the  military  service.     Here,  even   when   the 
reason  for  disobedience  of  orders  is  ever  so  clear,  and  an 
agent  disobeys,  he  does  it  at  his  own  risk  ;  and,  hence,  the 
modifying  facts  should  be  obvious  and  explicit,  in  order  to 
justify  a  variation  from  the  instructions. 

2.  When  the  agency  is  of  the  other  kind,  and  the  will 
of  the  principal  is  only  supposed  to  direct  the  end,  while 
the  means  and  manner  are  to  be  decided  upon  by  the  pro- 
fessional skill  of  the  agent,  I  suppose  that  the  agent  is  not 
bound  to  obey  the  directions  of  his  principal.     He  is  sup- 
posed to  know  more  on  the  subject,  and  to  be  better  able 
to  decide  what  will  benefit  his  principal,  than  the  principal 
himself;  and  he  has  no  right  to  injure  another  man,  even 
if  the  other  man  desire  it ;  nor  has  he  a  right  to  lend  him- 
self as  an  instrument  by  which  another  man,  by  conse- 
quence of  his  ignorance,  shall  injure  himself.      Besides, 
every  man   has  a   professional   reputation  to   sustain,  on 
which  his  means  of  living  depend.     He  has  no  right  to 
injure  this,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  another,  especially 
when,  by  so  gratifying  the  other,  he  shall  ruin  himself  also. 


MAY   BE    VIOLATED    BY   THE    INDIVIDUAL.  255 

A  physician  has  no  right  to  give  his  patient  drugs  which 
will  poison  him,  because  a  patient  wishes  it.  A  lawyer  has 
no  right  to  bring  a  cause  into  court  in  such  a  manner  as 
will  ensure  the  loss  of  it,  because  his  client  insists  upon  it. 
The  professional  agent  is  bound  to  conduct  the  business  of 
his  profession  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  This  is  the  end  of 
his  responsibility.  If  it  please  his  client,  well  ;  if  not,  the 
relation  must  cease,  and  the  principal  must  find  another 
agent. 

A  representative  in  Congress  is  manifestly  an  agent  of 
the  latter  of  these  two  classes.  He  is  chosen  on  account 
of  his  supposed  legislative  ability.  Hence,  he  is  strictly  a 
professional  agent ;  and,  on  these  principles,  he  is  under  no 
sort  of  obligation  to  regard  the  instructions  of  his  constitu- 
ents. He  is  merely  bound  to  promote  their  best  interests, 
but  the  manner  of  doing  it  is  to  be  decided  by  his  superior 
skill  and  ability. 

But,  secondly,  is  he  bound  to  resign  his  seat,  if  he  differ 
from  them  in  opinion  ?  This  is  a  question  to  be  decided 
by  the  constitution  of  the  country  under  which  he  acts. 
Society,  that  is,  the  whole  nation,  have  a  right  to  form  a 
government  as  they  will ;  and  to  choose  representatives 
during  good  behavior,  that  is,  for  as  long  a  time  as  they 
and  their  representatives  entertain  the  same  views  ;  or,  set- 
ting aside  this  mode  for  reasons  which  may  seem  good  to 
themselves,  to  elect  them  for  a  certain  period  of  service. 
Now,  if  they  have  chosen  the  latter  mode,  they  have  bound 
themselves  to  abide  by  it,  and  have  abandoned  the  former. 
If  they  elect  him  during  pleasure,  he  is  so  elected.  If  they, 
on  the  contrary,  elect  him  for  two  years,  or  for  six  years, 
he  is  so  elected.  And,  so  far  as  I  can  discover,  here  the 
question  rests.  It  is  in  the  power  of  society  to  alter  the 
tenure  of  office,  if  they  please;  but,  until  it  be  altered, 
neither  party  can  claim  any  thing  more  or  different  from 
what  that  tenure  actually  and  virtually  expresses. 


256    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY    AS    VIOLATED    BY    SOCIETY. 

SECTION    III. 

THE  RIGHT   OF    PROPERTY  AS  VIOLATED   BY   SOCIETY. 

I  have  already  stated  that,  whatever  a  man  possesses,  he 
possesses  exclusively  of  every  man,  and  of  all  men.  He 
has  a  right  to  use  his  property  in  such  a  manner  as  will 
promote  his  own  happiness,  provided  he  do  not  interfere 
with  the  rights  of  others.  But  with  this  right,  society  may 
interfere,  as  well  as  individuals ;  and  the  injury  is  here  the 
greater,  inasmuch  as  it  is  remediless.  In  this  world  the 
individual  knows  of  no  power  superior  to  society,  and  from 
its  decisions,  even  when  unjust,  he  has  no  appeal.  A  few 
suggestions  on  this  part  of  the  subject,  will  close  the  present 
chapter. 

I  have  mentioned  that  the  individual  has  a  right  to  use 
his  property,  innocently,  as  he  will,  exclusively  of  any  man, 
or  of  all  men.  It  is  proper  to  state  here,  that  this  right  is 
apparently  modified  by  his  becoming  a  member  of  society. 
When  men  form  a  civil  society,  they  mutually  agree  to  con- 
fer upon  the  individual  certain  benefits  upon  certain  con- 
ditions. But  as  these  benefits  cannot  be  attained  without 
incurring  some  expenses,  as,  for  instance,  those  of  courts  of 
justice,  legislation,  &,c.,  it  is  just  that  every  individual  who 
enters  the  society,  and  thus  enjoys  these  benefits,  should  pay 
his  portion  of  the  expense.  By  the  very  act  of  becoming  a 
member  of  society,  he  renders  himself  answerable  for  his 
portion  of  that  burden,  without  the  incurring  of  which,  society 
could  not  exist.  He  has  his  option,  to  leave  society,  or  to 
join  it.  But  if  he  join  it,  he  must  join  it  on  the  same  con- 
ditions as  others.  He  demands  the  benefit  of  laws,  and  of 
protection  ;  but  he  has  no  right  to  demand  what  other  men 
have  purchased,  unless  he  will  pay  for  it  an  equitable  price. 

From  these  principles,  it  will  follow,  that  society  has  a 
natural  right  to  require  every  individual  to  contribute  his 
portion  of  those  expenses  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
society. 

Besides  these,  however,  the  members  of  a  society  have 


RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY    AS    VIOLATED    BY    SOCIETY.    257 

the  power  to  agree  together  to  contribute  for  objects  which, 
if  not  essential  to  the  existence,  are  yet  important  to  the 
well-being  of  society.  If  they  so  agree,  they  are  bound  to 
fulfil  this  agreement ;  for  a  contract  between  the  individual 
and  society,  is  as  binding  as  one  between  individual  and 
individual.  Hence,  if  such  an  agreement  be  made,  society 
has  a  right  to  enforce  it.  This,  however,  by  no  means 
decides  the  question  of  the  original  wisdom  of  any  particular 
compact ;  much  less  is  it  meant  to  be  asserted,  that  the 
individual  is  bound  by  the  acts  of  a  majority,  when  that 
majority  has  exceeded  its  power.  These  subjects  belong 
to  a  subsequent  chapter.  What  is  meant  to  be  asserted 
here,  is,  that  there  may  arise  cases  in  which  society  may 
rightfully  oblige  the  individual  to  contribute  for  purposes 
which  are  not  absolutely  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
society. 

The  difference,  which  we  wish  to,  establish,  is  this :  In 
the  case  of  whatever  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society, 
society  has  a  natural  right  to  oblige  the  individual  to  bear 
his  part  of  the  burden ;  that  is,  it  has  a  right  over  his 
property  to  this  amount,  without  obtaining  any  concession 
on  his  part.  Society  has,  manifestly,  a  right  to  whatever  is 
necessary  to  its  own  existence. 

Whatever,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  society,  is  not  in  the  power  of  society,  unless 
it  has  been  conferred  upon  it  by  the  will  of  the  individual. 
That  this  is  the  rule,  is  evident  from  the  necessity  of  the 
case.  No  other  rule  could  be  devised,  which  would  not 
put  the  property  of  the  individual  wholly  in  the  power  of 
society ;  or,  in  other  words,  absolutely  destroy  the  liberty 
of  the  individual. 

If  such  be  the  facts,  it  will  follow  that  society  has  a  right 
over  the  property  of  the  individual,  for  all  purposes  necessa- 
ry to  the  existence  of  society  ;  and,  secondly,  in  all  respects 
in  which  the  individual  has  conferred  that  power,  but  only 
for  the  purposes  for  which  it  was  conferred. 

And  hence,  1.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  individual  to  hold  his 

property  always  subject  to  these  conditions ;  and,  for  such 

purposes,  freely  to  contribute  his  portion  of  that  expense 

for   which   he,   in   common   with   others,  is  receiving  an 

22* 


258    RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY    AS    VIOLATED    BY   SOCIETY. 

equivalent.     No  one  has  any  more  right  than  another  to 
receive  a  consideration  without  making  a  remuneration. 

2.  The  individual  has  a  right  to  demand  that  no  imposi- 
tions be  laid  upon  him,  unless  they  come  under  the  one  or 
the  other  of  these  classes. 

3.  He  has  a  right  to  demand,  that  the  burdens  of  society 
be  laid  upon  individuals  according  to  some  equitable  law. 
This  law  should  be  founded,  as  nearly  as  possible,  upon 
the  principle,  that  each  one  should  pay,  in  proportion  to. 
the   benefits   which   he   receives   from  the   protection   of 
society.     As  these  benefits  are  either  personal  or  pecuniary, 
and  as  those  which  are  personal  are  equal,  it  would  seem 
just  that  the  variation  should  be  in  proportion  to  property. 

If  these  principles  be  just,  it  is  evident  that  society  may 
violate  the  right  of  individual  property,  in  the  following 
ways: 

1.  By  taking,  through  the  means  of  government,  which 
Is  its  agent,  the  property  of  the  individual,  arbitrarily,  or 
merely  by  the  will  of  the  executive.     Such  is  the  nature  of 
the  exactions  in  despotic  governments. 

2.  When,   by    arbitrary   will,  or  by   law,  it  takes   the 
property  of  the  individual   for  purposes,  which,  whether 
good  or  bad,  are  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society, 
when  the  individuals  of  society  have  not  consented  that  it 
be  so  appropriated.     This  consent  is  never  to  be  presumed, 
except  in  the  case  of  necessary  expenditures,  as  has  been 
shown.     Whenever  this  plea  cannot  be  made  good,  society 
has  no  right  to  touch  the  property  of  the  individual,  unless 
it  can  show  the  constitutional  provision.     Were  our  govern- 
ment to  levy  a  tax  to  build  churches,  it  would  avail  nothing 
to  say,   that  churches  were  wanted,  or  that  the  good  of 
society  demanded  it ;  it  would  be  an  invasion  of  the  right  of 
property,  until  the  article  in  the  constitution  could  be  shown, 
granting  to  the  government  power  over  property,  for  this 
very  purpose. 

3.  Society,  even  when  the  claim  is  just,  may  violate  the 
rights  of  the  individual,  by  adopting  an  inequitable  rule  in 
the  distribution  of'  the  public  burdens.     Every  individual 
has  an  equal  right  to  employ  his  property  unmolested,  in 
just  such  manner  as  will  innocently  promote  his  own  hap- 


RIGHT    OF    PROPERTY    A3    VIOLATED    BY   SOCIETY.    259 

piness.  That  is,  it  is  to  society  a  matter  of  indifference  in 
what  way  he  employs  it.  Provided  it  be  innocent,  it  does 
not  come  within  the  view  of  society.  Hence,  in  this 
respect,  all  modes  of  employing  it  are  equal.  And  the 
only  question  to  be  considered,  in  adjusting  the  appropria- 
tion, is,  How  much  does  he  ask  society  to  protect  ?  and  by 
this  rule  it  should,  as  we  have  said  before,  be  adjusted.  If, 
then,  besides  this  rule,  another  be  adopted ;  and  an  indi- 
vidual be  obliged,  besides  his  pro  rata  proportion,  to  bear  a 
burden  levied  on  his  particular  catting,  to  the  exemption  of 
another,  he  has  a  right  to  complain.  He  is  obliged  to  bear 
a  double  burden,  and  one  portion  of  the  burden  is  laid  for 
a  cause  over  which  society  professes  itself  to  have  no  juris- 
diction. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  value  of  property  depends  upon  the 
unrestrained  use  which  I  am  allowed  to  make  of  it,  for  the 
promotion  of  my  individual  happiness,  society  interferes 
with  the  right  of  property,  if  it  in  any  manner  abridge  any 
of  these.  One  man  is  rendered  happy  by  accumulation, 
another  by  benevolence ;  one  by  promoting  science, 
another  by  promoting  religion.  Each  one  has  a  right  to 
use  what  is  his  own,  exactly  as  he  pleases.  And  if  society 
interfere,  by  directing  the  manner  in  which  he  shall  appro- 
priate it,  it  is  an  act  of  injustice.  It  is  as  great  a  violation 
of  property,  for  instance,  to  interfere  with  the  purpose  ot 
the  individual  in  the  appropriation  of  his  property  for  reli- 
gious purposes,  as  it  is  to  enact  that  a  farmer  shall  keep  but 
three  cows,  or  a  manufacturer  employ  but  ten  workmen. 


260 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 

JUSTICE    AS  IT   RESPECTS   CHARACTER. 

CHARACTER  is  the  present  intellectual,  social,  and  moral 
condition  of  an  individual.  It  comprehends  his  actual 
acquisitions,  his  capacities,  his  habits,  his  tendencies,  his 
moral  feelings,  and  every  thing  which  enters  into  a  man'o 
state  for  the  present,  or  his  powers  for  attaining  to  a  better 
state  in  the  future. 

That  character,  in  this  sense,  is  by  far  the  most  impor- 
tant of  all  the  possessions  which  a  man  can  call  his  own,  is 
too  evident,  to  need  discussion.  It  is  the  source  of  all  that 
he  either  suffers  or  enjoys  here,  and  of  all  that  he  either 
fears  or  hopes  for  hereafter. 

If  such  be  jthe   fact,  benevolence  would  teach  us  the 

obligation  to  do  all  in  our  power  to  improve  the  character 

of  our  neighbor.     This  is  its  chief  office^    This  is  the  great 

rf    practical  aim  of  Christianity.     Reciprocity  merely  jfrohibits 

the  infliction  of  any  injury  upon  the  character  of  another. 

The  reasons  of  this  prohibition  are  obvious.  No  man 
can  injure  his  own  character,  without  violating  the  laws  of 
/  God,  and  also  creating  those  tendencies  which  result  in 
violation  of  the  laws  of  man.  He  who,  in  any  manner, 
becomes  voluntarily  the  cause  of  this  violation,  is  a  partaker, 
— and,  not  unfrequently,  the  largest  partaker, — in  die 
guilte  As  he  who  tempts  another  to  suicide  is,  in  the  sight 
of  God,  guilty  of  murder,  so  he  who  instigates  another  to 
wickedness,  by  producing  those  states  of  mind  which  neces- 
sarily lead  to  it,  is,  in  the  sight  of  God,  held  responsible,  in 
no  slight  degree,  for  the  result. 

Again,  consider  the  motives  which  lead  men  to  injure 
the  character  of  each  other.  These  are  either  pure  malice, 
or  reckless  self-gratification. 

First,  malice.     Some  men  so  far  transcend  the  ordinary 


JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  CHARACTER.      261 

limits  of  human  depravity,  as  to  derive  a  truly  fiend-like 
pleasure  from  alluring  and  seducing  from  the  paths  of 
virtue  the  comparatively  innocent,  and  to  exult  over  the 
moral  desolations  which  they  have  thus  accomplished. 
"  They  will  compass  sea  and  land  to  make  one  proselyte, 
and  when  he  is  made,  they  make  him  tenfold  more  the 
child  of  hell  than  themselves."  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
•add,  that  language  has  no  terms  of  moral  indignation  that 
are  capable  of  branding,  with  adequate  infamy,  conduct  so 
intensely  vicious.  It  is  wickedness,  without  excuse,  and 
without  palliation.  Or,  secondly,  take  the  more  favorable 
case.  One  man  wishes  to  accomplish  some  purpose  of 
self-gratification,  to  indulge  his  passions,  to  increase  his 
power,  or  to  feed  his  vanity ;  and,  he  proceeds  to  accom- 
plish that  purpose,  by  means  of  rendering  another  immortal 
and  accountable  moral  creature  degraded  for  ever, — a 
moral  pest  henceforth,  on  earth,  and  both  condemned,  and 
the  cause  of  condemnation  to  others,  throughout  eternity. 
Who  has  given  this  wretch  a  right  to  work  so  awful  a  ruin 
among  CocTs  creatures,  for  the  gratification  of  a  momentary 
and  an  unholy  desire?  And  will  not  the  Judge  of  all, 
when  he  maketh  inquisition  for  blood,  press  to  the  lips  of 
such  a  sinner  the  bitterest  dregs  of  the  cup  of  trembling  ? 

With  this,  all  the  teaching  of  the  sacred  Scriptures  is 
consonant.  The  most  solemn  maledictions  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures  are  uttered  against  those  who  have  been  the  in- 
struments of  corrupting  others.  In  the  Old  Testament, 
Jeroboam  is  signalized  as  a  sinner  of  unparalleled  atrocity, 
because  he  made  Israel  to  sin.  In  the  New  Testament, 
the  judgment  of  the  Pharisees  has  been  already  alluded  to. 
And,  again,  "  Whosoever  shall  break  the  least  of  these 
commandments,  and  shall  teach  men  so,  shall  be  called 
least  in  the  kingdom  of  heaven."  By  comparison  with 
the  preceding  verse,  the  meaning  of  this  passage  is  seen  to 
be,  that,  as  the  doing  and  teaching  the  commandments  of 
God  is  the  great  proof  of  virtue,  so  the  breaking  them,  and 
the  teaching  others  to  break  them,  is  the  great  proof  of 
vice.  And,  in  the  Revelation,  where  God  is  represented  as 
taking  signal  vengeance  upon  Babylon,  it  is  because  "  she 
did  corrupt  the  earth  with  her  wickedness." 


262  JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    CHARACTER. 

The  moral  precept  on  this  subject,  then,  is  briefly  this . 
We  are  forbidden,  for  any  cause,  or  under  any  pretence,  or 
in  any  manner,  willingly  to  vitiate  the  character  of  another. 

This  prohibition  may  be  violated  in  two  ways  : 

1.  By  weakening  the  moral  restraints  of  men. 

2.  By  exciting  their  evil  passions. 

I.    BY  WEAKENING  THE  MORAL  RESTRAINTS  OF  MEN. 

It  has  been  already  shown,  that  the  passions  of  men 
were  intended  to  be  restrained  by  conscience  ;  and  that  the 
restraining  power  of  conscience  is  increased  by  the  doc- 
trines and  motives  derived  from  natural  and  revealed  reli- 
gion. Whoever,  therefore,  in  any  manner,  renders  obtuse 
the  moral  sensibilities  of  others,  or  diminishes  the  power 
of  that  moral  truth  by  which  these  sensibilities  are  rendered 
operative,  inflicts  permanent  injury  upon  the  character  of 
his  fellow-men.  This  also  is  done  by  all  wicked  example ; 
for,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the  sight  of  wickedness  weak- 
ens the  power  of  conscience  over  us.  It  is  done  when, 
either  by  conversation  or  by  writing,  the  distinctions  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  are  treated  with  open  scorn  or  covert 
contempt ;  by  all  conduct  calculated  to  render  inoperative 
the  sanctions  of  religion,  as  profanity,  or  Sabbath  breaking ; 
by  ridicule  of  the  obligations  of  morality  and  religion,  under 
the  names  of  superstition,  priestcraft,  prejudices  of  educa- 
tion ;  or,  by  presenting  to  men  such  views  of  the  character 
of  God  as  would  lead  them  to  believe  that  He  cares  very 
little  about  the  moral  actions  of  his  creatures,  but  is  willing 
that  every  one  shall  live  as  he  chooses  ;  and  that,  therefore, 
the  self-denials  of  virtue  are  only  a  form  of  gratuitous, 
self-inflicted  torture. 

It  is  against  this  form  of  moral  injury  that  the  young 
need  to  be  specially  upon  their  guard.  The  moral  sedu- 
cer, if  he  be  a  practised  villain,  corrupts  the  principles  of 
his  victim  before  he  attempts  to  influence  his  or  her  prac- 
tice. It  is  not  until  the  moral  restraints  are  silently  re- 
moved, and  the  heart  left  defenceless,  that  he  presents  the 
allurements  of  vice,  and  goads  the  passions  to  madness. 
His  task  is  then  easy.  If  he  have  succeeded  in  the  first 
effort,  he  will  rarely  fail  in  the  second.  Let  every  young 
man,  especially  every  young  woman,  beware  of  listening 


JUSTICE    AS  IT  RESPECTS    CHARACTER.  263 

for  a  moment  to  any  conversation,  of  which  the  object  is, 
to  show  that  the  restraints  of  virtue  are  unnecessary,  or  to 
diminish,  in  aught,  the  reverence  and  obedience,  which  are 
due  from  the  creature  to  the  law  of  the  Creator. 

II.  We  injure  the  characters  of  men  BY  EXCITING  TO 

ACTION  THEIR  EVIL  DISPOSITIONS. 

1.  By  viciously  stimulating  their  imaginations.     No  one 
is  corrupt  in  action,  until  he  has  become  corrupt  in   imagi- 
nation.    And,  on  the  other  hand,  he  who  has  filled  his  imagi- 
nation with  conceptions  of  vice,  and  who  loves  to  feast  his 
depraved  moral  appetite  with  imaginary  scenes  of  impurity, 
needs  but  the  opportunity  to   become  openly  abandoned. 
Hence,  one  of  the  most  nefarious  means  of  corrupting,  men, 
is   to   spread   before   them  those  images  of  pollution,  by 
which  they  will,  in  secret,  become  familiar  with  sin.     Such 
is  the  guilt  of  those  who  write,  or  publish,  or  sell,  or  lend, 
vicious  books,  under  whatever  name  or  character,  and  of 
those  who  engrave,  or  publish,  or  sell,  or  lend,  or  exhibit, 
obscene  or  lascivious  pictures.     Few  instances  of  human 
depravity  are  marked  by  deeper  atrocity,  than  that  of  an 
author,  or  a  publisher,  who,  from  literary  vanity,  or  sordid 
love  of  gain,  pours  forth  over  society  a  stream  of  moral 
pollution,  either  in  prose  or  in  poetry. 

And  yet,  there  are  not  only  men  who  will  do  this,  but, 
what  is  worse,  there  are  men,  yes,  and  women,  too,  who, 
if  the  culprit  have  possessed  talent,  will  commend  it,  and 
even  weep  tears  of  sympathy  over  the  infatuated  genius, 
who  was  so  sorely  persecuted  by  that  unfeeling  portion  of 
the  world,  who  would  not  consider  talent  synonymous  with 
virtue,  and  who  could  not  applaud  the  effort  of  that  ability 
which  was  exerted  only  to  multiply  the  victims  of  vice. 

2.  By  ministering  to  the  appetites  of  others.     Such  is 
the  relation  of  the  power  of  appetite  to  that  of  conscience, 
that,  where  no  positive  allurements  to  vice  are  set  before 
men,   conscience   will    frequently   retain    its    ascendency. 
While,  on  the  other  hand,  if  allurement  be  added  to  the 
power  of  appetite,  reason  and  conscience  prove  a  barrier 
too  feeble  to  resist   their  combined  and  vicious  tendency. 
Hence,  he  who  presents  the   allurements   of  vice  before 
others,  who  procures  and  sets  before  them  the  means  of 


264  JUSTICE"  AS    IT    RESPECTS    CHARACTER. 

vicious  gratification,  is,  in  a  great  degree,  responsible  for  the 
mischief  which  he  produces.  Violations  of  this  law  occur 
in  most  cases  of  immoral  traffic,  as  in  the  sale  and  manu- 
facture of  intoxicating  liquors,  the  sale  of  opium  to  the 
Chinese,  &tc.  Under  the  same  class,  is  also  comprehended 
the  case  of  female  prostitution. 

3.  By  using  others  to  minister  to  our  vicious  appetites. 
We  cannot  use  others  as  ministers  to  our  vices,  without  ren- 
dering them  corrupt,  and  frequently  inflicting  an  incurable 
wound  upon  their  moral  nature.     For  the  sake  of  a  base 
and  wicked  momentary  gratification,  the  vicious  man  will- 
ingly ruins  for  ever  an  immortal  being,  who  was,  but  for 
him,  innocent ;  and,  yet.  more,  not  unfrequently  considers 
this  ruin  a  matter  of  triumph.     Such  is  the  case  in  seduc- 
tion and  adultery,  and,  in  a  modified  degree,  in  all  manner 
of  lewdness  and  profligacy. 

4.  By  cherishing  the  evil  passions  of  men.     By   pas- 
sion, in  distinction  from  appetite,  I  mean  the   spiritual  in 
opposition  to  the  corporeal  desires.     It  frequently  happens, 
that  we  wish  to  influence  men,  who  cannot  be  moved  by 
an  appeal  to  their  reason  or  conscience,  but  who  can  be 
easily  moved  by  an  appeal  to  their  ambition,  their  avarice, 
their  party  zeal,  their  pride,  or  their  vanity.     An  acquaint- 
ance with  these  peculiarities   of  individuals,  is  frequently 
called,  understanding   human  nature,  "knowing  the   weak 
sides  of  men.,  and  is,  by   many    persons,  considered   the 
grand  means  for  great  and  masterly  effect.     But  he  can 
have  but  little  practical    acquaintance  with  a  conscience 
void  of  offence,  who  does  not  instinctively  feel  that  such 
conduct  is  unjust,  mean  and  despicable.     It  is  accomplish 
ing  our  purposes,  by  means  of  the  moral   degradation  oi 
him  of  whom  we  profess  to  be  the  friends.     It  is  mani- 
festly doing  a  man  a  greater  injury  that  simply  to  rob  him. 
If  we  stole  his  money,  he  would  be  injured  only  by  being 
made  poorer.     If  we  procure  his  services  or  his  money  in 
this  manner,  we  also  make   him  poorer;  and  we  besides 
cultivate  those  evil  dispositions,  which  already  expose  him 
to  sharpers ;  and  also  render  him  more  odious  to  the  God 
before  whom  he  must  shortly  stand. 

Nor  do  the  ordinary  excuses  on  this  subject  avail.     It  may 


JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    CHARACTER.  265 

be  said,  men  would  not  give  to  benevolent  objects,  but 
from  these  motives.  Suppose  it  true.  What  if  they  did 
not  ?  They  would  be  as  well  off,  morally,  as  they  are  now. 
A  man  is  no  better,  after  having  refused  from  avarice,  who, 
at  length,  gives  from  vanity.  His  avarice  is  no  better,  and 
his  vanity  is  even  worse.  It  may  be  said,  the  cause  of 
benevolence  could  not  be  sustained  without  it.  Then,  I 
say,  let  the  cause  of  benevolence  perish.  God  never  meant 
one  party  of  his  creatures  to  be  relieved,  by  our  inflicting 
moral  injury  upon  another.  If  there  be  no  other  way  of  sus- 
taining benevolence,  God  did  not  mean  that  benevolence 
should  be  sustained.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  appeal  to  men's 
better  feelings  is  the  proper  appeal  to  be  made  to  men.  It 
will,  when  properly  made,  generally  succeed  ;  and  if  it  do 
not,  our  responsibility  is  at  an  end. 

I  cannot  leave  this  subject,  without  urging  it  upon  those 
who  are  engaged  in  promoting  the  objects  of  benevolent  as- 
sociations. It  seems  to  me,  that  no  man  has  a  right  to 
E resent  any  other  than  an  innocent  motive,  to  urge  his 
jllow-men  to  action.  Motives  derived  from  party  zeal, 
from  personal  vanity,  from  love  of  applause,  however 
covertly  insinuated,  are  not  of  this  character.  If  a  man,  by 
exciting  such  feelings,  sold  me  a  horse  at  twice  its  value, 
he  would  be  a  sharper.  If  he  excite  me  to  give  from  the 
same  motives,  the  action  partakes  of  the  same  character. 
The  cause  of  benevolence  is  holy :  it  is  the  cause  of  God. 
It  needs  not  human  chicanery  to  approve  it  to  the  human 
heart.  Let  him  who  advocates  it,  therefore,  go  forth  strong 
in  the  strength  of  Him  whose  cause  he  advocates.  Let  him 
rest  his  cause  upon  its  own  merits,  and  leave  every  man's 
conscience  to  decide  whether  or  not  he  will  enlist  himself 
in  its  support.  And,  besides,  were  men  conscientiously  to 
confine  themselves  to  the  merits  of  their  cause,  they  would 
much  more  carefully  weigh  their  undertakings,  before  they 
attempted  to  enlist  others  in  support  of  them.  Much  of  that 
fanaticism,  which  withers  the  moral  sympathies  of  man, 
would  thus  be  checked  at  the  outset. 
23 


266 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

0 
OF   JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION. 

IT  has  been  already  remarked,  that  every  man  is,  by  the 
laws  of  his  Creator,  entitled  to  the  physical  results  of  his 
labor ;  that  is,  to  those  results  which  arise  from  the  operation 
of  those  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  which  govern  the  material 
on  which  he  operates.  Thus,  if  a  man  form  several  trees 
into  a  house,  the  result  of  this  labor,  supposing  the  materials 
and  time  to  be  his  own,  are  his  own  also.  Thus,  again,  if 
a  man  study  diligently,  the  amount  of  knowledge  which  he 
gains  is  at  his  own  disposal ;  and  he  is  at  liberty,  innocently, 
to  use  it  as  he  will.  And,  in  general,  if  a  man  be  indus- 
trious, the  immediate  results  of  industry  are  his,  and  no  one 
has  any  right  to  interfere  with  them. 

But  these  are  not  the  only  results.  There  are  others, 
springing  from  those  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  which  govern 
the  opinions  and  actions  of  men  towards  each  other,  which 
are  frequently  of  as  great  importance  to  the  individual,  as 
the  physical  results.  Thus,  if  a  man  have  built  a  house, 
the  house  is  his.  But,  if  he  have  done  it  well,  there  arises, 
in  the  minds  of  men,  a  certain  opinion  of  his  skill,  and  a 
regard  towards  him  on  account  of  it,  which  may  be  of  more 
value  to  him  than  even  the  house  itself ;  for  it  may  be  the 
foundation  of  great  subsequent  good  fortune.  The  indus- 
trious student  is  entitled,  not  merely  to  the  use  of  that 
knowledge  which  he  has  acquired,  but  also  to  the  esteem 
which  the  possession  of  that  knowledge  gives  him  among 
men.  Now,  these  secondary  and  indirect  results,  though 
they  may  follow  other  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  are  yet  as 
truly  effects  of  the  original  cause,  that  is,  of  the  character 
and  actions  of  the  man  himself,  and  they  as  truly  belong  to 
him,  as  the  primary  and  direct  results  of  which  we  have 
before  spoken.  And,  hence,  to  diminish  the  esteem  in 


JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION.      267 

which  a  man  is  held  by  his  fellows,  to  detract  from  the 
reputation  which  he  has  thus  acquired,  is  as  great  a  violation 
of  justice,  nay,  it  may  be  a  far  greater  violation  of  justice, 
than  robbing  him  of  money.  It  has,  moreover,  the  additional 
aggravation  of  conferring  no  benefit  upon  the  aggressor, 
beyond  that  of  the  gratification  of  a  base  and  malignant 
passion. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  the  man  has  a  reputation  greater 
than  he  deserves,  or  a  reputation  for  that  which  he  does 
not  deserve.  Have  I  not  a  right  to  diminish  it  to  its  true 
level  ? 

We  answer,  The  objection  proceeds  upon  the  concession 
that  the  man  lias  a  reputation.  That  is,  men  have  such  or 
such  an  opinion  concerning  him.  Now,  the  rule  of  prop- 
erty, formerly  mentioned,  applies  here,  if  a  man  be  in 
possession  of  property,  though  unjustly  in  possession,  this 
gives  to  no  one  a  right  to  seize  upon  that  property  for  him- 
self, or  to  seize  it  and  destroy  it,  unless  he  can,  himself, 
show  a  better  title.  The  very  fact  of  possession  bars  every 
other  claimant,  except  that  claimant  whom  the  present  pos- 
sessor has  defrauded.  So,  in  this  case,  if  this  reputation  injures 
the  reputation  of  another,  the  other  has  a  right  to  set  forth 
his  own  claims  ;  and  any  one  else  has  a  right,  when  prompt- 
ed by  a  desire  of  doing  justice  to  the  injured,  to  state  the 
facts  as  they  are  ;  but  where  this  element  of  desire  to  do 
justice  does  not  enter,  no  man  has  a  right  to  diminish  the 
esteem  in  which  another  is  held,  simply  because  he  may 
believe  the  other  to  have  more  than  he  deserves. 

The  moral  rule,  on  this  subject,  I  suppose  to  be  this  : 
We  are  forbidden  to  utter  any  thing  which  will  be  injurious 
to  the  reputation  of  another,  except  for  adequate  cause.  I 
say,  for  adequate  cause,  because  occasions  may  occur,  in 
which  it  is  as  much  our  duty  to  speak,  as  it  is  at  other  times 
our  duty  to  be  silent.  The  consideration  of  these  cases  will 
be  a  subsequent  concern.  The  precept,  thus  understood, 
applies  to  the  cases  in  which  we  speak  either  from  no  suf- 
ficient motive,  or  from  a  bad  motive.  It  is  merely  an  ex- 
tension of  the  great  principle  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  which 
commands  us  to  have  the  same  simple  desire  that  every 
other  man  should'  enjoy,  unmolested,  the  esteem  in  which 


268      JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION. 

he  is  held  by  men,  that  we  have  to  enjoy,  unmolested,  the 
same  possession  ourselves. 

I  do  not  here  consider  the  cases  in  which  we  utter, 
either  wilfully  or  thoughtlessly,  injurious  falsehood  respecting 
another.  In  these  cases,  the  guilt  of  lying  is  superadded 
to  that  of  slander.  I  merely  here  consider  slander  by  itself; 
it  being  understood  that,  when  what  is  asserted  is  false,  it 
involves  the  sin  of  lying,  besides  the  violation  of  the  law  of 
reciprocity,  which  we  are  here  endeavoring  to  enforce. 

The  precept  includes  several  specifications.  Some  of 
them  it  may  be  important  to  enumerate. 

I.  It  prohibits  us  from  giving  publicity  to  the  bad  actions 
of  men,  without  cause.  The  guilt  here  consists  in  cause- 
lessly giving  publicity.  Of  course,  it  does  not  include 
those  cases  in  which  the  man  himself  gives  publicity  to  his 
own  bad  actions.  He  has  himself  diminished  his  reputation, 
and  his  act  becomes  a  part  of  public  indiscriminate  infor- 
mation. We  are  at  liberty  to  mention  this,  like  any  other 
fact,  when  the  mention  of  it  is  demanded ;  but  not  to  do  it 
for  the  sake  of  injuring  him.  So,  whenever  his  bad  actions 
are  made  known  by  the  providence  of  God,  it  comes  under 
the  same  rule.  Thus,  I  may  know  that  a.  man  has  acted 
dishonestly.  This  alone  does  not  give  me  liberty  to  speak 
of  it.  But,  if  his  dishonesty  have  been  proved  before  a  court 
of  justice,  it  then  becomes  really  a  part  of  his  reputation, 
and  I  am  at  liberty  to  speak  of  it  in  the  same  manner  as  of 
any  other  fact.  Yet  even  here,  if  I  speak  of  it  with  pleas- 
ure, or  with  a  desire  of  injury,  I  commit  sin. 

Some  of  the  reasons  for  this  rule,  are  the  following  : 

1.  The  very  act  itself  is  injurious  to  the  slanderer's  own 
moral  character,  and  to  that  oLhim  who  lends  himself  to  be 
his  auditor.     Familiarity  with  wrong  diminishes  our  abhor- 
rence of  it.     The  contemplation  of  it  in  others  fosters  the 
spirit  of  envy  and  uncharitableness,  and  leads  us,  in  the  end, 
to  exult  in,  rather  than  sorrow  over,  the  faults  of  others. 

2.  In  the  present  imperfect  state,  where  every  individual, 
being  fallible,  must  fail  somewhere,  if  every  one  were  at  lib- 
erty to  speak  of  all  the  wrong  and  all  the  imperfection  of  every 
one  whom  he  knew,  society  would  soon  become  intolerable, 
from  the   festering  of  universal  ill-will.     What  would  be- 


JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    REPUTATION.  269 

come  of  families,  of  friendships,  of  communities,  if  parents 
and  children,  husbands  and  wives,  acquaintances,  neighbors, 
and  citizens,  should  proclaim  every  failing  which  they  knew 
or  heard  of,  respecting  each  other?  Now,  there  can  no 
medium  be  established  between  telling  every  thing,  and 
forbidding  every  thing  to  be  told  which  is  told  without 
adequate  cause. 

3.  We  may  judge  of  the  justice  of  the  rule,  by  applying 
it  to  ourselves.  We  despise  the  man  who,  either  thought- 
lessly or  maliciously,  proclaims  what  he  considers,  either 
justly  or  unjustly,  our  failings.  Now,  what  can  be  more 
unjust  or  more  despicable,  than  to  do  that  which  our  own 
conscience  testifies  to  be  unjust  and  despicable  in  others  ? 

II.  The  same  law  forbids  us  to  utter  general  conclusions 
respecting  the  characters  of  men,  drawn   from  particular 
bad   actions  which  they  may  have  committed.     This  is 
manifest  injustice,  and  it  includes,  frequently,  lying  as  well 
as  slander.     A  single  action  is  rarely  decisive  of  character, 
even  in  respect  to  that  department  of  character  to  which  it 
belongs.     A  single  illiberal  action  does  not  prove  a  man  to  be 
covetous,  any  more  than  a  single  act  of  charity  proves  him  to 
be  benevolent.     How  unjust,  then,  must  it  be,  to  proclaim 
a  man  destitute  of  a  whole  class  of  virtues,  because  of  one 
failure  in  virtue  !     How  much  more  unjust,  on  account  of 
one  fault,  to  deny  him  all  claim  to  any  virtue  whatsoever ! 
Yet  such  is  frequently  the  very  object  of  calumny.     And, 
in  general,  this  form  of  'vice  is  added  to  that  just  noticed. 
Men  first,  in  violation  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  make  public 
the  evil  actions  of  others  ;  and  then,  with  a  malignant  power 
of  generalization,  proceed  to  deny  their  claims,  not  only  to 
a  whole  class  of  virtues,  but,  not  unfrequently,  to  all  virtue 
whatsoever.     The  reasons,  in  this  case,  are  similar  to  those 
just  mentioned. 

III.  We  are  forbidden  to  judge,  that  is,  to  assign  un- 
necessarily bad  motives  to  the  actions  of  men.     I  say  un- 
necessarily, for  some  actions  are  in  their  nature  such,  that 
to  presume  a  good  motive  is  impossible. 

This  rule  would  teach  us,  first,  to  presume  no  unworthy 
motive,  when  the  action  is  susceptible  of  an  innocent  one. 
And,  secondly,  never  to  ascribe  to  an  action  which  we 
23* 


270  JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    REPUTATION. 

confess  to  be  good,  any  other  motive  than  that  from  which 
it  professes  to  proceed. 

This  is  the  rule  by  which  we  are  bound  to  be  governed 
in  our  own  private  opinions  of  men.  And  if,  from  any 
circumstances,  we  are  led  to  entertain  any  doubts  of  the 
motives  of  men,  we  are  bound  to  retain  these  doubts  within 
our  own  bosoms,  unless  we  are  obliged,  for  some  sufficient 
reason,  to  disclose  them.  But  if  we  are  obliged  to  adopt 
this  rule  respecting  our  own  opinions  of  others,  by  how 
much  more  are  we  obliged  to  adopt  it  in  the  publication  of 
our  opinions !  If  we  are  not  allowed,  unnecessarily,  to 
suppose  an  unworthy  motive,  by  how  much  less  are  we 
allowed  to  circulate  it,  and  thus  render  it  universally  sup- 
posed !  "  Charity  thinketh  no  evil,  rejoiceth  not  in  iniquity.'1 

The  reasons  for  this  rule  are  obvious  : 

1.  The  motives  of  men,  unless  rendered  evident  by  their 
actions,  can  be  known  to  God  alone.     They  are,  evidently, 
out  of  the  reach  of  man.     In  assigning  motives  unnecessa- 
rily, we  therefore  undertake  to  assert  as  fact,  what  we  at 
the  outset  confess  that  we  have  not  the  means  of  knowing 
to  be  such ;  which  is,  in  itself,   falsehood :  and  we   do  all 
this  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  a  contemptible  vanity,  or  a 
wicked  envy ;  or,  what  is  scarcely  less  reprehensible,  from 
a  thoughtless  love  of  talking. 

2.  There  is  no  offence  by  which  we  are  excited  to  a 
livelier  or  more  just  indignation,  than  by  the  misinterpreta- 
tion of  our  own  motives.     This  quick  sensitiveness  in  our- 
selves,  should  admonish  us  of  the  guilt  which  we  incur, 
when  we  traduce  the' motives  of  others. 

IV.  By  the  same  rule,  we  are  forbidden  to  lessen  the 
estimation  in  which  others  are  held,  by  ridicule,  mimicry, 
or  by  any  means  by  which  they  are  brought  into  contempt. 
No  man  can  be  greatly  respected  by  those  to  whom  he  is 
the  frequent  subject  of  laughter.  It  is  but  a  very  imperfect 
excuse  for  conduct  of  this  sort,  to  plead  that  we  do  not 
mean  any  harm.  What  do  we  mean  ?  Surely,  reasonable 
beings  should  be  prepared  to  answer  this  question.  Were 
the  witty  calumniator  to  stand  concealed,  and  hear  himself 
made  the  subject  of  remarks  precisely  similar  to  those  in 
which  he  indulges  respecting  others,  he  would  have  a  very 


JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECT3    KEPLTAT^C'N.  271 

definite  conception  of  what  oth,  ~s  mean.  Let  him,  then, 
carry  the  lesson  home  to  his  own  bosom. 

Nor  is  this  evil  the  less  for  the  veil  under  which  it  is 
frequently  and  hypocritically  hidden.  Men  and  women 
propagate  slander  under  the  cover  of  secrecy,  supposing 
that,  by  uttering  it  under  this  injunction,  the  guilt  is  of 
course  removed.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  simple  question 
is  this  :  Does  my  duty  either  to  God  or  to  man  require  me 
to  publish  this,  which  will  injure  another  ?  If  it  do,  publish 
it  wherever  that  duty  requires,  and  do  it  fearlessly.  If  it 
do  not,  it  is  just  as  great  guilt  to  publish  it  to  one  as  to 
another.  We  are  bound,  in  all  such  cases,  to  ask  ourselves 
the  question,  Am  I  under  obligation  to  tell  this  fact  to  this 
person  ?  If  not,  I  am  under  the  contrary  obligation  to  be 
silent.  And  still  more.  This  injunction  of  secrecy  is  gen- 
erally nothing  better  than  the  mere  dictate  of  cowardice. 
We  wish  to  gratify  our  love  of  detraction,  but  are  afraid  of 
the  consequences  to  ourselves.  We  therefore  converse 
under  this  injunction,  that  the  injury  to  another  may  be 
with  impunity  to  ourselves.  And  hence  it  is,  that  in  this 
manner  the  vilest  and  most  injurious  calumnies  are  generally 
circulated. 

And,  lastly,  if  all  this  be  so,  it  will  be  readily  seen  that 
a  very  large  portion  of  the  ordinary  conversation  of  persons, 
even  in  many  respects  estimable,  is  far  from  being  inno- 
cent. How  very  common  is  personal  character,  in  all  its 
length  and  breadth,  the  matter  of  common  conversation ! 
And  in  this  discussion,  men  seem  to  forget  that  they  are 
under  any  other  law  than  that  which  is  administered  by  a 
judge  and  jury.  How  commonly  are  characters  dissected, 
with  apparently  the  only  object  of  displaying  the  power 
of  malignant  acumen  possessed  by  the  operator,  as  though 
another's  reputation  were  made  for  no  other  purpose  than 
the  gratification  of  the  meanest  and  most  unlovely  attributes 
of  the  human  heart !  Well  may  we  say,  with  the  apostle 
James,  "  If  any  man  offend  not  in  word,  the  same  is  a 
perfect  man,  able  to  bridle  the  whole  body."  Well  may 
we  tremble  before  the  declaration  of  the  blessed  Savior: 
"  For  every  idle  word  that  men  speak,  they  shall  give  an 
account  in  the  day  of  judgment." 


- 

272  JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    REPUTATION. 

The  following  extract  from  Bishop  Wilson,  on  this  sub- 
ject, breathes  the  spirit  of  true  Christian  philanthropy :  4<  It 
is  too  true,  that  some  evil  passion  or  other,  and  to  gratify 
our  corruption,  is  the  aim  of  most  conversations.  We  love 
to  speak  of  past  troubles ;  hatred  and  ill-will  make  us  take 
pleasure  in  relating  the  evil  actions  of  our  enemies.  We 
compare,  with  some  degree  of  pride,  the  advantages  which 
we  have  over  others.  We  recount,  with  too  sensible  a 
pleasure,  the  worldly  happiness  which  we  enjoy.  This 
strengthens  our  passions,  and  increases  our  corruption. 
God  grant  that  I  may  watch  against  a  weakness  that  has 
such  evil  consequences !  May  I  never  hear,  and  never 
repeat  with  pleasure,  such  things  as  may  dishonor  God,  hun. 
my  own  character,  or  injure  my  neighbor  !" — Bishop  Wil- 
son's Sacra  Privata. 

The  precepts  of  the  Scriptures,  on  this  subject,  are 
numerous  and  explicit.  It  will  be  necessary  here  to  refer 
only  to  a  few,  for  the  sake  of  illustrating  their  general  ten- 
dency :  "  Judge  not,  that  ye  be  not  judged :  for  with  what 
judgment  ye  judge,  ye  shall  be  judged  ;  and  with  what 
measure  ye  mete,  it  shall  be  measured  to  you  again.  And 
why  beholdest  thou  the  mote  that  is  in  thy  brother's  eye, 
but  considerest  not  the  beam  that  is  in  thine  own  eye  ?" 
Matthew  vii,  1 — 5.  "  Let  all  bitterness,  and  wrath,  and 
clamor,  and  evil-speaking,  be  put  away  from  you."  Ephe- 
sians  iv,  3 1 .  "  Speak  evil  of  no  man."  Titus  iii,  2.  "  He 
that  will  love  life,  and  see  good  days,  let  him  refrain  his 
tongue  from  evil."  1  Peter  iii,  10. 

See  also  James,  third  chapter,  for  a  graphic  delineation 
of  the  miseries  produced  by  the  unlicensed  use  of  the 
tongue. 

Secondly.  I  have  thus  far  considered  the  cases  in  which 
silence,  respecting  the  evil  actions  of  others,  is  our  duty. 
It  is  our  duty,  when  we  have  no  just  cause,  either  for 
speaking  at  all,  or  for  speaking  to  the  particular  person 
whom  we  address.  But  where  there  is  a  sufficient  cause, 
we  are  under  an  equally  imperative  obligation  to  speak, 
wherever  and  whenever  that  cause  shall  demand  it.  The 
common  fault  of  men  is,  that  they  speak  when  they  should 
be  silent,  and  are  silent  only  when  they  should  speak. 


JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION.      273 

The  plain  distinction,  in  this  case,  is  the  following :  We 
are  forbidden,  causelessly,  to  injure  another,  even  if  he  have 
done  wrong.  Yet,  whenever  justice  can  be  done,  or  inno- 
cence protected,  in  no  other  manner  than  by  a  course  which 
must  injure  him,  we  are  under  no  such  prohibition.  No 
man  has  a  right  to  expect  to  do  wrong  with  impunity  ; 
much  less  has  he  a  right  to  expect  that,  in  order  to  shield 
him  from  the  just  consequences  of  his  actions,  injustice 
should  be  done  to  others,  or  that  other  men  shall,  by  silence, 
deliver  up  the  innocent  and  unwavy  into  his  power. 

The  principle  by  which  we  are  to  test  our  own  motives, 
in  speaking  of  that  which  may  harm  others,  is  this :  When 
we  utter  any  thing  which  will  harm  another,  and  we  do  it 
either  without  cause,  or  with  pleasure,  or  thoughtlessly,  we 
are  guilty  of  calumny.  When  we  do  it  with  pain  and  sor- 
row for  the  offender,  and  from  the  sincere  motive  of  protect- 
ing the  innocent,  of  promoting  the  ends  of  public  justice,  or 
for  the  good  of  the  offender  himself,  and  speak  of  it  only  to 
such  persons,  and  in  such  manner,  as  is  consistent  with  these 
ends,  we  may  speak  of  the  evil  actions  of  others,  and  yet 
be  wholly  innocent  of  calumny. 

We  are  therefore  bound  to  speak  of  the  faults  of  others, 

1.  To  promote  the  ends  of  public  justice.     He  who  con- 
ceals a  crime  against  society,  renders  himself  a  party  to 
the  offence.     We  are  bound  here,  not  merely  to  speak  of 
it,  but  also  to  speak  of  it  to  the  proper  civil  officer,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  brought  to  trial  and  punishment.     The 
ordinary  prejudice  against  informing  is  unwise  and  immoral. 
He  who,  from  proper  motives,  informs  against  crime,  per- 
forms an  act  as  honorable  as  that  of  the  judge  who  tries  the 
cause,  or  of  the  juror  who  returns  the  verdict.     That  this 
may  be  done  from  improper  motives,  alters  not  the  case. 
A  judge  may  hold  his  office  for  the  love  of  money,  but  this 
does  not  make  the  office  despicable. 

2.  To  protect  the  innocent.     When  we  are  possessed 
of  a  knowledge  of  certain  facts  in  a  man^s  history,  which, 
if  known  to  a  third  person,  would  protect  him  from  im- 
portant injury,  it  may  frequently  be  our  duty  to  put  that 
person  on  his  guard.     If  A  knows  that  B,  under  the  pre- 
tence of  religion,  is  insinuating  himself  into  the  good  opin- 


274      JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION. 

ion  of  C,  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  control  over  his  prop 
erty,  A  is  bound  to  put  C  upon  his  guard.  If  I  know 
that  a  man  who  is  already  married,  is  paying  his  addresses 
to  a  lady  in  another  country,  I  am  bound  to  give  her  the 
information.  So,  if  I  know  of  a  plan  laid  for  the  purpose 
of  seduction,  I  am  bound  to  make  use  of  that  knowledge 
to  defeat  it.  All  that  is  required  here,  is,  that  I  know 
what  I  assert  to  be  fact ;  and  that  I  use  it  simply  for  the 
purposes  specified. 

3.  For   the  good  of  the  offender  himself.     When  we 
know  of  the  crimes  of  another,  and  there  is  some  person 
— for  instance,  a  parent,    a   guardian,  or   instructor — who 
might,  by  control  or  advice,  be  the  means  of  the  offender's 
reformation,  it  is  our  duty  to  give  the  necessary  information. 
It  is  frequently  the  greatest  kindness  that  we  can  manifest 
to  both  parties.     Were  it  more  commonly  practised,  the 
allurements  to  sin  would  be  much  less  attractive,  and  the 
hope  of  success  in  correcting  the  evil  habits  of  the  young, 
much  more  encouraging.     No  wicked  person  has  a  right 
to  expect  that  the  community  will  keep  his  conduct  a 
secret  from  those  who  have  a  right  specially  to  be  informed 
of  it.     He  who  does  so  is  partaker  in  the  guilt. 

4.  Though  we  may  not  be  at  liberty  to  make  public  the 
evil  actions  of  another,  yet  no  obligation  exists  to  conceal 
his  fault  by  maintaining  towards  him  our  former  habits  of 
intimacy.     If  we  know  him  to  be  unworthy  of  our  confi- 
dence or  acquaintance,  we  have  no  right  to  act  a  lie,  by 
conducting  towards  him,  in  public  or  in  private,  as  though 
he  were  worthy  of  it.     By  associating  with  a  man,  we  give 
to  the  public  an   assurance,  that  we  know  of  nothing  to 
render   him  unworthy   of  our   association.     If  we    falsify 
this  assurance,  we  are  guilty  of  deception,  and  of  a  decep- 
tion by  which  we  benefit  the  wicked  at  the  expense  of 
the  innocent,  and,  so  far  as  our  example  can   do  it,  place 
the  latter  in  the  power  of  the  former.     And  still  more,  if 
we  associate,  on  terms  of  voluntary  intimacy,  with  persons 
of  known  bad  character,   we  virtually  declare  that  such 
offences  constitute  no  reason  why  the  persons  in  question 
are  not  good  enough  associates  for  us.     We  thus  virtually 
become  the  patrons  of  their  crime. 


JUSTICE    AS    IT    RESPECTS    REPUTATION.  275 

5.  From  what  has  been  remarked,  we  see  what  is  the 
nature  of  an  historian's  duty.  He  has  to  do  with  facts 
which  the  individuals  themselves  have  made  public,  or 
which  have  been  made  public  by  the  providence  of  God. 
He  records  what  has  already  been  made  known.  What 
has  not  been  made  known,  therefore,  comes  .not  within 
his  province ;  but  whatever  has  been  made  known,  comes 
properly  within  it.  This  latter  he  is  bound  to  use,  without 
either  fear,  favor  or  affection.  If,  from  party  zeal  or  secta- 
rian bigotry,  or  individual  partiality,  he  exaggerate,  or  con- 
ceal, or  misrepresent,  if  he  "  aught  extenuate,  or  set  down 
aught  in  malice,"  he  is  guilty  of  calumny  of  the  most  in- 
excusable character.  It  is  calumny  perpetrated  deliber- 
ately, under  the  guise  of  impartiality,  and  perpetrated  in  a 
form  intended  to  give  it  the  widest  publicity  and  the  most 
permanent  duration. 

These  remarks  have  had  respect,  principally,  to  the  pub- 
lication of  injurious  truth  or  falsehood,  by  conversation. 
But  it  will  be  immediately  seen  that  they  apply,  with  addi- 
tional force,  to  the  publication  of  whatever  is  injurious 
by  the  press.  If  it  be  wrong  to  injure  my  neighbor's  rep- 
utation within  the  limited  circle  of  my  acquaintance,  how 
much  more  wrong  must  it  be  to  injure  it  throughout  a 
nation !  If  it  be,  by  universal  acknowledgment,  mean,  to 
underrate  the  talents  or  vilify  the  character  of  a  personal 
rival,  how  much  more  so,  that  of  a  political  opponent ! 
If  it  would  be  degrading  in  me  to  do  it  myself,  by  how 
much  is  it  less  degrading  to  cause  it  to  be  done  by  others, 
and  to  honor  or  dishonor  with  my  confidence,  and  reward 
with  political  distinction,  those  who  do  it  ?  Because  a 
man  is  a  political  opponent,  does  he  cease  to  be  a  creature 
of  God ;  and  do  we  cease  to  be  under  obligations  to  obey 
the  law  of  God  in  respect  to  him  ?  or  rather,  I  might  ask, 
do  men  think  that  political  collisions  banish  the  Deity  from 
the  throne  of  the  universe  ?  Nor  do  these  remarks  apply 
to  political  dissensions  alone.  The  conductor  of  a  public 
press  possesses  no  greater  privileges  than  any  other  man, 
nor  has  he  any  more  right  than  any  other  man,  to  use,  or 
suffer  to  be  used,  his  press,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  per- 
sonal pique,  or  avenging  individual  wrong,  or  holding  up 


276      JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION. 

individuals,  without  trial,  to  public  scorn.  Crime  against 
society  is  to  be  punished  by  society,  and  by  society  alone  ; 
and  he  who  conducts  a  public  press  has  no  more  right, 
because  he  has  the  physical  power,  to  inflict  pain,  than  any 
other  individual.  If  one  man  may  do  it  because  he  has  a 
press,  another  may  do  it  because  he  has  muscular  strength  ; 
and  thus,  the  government  of  society  is  brought  to  an  end. 
Nor  has  he  even  a  right  to  publish  cases  of  individual  vice, 
unless  the  providence  of  God  has  made  them  public  before. 
While  they  are  out  of  sight  of  the  public,  they  are  out  of 
his  sight,  unless  he  can  show  that  he  has  been  specially 
appointed  to  perform  this  service. 


277 


CLASS    FIRST. 

DUTIES    TO    MEN,    AS    MEN. 
VERACITY. 

EVERY  individual,  by  necessity,  stands  in  most  important 
relations,  both  to  the  past  and  to  the  future.  Without  a 
knowledge  of  what  has  been,  and  of  what,  so  far  as  his 
fellow-men  are  concerned,  will  be,  he  can  form  no  decision 
in  regard  to  the  present.  But  this  knowledge  could  never 
be  attained,  unless  his  constitution  were  made  to  cor- 
respond with  his  circumstances.  It  has,  therefore,  been 
made  to  correspond.  There  is,  on  the  one  hand,  in 
men,  a  strong  a  priori  disposition  to  tell  the  truth  ;  and  it 
controls  them,  unless  some  other  motive  interpose  ;  and 
there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  disposition  to  believe  what 
is  told,  unless  some  counteracting  motive  is  supposed  to 
operate. 

Veracity  has  respect  to  the  PAST  AND  PRESENT,  or  to 
the  FUTURE.     We  shall  consider  them  separately. 
24 


278 


CHAPTER    FIRST. 

VERACITY  AS  IT  RESPECTS  THE  PAST  AND  PRESENT. 

VERACITY,  in  this  sense,  always  has  respect  to  a  fact ; 
that  is,  to  something  done,  or  to  something  which  swe  be- 
lieve to  be  doing. 

Moral  truth  consists  in  our  intention  to  convey  to  another, 
to  the  best  of  our  ability,  the  conception  of  a  fact,  exactly 
as  it  exists  in  our  own  minds. 

Physical  truth  consists  in  conveying  to  another  the  con- 
ception of  a  fact,  precisely  as  it  actually  exists,  or  existed. 

These  two,  it  is  evident,  do  not  always  coincide. 

I  may  innocently  have  obtained  an  incorrect  conception 
of  a  fact  myself,  and  yet  may  intend  to  convey  it  to  another 
precisely  as  it  exists  in  my  own  mind.  Here,  then,  is  a 
moral  truth,  but  a  physical  untruth. 

Or,  again,  I  may  have  a  correct  conception  of  a  fact, 
supposing  it  to  be  an  incorrect  one,  but  may  convey  it  to 
another,  with  the  intention  to  deceive.  Here,  then,  is  a 
moral  falsehood,  and  a  physical  truth.  Pure  truth  is  com- 
municated, only,  when  I  have  a  correct  conception  of  a 
fact,  and  communicate  it,  intentionally,  to  another,  precisely 
as  it  exists  in  my  own  mind. 

The  law  on  this  subject  demands,  that,  when  we  profess 
to  convey  a  fact  to  another,  we,  to  the  best  of  our  ability, 
convey  to  him  the  impression  which  exists  in  our  own 
minds.  This  implies,  first,  that  we  convey  the  impression 
which  exists,  and  not  another ;  and,  secondly,  that  we  con- 
vey that  impression,  without  diminution  or  exaggeration. 
In  other  words,  we  are  obliged,  in  the  language  of  jurispru- 
dence, to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  .and  nothing  but 
the  truth. 

This  law,  therefore,  forbids, —  » 

1.  The  utterance,  as  truth,  of  what  we  know  to  be  false. 


VERACITY    AS    IT    RESPECTS,   ETC.  279 

I  say  the  utterance  as  truth,  for  we  sometimes  imagine 
cases,  for  the  sake  of  illustration,  as  in  parables  or  fictitious 
writing,  where  it  is  known  beforehand,  that  we  merely 
address  the  imagination.  Since  we  utter  it  as  fiction,  and 
do  not  wish  it  to  be  believed,  there  is  no  falsehood  if  it  be 
not  true. 

2.  Uttering  as  truth,  what  we  do  not  know  to  be  true. 
Many  things  which  men   assert  they  cannot  know  to  be 
true ;  such,  for  instance,  are,  in  many  cases,  our  views  of 
the  motives  of  others.     There  are  many  other  things  which 
may  be  probable,  and  we  may  be  convinced  that  they  are 
so,  but  of  which  we  cannot  arrive  at  the  certainty.     There 
are  other  things  which  are  merely  matters  of  opinion,  con- 
cerning which  every  several   man  may  hold  a  different 
opinion.     Now,  in  any  such  case,  to  utter  as  truth  what  we 
cannot  know,  or  have  not  known  to  be  truth,  is  falsehood. 
If  a  man  utter  any  thing  as  truth,  he  assumes  the  responsi- 
bility of  ascertaining  it  to  be  so.     If  he,  who  makes  the 
assertion,  be  not  responsible,  where  shall  the  responsibility 
rest  ?     And,  if  any  man  may  utter  what  he  chooses,  under 
no  responsibility,  there  is  the  end  of  all  credibility. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  are  we  never  to  utter  any  thing 
which  we  do  not  know  to  be  true  ?  I  answer :  we  are 
never  to  utter  as  truth  what  we  do  not  Tcnow  to  be  true. 
Whatever  is  a  matter  of  probability  we  may  utter  as  a  mat- 
ter of  probability  ;  whatever  is  a  matter  of  opinion,  we  may 
state  as  a  matter  of  opinion.  If  we  convey  to  another  a 
conception  as  true,  of  which  we  have  only  the  impression 
of  probability,  we  convey  a  different  conception  from  that 
which  exists  in  our  own  minds,  and  of  course  we  do,  in 
fact,  speak  falsely. 

3.  Uttering  what  may  be  true  in  fact,  but  uttering  it  in 
such   a   manner,  as   to  convey  a  false   impression  to  the 
hearers.  ' 

As,  a.  By  exaggerating  some  or  all  of  the  circumstances 
attendant  upon  the  facts. 

b.  By  extenuating  some  or  all  of  the  circumstances  at- 
tendant upon  the  facts. 

c.  By  exaggerating  some,  and  extenuating  others. 

d.  By  stating  the  facts  just  as  they  existed,  but  so  ar- 


280  VERACITY   AS    IT   RESPECTS 

ranging  them  as  to  leave  a  false  impression  upon  the  hearer. 
As,  for  instance,  I  might  say,  A  entered  B's  room,  and  left 
it  at  ten  o'clock ;  within  five  minutes  after  he  left  it,  B  dis- 
covered that  his  watch  had  been  stolen.  Now,  although  I 
do  not  say  that  A  stole  B's  watch,  yet,  if  I  intentionally  so 
arrange  and  connect  these  facts  as  to  leave  a  false  impres- 
sion upon  the  mind  of  the  hearer,  I  am  guilty  of  falsehood. 
This  is  a  crime  to  which  pleaders  and  partial  historians,  and 
all  prejudiced  narrators,  are  specially  liable. 

4.  As  the  crime,  here  considered,  consists  in  making  a 
false  impression,  with  intention  to  deceive ;  the  same  effect 
may  be  produced  by  the  tones  of  the  voice,  a  look  of  the 
eye,  a  motion  of  the  head,  or  any  thing  by  which  the  mind 
of  another  may  be  influenced.     The  same  rule,  therefore, 
applies  to  impressions  made  in  this  manner,  as  to  those 
made  by  words. 

5.  As  this  rule  applies  to  our  intercourse  with  men  as 
intelligent  agents,  it  applies  to  our  intercourse  with  men 
under  all  the  possible  relations  of  life.     Thus,  it   forbids 
parents  to  lie  to  children,  and  children  to  lie  to  parents ; 
instructors  to  pupils,  and  pupils  to  instructors ;  the  old  to 
the  young,  and  the  young  to  the  old ;  attorneys  to  jurors, 
and  jurors  to  attorneys ;  buyers  to  sellers,  and  sellers  to 
buyers.     That  is,  the  obligation  is  universal,  and  cannot  be 
annulled,  by  any  of  the  complicated  relations  in  which  men 
stand  to  each  other. 

Nor  can  it  be  varied,  by  the  considerations,  often  intro- 
duced, that  the  person  with  whom  we  are  conversing  has 
no  right  to  know  the  truth.  This  is  a  sufficient  reason  why 
we  should  not  tell  the  truth,  but  it  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  tell  a  falsehood.  Under  such  circumstances,  we  are 
at  liberty  to  refuse  to  reveal  any  thing,  but  we  are  not  at 
liberty  to  utter  what  is  false. 

The  reason  for  this,  is  the  following :  The  obligation  to  ve- 
racity does  not  depend  upon  the  right  of  the  inquirer  to  know 
the  truth.  Did  our  obligation  depend  upon  this,  it  would 
vary  with  every  person  with  whom  we  conversed ;  and,  in 
every  case  before  speaking,  we  should  be  at  liberty  to 
measure  the  extent  of  our  neighbor's  right,  and  to  tell  him 
truth  or  falsehood  accordingly.  And,  inasmuch  as  the 


THE    PAST    AND    PRESENT.  281 

person  whom  we  address,  would  never  know  at  what  rate 
we  estimated  his  right ;  no  one  would  know  how  much  to 
believe,  any  more  than  we  should  know  how  much  truth 
we  were  under  obligation  to  tell.  This  would  at  once  de- 
stroy every  obligation  to  veracity.  On  the  contrary,  inas- 
much as  we  are  under  obligation  to  utter  nothing  but  the 
truth  in  consequence  of  our  relations  to  God,  this  obligation 
is  never  affected  by  any  of  the  circumstances  under  which 
we  are  called  upon  to  testify.  Let  no  one,  therefore, 
excuse  himself,  on  the  ground  that  he  tells  only  innocent 
lies.  It  cannot  be  innocent  to  do  that  which  God  has  for- 
bidden. "  Lie  not  one  to  another,  brethren,  seeing  ye  have 
put  off  the  old  man  with  his  deeds." 

That  obedience  to  this  law  is  demanded  by  the  will  of 
God,  is  manifest  from  several  considerations : 

1.  We  are  created  with  a  disposition  to  speak  what  is 
true,  and  also  to  believe  what  is  spoken.     The  fact  that  we 
are  thus  constituted,  conveys  to  us  an  intimation  that  the 
Creator  wills  us  to  obey  this  constitution.     The  intention 
is  as  evident  as  that  which  is  manifested  in  creating  the  eye 
for  light,  and  light  for  the  eye. 

2.  We  are  created  with  a  moral  constitution,  by  which 
(unless  our  moral  susceptibility  shall  have  been  destroyed) 
we  suffer  pain  whenever  we  violate  this  law,  and  by  whicn 
also  we  receive   pleasure  whenever,  under   circumstances 
which  urge  to  the  contrary,  we  steadfastly  obey  it. 

3.  We  are  so  constituted  that  obedience  to  the  law  of 
veracity  is  absolutely  necessary  to  our  happiness.     Were 
we  to  lose  either  our  feeling  of  obligation  to  tell  the  truth, 
or  our  disposition  to  receive  as  truth  whatever  is  told  to  us, 
there  would  at  once  be  an  end  to  all  science  and  all  knowl- 
edge, beyond  that  which  every  man  had  obtained  by  his 
own  personal  observation  and  experience.     No  man  could 
profit  by  the  discoveries  of  his  contemporaries,  much  less  by 
the  discoveries  of  those  men  who  have  gone  before  him. 
Language  would  be  useless,  and  we  should  be  but  little  re- 
moved from  the  brutes.     Every  one  must  be  aware,  upon 
the  slightest  reflection,  that  a  community  of  entire  liars  could 
not  exist  in  a  state  of  society.     The  effects  of  such  a  course 

24* 


282  VERACITY    AS    IT    RESPECTS 

of  conduct  upon  the  whole,  show  us  what  is  the  will  of  God 
in  the  individual  case. 

4.  The  will  of  God  is  abundantly  made  known  to  us  in 
the  holy  Scriptures.  I  subjoin  a  few  examples  : 

"  Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness  against  they  neigh- 
bor." Ex.  xx,  16.  "  Lying  lips  are  an  abomination  to 
the  Lord."  Prov.  vi,  16.  "  Keep  thy  tongue  from  evil, 
and  thy  lips  that  they  speak  no  guile."  Psalm  xxxiv,  13. 
Those  that  speak  lies  are  called-  children  of  the  devil,  that 
is,  followers,  imitators  of  the  actions  of  the  devil.  John  viii, 
44.  See  also  the  cases  of  Ananias  and  Sapphira,  and  of 
Gehazi.  Acts  v,  and  2  Kings  v,  20 — 27.  "All  liars 
shall  have  their  portion  in  the  lake  that  burneth  with  fire 
and  brimstone."  Rev.  xxi,  8.  "  There  shall  in  no  wise 
enter  therein  (into  heaven)  any  thing  that  maketh  a  lie." 
Ibid,  verse  27. 

From  what  has  been  said,  the  importance  of  strict  ad- 
herence to  veracity  is  too  evident  to  need  further  remark. 
I  will,  however,  add,  that  the  evil  of  falsehood  in  small 
matters,  in  lies  told  to  amuse,  in  petty  exaggerations,  and 
in  complimentary  discourse,  is  not  by  any  means  duly  esti- 
mated. Let  it  be  always  borne  in  mind,  that  he  who 
knowingly  utters  what  is  false,  tells  a  lie  ;  and  a  lie,  whether 
white,  or  of  any  other  color,  is  a  violation  of  the  command 
of  that  God  by  whom  we  must  be  judged.  And  let  us  also 
remember  that  there  is  no  vice  which,  more  easily  than  this, 
stupifies  a  man's  conscience.  He  who  tells  lies  frequently, 
will  soon  become  an  habitual  liar  ;  and  an  habitual  liar  will 
soon  lose  the  power  of  readily  distinguishing  between  the 
conceptions  of  his  imagination  and  the  recollections  of  his 
memory.  I  have  known  a  few  persons,  who  seemed  to 
have  arrived  at  this  most  deplorable  moral  condition.  Let 
every  one,  therefore,  beware  of  even  the  most  distant  ap- 
proaches to  this  detestable  vice.  A  volume  might  easily  be 
written  on  the  misery  and  loss  of  character  which  have 
grown  out  of  a  single  lie  ;  and  another  volume  of  illustra- 
tions of  the  moral  power  which  men  have  gained  by  means 
of  no  other  prominent  attribute  than  that  of  bold,  unshrinking 
veracity 


THE    PAST    AND    PRESENT.  283 

If  lying  be  thus  pernicious  to  ourselves,  how  wicked  must 
it  be  to  teach  it,  or  specially  to  require  it  of  others  !  What 
shall  we  say,  then,  of  parents,  who,  to  accomplish  a  mo- 
mentary purpose,  will  not  hesitate  to  utter  to  a  child  the 
most  flagitious  falsehoods  ?  Or  what  shall  we  say  of  those 
heads  of  families,  who  direct  their  children  or  servants  de- 
liberately to  declare  that  they  are  not  at  home,  while  they 
are  quietly  sitting  in  their  parlor  or  their  study  ?  What 
right  has  any  one,  for  the  purpose  of  securing  a  momentary 
convenience,  or  avoiding  a  petty  annoyance,  to  injure  for 
ever  the  moral  sentiments  of  another  ?  How  can  such  a 
man  or  woman  expect  to  hear  the  truth  from  those  whom 
they  have  deliberately  taught  to  lie  ?  The  expectation  is 
absurd  ;  and  the  result  will  show  that  such  persons,  in  the 
end,  drink  abundantly  of  the  cup  which  they  themselves 
have  mingled.  Before  any  man  is  tempted  to  lie,  let  him 
remember  that  God  governs  this  universe  on  the  principles 
of  veracity,  and  that  the  whole  constitution  of  things  is  so 
arranged  as  to  vindicate  truth,  and  to  expose  falsehood. 
Hence,  the  first  lie  always  requires  a  multitude  of  lies  to 
conceal  it ;  each  one  of  which  plunges  the  criminal  into 
more  inextricable  embarrassment ;  and,  at  last,  all  of  them 
will  combine  to  cover  him  with  shame.  The  inconveniences 
of  truth,  aside  from  the  question  of  guilt  and  innocence,  are 
infinitely  less  than  the  inconveniences  of  falsehood. 


284 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 

VERACITY   IN   RESPECT   TO    THE    FUTURE. 

THE  future  is,  within  some  conditions,  subject  to  our 
power.  We  may,  therefore,  place  ourselves  under  moral 
obligations  to  act,  within  those  conditions,  in  a  particular 
manner.  When  we  make  a  promise,  we  voluntarily  place 
ourselves  under  such  a  moral  obligation.  The  law  of  ve- 
racity obliges  us  to  fulfil  it. 

This  part  of  the  subject  includes  promises  and  contracts. 

I.  Of  PROMISES. 

In  every  promise,  two  things  are  to  be  considered :  the 
intention  and  the  obligation. 

1.  TIic  intention.  The  law  of  veracity,  in  this  respect, 
demands  that  we  convey  to  the  promisee  the  intention  as  it 
exists  in  our  own  minds.     When  we  inform  another  that 
we  intend  to  do  a  service  for  him  to-morrow,  we  have  no 
more  right  to  lie  about  this  intention  than  about  any  other 
matter. 

2.  The  obligation.     The  law  of  veracity  obliges  us  to 
fulfil  the  intention  just  as  we  made  it  known.     In  other 
words,  we  are  under  obligation  to  satisfy,  precisely,  the  ex- 
pectation  which   we   voluntarily   excited.     The   rule   of 
Dr.  Paley  is  as  follows :  "  A  promise  is  binding  in  the  sense 
in  which  the  promiser  supposed  the  promisee  to  receive  it." 

The  modes  in  which  promises  may  be  violated,  and  the 
reasons  for  believing  the  obligation  to  fulfil  promises  to  be 
enforced  by  the  law  of  God,  are  so  similar  to  those  men- 
tioned in  the  preceding  chapter,  that  I  will  not  repeat 
them. 

I  therefore  proceed  to  consider  in  what  cases  promises 
are  not  binding.  The  following  are,  I  think,  among  the 
most  important : 

Promises  are  not  binding, — 


VERACITY   IN    RESPECT   TO   THE    FUTURE. 

1.  When  the  performance  is  impossible.     We  cannot  be 
under  obligation  to  do  what  is  plainly  out  of  our  power. 
The  moral  character  of  such  a  promise,  will,  however,  vary 
with  the  circumstances  under  which  the  promise  was  made. 
If  I   knew  nothing  of  the  impossibility,  and  honestly  ex- 
pressed an  intention  which  I  designed  to  fulfil,  I  am,  at  the 
bar  of  conscience,  acquitted.     The  providence  of  God  has 
interfered  with  my  intention,  and  I  am  not  to  blame.     If, 
on  the  other  hand,  I  knew  of  the  impossibility,  I  have  vio- 
lated the  law  of  veracity.     I  expressed  an  intention  which 
I  did  not  mean  to  fulfil.     I  am  bound  to  make  good  to  the 
other  party  all  the  loss  which  he  may  have  sustained  by 
my  crime. 

2.  When  the  promise  is  unlawful.     No   man   can  be 
under  obligation  to  violate  obligation ;  for  this  would  be  to 
suppose  a  man  to  be  guilty  for  not  being  guilty.     Much 
less,  can  he  be  under  obligation  to  violate  his  obligations  to 
God.     Hence,  promises  to  lie,  to  steal,  or  in  any  manner 
to  violate  the  laws  of  society,  are  not  binding.      And  the 
duty  of  every  man,  who  has  placed  himself  under  any  such 
obligation,  is,  at  once,  to  confess  his  fault,  to  declare  himself 
free  from  his  engagement,   and  to  endeavor  to  persuade 
others  to  do  the  same.     Here,  as  in  the  former  instance, 
there    are   two   cases.     Where  the  unlawfulness  was  not 
known,  the  promiser  is  under  no  other  obligation  than  that 
of  informing  the  promisee  of  the  facts  as  soon  as  possible. 
Where  the  unlawfulness  was  known  to  the  promiser,  and 
not  to  the  promisee,  I  think  that  the  former  is  bound  to  make 
good  the  loss  to  the  latter,  if  any  occur.     When  it  is  known 
to  both  parties,  either  is  at  liberty  to  disengage  himself,  and 
neither  is  under  any  obligation  to  make  any  restitution  ;  for 
the  fault  is  common  to  both,  and  each  should  bear  his 
own  share  of  the  inconvenience. 

3.  Promises  are  not  binding  where  no  expectation  is  vol- 
untarily excited  by  the  promiser.     He  is  bound  only  to  fulfil 
the  expectation  which  he  voluntarily  excites  ;  and  if  he  have 
excited  none,  he  has  made  no  promise.     If  A  tell  B  that 
he  shall  give  a  horse  to  C,  and  B,  without  A's  knowledge 
or  consent,  inform  C  of  it,  A  is  not  bound.     But,  if  he 


286  VERACITY  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FUTURE. 

directed  B  to  give  the  information,  he  is  as  much  bound 
as  though  he  informed  C  himself. 

4.  Promises  are  not  binding  when  they  are  Tcnown  by  both 
parties  to  proceed  upon  a  condition,  which  condition  is  sub- 
sequently, by  the  promiser,  found  not  to  exist.     As,  if  A 
promise  to  give  a  beggar  money  on  the  faith  of  his  story, 
and  the  story  be  subsequently  found  to  be  a  fabrication,  A, 
in  such  a  case,  is  manifestly  not  bound. 

5.  As  the  very  conception  of  a  promise  implies  an  obli- 
gation entered  into  between  two  intelligent  moral  agents, 
I  think  there  can  be  no  such  obligation  entered  into  where 
one  of  the  parties  is  not  a  moral  agent.     I  do  not  think  we 
can  properly  be  said  to  make  a  promise  to  a  brute,  nor  to 
violate  it.     I  think  the  same  is  true  of  a  madman.     Never- 
theless, expediency  has,  even  in  such  cases,  always  taught 
the  importance  of  fulfilling  expectation  which  we  volun- 
tarily excite.     I   think,   however,   that   it   stands   on  the 
ground  of  expediency,  and  not  of  obligation.     I  do  not 
suppose  that  any  one  would  feel  guilty  for  deceiving  a  mad- 
man, in  order  to  lead  him  to  a  madhouse. 

These  seem  to  me  to  be  the  most  common  cases  in 
which  promises  are  not  binding.  The  mere  inconvenience 
to  which  we  may  be  exposed  by  fulfilling  a  promise,  is  not 
a  release.  We  are  at  liberty,  beforehand,  to  enter  into  the 
obligation,  or  not.  No  man  need  promise  unless  he  please  : 
but,  having  once  promised,  he  is  holclen  until  he  be  morally 
liberated.  Hence,  as,  after  the  obligation  is  formed,  it 
cannot  be  recalled,  prudence  would  teach  us  to  be  ex- 
tremely cautious  in  making  promises.  Except  in  cases 
where  we  are,  from  long  experience,  fully  acquainted  with 
all  the  ordinary  contingencies  of  an  event,  we  ought  never 
to  make  a  promise  without  sufficient  opportunity  for  reflec- 
tion. It  is  a  good  rule,  to  enter  into  no  important  engage- 
ment on  the  same  day  in  which  it  is  first  presented  to  our 
notice.  And  I  believe  that  it  will  be  generally  found,  that 
those  who  are  most  careful  in  promising,  are  the  most  con- 
scientious in  performing  ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  those 
who  are  willing,  on  all  occasions,  to  pledge  themselves  on 
the  instant,  have  very  little  difficulty  in  violating  their  en- 
gagements with  correspondent  thoughtlessness. 


*fc.RACITY   IN   RESPECT   TO   THE    FUTURE.  287 

OF    CONTRACTS. 

The  peculiarity  of  a  contract  is,  that  it  is  a  mutual  prom- 
ise :  that  is,  we  promise  to  do  one  thing,  on  the  condition 
that  another  person  does  another. 

The  rule  of  interpretation,  the  reasons  for  its  obligatori- 
ness,  and  the  cases  of  exception  to  the  obligatoriness,  are 
the  same  as  in  the  preceding  cases,  except  that  it  has  a 
specific  condition  annexed,  by  which  the  obligation  is 
limited. 

Hence,  after  a  contract  is  made,  while  the  other  party 
performs  his  part,  we  are  under  obligation  to  perform  our 
part ;  but,  if  either  party  fail,  the  other  is,  by  the  failure 
of  the  condition  essential  to  the  contract,  liberated. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Not  only  is  the  one  party  liberated, 
by  the  failure  of  the  other  party  to  perform  his  part  of  the 
contract ;  the  first  has,  moreover,  upon  the  second,  a  claim 
for  damages  to  the  amount  of  what  he  may  have  suffered 
by  such  failure. 

Here,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed,  that  a  distinction  is 
to  be  made  between  a  simple  contract,  that  is,  a  contract 
to  do  a  particular  act,  and  a  contract  by  which  we  enter 
upon  a  relation  established  by  our  Creator.  Of  the  first 
kind,  are  ordinary  mercantile  contracts  to  sell  or  deliver 
merchandise  at  a  particular  place,  for  a  specified  sum,  to  be 
paid  at  a  particular  time.  Here,  if  the  price  be  not  paid, 
we  are  under  no  obligation  to  deliver  the  goods  ;  and,  if 
the  goods  be  not  delivered,  we  are  under  no  obligation  to 
pay  the  price.  Of  the  second  kind,  are  the  contract  of 
civil  society,  and  the  marriage  contract.  These,  being 
appointed  by  the  constitution  under  which  God  has  placed 
us,  may  be  dissolved  only  for  such  reasons  as  he  has  ap- 
pointed. Thus,  society  and  the  individual  enter  mutually 
into  certain  obligations  with  respect  to  each  other ;  but  it 
does  not  follow,  that  either  party  is  liberated  by  every  fail- 
ure of  the  other.  The  case  is  the  same  with  the  marriage 
contract.  In  these  instances,  each  party  is  bound  to  fulfil 
its  part  of  the  contract,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  the 
other. 

It  is  here  proper  to  remark,  that  the  obligation  to  veracity 
is  precisely  the  same,  under  what  relations  soever  it  may  be 


288     VERACITY  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FUTURE. 

formed.  It  is  as  binding  between  individuals  and  society, 
on  both  parts,  and  upon  societies  and  societies,  as  it  is  be- 
tween individuals.  There  is  no  more  excuse  for  a  society, 
when  it  violates  its  obligation  to  an  individual,  or  for  an 
individual  when  he  violates  his  obligations  to  a  society, 
than  in  any  other  case  of  deliberate  falsehood.  By  how 
much  more  are  societies  or  communities  bound  to  fidelity, 
in  their  engagements  with  each  other,  since  the  faith  of 
treaties  is  the  only  barrier  which  interposes  to  shield  nations 
from  the  appeal  to  bloodshed  in  every  case  of  collision  of 
interests !  And  the  obligation  is  the  same,  under  what 
circumstances  soever  nations  may  treat  with  each  other. 
A  civilized  people  has  no  right  to  violate  its  solemn  obli- 
gations, because  the  other  party  is  uncivilized.  A  strong 
nation  has  no  right  to  lie  to  a  weak  nation.  The  simple 
fact,  that  two  communities  of  moral  agents  have  entered 
into  engagements,  binds  both  of  them  equally  in  the  sight 
of  their  common  Creator.  And  He,  who  is  the  Judge  of 
all,  in  His  holy  habitation,  will  assuredly  avenge,  with  most 
solemn  retributions,  that  violation  of  faith,  in  which  the 
peculiar  blessings  bestowed  upon  one  party  are  made  a 
reason  for  inflicting  misery  upon  the  other  party,  with  whom 
he  has  dealt  less  bountifully.  Shortly  before  the  death  of 
the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  the  pupil  of  Fenelon,  a  cabinet 
council  was  held,  at  which  he  was  present,  to  take  into 
consideration  the  expediency  of  violating  a  treaty  ;  which 
it  was  supposed  could  be  done  with  manifest  advantage 
to  France.  The  treaty  was  read  ;  and  the  ministers  ex- 
plained in  what  respects  it  operated  unfavorably,  and  how 
great  an  accession  of  territory  might  be  made  to  France, 
by  acting  in  defiance  of  its  solemn  obligations.  Reasons 
of  state  were,  of  course,  offered  in  abundance,  to  justify 
the  deed  of  perfidy.  The  Duke  of  Burgundy  heard  them 
all  in  silence.  When  they  had  finished,  he  closed  the 
conference  by  laying  his  hand  upon  the  instrument,  and 
saying,  with  emphasis,  "  Gentlemen,  there  is  a  treaty." 
This  single  sentiment  is  a  more  glorious  monument  to  his 
fame,  than  a  column  inscribed  with  the  record  of  an 
hundred  victories. 

It  is  frequently  said,  partly  by  way  of  explanation,  and 


VERACITY   IN   RESPECT   TO   THE   FUTURE.  289 

partly  by  way  of  excuse,  for  the  violation  of  contracts  by 
communities,  that  corporate  bodies  have  no  conscience. 
In  what  sense  this  is  true,  it  is  not  necessary  here  to  inquire. 
It  is  sufficient  to  know  that  every  one  of  the  corporators 
has  a  conscience,  and  is  responsible  to  God  for  obedience 
to  its  dictates.  Men  may  mystify  before  each  other, 
and  they  may  stupify  the  monitor  in  their  own  bosoms,  by 
throwing  the  blame  of  perfidy  upon  each  other ;  but  it  is 
yet  worthy  to  be  remembered,  that  they  act  in  the  presence 
of  a  Being  with  whom  the  night  shineth  as  the  day,  and  that 
they  must  appear  before  a  tribunal  where  there  will  be  f  no 
shuffling."  For  beings  acting  under  these  conditions,  there 
surely  can  be  no  wiser  or  better  course,  than  that  of  simple, 
unsophisticated  verity,  under  what  relations  soever  they 
may  be  called  upon  to  act. 
25 


296 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 

OF    OATHS. 

I.  The  theory  of  oaths. 

It  is  frequently  of  the  highest  importance  to  society,  that 
the  facts  relating  to  a  particular  transaction  should  be  dis- 
tinctly and  accurately  ascertained.  Unless  this  could  be 
done,  neither  the  innocent  could  be  protected,  nor  the 
guilty  punished  ;  that  is,  justice  could  not  be  administered, 
and  society  could  not  exist. 

To  almost  every  fact,  or  to  the  circumstances  which 
determine  it  to  be  fact,  there  must,  from  the  laws  of  cause 
and  effect,  and  from  the  social  nature  of  man,  be  many  wit- 
nesses. The  fact  can,  therefore,  be  generally  known,  if 
the  witnesses  can  be  induced  to  testify,  and  to  testify  the 
truth. 

To  place  men  under  such  circumstances,  that,  upon  the 
ordinary  principles  of  the  human  mind,  they  shall  be  most 
likely  to  testify  truly,  is  the  design  of  administering  an  oath. 

In  taking  an  oath,  besides  incurring  the  ordinary  civil 
penalties  incident  to  perjury,  he  who  swears,  calls  upon 
God  to  witness  the  truth  of  his  assertions  ;  and,  also,  either 
expressly  or  by  implication,  invokes  upon  himself  the  judg- 
ments of  God,  if  he  speak  falsely.  The  ordinary  form  of 
swearing  in  this  country,  and  in  Great  Britain,  is  to  close 
the  promise  of  veracity  with  the  words,  "  So  help  me  God ;" 
that  is,  may  God  only  help  me  so  as  I  tell  the  truth.  Inas- 
much as,  without  the  help  of  God,  we  must  be  miserable 
for  time  and  for  eternity  ;  to  relinquish  his  help,  if  we  vio- 
late the  truth,  is,  on  this  condition,  to  imprecate  upon  our- 
selves the  absence  of  the  favor  of  God,  and,  of  course,  all 
possible  misery  for  ever. 

The  theory  of  oaths,  then,  I  suppose  to  be  as  follows : 

1.  Men  naturally  speak  the  truth,   when   there   is  no 


OF    OATHS. 


291 


counteracting  motive  to  prevent  it ;  and,  unless  some  such 
motive  be  supposed  to  supervene,  they  expect  the  truth  to 
be  spoken. 

2.  When,  however,  by  speaking  falsely,  some  immediate 
advantage  can  be  gained,  or  some  immediate  evil  avoided, 
they  will  frequently  speak  falsely. 

3.  But,  when  a  greater  good  can  be  gained,  or  a  greater 
evil  avoided,  by  speaking  the  truth,  than  could  possibly  be 
either  gained  or  avoided  by  speaking  falsely,  they  will,  on 
the  ordinary  principles  of  the  human  mind,  speak  the  truth. 
To  place  them  under  such  circumstances,  is  the  design  of 
an  oath. 

4.  Now,  as  the  favor  of  God  is  the  source  of  every 
blessing  which  man   can  possibly  enjoy,  and  as  his  dis- 
pleasure must  involve  misery  utterly  beyond  the  grasp  of 
our  limited  conceptions,  if  we  can  place  men  under  such 
circumstances  that,  by  speaking  falsely,  they  relinquish  all 
claim  to  the  one,  and  incur  all  that  is  awful  in  the  other, 
we  manifestly   place   a  stronger  motive   before  them   for 
speaking  the  truth,  than  can    possibly   be  conceived  for 
speaking  falsehood.     Hence,  it  is  supposed,  on  the  ordinary 
principles  of  the  human  mind,  that  men,  under  such  circum- 
stances, will  speak  the  truth. 

Such  I  suppose  to  be  the  theory  of  oaths.  There  can 
be  ho  doubt  that,  if  men  acted  upon  this  conviction,  the 
truth  would  be,  by  means  of  oaths,  universally  elicited. 

But,  inasmuch  as  men  may  be  required  to  testify,  whose 
practical  conviction  of  these  great  moral  truths  is  at  best 
but  weak,  and  who  are  liable  to  be  more  strongly  influenced 
by  immediate  than  by  ulterior  motives,  human  punishments 
have  always  been  affixed  to  the  crime  of  perjury.  These, 
of  course,  vary  in  different  ages,  and  in  different  periods  of 
society.  The  most  equitable  provision  seems  to  be  that  of 
the  Jewish  law,  by  which  the  perjurer  was  made  to  suffer 
precisely  the  same  injury  which  he  had  designed  to  inflict 
upon  the  innocent  party.  The  Mosaic  enactment  seems 
intended  to  have  been,  in  regard  to  this  crime,  unusually 
rigorous.  The  judges  are  specially  commanded  not  to 
spare,  but  to  exact  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth. 
It  certainly  deserves  serious  consideration,  whether  modern 


292  OF    OATH;> 

legislators  might  not  derive  important  instruction  from  this 
feature  of  Jewish  jurisprudence. 

II.  The  lawfulness  of  oaths.  On  this  subject,  a  diversi- 
ty of  opinion  has  been  entertained.  It  has  been  urged,  by 
those  who  deny  the  lawfulness  of  oaths, — 

1.  That  oaths  are  frequently  forbidden  in  the  New  Tes- 
tament; and  that  we  are  commanded  to  use  yes  for  our 
affirmative,  and  no  for  our  negative ;  for  the  reason  that, 
"  whatsoever  is  more  than  these  cometh  of  evil,  or  of  the 
evil  one." 

2.  That  no  man  has  a  right  to  peril  his  eternal  salvation, 
upon  a  condition  which,  from  intellectual  or  moral  imbecility, 
he  would  be  so  liable  to  violate. 

3.  That  no  one  has  a  right  to  oblige  another  to  place 
himself  under  such  conditions. 

4.  That  the  frequent  use  of  oaths  tends,  by  abating  our 
reverence  for  the  Deity,  to  lessen  the  practical  feeling  of 
the  obligation  to  veracity. 

5.  That   no   reason   can  be  assigned,  why   this   crime 
should  be  treated  so  differently  from  every  other.     Other 
crimes,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  are  left  to  human  pun- 
ishments ;  and  there  can  be  no  reason  why  this  crime  should 
involve  the  additional  punishment  intended  by  the  impre- 
cation of  the  loss  of  the  soul. 

6.  It  is  said  that  those  sects  who  never  take  an  oath,  are 
as  fully  believed,  upon  their  simple   affirmation,  as   any 
others  ;  nay,  that  false  witness  among  them  is  more  rare 
than  among  other  men  taken  at  random.     This  is,  I  believe, 
acknowledged  to  be  the  fact. 

Those  who  defend  the  lawfulness  of  oaths  urge,  on  the 
contrary, — 

1.  That  those  passages  in  the  New  Testament  which 
have  been  referred  to,  forbid,  not  judicial  oaths,  but  merely 
profanity. 

2.  That  our  Savior  responded,  when    examined  upon 
oath.     This,  however,  is  denied,  by  the  other  party,  to  be 
a  fair  interpretation. 

3.  That  the  Apostles,  on  several  occasions,  call  God  to 
witness,  when  they  are  attesting  to  particular  facts.     The 
instances  adduced  are  such  phrases  as  these :  "  God  is  my 


OP    OATHS. 


293 


witness;"  "Behold,  before  God  I  lie  not."  The  example 
in  this  case  is  considered  sufficient  to  assure  us  of  the  law- 
fulness of  this  sort  of  appeal. 

4.  That  the  importance  of  truth  to  the  purposes  of  jus- 
tice, warrants  us  in  taking  other  measures  for  the  prevention 
of  perjury  than  are  taken  for  the  prevention  of  other  crimes ; 
and  specially,  as  this  is  a  crime  to  the  commission  of  which 
there  may  always  exist  peculiarly  strong  temptations. 

These  are,  I  believe,  the  principal  considerations  which 
have  been  urged  on  both  sides  of  the  question.  It  seems 
to  me  to  need  a  more  thorough  discussion  than  can  be 
allowed  to  it  in  this  place.  One  thing,  however,  seems 
evident,  that  the  multiplication  of  oaths,  demanded  by  the 
present  practice  of  most  Christian  nations,  is  not  only  very 
wicked,  but  that  its  direct  tendency  is  to  diminish  our  rever- 
ence for  the  Deity ;  and  thus,  in  the  end,  to  lead  to  the 
very  evil  which  it  is  intended  to  prevent. 

III.  Interpretation  of  oaths. 

As  oaths  are  imposed  for  the  safety  of  the  party  admin- 
istering them,  they  are  to  be  interpreted  as  he  understands 
them.  The  person  under  oath  has  no  right  to  make  any 
mental  reservation,  but  to  declare  the  truth,  precisely  in  the 
manner  that  the  truth,  the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  is  expected  of  him.  On  no  other  principle  would 
we  ever  know  what  to  believe  \)r  to  expect  from  a  witness. 
If,  for  the  sake  of  personal  friendship,  or  personal  advan- 
tage, or  from  fear  of  personal  inconvenience,  or  from  the 
excitement  of  party  partiality,  he  shrink  from  declaring 
the  whole  truth,  he  is  as  truly  guilty  of  perjury  as  though 
he  swore  falsely  for  money. 

IV.  Different  Jcinds  of  oaths. 

Oaths  respect  either  the  past  or  the  future,  that  is,  are 
either  assertory  or  promissory. 

1 .  The  oath  respecting  the  past,  is  definite.  A  transac- 
tion either  took  place,  or  it  did  not  take  place,  and  we 
either  have  or  have  not  some  knowledge  respecting  it.  It 
is,  therefore,  in  our  power  either  to  tell  what  we  know,  or 
to  tell  what,  and  in  how  much,  we  do  not  know.  This  is 
the  proper  occasion  for  an  oath. 

2  The  oath  respecting  the  future  is  of  necessity  indefi- 
&>* 


294  OF    OATHS. 

nite,  as  when  we  promise  upon  oath  to  discharge,  to  the 
best  of  our  ability,  a  particular  office.  Thus,  the  parties 
may  have  very  different  views  of  what  is  meant,  by  dis- 
charging an  office  according  to  the  best  of  our  ability ;  or 
this  obligation  may  conflict  with  others,  such  as  domestic  or 
personal  obligations  ;  and  the  incumbent  may  not  know, 
even  with  the  best  intentions,  which  obligation  ought  to  take 
the  precedence,  that  is,  what  is  the  best  of  his  ability. 
Such  being  the  case,  who,  that  is  aware  of  the  frailty  oi 
human  nature,  will  dare  to  peril  his  eternal  salvation  upon 
the  performance,  to  the  best  of  his  ability,  of  any  official 
duty  ?  And,  if  these  allowances  be  understood  by  both 
parties,  how  are  they  to  be  limited ;  and,  if  they  be  not 
limited,  what  is  the  value  of  an  oath  ?  Such  being  the  case, 
it  is,  at  best,  doubtful,  whether  promissory  oaths  of  office 
ought  ever  to  be  required.  Much  less  ought  they  to  be 
required,  as  is  frequently  the  case,  in  the  most  petty  details 
of  official  life.  They  must  be  a  snare  to  the  conscience  of 
a  thoughtful  man ;  and  must  tend  to  obliterate  moral  dis- 
tinctions from  the  mind  of  him  who  is,  as  is  too  frequently 
the  case,  unfortunately  thoughtless.  Why  should  one  man, 
who  is  called  upon  to  discharge  the  duties  of  a  constable, 
or  of  an  overseer  of  common  schools,  or  even  of  a  counsellor 
or  a  judge,  be  placed  under  the  pains  and  perils  of  perjury , 
or  under  peril  of  his  eternal  salvation,  any  more  than  his 
neighbor,  who  discharges  the  duty  of  a  merchant,  of  an  in 
structor  of  youth,  a  physician,  or  a  clergyman  ?  It  seems 
to  me  that  no  man  can  take  such  an  oath  of  office,  upon 
reflection,  without  such  mental  reservation  as  must  im- 
mediately convince  him  that  the  requirement  is  nugatory  ; 
and,  if  so,  that  it  must  be  injurious. 


CLASS   SECOND. 


DUTIES  WHICH  ARISE  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION    OP    THE    SEXES. 

IT  has  already  been  remarked,  that  the  very  fact,  that  our 
Creator  has  constituted  us  with  a  capacity  for  a  particular 
form  of  happiness,  and  has  provided  means  for  the  gratifica- 
tion of  that  desire,  is,  in  itself,  an  intimation  that  he  intended 
that  this  desire  should  be  gratified.  But,  as  our  happiness 
is  the  design  of  this  constitution,  it  is  equally  evident,  that 
he  intended  this  desire  to  be  gratified  only  in  such  manner 
as  would  conduce  to  this  result ;  and  that,  in  estimating  that 
result,  we  must  take  into  view  the  whole  nature  of  man,  as 
a  rational  and  accountable  being,  and  not  only  man  as  an 
individual,  but  man  also  as  a  society. 

1.  The  subject  upon  which  we  now  enter,  presents  a 
striking  illustration  of  the  truth  of  these  remarks.     On  the 
one  hand,  it  is  evident  that  the  principle  of  sexual  desire,  is 
a  part  of  the  constitution  of  man.     That  it  was  intended  to 
be  gratified,  is  evident  from  the  fact,  that,  without  such 
gratification,  the  race  of  man  would  immediately  cease  to 
exist.     Again,  if  it  were  not  placed  under  restrictions,  that 
is,  were  promiscuous  intercourse  permitted,  the  race  would 
perish  from   neglect   of  offspring,  and  universal  sterility. 
Thus,  universal  celibacy  and  unlimited  indulgence,  would 
both  equally  defeat  the  end  of  the  Creator.     It  is,  therefore, 
as  evident  that  our  Creator  has  imposed  a  limit  to  this  de- 
sire, as  a  part  of  our  constitution,  as  that  he  has  implanted 
within  us  the  desire  itself.     It  is  the  object  of  the  law  of 
chastity  to  explain  and  enforce  this  limit. 

2.  As  it  is  manifestly  the  object  of  the  Creator,  that  the 
sexes  should  live  together,  and  form  a  society  with  each 
other,  in  many  respects  dissimilar  to  every  other  society, 
producing  new  relations,  and  imposing  new  obligations,  the 


296  DUTIES   WHICH   ARISE,   ETC. 

laws  of  this  society  need  to   be   particularly  explained. 
This  is  the  law  of  marriage. 

3.  As  the  result  of  marriage  is  children,  a  new  relation 
arises  out  of  this  connection,  namely,  the  relation  of  parent 
and  child.  This  imposes  special  obligations  upon  both 
parties,  namely,  the  duties  and  rights  of  parents,  and  the 
duties  and  rights  of  children. 

This  class  of  duties  will,  therefore,  be  treated  of  in  the 
following  order : 

Chapter  1.  The  general  duty  of  chastity. 
"       2.  The  law  of  marriage. 
"       3.  The  rights  and  duties  of  parents. 
"      4.  The  rights  and  duties  of  children. 


297 


CHAPTER    FIRST. 

THE  GENERAL  DUTY  OP  CHASTITY. 

THE  sexual  appetite  being  a  part  of  'our  constitution, 
and  a  limit  to  the  indulgence  of  it  being  fixed  by  the 
Creator,  the  business  of  moral  philosophy  is  to  ascertain 
this  limit. 

The  moral  law  on  this  subject  is  as  follows  : 

The  duty  of  chastity  limits  the  indulgence  of  this  desire, 
to  individuals  who  are  exclusively  united  to  each  other  for 
life. 

Hence  it  forbids, — 

1.  Adultery,  or  intercourse  between  a  married  person  and 
every  other  person  except  that  person  to  whom  he  or  she  is 
united  for  life. 

2.  Polygamy,  or  a  plurality  of  wives  or  of  husbands. 

3.  Concubinage,  or  the  temporary  cohabitation  of  indi- 
viduals with  each  other. 

4.  Fornication,  or  intercourse  with  prostitutes,  or  with  any 
individual  under  any  other  condition  than  that  of  the  mar- 
riage covenant. 

5.  Inasmuch  as  unchaste  desire  is  strongly  excited  by 
the   imagination,  the   law  of  chastity  forbids    all   impure 
thoughts  and  actions ;   all  unchaste  conversation,  looks,  or 
gestures ;  the  reading  of  obscene  or  lascivious  books,  and 
every  thing  which  would  naturally  produce  in  us  a  disposi- 
tion of  mind  to  violate  this  precept. 

That  the  above  is  the  law  of  God  on  this  subject,  is 
manifest,  both  from  natural  and  from  revealed  religion. 
•The  law,  as  above  recited,  contains  two  restrictions  : 

1.  That  the  individuals  be  exclusively  united  to  each 
other;  and, — 

2.  That  this  exclusive  union  be  for  life. 


298        THE  GENERAL  DUTY  OF  CHASTITY. 

Let  us  examine  the  indications  of  natural  religion  upon 
both  of  these  points. 

I.  The  indulgence  of  the  desire  referred  to,  is,  by  the 
law  of  God,  restricted  to  individuals  exclusively  united  to 
each  other.  This  may  be  shown  from  several  consider- 
ations. 

1.  The  number  of  births,  of  both  sexes,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, and  in   all  ages,  has  been  substantially  equal. 
Now,  if  single  individuals  be  not  exclusively  united  to  each 
other,  there  must  arise  an  inequality  of  distribution,  unless 
we  adopt  the  law  of  promiscuous  concubinage.     But  as 
the  desire  is  universal,  it  cannot  be  intended  that  the  dis- 
tribution should  be  unequal ;  for  thus,  many  would,  from 
necessity,  be  left  single.     And  the  other  alternative,  pro- 
miscuous concubinage,  would  very  soon  lead,  as  we  have 
already  remarked,  to  the  extinction  of  society. 

2.  The  manifest  design   of  nature   is   to   increase   the 
human  species,  in  the  most  rapid  ratio  consistent  with  the 
conditions  of  our  being.     That  is  always  the  most  happy 
condition  of  a  nation,  and  that  nation  is  most  accurately 
obeying  the  laws  of  our  constitution,  in  which  the  number 
of  the  human  race  is  most  rapidly  increasing.     Now  it  is 
certain,  that,  under  the  law  of  chastity,  as  it  has  been  ex- 
plained, that   is,  where  individuals  are  exclusively  united 
to  each  other,  the  increase  of  population  will  be  more  rapid, 
than  under  any  other  circumstances. 

3.  That  must  be  the  true  law  of  the  domestic  relations 
which  will  have  the  most  beneficial  effect  upon  the  main 
tenance  and  education  of  children.     Under  the  influence- 
of  such  a  law  as  I  have  described,  it  is  manifest,  that  chil- 
dren will  be  incomparably  better  provided  for  than  under 
that  of  any  other.     The  number  of  children  produced  by 
a  single  pair  thus  united,  will  ordinarily  be  as  great  as  can 
be  supported   and   instructed  by  two   individuals.     And, 
besides,  the  care  of  children,  under  these  circumstances, 
oecomes  a  matter,  not  merely  of  duty,  but  of  pleasure.     On 
the  contrary,  just  in  so  far  as  this  law  is  violated,  the  love 
of  offspring  diminishes.     The  care  of  a  family,  instead  of  a 
pleasure,  becomes  an  insupportable  burden ;  and,  in  the 
worst  states  of  society,  children  either  perish  by  multitudes 


THE    GENERAL   DUTY    OF    CHASTITY.  299 

from  neglect,  or  are  murdered  by  their  parents  in  infancy. 
The  number  of  human  beings  who  perish  by  infanticide, 
in  heathen  countries,  is  almost  incredible.  And  in  coun- 
tries not  heathen,  it  is  a  matter  of  notoriety,  that  neglect  of 
offspring  is  the  universal  result  of  licentiousness  in  parents. 
The  support  of  foundlings,  in  some  of  the  most  licentious 
districts  in  Europe,  has  become  so  great  a  public  burden  as 
to  give  rise  to  serious  apprehension. 

4.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  man  is  intended  to  derive 
by  far  the  greatest  part  of  his  happiness  from  society. 
And  of  social  happiness,  by  far  the  greatest,  the  most  ex- 
quisite, and  the  most  elevating  portion,  is  that  derived  from 
the  domestic  relations ;  not  only  those  of  husband  and  wife, 
but  those  of  parent  and  child,  of  brother  and  sister,  and 
those  arising  from  the  more  distant  gradations  of  collateral 
kindred.  Now,  human  happiness,  in  this  respect,  can  exist 
only  in  proportion  to  our  obedience  to  the  law  of  chastity. 
What  domestic  happiness  can  be  expected  in  a  house  con- 
tinually agitated  by  the  ceaseless  jealousy  of  several  wives, 
and  the  interminable  quarrels  of  their  several  broods  of 
children  ?  How  can  filial  love  dwell  in  the  bosoms  of  chil- 
dren, the  progeny  of  one  father  by  several  concubines? 
This  state  of  society  existed  under  the  most  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, in  the  patriarchal  age ;  and  its  results  even 
here  are  sufficiently  deplorable.  No  one  can  read  the  his- 
tories of  the  families  of  Abraham,  Isaac,  and  Jacob,  and 
David,  without  becoming  convinced  that  no  deviation  can 
be  made  from  the  gospel  law  of  marriage,  without  creating 
a  tendency  to  wrangling  without  end,  to  bitterness  and 
strife,  nay,  to  incest  and  murder.  And  if  this  be  the  result 
of  polygamy  and  concubinage,  in  what  language  is  it  pos- 
sible to  describe  the  effects  of  universal  licentiousness  ?  By 
this,  the  very  idea  of  home  would  be  abolished.  The  name 
of  parent  would  signify  no  more  in  man  than  in  the  brutes. 
Man,  instead  of  being  social,  would  become  nothing  more 
than  a  gregarious  animal,  distinguished  from  his  fellow- 
animals  by  nothing  else  than  greater  intellectual  capacity, 
and  the  more  disgusting  abuse  of  it. 

5.  No  reason  can  be  assigned,  why  the  intellectual, 
moral  and  social  happiness  of  the  one  sex  is  not  as  valu- 


300  THE    GENERAL    DUTY    OP    CHASTITY. 

able,  in  the  sight  of  the  Creator,  as  that  of  the.  other 
Much  less  can  any  reason  be  assigned,  why  the  one  sex 
should  be  to  the  other  merely  a  source  of  sensual  gratifica- 
tion. But,  just  as  we  depart  from  the  law  of  chastity,  as  it 
has  been  here  explained,  woman  ceases  to  be  the  equal  and 
the  companion  of  man,  and  becomes  either  his  timid  and 
much  abused  slave,  or  else  the  mere  instrument  for  the 
gratification  of  his  lust.  No  one  can  pretend  to  believe 
that  the  Creator  ever  intended  that  one  human  being 
should  stand  in  such  a  relation  as  this  to  any  other  human 
being. 

II.  The  second  part  of  the  law  of  chastity  requires  that 
this  union  should  be  for  life. 

Some  of  the  reasons  for  this  are  as  follows : 

1.  In  order  to  domestic  happiness,  it  is  necessary  that 
both  parties  should  cultivate  a  spirit  of  conciliation  and  for- 
bearance, and  mutually  endeavor  to  conform  their  indi- 
vidual peculiarities   to  each  other.     Unless  this  be  done, 
instead  of  a  community  of  interests,  there  will  arise  inces- 
sant collision.     Now,  nothing  can  tend  more  directly  to  the 
cultivation  of  a  proper  temper,  than  the  consideration  that 
this  union  is  indissoluble.     A  mere  temporary  union,  liable 
to  be  dissolved  by  every  ebullition  of  passion,  would  foster 
every  impetuous  and  selfish  feeling  of  the  human  heart. 

2.  If  the  union  be  not  for  life,  there  is  no  other  limit  to 
be  fixed  to  its  continuance  than  the  will  of  either  party. 
This  would  speedily  lead  to  promiscuous  concubinage,  and 
all  the  evils  resulting  from  it,  of  which  I  have  already 
spoken. 

3.  Children  require  the  care  of  both  parents  until  they 
have  attained  to  maturity;  that  is,  generally,  during  the 
greater  £art  of  the  lifetime  of  their  parents,  at  least,  during 
all  that  period  of  their  life  in  which  they  would  be  most 
likely  to  desire  a  separation.     Besides,  the  children  are  the 
joint  property  of  both  parents  ;  and,  if  the  domestic  society 
be  dissolved,  they  belong  to  one  no  more  than  to  the  other ; 
that  is,  they  have  no  protector,  but  are  cast  out  defenceless 
upon  the  world. 

4.  Or,  if  thys  be  not  the  case,  and  they  are  protected  by 
one  parent,  they  must  suffer  an  irreparable   loss  by  the 


THE    GENERAL    DUTY    OF    CHASTITY.  301 

witlidrawment  of  the  other  parent  from  his  or  her  share  of 
the  parental  responsibility,  in  general,  the  care  would  fall 
upon  the  mother,  whose  parental  instincts  are  the  stronger, 
but  who  is,  from  her  peculiar  situation,  the  less  able  to 
protect  them.  The  whole  tendency  of  every  licentious 
system  is,  to  take  advantage  of  the  parental  tenderness  of 
the  mother ;  and,  because  she  would  rather  die  than  leave 
her  children  to  perish,  basely  to  devolve  upon  her  a  burden 
which  she  is  wholly  unable  to  sustain. 

5.  Parents  themselves,  in  advanced  years,  need  the  care 
of  their  children,  and  become  dependent,  in  a  great  measure, 
for  their  happiness  upon  them.  But  all  this  source  of 
happiness  is  dried  up  by  any  system  which  allows  of  the 
disruption  of  the  domestic  society,  and  the  desertion  of 
offspring,  simply  at  the  will  of  the  parent. 

The  above  considerations  may  perhaps  be  deemed  suffi- 
cient to  establish  the  general  law,  and  to  show  what  is  the 
will  of  the  Creator  on  this  subject.  But  it  may  be  suggest- 
ed, that  all  these  consequences  need  not  follow  occasional 
aberrations,  and  that  individual  cases  of  licentious  indul- 
gence should  be  exempted  from  the  general  rule.  To  this 
I  answer, — 

1.  The  severity  of  the  punishment  which  God  has  affixed 
to  the  crime  in  general,  shows  how  severe  is  his  displeasure 
against  it.     God  is  no  respecter  of  persons,  but  he  will 
visit  upon  every  one  the  strict  reward  of  his  iniquity.     And 
he  does  thus  act.     In  woman,  this  vice  is  immediately  fatal 
to  character  ;  and  in  man,  it  leads  directly  to  those  crimes 
which  are  the  sure  precursors  of  temporal  and  eternal  per- 
dition. 

2.  The  God  who  made  us  all,  and  who  is  the  Father 
and  the  Judge  of  his  creatures,  is  omniscient ;  and  he  will 
bring  every  secret  thing  into  judgment.     Let  the  seducer 
and  the  profligate  remember  that  each  must  stand,  with  his 
victim  and  his  partner  in  guilt,  before  the  Judge  of  quick 
and  dead,  where  a  recompense  will  be  rendered  to  every 
man  according  to  his  deeds. 

3.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  a  female  is  a  moral   and 
accountable  being,  hastening  with  us  to  the  bar  of  God ; 
that  she  is  made  to  be  the  centre  of  all  that  is  delightful 

26 


302  THE    GENERAL    DUTY    OF    CHASTITY. 

in  the  domestic  relations  ;  that,  by  her  very  nature,  she 
looks  up  to  man  as  her  protector,  and  loves  to  confide  in 
his  hands  her  happiness  for  life  ;  and  that  she  can  be  ruined 
only  by  abusing  that  confidence,  proving  false  to  that  re- 
liance, and  using  the  very  loveliest  trait  in  her  character  as 
the  instrument  of  her  undoing.  And  then  let  us  consider 
the  misery  into  which  a  loss  of  virtue  must  plunge  the 
victim  and  her  friends  for  ever ;  the  worth  of  that  soul, 
which,  unless  a  miracle  interpose,  must,  by  the  loss  of 
virtue,  be  consigned  to  eternal  despair ;  and  I  ask  whether, 
in  the  whole  catalogue  of  human  crime,  there  be  one 
whose  atrocity  more  justly  merits  the  deepest  damnation, 
than  that  which,  for  the  momentary  gratification  of  a  lawless 
appetite,  will  violate  all  these  obligations,  outrage  all  these 
sympathies,  and  work  out  so  wide-spreading,  so  intermi- 
nable a  ruin  ? 

Such  is  the  lesson  of  natural  religion  on  this  subject. 

III.  The  precepts  of  revealed  religion  may  be  very 
briefly  stated : 

1.  The  seventh  commandment  is,  "  Thou  shalt  not  com- 
mit adultery."     Ex.  xx,   14.     By  the    term    adultery,  is 
meant  every  unlawful  act  and  thought.     The  Mosaic  law 
enacted  that  he  who  seduced  a  woman  should  marry  her 
jEr.  xxii,  16,  17.     This  is,  doubtless,  the  equitable  rule  ; 
and  there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  be  strictly  enforced 
now,  both  by  the  civil  law  and  by  the  opinions  of  the  com- 
munity. 

2.  The   punishment   of  adultery  was,  under   the    same 
law,  death  to  both   parties.     Lev.  x,  22.     Deut.  xxii,  22. 
That  this  should  now  be  enforced,  no  one  will  contend. 
But  it  is  sufficient  to  show  in  what  abhorrence  the  crime  is 
held  by  the  Creator. 

3.  The   consequences   of  whoredom   and   adultery  are 
frequently  set  forth  in   the  prophets,  and  the  most  awful 
judgments    of  God   are  denounced   against    them.      This 
subject  is  also  treated  with  graphic  power  by  Solomon,  in 
the  book  of  Proverbs.     See  Proverbs  v,  3 — 29  ;  vii,  5 — 26. 

4.  Our  Savior  explains  the  law  of  chastity  and  mar- 
riage in  his  sermon  on  the  mount,  and  declares  it  equally  to 
respect  unclean  thoughts  and   actions :    "  Ye  have  heard 


THE    GENERAL    DUTY    OF    CHASTITY.  303 

that  it  hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time,  thou  shalt  not 
commit  adultery.  But  I  say  unto  you,  that  whosoever 
looketh  on  a  woman  to  lust  after  her,  hath  committed 
adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart.  And  if  thy  right 
eye  offend  thee  (or  cause  thee  to  offend),  pluck  it  out  and 
cast  it  from  thee  ;  for  it  is  profitable  for  thee  that  one  of 
thy  members  should  perish,  and  not  that  thy  whole  body 
should  be  cast  into  hell."  Matt,  v,  27 — 32.  That  is,  as 
I  suppose,  eradicate  from  your  bosom  every  impure  thought, 
no  matter  at  what  sacrifice ;  for  no  one  who  cherishes 
impurity,  even  in  thought,  can  be  an  inheritor  of  the 
kingdom  of  heaven. 

Uncleanness  is  also  frequently  enumerated  among  the 
crimes  which  exclude  men  from  the  kingdom  of  heaven  : 

Ephesians  v,  5,  6 :  "  No  whoremonger  or  unclean 
person  hath  any  inheritance  in  the  kingdom  of  Christ  and 
God." 

Galatians  v,  19 — 21 :  "  Now,  the  works  of  the  flesh 
are  manifest,  which  are  these  :  adultery,  fornication,  un- 
cleanness,  lasciviousness ;  of  the  which  I  tell  you  before, 
as  I  have  told  you  in  times  past,  that  they  which  do  such 
things  shall  not  inherit  the  kingdom  of  God." 

Colossians  iii,  5,  6  :  "  Mortify,  therefore,  your  members, 
which  are  upon  the  earth  :  fornication,  uncleanness,  inor- 
dinate affections  ;  for  which  things'  sake,  the  wrath  of  God 
cometh  upon  the  children  of  disobedience." 

Let  every  one  remember,  therefore,  that  whoever  vio- 
lates this  command,  violates  it  in  defiance  of  the  most 
clearly  revealed  command  of  God,  and  at  the  peril  of  his 
own  soul.  He  must  meet  his  act,  and  the  consequences 
of  it,  at  that  day  when  the  secrets  of  all  hearts  are  made 
manifest,  when  every  hidden  thing  will  be  brought  to  light, 
and  when  God  will  judge  every  man  according  to  his 
deeds. 

I  remarked  above,  that  the  law  of  chastity  forbade  the 
indulgence  of  impure  or  lascivious  imaginations,  the  har- 
boring of  such  thoughts  in  our  minds,  or  the  doing  of  any 
thing  by  which  such  thoughts  should  be  excited.  Of  no 
vice  is  it  so  true  as  of  this,  that  "  lust,  when  it  is  cherished, 
bringeth  forth  sin ;  and  sin,  when  it  is  finished,  bringeth 


304  THE    GENERAL    DUTY    OF    CHASTITY. 

forth  death."  Licentiousness  in  outward  conduct  never 
appears,  until  the  mind  has  become  defiled  by  impure 
imaginations.  When,  however,  the  mind  has  become  thus 
defiled,  nothing  is  wanted  but  suitable  opportunity  to  com- 
plete the  moral  catastrophe.  Hence,  the  necessity  of  the 
most  intense  vigilance  in  the  government  of  our  thoughts, 
and  in  the  avoiding  of  all  books,  and  all  pictures,  and  all 
society,  and  all  conduct  and  actions  of  which  the  tendency 
is  to  imbue  our  imaginations  with  any  thing  at  variance 
with  the  purest  chastity.  Whatever,  in  other  respects, 
may  be  the  fascinations  of  a  book,  if  it  be  impure  or  las- 
civious, let  it  be  eschewed.  Whatever  be  the  accomplish- 
ments of  an  acquaintance,  if  he  or  she  be  licentious  in  con- 
versation or  action,  let  him  or  her  be  shunned.  No  man 
can  take  fire  in  his  bosom,  and  his  clothes  not  be  burned. 
We  cannot  mingle  with  the  vile,  let  that  vileness  be  dressed 
in  ever  so  tasteful  a  garb,  without  becoming  defiled.  The 
only  rule  of  safety  is,  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  eml;  for 
thus  alone  shall  we  be  able  to  avoid  the  reality.  Hence  it 
is,  that  a  licentious  theatre  (and  the  tendency  of  all 
theatres  is  to  licentiousness),  immodest  dancing,  and  all 
amusements  and  actions  which  tend  to  inflame  the  passions, 
are  horribly  pernicious  to  morals.  It  would  be  interesting 
to  learn  on  what  principle  of  morals  a  virtuous  woman 
would  justify  her  attendance  upon  an  amusement,  in  which 
she  beholds  before  her  a  once  lovely  female  uttering  covert 
obscenity  in  the  presence  of  thousands,  and  where  she  is 
surrounded  by  hundreds  of  women,  also  once  lovely,  but 
now  abandoned,  whose  ruin  has  been  consummated  by 
this  very  means,  and  who  assemble  in  this  place,  with  the 
more  certain  assurance  of  thus  being  able,  most  success- 
fully, to  effect  the  ruin  of  others. 


305 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 

THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE. 

IT  has  been  already  remarked,  in  the  preceding  section, 
that  the  law  of  chastity  forbids  all  sexual  intercourse  be- 
tween persons  who  have  not  been  exclusively  united  for 
life.  In  the  act  of  marriage,  two  persons,  under  the  most 
solemn  circumstances,  are  thus  united ;  and  they  enter 
into  a  mutual  contract  thus  to  live  in  respect  to  each  other. 
This  relation  having  been  established  by  God,  the  contract 
thus  entered  into  has  all  the  solemnity  of  an  oath.  Hence 
he  who  violates  it  is  guilty  of  a  two-fold  crime  :  first,  the 
violation  of  the  law  of  chastity ;  and,  secondly,  of  the 
law  of  veracity, — a  veracity  pledged  under  the  most  solemn 
circumstances. 

But  this  is  by  no  means  all  that  is  intended  by  the  in- 
stitution of  marriage.  By  the  contract  thus  entered  into, 
a  society  is  formed,  of  a  most  interesting  and  important 
character,  which  is  the  origin  of  all  civil  society ;  and  in 
which,  children  are  prepared  to  become  members  of  that 
great  community.  As  our  principal  knowledge  of  the 
nature  and  obligations  of  this  institution  is  derived  from  the 
sacred  Scriptures,  I  shall  endeavor  briefly  to  explain  the 
manner  in  which  they  treat  of  it,  without  adding  any  thing 
to  what  I  have  already  said,  in  regard  to  the  teaching  of 
natural  religion. 

I  shall  consider,  first,  the  nature  of  this  contract,  and, 
secondly,  the  duties  which  it  enjoins,  and  the  crimes  which 
it  forbids. 

First.  The  nature  of  the  contract. 

1.  The  contract  is  for  life,  and  is  dissoluble  for  one  cause 
only, — the  cause  of  whoredom  : 

Matthew  xix,  3 — 6,  9.  "Then  came  some  of  die 
Pharisees  to  him,  and,  tempting  him,  asked,  Can  a  man, 

Qfi* 


306  THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE. 

upon  every  pretence,  divorce  his  wife?  He  answered, 
Have  ye  not  read,  that  at  the  beginning,  when  the  Crea- 
tor made  man,  he  formed  a  male  and  female  ;  and  said, 
for  this  cause  shall  a  man  leave  father  and  mother,  ai»J 
adhere  to  his  wife ;  and  they  two  shall  be  one  flesh. 
Wherefore,  they  are  no  longer  two,  but  one  flesh.  What  then 
God  hath  conjoined,  let  not  man  separate.  Wherefore,  I 
say  unto  you,  whosoever  divorceth  his  wife,  except  for 
whoredom,  and  marrieth  another,  committeth  adultery." 
I  use  here  the  translation  of  Dr.  Campbell,  which,  I  think, 
conveys  more  exactly  than  the  common  version  the  mean- 
ing of  the  original. 

2.  We  are  here  taught  that  marriage,  being  an  institu- 
tion of  God,  is  subject  to  his  laws  alone,  and  not  to  the 
laws  of  man.     Hence  the  civil  law  is  binding  upon  the 
conscience  only  in  so  far  as  it  corresponds  to  the  law  of 
God. 

3.  This   contract   is   essentially   mutual.     By   entering 
Into  it,  the  members  form  a  society,  that  is,  they  have  some- 
thing in  common.     Whatever  is  thus  in  common,  belongs 
equally  to  both.     And,  on  the  contrary,  what  is  not  thus 
surrendered,  remains  as  before  in  the  power  of  the  indi- 
vidual. 

4.  The  basis  of  this  union  is  affection.     Individuals  thus 
contract   themselves   to   each   other,  on   the   ground   not 
merely  of  mutual  regard,  but  also  of  a  regard  stronger  than 
that  which  they  entertain  for  any  other  persons  else.     If 
such  be  not  the  condition  of  the  parties,  they  cannot  be 
united  with  any  fair  prospect  of  happiness.    Now,  such  is  the 
nature  of  the  human  affections,  that  we  derive  a  higher  and 
a  purer  pleasure  from  rendering  happy  those  whom  we  love 
than   from  self-gratification.     Thus,  a  parent  prefers  self- 
denial,  for  the  sake  of  a  child,  to  self-indulgence.     The 
same  principle  is  illustrated  in  every  case  of  pure  and  dis- 
interested benevolence.     This  is  the  essential  element,  on 
which  depends  the  happiness  of  the  married  state.     To  be 
in  the  highest  degree  happy,  we  must  each  prefer  the  hap- 
piness of  another  to  our  own. 

5.  I  have  mentioned  above,  that,  this  being  a  voluntary 
compact,  and  forming  a  peculiar  society,  there  are  some 


THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE.  307 

things  which,  by  this  compact,  each  surrenders  to  the  o'Vr, 
and  also  other  things  which  are  not  surrendered.     It  is  im- 
portant that  these  be  distinguished  from  each  other. 
I  remark,  then, — 

a.  Neither  party  surrenders  to  the  other  any  control  over 
any  thing  appertaining  to  the  conscience.     From  the  nature 
of  our  moral  constitution,  nothing  of  this  sort  can  be  surren- 
dered to  any  created  being.     For  either  party  to  interfere 
with  the  discharge  of  those  duties,  which  the  other  party 
really  supposes  itself  to  owe  to  God,  is  therefore  wicked 
and  oppressive. 

b.  Neither  party  surrenders  to  the  other  any  thing  which 
would  violate  prior  and  lawful  obligations.     Thus,  a  hus- 
band does  not  promise  to  subject  his  professional  pursuits 
to  the  will  of  his  wife.     He  has  chosen  his  profession,  and, 
if  he  pursue  it  lawfully,  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  con- 
tract.    So,  also,  his  duties  as  a  citizen,  are  of  prior  obliga- 
tion ;    and,  if  they  really  interfere   with  any  others,  those 
subsequently   formed  must  be   construed  in  subjection   to 
them.     Thus,  also,  the  filial  duties  of  both  parties  remain, 
in    some    respects,   unchanged    after    marriage,    and   the 
marriage  contract  should  not  be  so  interpreted  as  to  violate 
them. 

c.  On  the  other  hand,  I  suppose  that  the  marriage  contract 
binds  each  party,  whenever  individual  gratification  is  con- 
cerned, to  prefer  the   happiness  of  the   other  party  to  its 
own.     If  pleasure  can  be  enjoyed  by  both,  the  happiness 
of  both  is  increased  by  enjoying  it  in  common.     If  it  can 
be  enjoyed  but  by  one,  each  should  prefer  that  it  be  enjoyed 
by  the  other.     And  if  there  be  sorrow  to  be  endured,  or 
inconvenience  to  be  suffered,  each  should  desire,  if  possible, 
to  bear  the  infliction   for  the  sake  of  shielding  the  other 
from  pain. 

d.  And,  as  I  have  remarked  before,  the  disposition  to  do 
this  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  the  principles  on  which 
the  compact  is  formed,  from  unreserved  affection.     This  is 
the  very  manner  in  which  affection  always  displays  itself. 
This  is  the  very   means  by   which  affection   is   created. 
"  She  loved   me  for  the  dangers  I  had  seen,  and  I  loved 
her  that  she  did  pity  them." — SHAKSPEARE.     And  this  is 


308  THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE. 

the  only  course  of  conduct  by  which  affection  can  be  re- 
tained. And  the  manifestation  of  this  temper  is,  under  all 
circumstances,  obligatory  upon  both  parties. 

6.  As,  however,  in  all  societies,  there  may  be  differences 
of  opinion,  even  where  the  harmony  of  feeling  remains  un- 
impaired, so  there  may  be  differences  here.  Where  such 
differences  of  opinion  exist,  there  must  be  some  ultimate 
appeal.  In  ordinary  societies,  such  questions  are  settled 
by  a  numerical  majority.  But  as,  in  this  case,  such  a  decis- 
ion is  impossible,  some  other  principle  must  be  adopted. 
The  right  of  deciding  must  rest  with  either  the  one  or  the 
other.  As  the  husband  is  the  individual  who  is  responsible 
to  civil  society,  as  his  intercourse  with  the  world  is  of 
necessity  greater,  the  voice  of  nature  and  of  revelation 
unite  in  conferring  the  right  of  ultimate  authority  upon  him. 
By  this  arrangement  the  happiness  of  the  wife  is  increased 
no  less  than  that  of  the  husband.  Her  power  is  always 
greatest  in  concession.  She  is  graceful  and  attractive 
while  meek  and  gentle ;  but  when  angered  and  turbulent, 
she  loses  the  fascination  of  her  own  sex,  without  attaining 
to  the  dignity  of  the  other. 

"  A  woman  moved  is  like  a  fountain  troubled, 
Muddy,  ill-seeming,  and  bereft  of  beauty."       SHAKS. 

Secondly.  I  come  now  to  speak  of  the  duties  imposed  by 
the  marriage  relation. 

I.  The  marriage  relation  imposes  upon  both  parties, 
equally,  the  duty  of  chastity. 

1.  Hence  it  forbids  adultery,  or  intercourse  with   any 
other  person  than  that  one  to  whom  the  individual  is  united 
in  marriage. 

2.  And,  hence,  it  forbids  all  conduct  in  married  persons, 
or  with  married  persons,  of  which  the  tendency  would  be 
to  diminish  their  affection  for  those  to  whom  they  are  united 
in  marriage,  or  of  which  the  tendency  would  be  to  give 
pain  to  the  other  party.     This  is  evident  from  what  we 
have  before  said.     For,  if  the  contract  itself  proceed  upon 
the  principle  of  entire  and  exclusive  affection,  any  thing 
must  be  a  violation  of  it,  which  destroys  or  lessens  that 
affection ;  and  that  which  causes  this  affection  to  be  doubted, 


THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE.  309 

produces  to  the  party  in  which  the  doubt  exists,  the  same 
misery  that  would  ensue  from  actual  injury. 

The  crime  of  adultery  is  of  an  exceedingly  aggravated 
nature.  As  has  been  before  remarked,  aside  from  being  a 
violation  of  the  law  of  chastity,  it  is  also  a  violation  of  a 
most  solemn  contract.  The  misery  which  it  inflicts  upon 
parents  and  children,  relatives  and  friends,  the  total  anni- 
hilation of  domestic  happiness,  and  the  total  disruption  of 
parental  and  filial  ties  which  it  necessarily  produces,  mark 
it  for  one  of  the  basest  forms  of  human  atrocity.  Hence, 
as  might  be  expected,  it  is  spoken  of  in  the  Scriptures  as 
one  of  those  crimes  on  which  God  has  set  the  seal  of  his 
peculiar  displeasure.  In  addition  to  the  passages  already 
quoted  on  this  subject,  I  barely  mention  the  following : 

Matthew  v,  28.  "  Whosoever  looketh  on  a  woman  to 
cherish  impure  desire,  hath  committed  adultery  with  her 
already  in  his  heart."  Hebrews  xiii,  4.  "Marriage  is 
honorable  in  all,  and  the  bed  undefiled ;  but  whoremongers 
and  adulterers  God  will  judge."  Revelations  xxi,  8. 
"  Murderers  and  the  lascivious  shall  have  their  part  in  the 
lake  that  burneth  with  fire  and  brimstone,  which  is  the 
second  death."  Throughout  the  writings  of  the  prophets, 
in  numberless  instances,  this  crime  is  singled  out,  as  one  for 
which  God  visits  with  the  most  awful  judgments,  both 
nations  and  individuals.  And,  if  any  one  will  reflect  that 
the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  a  country  must  depend  on 
the  virtue  of  the  domestic  society  more  than  on  any  thing 
else,  he  cannot  fail  to  perceive  that  a  crime,  which,  by  a 
single  act,  sunders  the  conjugal  tie,  and  leaves  children 
worse  than  parentless,  must  be  attended  with  more  abun- 
dant and  remediless  evils,  than  almost  any  other  that  can 
be  named.  The  taking  of  human  life  can  be  attended  with 
no  consequences  more  dreadful.  In  the  one  case,  the 
parental  tie  is  broken,  but  the  victim  is  innocent ;  in  the 
other,  the  tie  is  broken,  with  the  additional  aggravation  of 
an  irretrievable  moral  stain,  and  a  wide-spreading  dishonor 
that  cannot  be  washed  away. 

II.  The  law  of  marriage  enforces  the  duty  of  mutual 
affection. 

Affection  towards  another  is  the  result  of  his  or  her  actions 


310  THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE. 

and  temper  towards  us.  Admiration  and  respect  may  be 
the  result  of  other  manifestations  of  character,  but  nothing 
is  so  likely,  as  evidence  of  affection  towards  ourselves,  to 
produce  in  us  affection  towards  others. 

Hence  the  duty  of  cultivating  affection,  imposes  upon 
each  party  the  obligation  to  act  in  such  manner  as  to  excite 
affection  in  the  bosom  of  the  other.  The  rule  is,  "  As  ye 
would  that  others  should  do  unto  (or  be  affected  towards) 
you,  do  ye  even  so  unto  (or  be  ye  so  affected  towards) 
them."  And  the  other  gospel  rule  is  here  also  verified : 
"  Give,  and  it  shall  be  given  unto  you,  good  measure,  pressed 
down,  and  heaped  together,  and  running  over,  shall  men  give 
into  your  bosom."  To  cultivate  affection,  then,  is  not  to 
strive  to  excite  it  by  any  direct  effort  of  abstract  thinking,  but 
to  show,  by  the  whole  tenor  of  a  life  of  disinterested  goodness, 
that  our  happiness  is  really  promoted  by  seeking  the  hap- 
piness of  another.  It  consists  in  restraining  our  passions,  in 
subduing  our  selfishness,  in  quieting  our  irritability,  in  erad- 
icating from  our  minds  every  thing  which  could  give  pain 
to  an  ingenuous  spirit,  and  in  cherishing  a  spirit  of  meekness, 
forbearance,  forgiveness,  and  of  active,  cheerful,  and  inces- 
sant desire  for  the  happiness  of  those  whom  we  love.  At 
no  less  price  than  this  can  affection  be  purchased  ;  and 
those  who  are  willing  to  purchase  it  at  this  price,  will  rarely 
have  reason  to  complain  of  the  want  of  it. 

III.  The  law  of  marriage  imposes  the  duty  of  mutual 
assistance. 

In  the  domestic  society,  as  in  every  other,  there  are 
special  duties  devolving  upon  each  member ;  this  is  no 
more  than  to  say  that  it  is  not  the  duty  of  every  member 
of  a  society  to  do  every  thing.  So  here,  there  are  duties 
devolving  of  right  upon  the  husband,  and  other  duties  de- 
volving of  right  upon  the  wife.  Thus,  it  is  the  duty,  in  the 
first  instance,  of  the  husband,  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the 
family  ;  and  of  the  wife  to  assume  the  charge  of  the  affairs 
of  the  household.  His  sphere  of  duty  is  without,  her  sphere 
of  duty  is  within.  Both  are  under  obligation  to  discharge 
these  duties,  specially  because  they  are  parties  to  this  par- 
ticular compact.  The  Apostle  Paul  affirms,  that  he  who 
does  not  provide  for  his  own,  specially  for  those  of  his  own 


THE    LAW   OF    MARRIAGE.  311 

house,  hath  denied  the  faith,  and  is  worse  than  an  infidel. 
That  man  is  worthily  despised,  who  does  not  qualify  himself 
to  support  that  family,  of  which  he  has  voluntarily  assumed 
the  office  of  protector.  Nor  surely  is  that  woman  less  de- 
serving of  contempt,  who,  having  consumed  the  period  of 
youth  in  frivolous  reading,  dissipating  amusement,  and  in 
the  acquisition  of  accomplishments,  which  are  to  be  con- 
signed, immediately  after  marriage,  to  entire  forge  tfu  In  ess, 
enters  upon  the  (duties  of  a  wife,  with  no  other  expectation, 
than  that  of  being  a  useless  and  prodigal  appendage  to  a 
household,  ignorant  of  her  duties,  and  of  the  manner  of 
discharging  them  ;  and  with  no  other  conceptions  of  the 
responsibilities  which  she  has  assumed,  than  such  as  have 
been  acquired  from  a  life  of  childish  caprice,  luxurious  self- 
indulgence,  and  sensitive,  feminine,  yet  thoroughly  finished 
selfishness.  And  yet  I  fear  that  thfy  system  of  -.femalfi  edu- 
cation, at  present  in  vo^ue,  is,  in  many  respects,  liable  to 
the  accusation  of  producing  precisely  this  tendency. 

I  have  remarked,  that  the  duties  of  the  husband  and 
wife  are  thus,  in  the  first  instance,  apportioned.  Yet,  if 
one  be  disabled,  all  that  portion  of  the  duty  of  the  disabled 
party,  which  the  other  can  discharge,  falls  upon  that  other. 
If  the  husband  cannot  alone  support  the  family,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  wife  to  assist  him.  If  the  wife  is,  through 
sickness,  unable  to  direct  her  household,  the  husband  is 
bound,  in  so  far  as  it  is  possible,  to  assume  her  care.  In 
case  of  the  death  of  either,  the  whole  care  of  the  children 
devolves  upon  the  survivor ;  nor  has  the  survivor  a  right  to 
devolve  it  upon  another  person,  if  he  or  she  can  discharge 
it  alone. 

(  IV.  The  law  of  marriage,  both  from  Scripture  and  from 
reason,  makes  the  husband  the  head  of  the  domestic  so- 
ciety. Hence,  when  difference  of  opinion  exists  (except 
as  stated  above,  where  a  paramount  obligation  binds),  the 
decision  of  the  husband  is  ultimate.  Hence  the  duty  of 
the  wife  is  submission  and  obedience.  The  husband,  how- 
ever, has  no  more  right  than  the  wife  to  act  unjustly,  op- 
pressively, or  unkindly ;  nor  is  the  fact  of  his  possessing 
authority  in  the  least  an  excuse  for  so  acting.  But  as 
differences  of  opinion  are  always  liable  to  exist,  and  as,  in 


312  THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE. 

such  case,  one  or  the  other  party  must  yield,  to  avoid  the 
greatest  of  all  evils  in  such  a  society, — continual  dissension, 
— the  duty  of  yielding  devolves  upon  the  wife.  And  it  is 
to  be  remembered,  that  the  act  of  submission  is,  in  every 
respect,  as  dignified  and  as  lovely  as  the  act  of  authority  ; 
nay,  more,  it  involves  an  element  of  virtue  which  does  not 
belong  to  the  other.  It  supposes  neither  superior  excel- 
lence nor  superior  mind  in  the  party  which  governs  ;  but 
merely  an  official  relation,  held  for  the  mutual  good  of  both 
parties  and  of  their  children.  The  teaching*  of  Scripture 
on  this  subject  is  explicit ;  see  1  Peter  iii,  1 — 7  :  "  Like- 
wise, ye  wives,  be  in  subjection  to  your  own  husbands,  that 
if  any  obey  not  the  word,  they  also  may,  without  the  word, 
be  won  by  the  conversation  of  the  wives  ;  while  they  behold 
your  chaste  conversation  united  with  respect.  Whose 
adorning,  let  it  not  be  that  outward  adorning  of  plaiting 
the  hair,  and  of  wearing  of  gold,  and  of  putting  on  of  ap- 
parel ;  but  let  it  be  the  inward  disposition  of  the  mind, 
which  is  not  corruptible,  even  the  ornament  of  a  meek  and 
quiet  spirit,  which  is,  in  the  sight  of  God,  of  great  price. 
Likewise,  ye  husbands,  dwell  with  your  wives  according  to 
knowledge,  as  with  the  weaker  party  ;  rendering  respect  to 
them,  as  heirs  with  you  of  the  grace  of  life."  That  is,  if  1 
understand  the  passage,  conduct  towards  them,  as  knowing 
that  they  are  weak ;  that  is,  needing  support  and  protec- 
tion ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  rendering  them  all  that  respect 
which  is  due  to  those  who  are,  as  much  as  yourselves,  heirs 
to  a  blessed  immortality.  A  more  beautiful  exhibition  of 
the  duties  of  the  marriage  relation  cannot  be  imagined. 

I  shall  close  this  chapter  with  the  following  well  known 
extract  from  a  poet,  whose  purity  of  character  and  exquisite 
sensibility  have  done  more  than  any  other  in  our  language, 
to  clothe  virtue  in  her  own  native  attractiveness : 

Domestic  happiness,  thou  only  bliss 
Of  Paradise,  that  has  survived  the  fall ! 
Though  few  now  taste  thee  unimpaired  and  pure, 
Or,  tasting,  long  enjoy  thee  !  too  infirm, 
Or  too  incautious,  to  preserve  thy  sweets 
Unmixed  with  drops  of  bitter,  which  neglect 
Or  temper  sheds  into  thy  crystal  cup : 
Thou  art  the  nurse  of  rirtue ;  in  thine  arms 


THE    LAW    OF    MARRIAGE.  313 

She  smiles,  appearing,  as  in  truth  she  is, 
Heaven-born,  and  destined  to  the  skies  again. 
Thou  art  not  known  where  pleasure  is  adored, — 
That  reeling  goddess,  with  her  zoneless  waist 
And  wandering  eyes,  still  leaning  on  the  arm 
Of  novelty,  her  fickle,  frail  support; 
For  thou  art  meek  and  constant,  hating  change, 
And  finding  in  the  calm  of  truth-tried  lov?, 
Joys  which  her  stormy  rapture  never  yields. 
Forsaking  thee,  what  shipwreck  have  we  seen, 
Of  honor,  dignity,  and  fair  renown! 
'Till  prostitution  elbows  us  aside 
In  all  our  crowded  streets.  Task. 


314 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 

THE   LAW  OF   PARENTS. 

THE  adaptation  of  the  physical  and  moral  laws  under 
which  man  is  placed,  to  the  promotion  of  human  happiness, 
is  beautifully  illustrated  in  the  relation  which  exists  between 
the  law  of  marriage  and  the  law  of  parent  and  child. 
Were  the  physical  or  moral  conditions  of  marriage  different 
in  any  respect  from  those  which  exist,  the  evils  which  would 
ensue  would  be  innumerable.  And,  on  the  contrary,  by 
accurately  observing  these  conditions,  we  shall  see  that 
they  not  only  contain  a  provision  for  the  well-being  of  suc- 
cessive generations,  but  also  establish  a  tendency  to  in- 
definite social  progress. 

For  instance,  we  see  that  mankind  are  incapable  of  sus- 
taining the  relation  of  parent  until  they  have  arrived  at  the 
age  of  maturity,  attained  to  considerable  knowledge  and 
experience,  and  become  capable  of  such  labor  as  will  en- 
able them  to  support  and  protect  their  offspring.  Were 
this  otherwise,  were  children  liable  to  become  parents- 
parent  and  child  growing  up  together  in  physical  and  intel- 
lectual imbecility — the  progress  of  man  in  virtue  and  knowl- 
edge would  be  impossible,  even  if  the  whole  race  did  not 
perish  from  want  and  disease. 

Again,  the  parent  is  endowed  with  a  love  of  his  offspring, 
which  renders  it  a  pleasure  to  him  to  contribute  to  its  wel- 
fare, and  to  give  it,  by  every  means  in  his  power,  the  ben- 
efit of  his  own  experience.  And,  on  the  contrary,  there  is 
in  the  child,  if  not  a  correspondent  love  of  the  parent,  a 
disposition  to  submit  to  the  parent's  wishes,  and  to  yield 
(unless  its  instincts  have  been  mismanaged)  to  his  authority. 
Were  either  of  these  dispositions  wanting,  it  is  evident  that 
vhe  whole  social  system  would  be  disarranged,  and  incalcu- 
laKe  misery  entailed  upon  our  race. 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  315 

Again,  it  is  evident  that  civil  society  is  constituted  by 
the  surrender  of  the  individual's  personal  desires  and  pro- 
pensities to  the  good  of  the  whole.  It  of  course  involves 
the  necessity  of  self-restraint — that  is,  of  habitual  self-gov- 
ernment. Now,  in  this  point  of  view,  the  domestic  society 
is  designed  to  be,  as  has  been  frequently  remarked,  the 
nursery  for  the  state. 

Thus,  the  parent  being  of  an  age  and  having  experience 
sufficient  to  control  and  direct  the  child,  and  being  instinc- 
tively impelled  to  exert  this  control  for  the  child's  benefit ; 
and  the  child  being  instinctively  disposed  to  yield  to  his 
authority,  when  judiciously  exerted  ;  the  child  grows  up 
under  a  system  in  which  he  yields  to  the  will  of  another, 
and  thus  he  learns  at  home  to  submit  to  the  laws  of  that 
society  of  which  he  is  soon  to  become  a  member.  And 
hence  it  is  that  the  relaxation  of  parental  authority  has 
always  been  found  one  of  the  surest  indications  of  the  de- 
cline of  social  order,  and  the  unfailing  precursor  of  public 
turbulence  and  anarchy. 

But  still  more,  it  is  a  common  remark,  that  children  are 
influenced  by  example  more  readily  than  by  any  other 
means.  Now,  by  the  marriage  constitution,  this  principle 
of  human  nature  is  employed  as  an  instrument  of  the  great- 
est possible  good.  We  stated  that  the  basis  of  the  mar- 
riage covenant  is  affection,  and  that  it  supposes  each  party 
to  prefer  the  happiness  of  the  other  to  its  own.  While  the 
domestic  society  is  governed  by  this  principle,  it  presents 
to  the  children  a  continual  example  of  disinterestedness  and 
self-denial,  and  of  the  happiness  which  results  from  the 
exercise  of  these  virtues.  And  yet  more,  the  affection  of 
the  parents  prompts  them  to  the  exercise  of  the  same  virtues 
in  behalf  of  their  children ;  and,  hence,  the  latter  have 
before  their  eyes  a  constantly  operating  motive  to  the  culti- 
vation of  these  very  dispositions.  And,  lastly,  as  the  duty 
of  the  wife  is  submission,  children  are  thus  taught,  by  the 
example  of  one  whom  they  respect  and  love,  that  submis- 
sion is  both  graceful  and  dignified  ;  and  that  it  in  no  man- 
ner involves  the  idea  of  baseness  or  servility. 

1.  From  these  considerations,  we  learn  the  relation 
which  exists,  by  nature,  between  parents  and  children.  It 


316  THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS. 

is  the  relation  of  a  superior  to  an  inferior.  The  right  of 
the  parent  is  to  command  ;  the  duty  of  the  child  is  to  obey 
Authority  belongs  to  the  one,  submission  to  the  other. 
This  relation  is  a  part  of  our  constitution,  and  the  obligation 
which  arises  from  it  is,  accordingly,  a  part  of  our  duty.  It 
is  not  a  mere  matter  of  convenience  or  of  expediency,  but 
it  belongs  to  the  relations  under  which  we  are  created  ;  and 
to  the  violation  of  it,  our  Creator  has  affixed  peculiar  and 
afflicting  penalties. 

2.  While   this  is  the  relation,  yet  the  motive  which 
should  govern  the  obligation,  on  both  sides,  is  affection . 
While  the  authority  to  command  rests  with  the  parent,  and 
the  duty  of  submission  is  imposed  upon  the  child,  yet  the 
parent  is  not  at  liberty  to  exercise  this  authority  from  caprice, 
or  from  love  of  power,  or  for  his  own  advantage,  but  from 
simple  love  to  the  child,  and  for  the  child's  advantage. 
The  constitution  under  which  we  are  placed,  renders  it  ne- 
cessary that  the  parent  should  exercise  this  power  ;  but  that 
parent  abuses  it,  that  is,  he  uses  it  for  purposes  for  which 
it  was  not  conferred,  if  he  exercise  it  from  any  other  motive 
than  duty  to  God,  and  love  to  his  offspring. 

3.  This  relation  being  established  by  our  Creator,  and 
the  obligations  consequent  upon  it  being  binding  upon  both 
parties,  the  failure  in  one  party  does  not  annihilate  the  ob- 
ligations of  the  other.     If  a  child  be  disobedient,  the  parent 
is  still  under  obligation  to  act  towards  it  for  its  own  good, 
and  not  to  exert  his  authority  for  any  other  purpose.     If  a 
parent  be  unreasonable,  this  does  not  release  the  child  ;  he 
is  still  bound  to  honor,  and  obey,  and  reverence  his  parent. 

The  duty  of  parents  is,  then,  generally,  to  educate,  or  to 
bring  up,  their  children  in  such  a  manner  as  they  believe 
will  be  most  for  their  future  happiness,  both  temporal  and 
eternal. 

This  comprehends  several  particulars : 

I.    SUPPORT,  OR  MAINTENANCE. 

That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  parents  to  keep  alive  the  help- 
less being  whom  they  have  brought  into  existence,  need  not 
be  provea.  As  to  the  expensiveness  of  this  maintenance, 
I  do  not  know  that  any  thing  very  definite  can  be  asserted. 
The  general  rule  would  seem  to  be,  that  the  mode  of  life 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  317 

adopted  by  the  parent,  would  be  tbat  which  he  is  required 
to  provide  for  the  child.  This,  however,  would  be  modified 
by  some  circumstances.  If  a  parent  of  large  wealth  brought 
up  his  family  in  meanness  and  ignorance,  so  that  they  would 
be ,  specially  unfitted  for  the  opulence  which  they  were 
hereafter  to  enjoy,  he  would  act  unjustly.  He  is  voluntarily 
placing  them  in  circumstances  of  great  temptation.  So,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  a  parent,  destitute  of  means  to  render  his 
children  independent  of  labor,  brings  them  up,  whether  male 
or  female,  in  idleness  and  expensiveness,  he  violates  his 
duty  as  a  parent ;  he  is  preparing  them  for  a  life,  not  of 
happiness,  but  of  discontent,  imbecility  and  misery.  The 
latter,  owing  to  the  natural  weakness  of  parental  affection, 
is,  by  far,  the  most  common  error,  and  is  liable  to  become 
peculiarly  prevalent  in  the  social  condition  of  this  country. 

II.  EDUCATION. 

1.  Physical  education.  A  parent  is  under  obligation  to 
use  all  the  means  in  his  power  to  secure  to  his  children  a  good 
physical  constitution.  It  is  his  duty  to  prescribe  such  food, 
and  in  such  quantity,  as  will  best  conduce  to  their  health  ;  to 
regulate  their  labor  and  exercise,  so  as  fully  to  develop 
all  the  powers,  and  call  into  exercise  all  the  functions,  of 
their  physical  system ;  to  accustom  them  to  hardship,  and 
render  them  patient  of  labor.  Every  one  knows  how 
greatly  the  happiness  of  a  human  being  depends  upon  early 
physical  discipline ;  and  it  is  manifest  that  this  discipline 
can  be  enforced  by  no  one  but  a  parent,  or  by  one  who 
stands  in  the  place  of  a  parent. 

By  the  same  rule,  we  see  the  wickedness  of  those  parents 
who  employ  their  children  in  such  service,  or  oblige  them 
to  labor  in  such  manner,  as  will  expose  them  to  sickness, 
infirmity,  disease,  and  premature  death.  In  many  manu- 
facturing countries,  children  are  forced  to  labor  before  they 
are  able  to  endure  confinement  and  fatigue,  or  to  labor  vastly 
beyond  their  strength  ;  so  that  the  vigor  of  their  constitution 
is  destroyed  even  in  infancy.  The  power  of  the  parent 
over  the  child,  was  given  for  the  child's  good,  and  neither 
to  gratify  the  parent's  selfishness,  nor  to  minister  to  his  love 
of  gain.  It  is  not  improper  to  add,  that  the  guilt  and  the 
shame  of  this  abuse  of  the  rights  of  children,  are  equally 
27* 


318  THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS. 

shared  between  the  parent  who  thus  sells  his  child's  health 
and  life  for  gold,  and  the  heartless  agent  who  thus  profits 
by  his  wickedness.  Nor  is  this  form  of  violation  of  parental 
obligation  confined  to  any  one  class  of  society.  The  am- 
bitious mother,  who,  for  the  sake  of  her  own  elevation,  or 
the  aggrandizement  of  her  family,  and  without  any  respect 
to  the  happiness  of  her  child,  educates  her  daughter  in  all 
the  trickery  of  fashionable  fascination,  dwarfing  her  mind, 
and  sensualizing  her  aspirations,  for  the  chance  of  negotiating 
for  her  a  profitable  match,  regardless  of  the  character  or 
habits  of  him  to  whom  she  is  to  be  united  for  life,  falls  under 
precisely  the  same  condemnation. 

2.  Intellectual  education.  A  child  enters  into  the  world 
utterly  ignorant,  and  possessed  of  nothing  else  than  a  col- 
lection of  impulses  and  capabilities.  It  can  be  happy  and 
useful  only  as  this  ignorance  is  dispelled  by  education,  and 
these  impulses  and  capabilities  are  directed  and  enlarged 
foy  discipline  and  cultivation.  To  some  knowledge  arid 
.discipline  the  parent  has,  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
attained  ;  and,  at  least,  so  much  as  this  he  is  bound  to  com- 
municate to  his  children.  In  some  respects,  however,  this 
duty  can  be  discharged  more  effectively  by  others  than  by 
the  parent ;  and  it  may,  therefore,  very  properly,  be  thus 
devolved  upon  a  teacher.  The  parental  obligation  re- 
quires that  it  be  done  either  by  a  parent  himself,  or  that 
he  procure  it  to  be  done  by  another. 

I  have  said  that  it  can,  in  part.,  be  discharged  by  the 
teacher.  But,  let  it  be  remembered,  it  can  be  done  only  in 
part.  The  teacher  is  only  the  agent ;  the  parent  is  the 
principal.  The  teacher  does  not  remove  from  the  parent 
any  of  the  responsibility  of  his  relation.  Several  duties 
devolve  upon  the  one,  which  cannot  be  rightfully  devolved 
upon  the  other. 

For  instance, — 

1.  He  is  bound  to  inform  himself  of  the  peculiar  habits, 
and  reflect  upon  the  probable  future  situation,  of  his  child, 
and  deliberately   to   consider   what  sort  of  education  will 
most  conduce  to  his  future  happiness  and  usefulness. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  select  such  instructors  as  will  best  accom- 
plish the  results  which  he  believes  will  be  most  beneficial. 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  319 

3.  He  is  bound  to  devote  such  time  and  attention  to  the 
subject,  as   will  enable  him  to  ascertain  whether  the  in- 
structor of  his  child  discharges  his  duty  with  faithfulness. 

4.  To  encourage  his  child,  by  manifesting  such  interest 
in  his  studies  as  shall  give  to  diligence  and  assiduity  all  the 
assistance  and  benefit  of  parental  authority  and  friendship. 

5.  And,  if  a  parent  be  under  obligation  to  do  this,  he  is, 
of  course,  under  obligation  to  take  time  to  do  it,  and  so  to 
construct  the  arrangements  of  his  family  and  business,  that 
it  may  be  done.     He  has  no  right  to  say  that  he  has  no 
time  for  these  duties.     If  God  have  required  them  of  him, 
as  is  the  fact,  he  has  time  exactly  for  them;  and  the  truth 
is,  he  has  not  time  for  those  other  occupations  which  inter- 
fere with  them.     If  he  neglect  them,  he  does  it  to  the  in- 
jury of  his  children,  and,  as  he  will  ascertain  when  it  shall 
be  too  late,  to  his  own  disappointment  and  misery. 

Nor  let  it  be  supposed  that  this  will  ever  be  done  with- 
out bringing  with  it  its  own  reward.  God  has  always  con- 
nected together,  indissolubly,  our  own  personal  benefit  and 
the  discharge  of  every  duty.  Thus,  in  the  present  case,  a 
parent  who  assiduously  follows  his  children  throughout  the 
various  steps  of  their  education,  will  find  his  own  knowl- 
edge increased,  and  his  own  education  carried  forward, 
vastly  beyond  what  he  would  at  first  have  conceived. 
There  are  very  few  things  which  a  child  ought  to  learn, 
from  the  study  of  which  an  adult  will  not  derive  great 
advantage,  especially  if  he  go  through  the  process  of  sim- 
plification and  analysis,  which  are  so  necessary  in  order  to 
communicate  knowledge  to  the  mind  of  the  young.  And 
yet  more.  It  is  only  thus  that  the  parent  will  be  able  to 
retain  that  intellectual  superiority  which  it  is  so  much  for 
the  interest  of  both  parties  that  he  should,  for  a  long  time, 
at  least,  possess.  It  is  an  unfortunate  circumstance,  for  a 
child  to  suppose  that  he  knows  more  than  his  parent ;  and, 
if  his  supposition  be  true,  he  will  not  be  slow  to  entertain 
it.  The  longer  the  parent  maintain  his  superiority  in 
Knowledge  and  wisdom,  the  better  will  it  be  for  both  parties. 
But  this  superiority  cannot  be  retained,  if,  as  soon  as  the 
parent  enters  upon  active  business,  he  desist  from  all  effort 
after  intellectual  cultivation,  and  surrenders  himself  a  slave 


320  THE    LAW   OF    PARENTS. 

to  physical  labor,  while  he  devotes  his  child  to  mere  intel- 
lectual cultivation,  and  thus  renders  intellectual  intercourse 
between  himself  and  his  children  almost  impossible. 

3.  Moral  education. 

The  eternal  destiny  of  the  child  is  placed,  in  a  most 
important  sense,  in  the  hands  of  its  parents.  The  parent 
is  under  obligation  to  instruct,  and  cause  his  child  to  be 
instructed,  in  those  religious  sentiments  which  he  believes 
to  be  according  to  the  will  of  God.  With  his  duty  in  this 
respect,  until  the  child  becomes  able  to  decide  for  himself, 
no  one  has  a  right  to  interfere.  If  the  parent  be  in  error, 
the  fault  is  not  in  teaching  the  child  what  he  believes,  but 
in  believing  what  is  false,  without  having  used  the  means; 
which  God  has  given  him  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  But,  if 
such  be  the  responsibility,  and  so  exclusive  the  authority 
of  the  parent,  it  is  manifest  that  he  is  under  a  double  obli- 
gation to  ascertain  what  is  the  will  of  God,  and  in  what 
manner  the  future  happiness  of  an  immortal  soul  may  be 
secured.  As  soon  as  he  becomes  a  parent,  his  decisions  on 
this  subject  involve  the  future  happiness  or  misery,  not  only 
of  his  own  soul,  but  also  of  that  of  another.  Both  con- 
siderations, therefore,  impose  upon  him  the  obligation  of 
coming  to  a  serious  and  solemn  decision  upon  his  moral 
condition  and  prospects. 

But,  besides  that  of  making  himself  acquainted  with  the 
doctrines  of  religion,  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  im- 
poses upon  the  parent  several  other  duties. 

It  is  his  duty, — 

1.  To  teach  his  child  its  duties  to  God  and  to  man,  and 
produce  in  its  mind  a  permanent  conviction  of  its  moral 
responsibility.     This  is  to  be  done,  not  merely  by  direct, 
but  also  by  indirect,  precept ;  and  by  directing  it  to  such 
trains  of  observation  and  reflection  as  shall  create  a  correct 
moral  estimate  of  actions  and  of  their  consequences.     And 
specially  should  it  be  the  constant  effort  of  the  parent  to 
cultivate  in  his  child  a  spirit  of  piety,  or  a  right  feeling 
towards  God,  the  true  source  of  eveiy  other  virtue. 

2.  Inasmuch  as  the  present  state  of  man  is  morally  im- 
perfect, and  every  individual  is  a  sharer  in  that  imperfec- 
tion, it  is  the  duty  of  the  parent  to  eradicate,  so  far  as  is  in 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  321 

his  power,  the  wrong  propensities  of  his  children.  He 
should  watch,  with  ceaseless  vigilance,  for  the  first  appear- 
ances of  pride,  obstinacy,  malice,  envy,  vanity,  cruelty, 
revenge,  anger,  lying,  and  their  kindred  vices  ;  and,  by 
steadfast  and  unwearied  assiduity,  strive  to  extirpate  them 
before  they  have  gained  firmness  by  age,  or  vigor  by  in- 
dulgence. There  cannot  be  a  greater  unkindness  to  a 
child,  than  to  allow  it  to  grow  up  with  any  of  its  evil  habits 
uncorrected.  Every  one  would  consider  a  parent  cruel, 
who  allowed  a  child  to  grow  up  without  having  taken 
means  to  cure  a  limb  which  had  been  broken ;  but  how 
much  worse  is  an  evil  temper  than  a  broken  limb  ! 

3.  Inasmuch  as  precept  will  be  of  no  avail  without  a 
correspondent  example,  a  parent  is  under  obligation,  not 
only  to  set  no  example  by  which  the  evil  dispositions  of 
his  child  will  be  cherished,  but  to  set  such  an  example  as 
will  be  most  likely  to  remove  them.     A  passionate,  selfish, 
envious  man  must  expect  that,  in  spite  of  all  his  precepts, 
his  children  will  be  passionate,  envious,  and  selfish. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  all  our  efforts  will  be  fruitless  without 
the  blessing  of  God,  that  parent  must   be   convicted  of 
great  neglect  of  duty,  who  does  not  habitually  pray  for 
that  direction  which  he  needs  in  the  performance  of  these 
solemn  obligations  ;  as  well  as  for  that  blessing  upon  his 
efforts,  without  which,  though  ever  so  well  directed,  they 
will  be  utterly  in  vain. 

5.  Inasmuch   as   the   moral    character   of  the  child   is 
greatly  influenced  by  its  associations  and  companions,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  parent  to  watch  over  these  with  vigi- 
lance,  and   to   control    them    with   entire    independence. 
He  is  false  to  his  trust,  if,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  the 
desires  of  his  child,  or  of  conciliating  the  favor  of  others, 
or  avoiding  the  reputation  of  singularity  or  preciseness,  he 
allow   his  child  to  form  associations  which  he  believes,  or 
even  fears,  will  be  injurious  to  him.     And,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  such  be  the  duty  of  the  parent,  he  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered as  fully  at  liberty  to  perform  it,  without  remark,  and 
without  offence.     In  such  matters,  he  is  the  ultimate  and  the 
only  responsible  authority.     He  who  reproaches  another  for 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS. 

the  exercise  of  this  authority,  is  guilty  of  slander.  He  who, 
from  the  fear  of  slander,  shrinks  from  exercising  it,  is  justly 
chargeable  with  a  pusillanimity  wholly  unworthy  of  the  rela- 
tion which  he  sustains. 

6.  As  the  parent  sustains  the  same  relation  to  all  his 
children,  it  is  manifest  that  his  obligations  to  them  all  are 
the  same.  Hence,  he  is  bound  to  exercise  his  authority 
with  entire  impartiality.  The  want  of  this  must  always 
end  in  jealousy,  envy,  and  malice,  and  cannot  fail  to  render 
the  domestic  society  a  scene  of  perpetual  bickering  and 
contention.  A  striking  exemplification  of  all  this  is  recorded 
in  the  history  of  Joseph  and  his  brethren. 

If  this  be  so,  it  is  evident  that  the  violation  of  parental 
obligation  is  more  common,  among  even  indulgent  parents, 
than  would  generally  be  supposed. 

1.  Parents  who  render  themselves  slaves  to  fashiona- 
ble society  and  amusement,  violate  this  obligation.     The 
mother  who  is  engaged  in  a  perpetual  round  of  visiting  and 
company,  and  who,  from  the  pressure  of  engagements  to 
which  she  subjects  herself,  has  no  leisure  to  devote  to  the 
mental  and  moral  culture  of  her  children,  violates  her  most 
solemn  duties.     She  has   no  right  to  squander  away,  in 
frivolous  self-gratification,  the  time  which  belongs  to  hei 
offspring.     She  will  reap  the  fruits  of  her  folly,  when,  in  a 
few  years,  her  children,  having  grown  up  estranged  from  her 
affection,  shall  thwart  her  wishes,  disappoint  her  hopes,  and 
neglect,  if  they  do  not  despise,  the  mother  who  bare  them. 

2.  The  father  who  plunges  into  business  so  deeply  that 
he  has  no  leisure  for  domestic  duties  and  pleasures,  and 
whose  only  intercourse  with  his  children  consists  in  a  brief 
and  occasional  word  of  authority,  or  a  surly  lamentation 
over  their  intolerable  expensiveness,  is  equally  to  be  pitied 
and  to  be  blamed.     What  right  has  he  to  devote  to  other 
pursuits  the  time  which  God  has  allotted  to  his  children  ? 
Nor  is  it  any  excuse,  to  say  that  he  cannot  support  his 
family  in  their  present  style  of  living,  without  this  effort.     I 
ask,  By  what  right  can  his  family  demand  to  live  in  a  man- 
ner which  requires  him  to  neglect  his, most  solemn  and 
important  duties?     Nor  is   it  an   excuse,  to  say  that  he 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  323 

wishes  to  leave  them  a  competence.  Is  he  under  obligation 
to  leave  them  that  competence  which  he  desires  ?  Is  it  an 
advantage  to  them  to  be  relieved  from  the  necessity  of 
labor?  Besides,  is  money  the  only  desirable  bequest 
which  a  father  can  leave  to  his  children?  Surely,  well 
cultivated  intellects,  hearts  sensible  to  domestic  affection, 
the  love  of  parents  and  brethren  and  sisters,  a  taste  for 
home  pleasures,  habits  of  order,  regularity  and  industry,  a 
hatred  of  vice  and  of  vicious  men,  and  a  lively  sensibility 
to  the  excellence  of  virtue,  are  as  valuable  a  legacy  as  an 
inheritance  of  property,  simple  property,  purchased  by  the 
loss  of  every  habit  which  could  render  that  property  a 
blessing. 

3.  Nor  can  thoughtful  men  be  always  exculpated  from 
the  charge  of  this  violation.  The  duties  of  a  parent  are 
established  by  God,  and  God  requires  us  not  to  violate 
them.  While  the  social  worship  of  God  is  a  duty,  it  ought 
not  to  interfere  with  parental  duty.  Parents  who  spend 
that  time  which  belongs  to  their  children,  in  offices  of  public 
social  worship,  have  mistaken  the  nature  of  their  special 
obligation.  I  do  not  pretend  to  say  what  time,  or  how 
much  time,  any  individual  shall  spend  in  any  religious 
service.  This  question  does  not  belong  to  the  present  dis- 
cussion. But  I  say  that  this  time  must  be  taken  out  of  that 
which  belongs  to  ourselves  ;  and  it  might  easily  be  abstracted 
from  that  devoted  to  visiting,  company,  or  idleness ;  it 
should  not  be  taken  from  that  which  belongs,  by  the 
ordinance  of  God,  to  our  children. 

It  will  be  easily  seen,  that  the  fulfilment  of  these  obliga- 
tions, in  the  manner  I  have  suggested,  would  work  a  very 
perceptible  change  in  the  whole  fabric  of  society.  It  would 
check  the  eager  desire  of  accumulation,  repress  the  ardor 
of  ambition,  and  allay  the  feverish  thirst  for  selfish  gratifica- 
tion. But  it  would  render  a  family,  in  truth,  a  society.  It 
would  bring  back  parents  and  children  to  the  relations  to 
each  other  which  God  has  established.  It  would  restore  to 
home  a  meaning,  and  to  the  pleasures  of  home  a  reality, 
which  they  are  in  danger  of  losing  altogether.  Forsaking 
the  shadow  of  happiness,  we  should  find  the  substance. 
Instead  of  a  continual  round  of  physical  excitation,  and  the 


324  THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS. 

ceaseless  pursuit  of  pleasures  which,  as  every  one  confesses, 
end  in  ennui  and  disappointment,  we  should  secure 

"  A  sacred  and  home-felt  delight, 
A  sober  certainty  of  waking  bliss," 

of  which,  previously,  we  could  have  had  no  conception. 

THE  RIGHTS  OF  PARENTS. 

The  right  of  the  parent  over  his  child  is,  of  course,  com- 
mensurate with  his  duties.  If  he  be  under  obligation  to 
educate  his  child  in  such  manner  as  he  supposes  will  most 
conduce  to  the  child's  happiness  and  the  welfare  of  society, 
he  has,  from  necessity,  the  right  to  control  the  child  in 
every  thing  necessary  to  the  fulfilment  of  this  obligation. 
The  only  limits  imposed  are,  that  he  exert  this  control  no 
further  than  is  necessary  to  the  fulfilment  of  his  obligation, 
and  that  he  exert  it  with  the  intention  for  which  it  was 
conferred.  While  he  discharges  his  parental  duties  within 
these  limits,  he  is,  by  the  law  of  God,  exempt  from  inter- 
ference both  from  the  individual  and  from  society. 

Of  the  duration  of  this  obligation  and  this  right. 

1.  In  infancy,  the  control  of  the  parent  over  the  child 
is  absolute;  that  is,  it  is    exercised   without   any   respect 
whatever  to  the  wishes  of  the  child. 

2.  When  the  child  has   arrived    at   majority,   and  has 
assumed   the  responsibility  of  its  own  conduct,  both  the 
responsibility  and  the  right  of  the  parent  cease  altogether. 

The  time  of  majority  is  fixed  in  most  civilized  nations 
by  statute.  In  Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States,  an 
individual  becomes  of  age  at  his  twenty-first  year.  The 
law,  therefore,  settles  the  rights  and  obligations  of  the 
parties,  so  far  as  civil  society  is  concerned,  but  does  not 
pretend  to  decide  upon  the  moral  relations  of  the  parties. 

3.  As  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  parent  at  one  period 
are  absolute,  and  at  another  cease  altogether,  it  is  reason- 
able to  infer,  that  the  control  of  the  parent  should  be  ex- 
ercised on  more  and  more  liberal  principles,   that  a  wider 
and  wider  discretion  should  be  allowed  to  the  child,  and 
that  his  feelings  and  predilections  should  be  more  and  more 
consulted,  as  he  grows  older ;  so  that,  when  he  comes  to 
act  for  himself,  he  may  have  become  prepared  for  the 


THE    LAW    OF    PARENTS.  325 

responsibility  which  he  assumes,  by  as  extensive  an  experi- 
ence as  the  nature  of  the  case  admits. 

4.  Hence,  I  think  that  a  parent  is  bound  to  consult  the 
wishes  of  his  child,  in  proportion  to  his  age,  whenever  this 
can  be  done  innocently  ;  and  also,  to  vary  his  modes  of 
enforcing  authority,  so  as  to  adapt  them  to  the  motives  of 
which  the  increasing  intellect  of  the  child  is  susceptible. 
While  it  is  true  that  the  treatment  proper  for  a  young  man, 
would  ruin  a  child,  it  is  equally  true  that  the  treatment 
proper  for  a  child,  might  very  possibly  ruin  a  young  man. 
The  right  of  control,  however,  still  rests  with  the  parent, 
and  the  duty  of  obedience  still  is  imposed  upon  the  child. 
The  parent  is  merely  bound  to  exercise  it  in  a  manner 
suited  to  the  nature  of  the  being  over  whom  it  is  to  be 
exerted. 

The  authority  of  instructors  is  a  delegated  authority, 
derived  immediately  from  the  parent.  He,  for  the  time 
beinff,  stands  to  the  pupil  in  loco  parentis.  Hence,  the 
relation  between  him  and  the  pupil  is  analogous  to  that 
between  parent  and  child;  that  is,  it  is  the  relation  of 
superiority  and  inferiority.  The  right  of  the  instructor  is 
to  command  ;  the  obligation  of  the  pupil  is  to  obey.  The 
right  of  the  instructor  is,  however,  to  be  exercised,  as  I 
before  stated,  when  speaking  of  the  parent,  for  the  pupil's 
benefit.  For  the  exercise  of  it,  he  is  responsible  to  the 
parent,  whose  professional  agent  he  is.  He  must  use  his 
own  best  skill  and  judgment,  in  governing  and  teaching 
his  pupil.  If  he  and  the  parent  cannot  agree,  the  con- 
nection must  be  dissolved.  But,  as  he  is  a  professional 
agent,  he  must  use  his  own  intellect  and  skill  in  the  exer- 
cise of  his  own  profession,  and,  in  the  use  of  it,  he  is  to  be 
interfered  with  by  no  one. 
28 


326 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN. 

1  SHALL  consider  in  this  chapter  the  duties  and  the  rights 
of  children,  and  their  duration. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  CHILDREN. 

I.  Obedience.  By  this  I  mean,  that  the  relation  be- 
tween parent  and  child  obliges  the  latter  to  conform  to  the 
will  of  the  former  because  it  is  his  will,  aside  from  the  con- 
sideration that  what  is  required  seems  to  the  child  best  or 
wisest.  The  only  limitation  to  this  rule  is  the  limitation  of 
conscience.  A  parent  has  no  right  to  require  a  child  to  do 
what  it  believes  to  be  wrong  ;  and  a  child  is  under  no  ob- 
ligation, in  such  a  case,  to  obey  the  commands  of  a  parent. 
The  child  must  obey  God,  and  meekly  suffer  the  conse- 
quences. It  has  even  in  this  case  no  right  to  resist. 

The  reasons  of  this  rule  are  manifest. 

1.  The  design  of  the  whole  domestic  constitution  would 
be  frustrated  without  it.     This  design,  from  what  has  been 
already  remarked,  is,  to  enable  the  child  to  avail  itself  both 
of  the  wisdom,  and  knowledge,  and  experience,  of  the  parent ; 
and  also  of  that  affection  which  prompts  the  parent  to  em- 
ploy all  these  for  the  well-being  of  the  child.     But  of  these 
advantages  the  child  can  never  avail  himself,  unless  he  yield 
obedience  to  the  parent's  authority,  until  he  have  acquired 
that  age  and  experience  which  are  necessary  to  enable  him 
to  direct  and  to  govern  himself. 

2.  That  this  is  the  duty  of  children  is  made  apparent  by 
the  precepts  of  the  Holy  Scriptures : 

Exodus  xx,  12.  "  Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mother, 
that  thy  days  may  be  long  in  the  land  which  the  Lord  thy 
God  giveth  thee."  This,  as  St.  Paul  remarks,  Eph.  vi,  2, 
3,  is  the  only  commandment  in  the  decalogue,  to  which  a 
special  promise  is  annexed 


THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN.  327 

In  the  book  of  Proverbs  no  duty  is  more  frequently  incul- 
cated than  this ;  and  of  no  one  are  the  consequences  of 
obedience  and  disobedience  more  fully  set  forth. 

A  few  examples  may  serve  as  a  specimen : 

Proverbs  i,  8,  9.  "  My  son,  keep  the  instruction  of  thy 
father,  and  forsake  not  the  law  of  thy  mother.  They  shall 
be  an  ornament  of  grace  (that  is,  a  graceful  ornament)  unto 
thy  head,  and  chains  about  thy  neck." 

Proverbs  vi,  20.  "  Keep  thy  father's  commandment,  and 
forsake  not  the  law  of  thy  mother." 

Proverbs  xiii,  1.  "A  wise  son  heareth  his  father's 
instructions,  but  a  scorner  heareth  not  rebuke." 

The  same  duty  is  frequently  inculcated  in  the  New 
Testament : 

Ephesians  vi,  1.  "  Children,  obey  your  parents  in  the 
Lord,  for  this  is  right."  The  meaning  of  the  phrase,  "  in 
the  Lord,"  I  suppose  to  be,  in  accordance  with  the  will  of 
the  Lord. 

Colossians  iii,  20.  "  Children,  obey  your  parents  in  all 
things,  for  this  is  well  pleasing  unto  the  Lord."  The  phrase, 
"  well  pleasing  unto  the  Lord,"  is  here  of  the  same  meaning 
as  "  in  the  Lord,"  above. 

The  displeasure  of  God  against  those  who  violate  this 
command,  is  also  frequently  denounced  in  the  Scriptures : 

Deuteronomy  xxvii,  16.  "Cursed  be  he  that  setteth 
light  by  his  father  or  his  mother  ;  and  all  the  people  shall 
say  Amen." 

'Proverbs  xv,  5.  "  4  fool  despiseth  his  father's  instruc- 
tions." 

Proverbs  xxx,  17.  "The  eye  that  mocketh  at  his 
father,  and  despiseth  to  obey  his  mother,  the  ravens  of  the 
valley  shall  pluck  it  out,  and  the  young  eagles  shall  eat  it." 
That  is,  he  shall  perish  by  a  violent  death ;  he  shall  come 
to  a  miserable  end. 

From  such  passages  as  these,  and  I  have  selected  only  a 
very  few  from  a  great  number  that  might  have  been  quoted, 
we  learn,  1.  That  the  Holy  Scriptures  plainly  inculcate 
obedience  to  parents  as  a  command  of  God.  He  who  is 
guilty  of  disobedience,  therefore,  violates  not  merely  the 
command  of  man,  but  that  also  of  God.  And  it  is,  there- 


328  THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN. 

fore,  our  duty  always  to  urge  it,  and  to  exact  it,  mainly  on 
this  ground. 

2.  That  they  consider  obedience  to  parents  as  no  indi- 
cation of  meanness  and  servility ;  but,  on  the  contrary,  as 
the  most  honorable  and  delightful  exhibition  of  character 
that  can  be  manifested  by  the  young.     It  is   a  graceful 
ornament,  which  confers  additional  beauty  upon  that  which 
was  otherwise  lovely. 

3.  That  the  violation  of  this  commandment  exposes  the 
transgressor  to  special  and  peculiar  judgments.     And,  even 
without  the  light  of  revelation,  I  think  that  the  observation 
of  every  one  must  convince  him,  that  the  curse  of  God  rests 
heavily  upon  filial  disobedience,  and  that  his  peculiar  bless- 
ing follows  filial  obedience.     And,  indeed,  what  can  be  a 
surer  indication  of  future  profligacy  and  ruin,  than  that  tur- 
bulent impatience  of  restraint,  which  leads  a  youth  to  follow 
the   headlong   impulses   of  passion,  in   preference   to   the 
counsels  of  age  and  experience,  even  when  conveyed  in  the 
language  of  tender  and  disinterested  affection  ? 

II.  Another  duty   of  children    to  parents,  is  reverence. 
This  is  implied  in  the  commandment,  "  honor  thy  father 
and  thy  mother."     By  reverence,  I  mean  that  conduct  and 
those  sentiments  which  are  due  from  an  inferior  to  a  supe- 
rior.    The  parent  is  the  superior,  and  the  child  the  inferior, 
by  virtue  of  the  relation  which  God  himself  has  established. 
Whatever  may  be  the  rank  or  the  attainments  of  the  child, 
and  how  much  soever  they  may  be  superior  to  those  of  the 
parent,    these   can   never   abrogate   the    previous   relation 
which  God  has  established.     The  child  is  bound  to  show 
deference  to  the  parent,  whenever  it  is  possible,  to  evince 
that  he  considers  him  his  superior ;  and  to  perform  for  him 
services  which  he  would  perform  for  no  other  person.     And 
let  it  always  be  remembered,  that  in  this,  there  is  nothing 
degrading,  but  every  thing  honorable.     No  more  ennobling 
and  dignified  trait  of  character  can  be  exhibited,  than  that 
of  universal  and  profound  filial  respect.  The  same  principle, 
carried  out,  would  teach  us  universal  and  tender  respect  for 
old  age,  at  all  times,  and  under  all  circumstances. 

III.  Another  duty  of  children  is  filial  affection,  or  the 
peculiar  affection  due  from  a  child  to  a  parent,  because  he 


THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN.  329 

is  a  parent.  A  parent  may  be  entitled  to  our  love,  because 
he  is  a  man,  or  because  he  is  such  a  man,  that  is,  possessing 
such  excellences  of  character ;  but,  besides  all  this,  and 
aside  from  it  all,  he  is  entitled  to  out  affection  on  account 
of  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  to  us.  This  imposes 
upon  us  the  duty  not  only  of  hiding  his  foibles,  of  cover- 
ing his  defects,  of  shielding  him  from  misfortune,  and  of 
seeking  his  happiness  by  what  means  soever  Providence 
has  placed  in  our  power,  but  also  of  performing  all  this, 
and  all  the  other  duties  of  which  we  have  spoken,  from 
love  to  him,  because  he  is  our  parent, — a  love  which  shall 
render  such  services  not  a  burden,  but  a  pleasure,  under 
what  circumstances  soever  it  may  be  our  duty  to  render 
them. 

IV.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  child,  whenever  it  is  by  the 
providence  of  God  rendered  necessary,  to  support  his 
parent  in  old  age.  That  man  would  deserve  the  reputa- 
tion of  a  monster,  who  would  not  cheerfully  deny  himself, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  minister  to  the  comforts  of  the  de- 
clining years  of  his  parent. 

THE  RIGHTS  OF  CHILDREN. 

1.  Children  have  a  right  to  maintenance,  and,  as  has 
been  remarked  before,  a  maintenance  corresponding  to  the 
circumstances  and  condition  of  the  parent. 

2.  They  have  a  right  to  expect  that  the  parent  will  exert 
his  authority,  not  for  his  own  advantage,  nor  from  caprice, 
but  for  the  good  of  the  child,  according  to  his  best  judg- 
ment.    If  the  parent  act  otherwise,  he  violates  his  duty  to 
his  children  and  to  God.     This,  however,  in  no  manner 
liberates   the   child   from    his  obligations    to    his   parent. 
These  remain  in  full  force,  the   same  as   before.      The 
wrong  of  one  party  is  no  excuse  for  wrong  in  the  other. 
It  is  the  child's  misfortune,  but  it  can  never  be  alleviated 
by  domestic  strife,  and  still  less  by  filial  disobedience  and 
ingratitude. 

Of  the  duration  of  these  rights  and  obligations. 

1.   Of  obedience.      The   child   is  bound   to   obey   the 

parent  so  long  as  he  remains  in  a  state  of  pupilage,  that 

is,  so  long  as  the  parent  is  responsible  for  his  conduct,  and 

he  is  dependent  upon  his   parent.     This  period,  so  far  as 

28* 


330  THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN. 

society  is  concerned,  as  has  been  remarked,  is  fixed,  in 
most  countries,  by  statute.  Sometimes,  by  the  consent 
of  both  parties,  it  ceases  before  that  period  ;  at  other  times, 
it  continues  beyond  it.  With  the  termination  of  minority, 
let  it  occur  when  it  will,  the  duty  of  obedience  ceases. 
After  this,  however,  the  advice  of  the  parent  is  entitled  to 
more  deference  and  respect  than  that  of  any  other  person  ; 
but,  as  the  individual  now  acts  upon  his  own  responsibility, 
it  is  only  advice,  since  it  has  ceased  to  be  authoritative. 

2.  The  conscience  of  a  child  becomes  capable  of  delib- 
erate decision  long   before  its  period  of  pupilage  ceases. 
Whenever  this  decision  is  fairly  and  honestly  expressed, 
the  parent  ought  not  to  interfere  with  it.     It  is  his  duty  to 
strive  to  convince  his  child,  if  he  think  it  to  be  in  error ; 
but,  if  he  cannot  succeed  in  producing  conviction^  he  must 
leave  the  child,  like  any  other  human  being,  to  obey  God 
in  the  manner  it  thinks  will  be  most  acceptable  to  Him. 

3.  The  obligation  of  respect  and  affection  for  parents, 
never   ceases,   but    rather  increases   with   advancing  age. 
As    the  child  grows  older,  he   becomes  capable  of  more 
disinterested    affection,   and  of  the   manifestation  of  more 
delicate  respect ;  and,  as  the  parent  grows  older,  he  feels 
more  sensibly  the  need  of  attention  ;  and   his  happiness  is 
more    decidedly   dependent  upon  it.     As  we   increase  in 
years,  it  should,  therefore,  be  our  more  assiduous  endeavor 
to  make  a  suitable  return  to  our  parents  for  their  kindness 
bestowed  upon  us  in  infancy  and  youth,  and  to  manifest, 
by  unremitting  attention,  and  delicate  and  heartfelt  affection, 
our  repentance  for  those  acts  of  thoughtlessness  and  way- 
wardness which  formerly  may  have  grieved  them. 

That  a  peculiar  insensibility  exists  to  the  obligations  of 
the  parental  and  filial  relation,  is,  I  fear,  too  evident  to 
need  any  extended  illustration.  The  notion,  that  a  family 
is  a  society,  and  that  a  society  must  be  governed,  and  that 
the  right  and  the  duty  of  governing  this  society  rest  with 
the  parent,  seems  to  be  rapidly  vanishing  from  the  minds 
of  men.  In  the  place  of  it,  it  seems  to  be  the  prevalent 
opinion,  that  children  may  grow  up  as  they  please  ;  and 
that  the  exertion  of  parental  restraint  is  an  infringement 
upon  the  personal  liberty  of  the  child.  But  all  this  will 


THE    LAW    OF    CHILDREN.  331 

not  abrogate  the  law  o'f  God,  nor  will  it  avert  the  punish- 
ments which  he  has  connected,  indissolubly,  with  disobe- 
dience. The  parent  who  neglects  his  duty  to  his  children, 
is  sowing  thickly,  for  himself  and  for  them,  the  seeds  of 
his  future  misery.  He  who  is  suffering  the  evil  dispositions 
of  his  children  to  grow  up  uncorrected,  will  find  that  he  is 
cherishing  a  viper  by  which  he  himself  will  first  be  stung. 
That  parent  who  is  accustoming  his  children  to  habits  of 
thoughtless  caprice  and  reckless  expenditure,  and  who 
stupidly  smiles  at  the  ebullitions  of  youthful  passion,  and 
the  indulgence  in  fashionable  vice,  as  indications  of  a  manly 
spirit,  needs  no  prophet  to  foretell,  that,  unless  the  dissolute- 
ness of  his  family  leave  him  early  childless,  his  gray  hairs 
will  be  brought  down  with  sorrow  to  the  grave. 

I  remarked,  at  the  close  of  the  last  chapter,  that  the 
duty  of  instructors  was  analogous  to  that  of  parents,  and 
that  they  stood  to  pupils  in  a  relation  essentially  parental. 
It  is  proper  here  to  add,  that  a  pupil  stands  to  his  instructor 
in  a  relation  essentially  filial.  His  duty  is  obedience: 
first  to  his  parent ;  and,  secondly,  to  the  professional  agent 
to  whom  he  has  been  committed  by  his  parent.  The 
equals,  in  this  relation,  are  the  parent  and  the  instructor : 
to  both  of  them  is  the  pupil  the  inferior ;  and  to  both  is 
he  under  the  obligation  of  obedience,  respect  and  reverence. 

Now,  such  being  the  nature  of  the  relation,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  instructor  to  enforce  obedience,  and  of  the  pupil  to 
render  it.  It  would  be  very  easy  to  show,  that,  on  the 
fulfilment  of  this  duty  on  the  part  of  the  instructor,  the  in- 
terests of  education,  and  the  welfare  of  the  young,  vitally 
depend.  Without  discipline,  there \an  be  formed  no  valu- 
able habit.  Without  it,  when  young  persons  are  congre- 
gated together,  far  away  from  the  restraints  of  domestic 
society,  exposed  to  the  allurements  of  ever-present  tempta- 
tion, and  excited  by  the  stimulus  of  youthful  passion,  every 
vicious  habit  must  be  cultivated.  The  young  man  may 
applaud  the  negligent  and  pusillanimous  instructor ;  but, 
when  that  man,  no  longer  young,  suffers  the  result  of  that 
neglect  and  pusillanimity,  it  is  well  if  a  better  spirit  have 
taught  him  to  mention  the  name  of  that  instructor  without 
bitter  execration. 


332  THE    LAW    OP    CHILDREN. 

"  In  colleges  and  halls,  in  ancient  days, 
There  dwelt  a  sage  called  Discipline. 
His  eye  was  meek  and  gentle,  and  a  smile 
Played  on  his  lips ;  and  in  his  speech  was  heard 
Paternal  sweetness,  dignity,  and  love. 
The  occupation  dearest  to  his  heart 
Was  to  encourage  goodness.     Learning  grew, 
Beneath  his  care,  a  thriving,  vigorous  plant. 
The  mind  was  well  informed,  the  passions  held 
Subordinate,  and  diligence  was  choice. 
If  e'er  it  chanced,  as  sometimes  chance  it  must, 
That  one,  among  so  many,  overleaped 
The  limits  of  control,  his  gentle  eye 
Grew  stern,  and  darted  a  severe  rebuke. 
His  frown  was  full  of  terror,  and  his  voice 
Shook  the  delinquent  with  such  fits  of  awe, 
As  left  him  not,  till  penitence  had  won 
Lost  favor  back  again,  and  closed  the  breach. 

But  Discipline  at  length, 

O'erlooked  and  unemployed,  grew  sick,  and  died. 
Then  study  languished,  emulation  slept, 
And  virtue  fled.     The  schools  became  a  scene 
Of  solemn  farce,  where  ignorance  in  stilts, 
His  cap  well  lined  with  logic  not  his  own, 
With  parrot  tongue,  performed  the  scholar's  part, 
Proceeding  soon  a  graduated  dunce. 
What  was  learned, 

If  aught  was  learned  in  childhood,  is  forgot; 
And  such  expense  as  pinches  parents  blue, 
And  mortifies  the  liberal  hand  of  love, 
Is  squandered  in  pursuit  of  idle  sports 
And  vicious  pleasures."  Task. 


333 


CLASS    THIRD. 

DUTIES    TO    MAN,  AS    A  MEMBER  OF  CIVIL    SOCIETY. 


To  this  class  belong  the  duties  of  magistrates  and  citizens. 
As  these,  however,  would  be  but  imperfectly  understood, 
without  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  civil  society,  and  of 
the  relations  subsisting  between  society  and  the  individual, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  these  latter,  before  entering 
upon  the  former.  I  shall,  therefore,  attempt  to  explain, 
first,  The  Nature  and  Limitations  of  Civil  Society ;  sec- 
ondly, Government,  or  the  Manner  in  which  the  Obligations 
of  Society  are  Discharged  ;  thirdly,  The  Duties  of  Magis- 
trates ;  fourthly,  The  Duties  of  Citizens. 


334 


CHAPTER    FIRST 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

As  civil  society  is  a  somewhat  complicated  conception, 
it  may  be  useful,  in  the  first  place,  to  consider  the  nature 
of  a  society  in  its  simplest  form.  This  chapter  will,  there- 
fore, be  divided  into  two  sections.  The  first  treats  of  the 
constitution  of  a  simple  society ;  the  second,  of  the  consti- 
tution of  civil  society. 


SECTION    I. 

OF    A   SIMPLE    SOCIETY. 

I.   Of  the  nature  of  a  Simple  Society. 

1.  A  society  of  any  sort  originates  in  a  peculiar  form  of 
contract,    entered   into   between    each   several    individual 
forming  the  society,  on  the  one  part,  and  all  the  other 
members  of  the  society  on  the  other  part.     Each  party 
promises  to  do  certain  things  to  or  for  the  other,  and  puts 
itself  under  moral  obligation  to  do  so.     Hence,  we  see  that 
conscience,  or  the  power  of  recognising  moral  obligation,  is, 
in  the  very  nature  of  things,  essential  to  the  existence  of  a 
society.     Without  it,  a  society  could  not  be  formed. 

2.  This  contract,  like  any  other,  respects  those  things,  and 
those  things  only,  in  which  the  parties  have  thus  bound 
themselves  to  each  other.     As  the  individual  is  under  no 
obligation  to  belong  to  the  society,  but  the  obligation  is 
purely  voluntary,  he  is  bound  in  no  other  manner,  and  for 
no  other  purpose,  than  those  in  and  for  which  he  has  bound 


OF    A    SIMPLE    SOCIETY.  335 

nimself.     In  all  other  respects,  he  is  as  free  as  he  was 
before. 

3.  Inasmuch  as  the  formation  of  a  society  involves  the 
idea  of  a  moral  obligation,  each  party  is  under  moral  obli- 
gation to  fulfil  its  part  of  the  contract.     The  society  is 
bound  to  do  what  it  has  promised  to  every  individual,  and 
every  individual  is  bound  to  do  what  he  has  promised  to 
the  society.     If  either  party  cease  to  do  this,  the  compact, 
like  any  other  mutual  contract,  is  dissolved. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  every  individual  is,  in  all  respects  ex- 
cepting those  in  which  he  has  bound  himself,  as  free  as  he 
was  before,  the  society  has  no  right  to  impose  upon  the 
individual  any  other  obligation  than  those  under  which  he 
has  placed  himself.     For,  as  he  has  come  under  no  such 
obligation  to  them,  they  have  no  more  control  over  him 
than  any  other  men.     And,  as  their  whole  power  is  limited 
to  that  which  has  been  conferred  upon  them  by  individuals, 
beyond   this   limit,  they  are   no   society;    they  have   no 
power ;  their  act  is  really  out  of  the  society,  and  is,  of  course, 
binding  upon  no  member  of  the  society,  any  more  than 
upon  any  other  man. 

5.  As  every  member  of  the  society  enters  it  upon  the 
same  terms,  that  is,  as  every  one  comes  under  the  same 
obligations  to  the  society,  and  the  society  comes  under  the 
same  obligations  to  him,  they  are,  by  consequence,  so  far 
as  the  society  is  concerned,  all   equals  or   fellows.      All 
have  equal  rights,  and  all  are  subject   to  the  same  obli- 
gations. 

6.  That  which  defines  the  obligations  under  which  the 
individual  and  the  society  have  come,  in  respect  to  each 
other,  is  called  the  constitution  of  the  society.     It  is  intend- 
ed to  express  the  object  of  the  association,  and  the  manner 
in  which  that  object  is  to  be  accomplished :  that  is  to  say, 
it  declares  what  the  individual  promises  to  do  for  the  society, 
what  the  society  promises  to  do  for  the  individual,  and  the 
object   for  which   this  association  between  the  parties  is 
formed. 

7.  As  the  union  of  individuals  in  this  manner  is  voluntary, 
every  member  naturally  has  a  right  to  dissolve  the  con- 
nection when  he  pleases ;  and  the  society  have  also  a  cor- 


336  OF    A    SIMPLE    SOCIETY. 

responding  right.  As,  however,  this  would  frequently 
expose  both  parties  to  inconvenience,  it  is  common,  in  the 
articles  of  the  constitution,  or  the  form  of  compact,  to 
specify  on  what  terms  this  may  be  done.  When  this  part 
of  the  agreement  has  thus  been  entered  into,  it  of  course 
becomes  as  binding  as  any  other  part  of  it. 

II.  Of  the  manner  in  which  such  a  society  shall  be  gov- 
erned. 

The  object  of  any  such  association  is  to  do  something. 
But  it  is  obvious  that  they,  can  act  only  on  one  of  three 
suppositions  :  by  unanimity,  by  a  minority,  or  by  a  majority. 
To  expect  unanimity  in  the  opinions  of  a  being  so  diver- 
sified in  character  as  man,  is  frivolous.  To  suspend  the 
operation  of  many  upon  the  decisions  of  one,  is  manifestly 
unjust,  would  be  subversive  of  the  whole  object  of  the 
association,  and  would  render  the  whole  society  more  ineffi- 
cient than  the  separate  individuals  of  which  it  is  composed. 
To  suppose  a  society  to  be  governed  by  a  minority,  would 
be  to  suppose  a  less  number  of  equals  superior  in  wisdom 
and  goodness  to  a  greater  number,  which  is  absurd.  It 
remains,  therefore,  that  every  society  must  of  necessity  be 
governed  by  a  majority. 

III.  Of  the  limits  within  which  the  power  of  the  majority 
is  restricted. 

The  majority,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  vested,  from 
necessity,  with  the  whole  power  of  the  society.  But  it 
derives  its  power  wholly  and  exclusively  from  the  society, 
and  of  course  it  can  have  no  power  beyond,  or  diverse  from, 
that  of  the  society  itself.  Now,  as  the  power  of  the  society 
is  limited  by  the  concessions  made  by  each  individual 
respectively,  and  is  bound  by  its  obligations  to  each  individ- 
ual, the  power  of  the  majority  is  manifestly  restricted  within 
precisely  the  same  limits. 

Thus,  to  be  more  particular,  a  majority  has  no  right  to  do 
any  thing  which  the  individuals  forming  the  society  have 
not  authorized  the  society  to  do : 

1.  They  have  no  right  to  change  the  object  of  the  so- 
ciety. If  this  be  changed,  another  society  is  formed,  and 
the  individual  members  are,  as  at  first,  at  liberty  to  unite 
with  it  or  not. 


OF    A    SIMPLE    SOCIETY.  337 

2.  They  have  no  right  to  do  any  thing  beyond,  or  differ- 
ent from,  the  object  of  the  society.     The  reasons  are  the 
same  as  in  the  former  instance. 

3.  Nor  have  they  a  right  to  do  any  thing  in  a  manner 
different   from   that   to  which  the  members,  upon  entering 
the  society,  agreed.     The  manner  set  forth  in  the  consti- 
tution, was  that  by  which  the  individuals  bound  themselves, 
and  they  are  bound  by  nothing  else. 

4.  Nor  have  they  a  right  to  do  any  thing  which  violates 
the  principle  of  the  entire  social  equality  of  the  members. 
As  all  subjected  themselves  equally  to  the  same  rules,  any 
act  which  supposes  a  difference  of  right,  is  at  variance  with 
the  fundamental  principle  of  the  compact. 

And,  hence,  from  the  nature  of  the  compact,  it  is  obvious, 
that,  while  a  majority  act  within  the  limits  of  the  authority 
thus  delegated  to  them,  the  individual  is  under  a  moral 
obligation  to  obey  their  decisions  ;  for  he  has  voluntarily 
placed  himself  under  such  obligation,  and  he  is  bound  to 
fulfil  it. 

And,  on  the  other  hand,  the  society  is  bound  to  fulfil  to 
the  individual  the  contract  which  they  have  formed  with 
him,  and  to  carry  forward  the  object  of  the  association  in 
the  manner  and  in  the  spirit  of  the  contract'  entered  into. 
Nor  is  this  a  mere  matter  of  form  or  of  expediency :  it  is  a 
matter  of  moral  obligation  voluntarily  entered  into ;  and  it 
is  as  binding  as  any  other  contract  formed  under  any  other 
circumstances. 

And,  again,  if  the  society  or  the  majority  act  in  violation 
}f  these  engagements,  or  if  they  do  any  thing  not  committed 
.o  them  by  the  individual,  such  act  is  not  binding  upon  any 
member ;  and  he  is  under  no  more  obligation  to  be  gov- 
erned by  it,  than  he  would  be  if  it  were  done  by  any  other 
persons,  or  if  not  done  at  all. 

If  these  principles  be  correct,  they  will,  I  think,  throw 
some  light  upon  the  question  of  the  durability  of  corpora- 
tions. A  corporation  is  a  society  established  for  certain 
purposes,  which  are  to  be  executed  in  a  certain  manner. 
He  who  joins  it,  joins  it  under  these  conditions  ;  and  the 
whole  power  of  the  society  consists  in  power  to  do  these 
things  in  this  manner.  If  they  do  any  tiling  else,  they, 
29 


338  OF    A    SIMPLE    SOCIETY. 

when  doing  it,  are  not  this  society,  but  some  other.  And 
of  course  those,  whether  the  minority  or  the  majority,  who 
act  according  to  the  original  compact,  are  the  society  ;  and 
the  others,  whether  more  or  less,  are  something  else.  The 
act  of  incorporation  is  governed  by  the  same  principles. 
It  renders  the  persons  so  associated  a  body  politic,  and 
recognised  in  law,  but  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  original 
principles  of  such  an  association.  The  corporation,  there- 
fore, are  the  persons,  whether  more  or  less,  who  adhere  to 
the  original  agreement ;  and  any  act  declaring  any  thing 
else  to  be  the  society,  is  unjust  and  void. 

But  suppose  them  all  to  have  altered  their  sentiments. 
The  society  is  then,  of  course,  dissolved.  They  may,  if 
they  choose,  form  another  society  ;  but  they  are  not  another, 
of  course,  nor  can  they  be  such  until  they  form  another 
organization. 

Again,  suppose  that  they  have  property  given  under  the 
original  association,  and  for  the  promotion  of  its  objects, 
and  the  whole  society,  or  a  majority  of  them,  have  changed 
its  objects.  I  answer,  If  a  part  still  remain,  and  prosecute 
the  original  object,  they  are  the  society  ;  and  the  others, 
by  changing  the  object,  have  ceased  to  be  the  society. 
The  right  of  property  vests  with  those  who  adhere  to  the 
original  constitution.  If  all  have  changed  the  object,  the 
society  is  dissolved ;  and  all  ownership,  so  far  as  the 
property  is  concerned,  ceases.  It  therefore  either  belongs 
to  the  public,  or  reverts  to  the  heirs  at  law.  A  company 
of  men  united  for  another  object,  though  retaining  the 
same  name,  have  no  more  right  to  inherit  it  than  any  other 
citizens.  The  right  of  a  legislature  to  give  it  to  them  by 
special  act,  is  even  very  questionable.  Legislatures  are  not 
empowered  to  bestow  property  upon  men  at  will ;  and  such 
grant,  being  beyond  the  power  conceded  to  the  legislator, 
seems  to  me  to  be  null  and  void. 

The  principles  of  this  section  seem  to  me  to  demand 
the  special  attention  of  those  who  are  at  present  engaged  in 
conducting  the  business  of  voluntary  associations.  It  should 
always  be  remembered,  that  he  who  joins  a  voluntary  asso- 
ciation, joins  it  for  a  specified  object,  and  for  no  other. 
The  association  itself  has  one  object,  and  no  other.  This 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  339 

object,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  is  to  be  accomplished, 
ought  to  be  plainly  set  forth  in  the  constitution.  Now, 
when  a  majority  attempt  to  do  any  thing  not  comprehended 
within  this  object  thus  set  forth,  or  in  a  manner  at  variance 
with  that  prescribed,  they  violate  the  fundamental  article 
of  the  compact,  and  the  society  is  virtually  dissolved.  And 
against  such  infraction  of  right  it  is  the  duty  of  the  individual 
to  protest ;  and  if  it  be  persisted  in,  it  is  his  duty  to  withdraw. 
And  it  seems  to  me  that,  otherwise,  the  whole  benefit  of 
voluntary  associations  will  be  lost ;  and  if  the  whole  society 
do  it,  the  society  is  changed,  and  it  is  changed  in  no  man- 
ner the  less  because  its  original  name  is  retained.  If  the 
objects  of  such  associations  he  not  restricted,  their  increasing 
complication  will  render  them  unmanageable  by  any  form 
of  agency.  If  an  individual,  when  he  unites  with  others 
for  one  object,  knows  not  for  how  many  objects,  nor  for 
what  modes  of  accomplishing  them,  he  shall  be  held  re- 
sponsible, who  will  ever  unite  in  a  benevolent  enterprise  ? 
And,  if  masses  of  men  may  be  thus  associated  in  every 
part  of  a  country  for  one  professed  object,  and  this  object 
may  be  modified,  changed,  or  exceeded,  according  to  the 
will  of  an  accidental  majority,  voluntary  associations  will 
very  soon  be  transformed  into  the  tools  of  intriguing  an  i 
ambitious  men,  and  will  thus  become  a  curse  instead  of  a 
blessing. 


SECTION    II. 

OP  CIVIL  SOCIETY, 

In  order  to  consider  this  subject  correctly,  it  will  be 
necessary  to  consider  society  as  distinct  from  government. 
It  may  exist  without  a  government.  At  some  time  it  must 
have  so  existed.  And  in  all  cases,  government  is  merely 
the  instrument  by  which  it  accomplishes  its  purposes. 
Government  is  the  agent.  Society  is  the  principal. 

The  first  consideration  which  meets  us,  in  the  discussion 


340  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

of  this  subject,  is,  that  CIVIL  SOCIETY  is  AN  INSTITUTION  OF 
GOD  ;  or,  in  other  words,  it  is  the  will  of  God  that  man 
should  live  in  a  state  of  society.  This  may  be  shown  both 
from  the  original  impulses  common  to  all  men,  and  from  the 
necessities  of  man,  arising  out  of  the  conditions  of  his 
present  existence. 

I.  From  the  original  impulses  of  man. 

1.  One  of  the  strongest  and  most  universal  impulses  of 
our  nature,  is  a  general  love  for  society.     It  commences, 
as  every  one  must  have  observed,  with  early  infancy,  and 
continues,  unabated,  to  the  close  of  life.     The  poets  can 
conceive  of  no  situation  more  afflictive,  or  more  intolerable, 
than  that  of  a  human  being  in  a  state  of  perfect  loneliness. 
Hence,  solitary  confinement  is  considered,  by  all  mankind, 
as  one  of  the  severest  forms  of  punishment.     And,  hence, 
a  disposition  to  separate  one's  self  from  society  is  one  of 
the  surest  indications  of  mental  derangement.     Now,  the 
natural  result  of  this  intense  and  universal  impulse  is    a 
disposition  to  control  such  other  desires  as  shall  be  incon- 
sistent with  it.     Wherever  these   dispositions  exist,  a  num 
ber  of  human  beings  will  as  readily  and  naturally  form  a 
society  as  they  will  do  any  other  thing  on  which  their 
happiness  depends.     A  constitution  of  this  sort  manifestly 
shows  what  is  the  will  of  our  Creator  concerning  us. 

2.  The  various  forms  of  human  attachment  illustrate  the 
same  truth. 

Thus,  the  attachment  between  the  sexes  at  once  forms 
a  society,  which  is  the  origin  of  every  other.  Of  this  union, 
the  fundamental  principle  is  a  limited  surrender  of  the 
happiness  of  each  to  that  of  the  other,  and  the  consequent 
attainment  of  an  increased  return  of  happiness.  From  this 
arises  the  love  of  parents  to  children,  and  that  of  children 
to  parents,  and  all  the  various  modifications  of  affection 
resulting  from  collateral  and  more  distant  relationships. 

Besides  these,  there  must  continually  arise  the  feeling  of 
friendship  between  individuals  of  similar  habits  and  of  cor- 
respondent pursuits  ;  the  love  of  benevolence  towards  those 
who  need  our  succor,  or  who  awaken  our  sympathy  ;  and 
the  love  of  approbation,  which  will  stimulate  us  to  deny 
ourselves  for  the  sake  of  acquiring  the  good  opinion  of  those 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  341 

by  whom  we  are  surrounded.  Now,  the  tendency  of  all 
these  instincts  is  manifestly  twofold :  first,  as  in  the  former 
instance,  as  these  propensities  can  be  gratified  only  by 
society,  we  shall  be  disposed  to  surrender  whatever  will  be 
inconsistent  with  the  enjoyment  of  society ;  and,  secondly, 
since  it  is,  as  we  have  seen  before,  in  the  very  nature  of 
affection,  to  surrender  our  own  personal  gratification  for  the 
happiness  of  those  whom  we  love,  affection  renders  such  a 
surrender  one  of  the  very  sources  of  our  individual  happi- 
ness. Thus,  patriotism,  which  is  only  one  form  of  the  love 
of  society,  not  only  supposes  a  man  to  be  willing  to  sur- 
render something  personal  for  the  sake  of  something  general, 
which  he  likes  better,  but  also  to  derive  happiness  from  that 
very  surrender,  and  to  be  actually  happier  when  acting 
from  these  principles  than  from  any  other.  It  is  almost 
needless  to  add,  that  the  Creator's  intention,  in  forming 
beings  with  such  impulsions,  is  too  evident  to  be  mistaken. 
II.  The  same  truth  is  taught  from  the  necessities  imposed 
upon  us  by  the  conditions  of  our  being. 

1.  Suppose  the  human  race,  entirely  destitute  of  these 
social  principles,  to  have  been  scattered .  abroad  over  the 
face  of  the  earth  as  mere  isolated  individuals.     It  is  evident 
that,  under  such  circumstances,  the  race  must  quickly  have 
perished.     Man,  thus  isolated,  could  never  contend,  either 
with  the  cold  of  the  northern,  or  with  the  wild  beasts  of  the 
temperate  and  warmer,  regions.     He  has  neither  muscular 
power,  nor  agility,  nor  instinct,  to  protect  him  from  the  one, 
nor  any  natural  form  of  clothing  to  shield  him  from  the  other. 

2.  But  suppose  that,  by  any  means,  the  race  of  man 
could   be   continued.       Without   society,   the   progressive 
melioration  of  his  condition  would  be  impossible. 

Without  society,  there  could  be  no  division  of  labor. 
Every  one  must  do  every  thing  for  himself,  and  at  the 
greatest  possible  disadvantage.  Without  society,  there 
could  be  neither  any  knowledge  of  the  agents  of  nature, 
nor  any  application  of  them  to  the  production  of  value. 
A  man's  instruments  would  be  almost  exclusively  limited  to 
his  teeth  and  nails.  Without  society,  there  could  be  no 
acknowledged  right  of  property.  Hence,  from  these 
causes,  there  could  be  no  accumulated  capital;  and  each 
29* 


342  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

successive  generation  of  men  must,  like  the  brutes,  remain 
precisely  in  the  condition  of  their  predecessors.  It  is 
equally  evident,  that,  under  these  circumstances,  there 
could  exist  no  possibility  of  either  intellectual  or  moral 
improvement.  In  fact,  take  the  most  civilized,  intellectual, 
and  moral  condition  in  which  man  has  ever  existed,  and 
compare  it  with  the  condition  of  man  naked,  wandering, 
destitute,  exposed  to  the  peltings  of  every  tempest,  and 
liable  to  become  the  prey  of  every  ferocious  beast,  and  the 
difference  between  these  two  conditions  is  wholly  the  result 
of  society.  If  it  be  granted  that  God  is  benevolent,  and 
wills  the  happiness  of  man,  nay,  if  it  be  even  granted  that 
God  wills  the  existence  of  man,  it  must  be  conceded  that 
He  also  wills  that  condition  on  which,  not  merely  his  hap- 
piness, but  even  his  very  existence,  depends. 

Now,  if  this  be  the  fact,  that  is,  if  civil  society  be  an 
institution  of  God,  several  important  conclusions  will  be 
seen  to  follow  from  it : 

1.  A  very  important  distinction  may  be  observed  between 
civil  society  and  a  simple  or  voluntary  society,  such  as  is 
described  in  the  last  section.     In  a  simple  society,  the  con- 
tract is  voluntary,  and  is,  like  any  other  society,  dissolved 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  parties  ;  or  it  ceases  to  be  binding 
upon  either  party,  if  its  conditions  be  violated  by  the  other 
party.     But,  civil  society  being  an  institution  of  God,  spe- 
cific duties  are  imposed  upon  both  parties,  which  remain 
unchanged  even  after  the  other  party  may,  in  various  re- 
spects,   have  violated  his  part  of  the  contract.     In  civil 
society,  we  are  under  obligation  to  God  as  well  as  to  man, 
and  the  former  obligation  remains  even  after  the  other  has 
been  annulled.     In  this  respect,  it  follows  the  analogy  of 
the  other  relations  established  by  God,  as  that  of  husband 
and  wife,  parent  and  child,  in  which  the  one  party  is  bound 
to  act  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God,  and  according  to  the 
obligations  of  the  relation,  whether  the  other  party  does  so 
or  not. 

2.  Civil  society  being  an  ordinance  of  God,  it  cannot 
be  justly  established,  upon  any  principles  whatsoever,  simply 
according  to  the  will  of  the  parties,  but  it  must  be  established 
upon  the  principles  which  God  has  established.     If  it  be 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  343 

established  upon  any  other  principles,  the  evidence  of  his 
displeasure  will  be  seen  in  the  mutual  evil  which  both  parties 
suffer,  in  consequence  of  violating  a  law  of  their  being. 
Such  is  the  case  with  marriage.  This  is  a  form  of  society 
established  by  God.  Men  have  no  right  to  enter  into  it  as 
they  please,  but  only  according  to  the  laws  which  God  has 
established  ;  and,  if  they  act  otherwise,  mutual  misery  will 
be  the  result. 

3.  If  society  be  an  ordinance  of  God,  it  follows  that 
every  man  who  conforms  to  the  social  laws  of  God  has  a 
right  to  it.     For  if,  in   the  formation  of  civil  society,  men 
are  under  obligation  to  act  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  God, 
they  have  no  right  to  construct  it  upon  such  principles  as 
will   exclude  any  man  who  is  willing  to  obey  the  social 
laws  of  his  Maker.     No  man  can,  therefore,  justly  be  ex- 
cluded from  society,  unless  he  have  committed  some  overt 
act  by  which  he  has  forfeited  this  right.     His  original  right 
is  to  be  taken  for  granted  ;  the  proof  of  forfeiture  rests  with 
those  who  would  exclude  him.     Hence,  it  is  not  enough,  to 
say,  if  a  man  does  not  like  this  society,  he  may  go  to 
another.     So  long  as  he  violates  none  of  his  Maker's  social 
laws,  he  has  a  right  to  this  society,  and  he  cannot  be  ex- 
cluded from  it  without  injustice.     Any  course  of  legislation, 
therefore,  which  obliges  men    to  leave  a  society,  unless 
their  forfeiture  of  social  right  be  proved,  is  oppressive  and 
unjust. 

4.  As  society  is  an  ordinance  of  God,  it  is  evidently  the 
will  of  God  that  its  existence  be  preserved.     Hence,  society 
has  a  right  to  take  all  the  means  which  may  be  necessary 
to  prevent  those  crimes,  which,  if  permitted,  must  destroy 
society  itself.     Hence  is  derived  its  power  to  punish  crimi- 
nals, to  enforce  contracts,  and  to  establish  such  forms  of 
government  as  may  best  conduce  to  the  well-being  of  the 
social  institution. 

I  suppose  it  to  have  been  from  a  misconception  of  these 
principles,  that  our  forefathers  erred.  They  conceived 
that,  in  forming  a  civil  society  here  in  the  wilderness,  they 
had  a  right  to  frame  its  provisions  in  such  manner  as  they 
chose.  Hence,  they  made  the  form  of  religious  belief  a 
subject  of  civil  legislation,  and  assumed  the  right  of  ban- 


344  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

ishing  from  their  society  those  who  differed  from  them  in 
the  mode  of  worshipping  God.  Their  first  assumption  I 
conceive  to  be  an  error.  If  society  be  an  ordinance  of 
God,  whenever  and  wherever  men  form  it,  they  must  form 
it  in  obedience  to  his  laws.  But  he  has  never  intended 
that  religious  belief,  or  religious  practice,  if  they  interfere 
not  with  the  rights  of  others,  should  be  subject  to  human 
legislation. 

Secondly.  OF  THE  NATURE  AND  LIMITATIONS  OF  THE 
CONTRACT  entered  into  between  the  individual  and  civil 
society. 

It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  every  society  is  es- 
sentially a  mutual  compact,  entered  into  between  every  in- 
dividual and  all  the  rest  of  those  who  form  the  society.  As 
all  these  individuals  enter  the  society  upon  the  same  terms, 
that  is,  put  themselves  under  the  power  of  society  in  the 
same  respects,  the  power  of  the  society  over  the  individual  is 
derived  from  the  concession  of  every  individual,  and  is  no 
other,  and  in  no  wise  different  from  what  these  individuals 
have  made  it.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  as  every  member 
of  the  society  is  a  party  to  the  contract  which  the  society 
has  made  with  the  individual,  every  member  of  the  society 
is  bound  faithfully  to  execute  the  contract  thus  entered 
into. 

But,  as  it  was  also  remarked,  this  society  differs  from  a 
simple  or  voluntary  society,  inasmuch  as  it  is  an  ordinance 
of  God,  and  it  is  subject  to  the  laws  which  he  has  imposed 
upon  it.  That  every  man  is  bound  to  become  a  member  of 
civil  society,  need  not  be  asserted ;  all  that  I  affirm  is,  that, 
if  men  form  a  civil  society,  they  are  bound  to  form  it  ac- 
cording to  the  laws  which  God  has  appointed.  They 
cannot  form  it  according  to  any  other  principles,  without 
violating  the  rights  of  their  fellow-men,  and  disobeying  the 
laws  of  God. 

The  question,  then,  which  meets  us  as  of  the  first  im- 
portance, is  this:  What  are  the  laws  under  which  God 
has  subjected  civil  society  ?  On  this  question  I  now  pro- 
ceed to  offer  a  few  suggestions,  considering,  first,  what  is 
essential  to  the  existence  of  society ;  and,  secondly,  what  is 
merely  accidental 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  345 

1.  Of  what  is  essential  to  the  existence  of  civil  society. 

1.  As  God  wills  the  existence  of  civil  society,  it  is  man- 
ifest that  he  must  forbid  whatever  would  be  inconsistent 
with   its   existence.      And,    on  the  other  hand,   he   who 
chooses  to  enter  society,  virtually  contracts  to  abstain   from 
whatever  is,  from   the  constitution   of  things,  inconsistent 
with  its   existence.     This,  I  think,  is  as  evident  as  that  a 
man  cannot  honestly  enter  into  a  contract  to  do  any  two 
things  in  their  nature  essentially  at  variance. 

2.  Suppose,  now,  a  number  of  men  to  meet  together  to 
form  a  society,  all  being  perfectly  acquainted  with  the  law 
of  .reciprocity,    and    all   perfectly  inclined  to   obey  it.     I 
think  it  is  manifest  that  such  persons  would  have  to  surren- 
der nothing  whatever,   in   order  to   form  a  civil  society. 
Every  one  would  do  just  as  he  pleased,  and  yet  every  one 
would  enjoy  fully  all  the  benefit  of  the  social  nature  of 
man ;  that   is,  every   one   would  enjoy    all  the  blessings 
arising  both  from  his  individual  and  from  his  social  constitu- 
tion.    This,  I  suppose,  would  be  the  most  perfect  state  of 
human  society  of  which  we  are  able  to  conceive. 

As,  therefore,  society,  in  its  most  perfect  state,  may  exist 
without  the  individual's  surrendering  up  the  right  to  do  any 
thing  which  is  consistent  with  the  law  of  reciprocity,  the 
existence  of  society  presents  no  reason  why  he  should  sur- 
render any  right  which  he  may  enjoy  consistently  with  this 
law.  Whatever  other  reasons  there  may  be,  as  those  of 
benevolence,  mercy,  or  religion,  they  belong  not  to  this 
question.  As  every  man  has,  originally,  the  right  to  do  as 
he  pleases,  provided  he  interferes  not  with  the  rights  of  his 
neighbors,  and  as  the  existence  of  civil  society  presents  no 
reason  why  this  right  should  be  restricted,  it  remains,  not- 
withstanding the  existence  of  such  society,  just  as  it  was 
before ;  that  is,  the  right  vests,  without  change,  in  the  in- 
dividual himself. 

3.  Suppose,  now,  any  individual  to  violate  the  law  of 
reciprocity  ;  as,  for  instance,  that  A  steals  the  property  of 
B,  or  violates  a  contract  into  which  they  have  mutually 
entered.     If  this  be  allowed,  that  is,  if  every  man  were  to 
steal  at  will  the  property  of  his  neighbor,  it  is  manifest 
that  the  right  of  property  would  be  at  an  end,  and  every 


346  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

man  would  be  obliged  to  retire  as  far  as  possible  from  every 
other  man  ;  that  is,  society  would  be  dissolved. 

4.  Again,  suppose  that  B  takes  the  work  of  redress 
into  his  own  hands,  being,  at  once,  his  own  legislatoi, 
judge  and  executioner.  From  the  native  principles  of  the 
human  heart,  it  is  evident  that,  from  being  the  aggrieved 
party,  he  would,  in  turn,  become  the  aggressor.  This 
would  lead  to  revenge  on  the  part  of  A, — a  revenge  to  be 
repeated  by  the  other  party,  until  it  ended  either  in  the 
destruction  of  one  or  of  both.  Hence,  every  difference 
would  lead  to  interminable  war  and  unbridled  ferocity ;  and 
society  would  cease,  because  every  man  would  prefer  quiet 
solitude  to  ceaseless  hostility. 

To  allow  one's  self,  therefore,  in  any  violation  of  the 
law  of  reciprocity,  or  to  assume  the  right  of  redressing 
one's  own  wrongs,  is  to  pursue  a  course  inconsistent  with 
the  existence  of  society  ;  for,  were  such  a  course  to  be 
pursued  universally,  society  could  not  exist. 

Again,  on  the  other  hand,  since,  in  a  company  of  mor- 
ally imperfect  beings,  injury  is  liable  to  occur,  and  since, 
if  injury  were  not  prevented,  the  virtuous  would  become 
the  prey  of  the  vicious,  and  society  would,  as  before,  be 
destroyed  by  universal  violence,  it  is  manifestly  necessary 
that  injury  be  prevented,  that  is,  that  the  virtuous  be  pro- 
tected, and  that  wrongs  be  redressed.  But,  as  we  have 
shown  that  the  rights  of  individual  self-protection  and 
redress  are  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of  society,  and 
as  the  individual  must  not  redress  them,  the  duty  devolves 
upon  the  other  party,  that  is,  upon  society.  Society  is, 
therefore,  bound  to  do  for  the  individual  what  he  has  relin- 
quished the  right  to  do  for  himself;  that  is,  to  protect  him 
from  violation  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  or  to  redress  his 
wrong,  if  this  right  be  violated. 

Hence,  we  see  the  nature  of  the  compact  entered  into 
between  the  individual  and  society.  It  essentially  involves 
the  following  particulars : 

1.  Every  individual,  by  entering  society,  promises  that 
he  will  abstain  from  every  violation  of  the  law  of  recipro- 
city, which,  if  universally  permitted,  would  destroy  society. 
For,  if  he  be  allowed  to  violate  it,  the  allowance  to  violate 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  347 

it  must  be  extended  to  all,  since  all  are  equals  ;  and  thus 
^society  would  be  destroyed.  But  as,  by  the  destruction 
of  society,  he  would  gain  nothing  but  solitude,  which  he 
could  enjoy  without  depriving  others  of  what  is  to  them  a 
source  of  happiness,  there  can  be  no  reason  assigned  why 
he  should  diminish  their  happiness,  to  procure  what  he 
could  equally  well  enjoy  by  leaving  them  alone.  If  he 
join  the  society,  he  must  conform  to  whatever  is  necessary 
to  its  existence  ;  if  he  be  unwilling  to  do  so,  he  must  re- 
main alone. 

2.  Every  individual  promises  to  surrender  to  society  the 
right  of  self-protection. 

3.  And,  lastly,  every  individual  promises  to  surrender  to 
society  the  right  to  redress  his  own  wrongs. 

And,  on  the  other  hand,  society  promises, — 

1.  To  protect  the  individual  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  his 
rights  ;  that  is,  to  enforce  upon  every  individual,  within  cer- 
tain limits,  obedience  to  the  law  of  reciprocity. 

2.  To  redress  wrongs  whenever  they  may  occur,  either 
by  obliging  the  offender  to  do  justly,  or  else  by  inflicting 
such  punishment  as  may  be  most  likely  to  prevent  a  repe- 
tition of  the  injury,  either  by  the  offender  or  by  others. 

It  is  important  here  to  remark,  that  this  surrender  on 
the  one  part,  and  this  obligation  on  the  other  part,  are 
mutual  and  universal :  that  is  to  say,  the  individual,  on  his 
part,  surrenders  wholly  and  entirely  the  right  either  to 
defend  or  to  redress  himself;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  society 
guarantees  to  defend  him,  and  to  do  him  justice  to  the 
utmost ;  that  is,  no  matter  in  how  small  a  right,  and  no 
matter  at  how  great  an  expense. 

Hence,  we  see  the  anti-social  tendency  of  all  those 
secret  societies,  of  which  the  object,  either  avowed  or  in 
fact,  is  to  protect  the  individual  members  in  opposition  to 
the  laws,  that  is,  in  opposition  to  society.  In  this  case, 
while  the  individual  receives  from  civil  society  the  same 
benefits  as  other  men,  and  expects  from  it  the  fulfilment 
of  its  part  of  the  contract,  he  does  not  make,  on  his  part, 
the  correspondent  surrender.  He  expects  to  be  protected 
and  redressed,  but  he  reserves  also  the  right  of  protecting 
and  redressing  himself,  and  it  may  be  in  opposition  to  the 


348  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

just  operation  of  those  laws  which  he  enforces  upon 
others. 

And  hence,  also,  we  see  the  obligation  of  every  one  to 
exert  himself  to  the  uttermost,  in  order  to  enforce  the 
execution  of  the  laws,  no  matter  in  how  small  a  matter,  or 
in  the  case  of  how  obscure  an  individual.  The  execution 
of  the  laws  is  what  we  all  promise,  and  we  are  all  bound 
to  fulfil  it.  And  if  laws  are  not  executed,  that  is,  if  indi- 
viduals be  not  protected,  and  wrongs  be  not  redressed  by 
society,  the  individuals  will  redress  them  themselves,  and 
thus  society  will  be  dissolved.  The  frequent  occurrence 
of  mobs,  that  is,  of  extra-legal  modes  of  redress  for  sup- 
posed grievances,  are  among  the  most  decisive  indications 
of  a  state  of  society  verging  towards  dissolution. 

But,  while  this  contract  is  thus  universal  and  obligatory, 
it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  it  is  so  only  in  respect  to  those 
things  in  which  the  parties  have  respectively  bound  them- 
selves. The  individual,  by  entering  into  society,  promises 
to  abstain  from  whatever  is  inconsistent  with  the  existence 
of  society;  but,  by  entering  into  society,  he  promises 
nothing  more.  Society  promises  to  restrain  and  to  redress 
whatever  would  be  destructive  to  society,  but  it  promises 
no  more.  In  all  other  respects,  the  parties  are  exactly  in 
the  situation  in  which  they  were  before  the  establishment 
of  society.  Thus  freedom,  therefore,  both  of  person,  of 
intellect,  and  of  conscience,  remain,  by  the  fact  of  the 
existence  of  society,  untouched.  Thus  also  freedom  of 
property  remains  as  before,  except  simply  in  so  far  as  a 
portion  of  every  man's  property  is  pledged  to  meet  the 
necessary  expenses  of  government.  So  long  as  he  obey 
the  law  of  reciprocity,  society  has  no  further  demands  upon 
him,  unless  his  assistance  be  demanded  in  enforcing  this 
obedience  upon  others. 

By  this  compact,  every  individual  is  very  greatly  the 
gainer. 

1.  He  promises  to  obey  the  law  of  reciprocity,  which  is 
the  law  of  his  nature,  and  by  the  obedience  to  which  alone 
he  can  be  happy. 

2.  He   surrenders   the   right    of    self-protection,   which 
without  society  he  can  exert  in  but  n  very  imperfect  man- 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  349 

ner,  and  with  nothing  but  the  force  of  his  individual  arm ; 
and  he  receives  in  return  the  right  to  wield  in  his  defence 
the  whole  power  of  society. 

3.  He  surrenders  the  right  of  redressing  his  own  griev- 
ances, and  receives  in  return  the  right  to  have  his  griev- 
ances redressed,  at  whatever  expense,  by  the  whole  power 
of  the  society. 

And,  hence,  as  God  wills  the  happiness  of  man,  we  see 
another  reason  why  society  is  in  obedience  to  his  will ;  and 
why  the  laws  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society  may  be 
considered,  as  they  are  in  fact  considered  in  the  Scriptures, 
as  enacted  by  His  authority. 

And,  again,  we  see  that,  from  the  very  nature  of  society, 
the  individual  is  perfectly  within  its  physical  power.  This 
power  of  the  whole,  which  they  are  bound  to  use  only  for 
his  protection  and  defence,  they  may  use  for  his  injury  and 
oppression.  And  as  the  whole  power  of  the  society  is  in 
the  hands  of  the  majority,  the  whole  happiness  of  the  indi- 
vidual or  of  the  minority  is  always  in  the  power  of  the 
majority.  Hence  we  see  there  is  no  safeguard  against 
oppression,  except  that  which  exists  in  the  conditions  of  the 
compact  on  which  the  society  is  formed,  and  the  feeling  of 
moral  obligation  to  observe  that  compact  inviolably.  That 
is  to  say,  the  real  question  of  civil  liberty  is  not  concerning 
forms  of  government,  but  concerning  the  respective  limits 
and  obligations  of  the  individual  and  of  society.  When 
these  are  correctly  adjusted  and  inviolably  observed,  there 
can  be  no  oppression  under  any  form  of  government. 
When  these  are  not  understood  or  not  observed,  there  will 
be  tyranny,  under  any  form  whatsoever.  And  to  a  man  of 
sense  it  is  a  matter  of  very  small  consequence  whether 
oppression  proceed  from  one  or  from  many ;  from  an 
hereditary  tyrant  or  from  an  unprincipled  majority.  The 
latter  is  rather  the  more  galling,  and  surely  at  least  as 
difficult  of  remedy. 

And  supposing  the  limits  to  have  been  correctly  adjusted, 
il  is  obvious  that  they  will  be  of  no  avail,  unless  there  be 
in  the  community  sufficient  virtue  to  resist  the  temptations 
which  continually  occur  to  violate  them.  In  the  absense 
of  this,  the  best  constitution  is  valueless,  or  worse  than 
30 


350  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

valueless.  Hence,  we  see  the  necessity  of  individual  virtue 
to  the  existence  of  civil  freedom.  And,  hence,  whatever 
tends  to  depress  the  standard  of  individual  virtue,  saps  the 
very  foundations  of  liberty.  And  hence  religion,  in  its 
purest  form,  and  under  its  most  authoritative  sanctions,  is 
the  surest  hope  of  national  as  well  as  of  individual  happiness. 

II.   Of  the  accidental  modifications  of  civil  society. 

I  have  thus  far  treated  of  what  is  essential  to  the  social 
compact.  Without  such  a  contract  as  I  have  suggested, 
society  could  not  exist.  I  by  no  means,  however,  intend 
to  assert  that  these  limits  are  exclusive ;  and  that  men,  in 
forming  society,  may  not  enter  into  contract  in  other 
respects,  besides  those  which  I  have  stated. 

Some  of  the  incidental  additions  to  the  original  forms  of 
contract  are  the  following  : 

1.  After  having  adjusted  the  limits  of  the   respective 
obligations,  both  of  the  society  and  of  the  individual,  men 
may  choose  whatever  form  of  government  they  please  for 
the  purpose  of  carrying  forward  the  objects  of  society.     But, 
having  adopted  a  particular  form  of  government,  they  bind 
themselves  to  whatever  is  necessary  to  the  existence  of  that 
government.     Thus,  if  men  choose  a  republican  form  of 
government,  in  which  the  people  are  acknowledged  to  be 
the  immediate  fountain  of  alt  power,  they  come  under  obli- 
gation to  educate  their  children  intellectually  and  morally  ; 
for,  without  intellectual  and  moral  education,  such  a  form 
of  government  cannot  long  exist.     And,  as  the  intellectual 
education  of  the  young  can  be  made  properly  a  subject  of 
social  enactment,  this  duty  may  be  enforced  by  society. 
And  the  only  reason  why  religious  education  does  not  come 
under  the  same  rule  is,  that  it  is  not,  for  reasons  which 
have  been  before  given,  a  subject  for  social  enactment. 

2.  I  have  said  that,  by  the  essential  principles  of  the 
social  compact,  every  man  is  bound  to  contribute  his  part 
to  the  expenses  of  civil  society  ;  but  that,  beyond  this,  he 
is  not  in  any  respect  bound.     Still,  this  does  not  exclude 
other  forms  of  contract.     Men  may,  if  they  choose,  agree 
to  hold  their  whole  property   subiect  to  the  will  of  the 
whole,  so  that  they  shall  be  obligea  to  employ  it,  not  each 
one  for  his  own  good,  but  each  one  for  the  benefit  of  the 


OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY.  351 

whole  society.  I  say,  that  such  a  state  of  things  might 
exist,  but  it  is  manifest  that  it  is  not  essential  to  society ; 
and  that,  being  not  essential,  it  is  by  no  means  to  be  pre- 
sumed', and  that  it  cannot  exist  justly,  unless  this  right 
have  been  expressly  conceded  by  the  individual  to  society. 
If  society  exert  such  a  power  when  it  has  not  been  express- 
ly conceded  to  it,  it  is  tyranny.  The  common  fact  has 
been,  that  society  has  presumed  upon  such  powers,  and 
has  exercised  them  without  reflection,  and  very  greatly  to 
social  and  individual  injury. 

3.  Men  have  very  generally  been  disposed  to  take  for 
granted  these  accidental  powers,  and  to  question  or  limit 
the  essential  powers  of  society.  An  instance  in  point 
occurs  in  the  question  of  war.  The  very  idea  of  war  sup- 
poses the  society  to  have  the  right  of  determining  the  moral 
relations  in  which  the  individuals  of  one  nation  shall  stand 
to  the  individuals  of  another  nation.  Now,  this  power  of 
society  over  the  individual  has  never,  that  I  know  of,  been 
questioned.  And  yet,  1  think  it  would  be  very  difficult 
to  establish  it.  The  moral  precept  is,  "  If  thine  enemy 
hunger,  feed  him ;  if  he  thirst,  give  him  drink."  And  I  do 
not  see  that  society  has  a  right  to  abrogate  this  command, 
or  to  render  void  this  obligation  ;  or  that  any  moral  agent 
has  the  right  to  commit  to  other  individuals  the  power  of 
changing  his  moral  relations  to  any  creature  of  God.  For- 
giveness and  charity  to  men  are  dispositions  which  we  owe 
to  God.  And  I  do  not  see  that  society  has  any  more  right 
to  interfere  with  the  manifestation  of  these  dispositions,  than 
with  the  liberty  to  inculcate  them  and  to  teach  them. 

To  conclude.  Whatever  concessions  on  the  part  of  the 
individual,  and  whatever  powers  on  the  part  of  society,  are 
necessary  to  the  existence  of  society,  must,  by  the  very  fact 
of  the  existence  of  society,  be  taken  for  granted.  Whatever 
is  not  thus  necessary  is  a  matter  of  concession  and  mutual 
adjustment ;  and  has  no  right  to  be  presumed,  unless  it  can 
be  shown  to  have  actually  been  surrendered.  That  is,  in 
general,  a  man  is  bound  by  what  he  has  agreed  to ;  but  he 
is  not  bound  by  any  thing  else. 

I  think  no  one  can  reflect  upon  the  above  considerations 
without  being  led  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  cultivation  of 


352  OF    CIVIL    SOCIETY. 

the  moral  nature  of  man  is  the  grand  means  for  the  im 
provement  of  society.  This  alone  teaches  man,  whether 
as  an  individual  or  as  a  society,  to  respect  the  rights  of 
man,  as  an  individual  or  as  a  society.  This  teaches  every- 
one to  observe  inviolate  the  contract  into  which,  as  a 
member  of  society,  he  has  entered.  Now,  since,  as  we 
have  before  shown,  the  light  of  conscience  and  the  dictates 
of  natural  religion  are  insufficient  to  exert  the  requisite 
moral  power  over  man,  our  only  hope  is  in  that  revelation 
of  his  will  which  God  has  made  in  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
In  these  books  we  are  taught  that  all  our  duties  to  man  are 
taken  under  the  immediate  protection  of  Almighty  God. 
On  pain  of  his  eternal  displeasure,  he  commands  us  to  love 
every  man  as  ourselves.  Here  he  holds  forth  the  strongest 
inducements  to  obedience,  and  here  he  presents  the  strongest 
motives,  not  merely  to  reciprocity,  but  also  to  benevolence. 
It  is  lamentable  to  hear  the  levity  with  which  some  politi- 
cians, and,  as  they  would  persuade  us  to  believe  them  to 
be,  statesmen,  speak  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ;  to 
observe  how  complacently  they  talk  of  using  it  as  an  instru- 
ment, convenient  enough  for  directing  the  weak,  but  which 
a  man  of  sense  can  well  enough  do  without ;  and  which  is 
a  mere  appendage  to  the  forces  that,  by  his  constitution, 
are  destined  to  act  upon  man.  A  more  profound  acquaint- 
ance with  the  moral  and  social  nature  of  man,  \vould,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  work  a  very  important  change  in  their  views 
of  this  subject. 


353 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 


OF    THE    MODE    IN    WHICH    THE    OBJECTS    OF    SOCIETY    ARE 
ACCOMPLISHED. 

WE  have  thus  far  treated  merely  of  the  constitution  of 
a  society,  of  the  contract  entered  into  between  the  individ- 
ual and  society,  and  of  the  obligations  hence  devolving  upon 
each.  The  obligations  of  society  are  to  protect  the  indi- 
vidual from  infractions  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  and  to 
redress  his  wrongs  if  he  have  been  injured. 

But  it  is  manifest  that  this  obligation  cannot  be  dis- 
charged by  the  whole  of  society  as  a  body.  If  a  man 
steal  from  his  neighbor,  the  whole  community  cannot  leave 
their  occupations,  to  detect,  to  try,  and  to  punish  the  thief. 
Or,  if  a  law  is  to  be  enacted  respecting  the  punishment  of 
theft,  it  cannot  be  done  by  the  whole  community,  but  must 
of  necessity  be  intrusted  to  delegates.  On  the  principle  of 
division  of  labor,  it  is  manifest  that  this  service  will  be  both 
more  cheaply  and  more  perfectly  done,  by  those  who 
devote  themselves  to  it,  than  by  those  who  are,  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  time,  engaged  in  other  occupations. 

Now  I  suppose  a  government  to  be  that  system  of  dele- 
gated agencies,  by  which  these  obligations  of  society  to  the 
individual  are  fulfilled. 

And,  moreover,  as  every  society  may  have  various  en- 
gagements to  form  with  other  independent  societies,  k  is 
convenient,  in  general,  that  this  business  should  be  trans- 
acted by  this  same  system  of  agencies.  These  two  offices 
of  government,  though  generally  united,  are  in  their  na- 
ture distinct.  Thus  we  see,  in  our  own  country,  the  State 
Governments  are,  to  a  considerable  degree,  intrusted  with 
the  first,  while  a  part  of  the  former,  and  all  the  latter  power, 
vest  in  the  general  government. 
30* 


354  MODES    IN   WHICH    THE    OBJECTS    OF 

A  government  thus  understood  is  naturally  divided  into 
three  parts. 

1.  An  individual  may  from  ignorance  violate  the  rights 
of  his  neighbor,  and  thus  innocently  expose  himself  to  pun- 
ishment.    Or,  if  he  violate  his  neighbor's  rights  maliciously, 
and  justly  merit  punishment,  a  punishment  may  be  inflicted 
more  severe  than  the  nature  of  the  case  demands.     To 
avoid  this,  it  is  necessary  that  the  various  forms  of  violation 
be  as  clearly  as  possible  defined,  and  also  that  the  penalty 
be  plainly  and  explicitly  attached  to  each.     This  is  a  law. 
This,   as  we  have   shown,  must  be   done   by  delegates. 
These  delegates  are  called  a  legislature,  and  the  individual 
members  of  it  are  legislators. 

From  what  we  have  said,  their  power  is  manifestly 
limited.  They  have  no  power  except  to  execute  the  obli- 
gations which  society  has  undertaken  to  fulfil  towards  the 
individual.  This  is  all  that  society  has  conferred,  for  it  is 
all  that  society  had  to  confer. 

If  legislators  originate  any  power  in  themselves,  or  exer- 
cise any  power  conferred,  for  any  purpose  different  from 
that  for  which  it  was  conferred,  they  violate  right,  and  are 
guilty  of  tyranny. 

2.  But  suppose  a  law  to  be  enacted,  that  is,  a  crime  to 
be  defined,  and  the  penalty  to  be  affixed.     It  has  reference 
to  no  particular  case,  for,  when  enacted,  no  case  existed  to 
be  affected  by  it.     Suppose  now  an  individual  to  be  accused 
of  violating  this  law.     Here  it  is  necessary  to  apply  the 
law  to  this  particular  case.     In  order  to  do  this,  we  must 
ascertain,  first,  whether  the  accused  did  commit  the  act  laid 
to  his  charge ;  secondly,  whether  the  act,  if  it  be  proved  to 
have  been  done,  is  a  violation  of  the  law ;  that  is,  whether 
it  come   within  the  description  of  actions  which  the   law 
forbids ;  and,  thirdly,  if  this  be  proved,  it  is  necessary  to 
declare  the  punishment  which  the  law  assigns  to  this  par- 
ticular violation.     This  is  the  judicial  branch  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

3.  After  the  law  has  been  thus  applied  to  this  particular 
case,  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  carried  into  effect.     This 
devolves  upon  the  third,  or  the  executive  branch  of  a  gov- 
ernment. 


SOCIETY    ARE    ACCOMPLISHED.  355 

Respecting  all  of  these  three  branches  of  government,  it 
may  be  remarked  in  general,  that  they  are  essentially  inde- 
pendent of  each  other ;  that  each  one  has  its  specific  duties 
marked  out  by  society,  within  the  sphere  of  which  duties  it 
is  responsible  to  society,  and  to  society  alone.  Nor  is  this 
independence  at  all  affected  by  the  mode  of  its  appoint- 
ment. Society  may  choose  a  way  of  appointing  an  agent, 
but  that  is  by  no  means  a  surrender  of  the  claim  which  it 
has  upon  the  agent.  Thus,  society  may  impose  upon  a 
legislature,  or  an  executive,  the  duty  of  appointing  a  judi- 
ciary ;  but  the  judiciary  is  just  as  much  independent  of  the 
executive,  or  of  the  legislature,  as  though  it  were  appointed 
in  some  other  way.  Society,  by  conferring  upon  one  branch 
the  right  of  appointment,  has  conferred  upon  it  no  other 
right.  The  judge,  although  appointed  by  the  legislator,  is 
as  independent  of  him,  as  the  legislator  would  be  if  appoint- 
ed by  the  judge.  Each,  within  his  own  sphere,  is  under 
obligation  to  perform  precisely  those  duties  assigned  by 
society,  and  no  other.  And  hence  arises  the  propriety  of 
establishing  the  tenure  of  office,  in  each  several  branch, 
independently  of  the  other. 

The  two  first  of  these  departments  are  frequently  sub- 
divided. 

Thus,  the  legislative  department  is  commonly  divided 
into  two  branches,  chosen  under  dissimilar  conditions,  for 
the  purpose  of  exerting  a  check  upon  each  other,  by  repre- 
senting society  under  different  aspects,  and  thus  preventing 
partial  and  hasty  legislation. 

The  judiciary  is  also  generally  divided.  The  judges 
explain  and  interpret  the  law ;  while  it  is  the  province  of 
the  jury  to  ascertain  the  facts. 

The  executive  is  generally  sole,  and  executes  the  law  by 
means  of  subordinate  agents.  Sometimes,  however,  a  coun- 
cil is  added,  for  the  sake  of  advice,  without  whose  concur- 
rence the  executive  cannot  act. 

Sometimes  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  social  com- 
pact are  expressed,  and  the  respective  powers  of  the  different 
branches  of  the  government  are  defined,  and  the  mode  of 
their  appointment  described  in  a  written  document.  Such 
is  the  case  in  the  United  States.  At  other  times,  these 


356  MODES    IN   WHICH   THE    OBJECTS    OF 

principles  and  customs  have  grown  up  in  the  progress  of 
spciety,  and  are  the  deductions  drawn  from,  or  princi- 
ples established  by,  uncontested  usage.  The  latter  is  the 
case  in  Great  Britain.  In  either  case,  such  principles  and 
practices,  whether  expressed  or  understood,  are  called  the 
constitution  of  a  country. 

Nations  differ  widely  in  the  mode  of  selection  to  office, 
and  in  the  tenure  by  which  office  is  held.  Thus,  under 
some  constitutions,  the  government  is  wholly  hereditary. 
In  others,  it  is  partly  hereditary  and  partly  elective.  In 
others,  it  is  wholly  elective. 

Thus,  in  Great  Britain,  the  executive  and  one  branch  of 
the  legislature  are  hereditary  ;  the  other  branch  of  the  legis- 
lature is  elective.  The  judiciary  is  appointed  by  the  exec- 
utive, though  they  hold  office,  except  in  the  case  of  the 
lord  high  chancellor,  during  good  behavior. 

In  the  United  States,  the  executive,  and  both  branches 
of  the  legislature,  are  elective.  The  judiciary  is  appointed 
by  the  executive,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  senate.  In  the  State  Government,  the  mode  of  ap- 
pointment is  various. 

If  it  be  asked,  Which  of  these  is  the  preferable  form  of 
government?  the  answer,  I  think,  must  be  conditional. 
The  best  form  of  government  for  any  people,  is  the  best 
that  its  present  moral  and  social  condition  renders  prac- 
ticable. A  people  may  be  so  entirely  surrendered  to  the 
influence  of  passion,  and  so  feebly  influenced  by  moral  re- 
straint, that  a  government  which  relied  upon  moral  restraint, 
could  not  exist  for  a  day.  In  this  case,  a  subordinate  and 
inferior  principle  yet  remains, — the  principle  of  fear ;  and 
the  only  resort  is  to  a  government  of  force,  or  a  military 
despotism.  And  such  do  we  see  to  be  the  fact.  An  an- 
archy always  ends  in  this  form  of  government.  After  this 
has  been  established,  and  habits  of  subordination  have  been 
formed,  while  the  moral  restraints  are  yet  too  feeble  for 
self-government,  an  hereditary  government,  which  addresses 
itself  to  the  imagination,  and  strengthens  itself  by  the  in- 
fluence of  domestic  connections  and  established  usage,  may 
be  as  good  a  form  as  a  people  can  sustain.  As  they  ad- 
vance in  intellectual  and  moral  cultivation,  it  may  advanta 


SOCIETY    ARE    ACCOMPLISHED.  357 

geously  become  more  and  more  elective  ;  and,  in  a  suitable 
moral  condition,  it  may  be  wholly  so.  For  beings,  who  are 
willing  to  govern  themselves  by  moral  principle,  there  can 
be  no  doubt,  that  a  goverment  relying  upon  moral  principle, 
is  the  true  form  of  government.  There  is  no  reason  why  a 
man  should  be  oppressed  by  taxation,  and  subjected  to  fear, 
who  is  willing  to  govern  himself  by  the  law  of  reciprocity.  It 
is  surely  better  for  an  intelligent  and  moral  being  to  do  right 
from  his  own  will,  than  to  pay  another  to  force  him  to  do  right. 
And  yet,  as  it  is  better  that  he  should  do  right  than  wrong, 
even  though  he  be  forced  to  it,  it  is  well  that  he  should  pay 
others  to  force  him,  if  there  be  no  other  way  of  insuring  his 
good  conduct.  God  has  rendered  the  blessing  of  freedom 
inseparable  from  moral  restraint  in  the  individual ;  and  hence 
it  is  vain  for  a  people  to  expect  to  be  free,  unless  they  are 
first  willing  to  be  virtuous. 

It  is  on  this  point,  that  the  question  of  the  permanency 
of  the  present  form  of  government  "of  the  United  States  turns. 
That  such  a  form  of  government  requires,  of  necessity,  a 
given  amount  of  virtue  in  the  people,  cannot,  I  think,  be 
doubted.  If  we  possess  that  required  amount  of  virtue,  or 
if  we  can  attain  to  it,  the  government  will  stand ;  if  not,  it 
will  fall.  Or,  if  we  now  possess  that  amount  of  virtue,  and 
do  not  maintain  it,  the  government  will  fall.  There  is  no 
self-sustaining  power  in  any  form  of  social  organization. 
The  only  self-sustaining  power  is  in  individual  virtue.  And 
the  form  of  a  government  will  always  adjust  itself  to  the 
moral  condition  of  a  people.  A  virtuous  people  will,  by 
their  own  moral  power,  frown  away  oppression,  and,  under 
any  form  of  constitution,  become  essentially  free.  A  people 
surrendered  up  to  their  own  licentious  passions,  must  be 
held  in  subjection  by  force  ;  for  every  one  will  find,  that 
force  alone  can  protect  him  from  his  neighbors  ;  and  he 
will  submit  to  be  oppressed,  if  he  may  only  be  protected. 
Thus,  in  the  feudal  ages,  the  small  independent  landholders 
frequently  made  themselves  slaves  of  one  powerful  chief,  to 
shield  themselves  from  the  incessant  oppression  of  twenty. 


358 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 

THE  DUTY   OF  THE    OFFICERS  OF  A  GOVERNMENT. 

FROM  what  has  been  said,  the  duties  of  the  officers  of  a 
government  may  be  stated  in  a  few  words. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  a  government  derives  its 
authority  from  society,  of  which  it  is  the  agent ;  that 
society  derives  its  authority  from  the  compact  formed  by 
individuals  ;  that  society,  and  the  relations  between  society 
and  individuals,  are  the  ordinance  of  God :  of  course  the 
officer  of  a  government,  as  the  organ  of  society,  is  bound 
as  such  by  the  law  of  God,  and  is  under  obligation  to  per- 
form the  duties  of  his  office  in  obedience  to  this  law.  And, 
hence,  it  makes  no  difference  how  the  other  party  to  the 
contract  may  execute  their  engagements  ;  he,  as  the  servant 
of  God,  set  apart  for  this  very  thing,  is  bound,  neverthe- 
less, to  act  precisely  according  to  the  principles  by  which 
God  has  declared  that  this  relation  should  be  governed. 

The  officers  of  a  government  are  Legislative)  Judicial, 
and  Executive. 

I.   Of  Legislative  Officers. 

1.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  legislator  to  understand  the  social 
principles  of  man,  the  nature   of  the  relation   which  sub- 
sists between  the  individual   and  society,  and  the  mutual 
obligations  of  each.     By  these  are  his  power  and  his  obli- 
gations limited ;  and,  unless  he  thus  inform  himself,  he  can 
never   know  respecting   any   act,  whether  it  be  just,  or 
whether  it  be  oppressive.     Without  such  knowledge,  he 
can  never  act  with  a  clear  conscience. 

2.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  legislator  to  understand  the  precise 
nature  of  the  compact  which  binds  together  the  particular 
society  for  which  he  legislates.     This  involves  the  general 
conditions  of  the  social  compact,  and  something  more.     It 
generally  specifies  conditions  which   the  former   does  not 


THE    DUTY    OF    THE    OFFICERS,    ETC.  359 

contain,  and,  besides,  establishes  the  limit  of  the  powers 
of  the  several  branches  of  the  government.  He  who 
enters  upon  the  duties  of  a  legislator,  without  such  knowl- 
edge, is  not  only  wicked,  but  contemptible.  He  is  the 
worst  of  all  empirics  ;  he  offers  to  prescribe  for  a  malady, 
and  knows  not  whether  the  medicine  he  uses  be  a  remedy 
or  a  poison.  The  injury  which  he  inflicts  is  not  on  an  in- 
dividual, but  on  an  entire  community.  There  is  probably 
no  method  in  which  mischief  is  done  so  recklessly,  and 
on  so  large  a  scale,  as  by  ignorant,  and  thoughtless,  and 
wicked  legislation.  Were  these  plain  considerations  duly 
weighed,  there  would  be  somewhat  fewer  candidates  for 
legislative  office,  and  a  somewhat  greater  deliberation  on 
the  part  of  the  people  in  selecting  them. 

3.  Having  made  himself  acquainted  with  his  powers  and 
his  obligations,  he  is  bound  to  exert  his  power  precisely 
within  the  limits  by  which  it  is  restricted,  and  for  the  pur- 
poses for  which  it  was  conferred,  to  the  best  of  his  knowl- 
edge  and   ability,   and   for   the   best  good   of  the   whole 
society.     He  is  bound  impartially  to  carry  into  effect  the 
principles  of  the  general  and  the  particular  compact,  just 
in  those  respects  in  which  the  carrying  them  into  effect  is 
committed  to  him.     For  the  action  of  others  he  is  not  re- 
sponsible, unless  he  has  been  made  so  responsible.     He  is 
not  the  organ  of  a  section,  or  of  a  district,  much  less  of  a 
party,  but  of  the  society  at  large.     And  he  who  uses  his 
power  for  the  benefit  of  a  section,  or  of  a  party,  is  false  to 
his  duty,  to  his  country,  and  to  his  God.     He  is  engraving 
his  name  on  the  adamantine  pillar  of  his  country's  history, 
to  be  gazed  upon  for  ever  as  an  object  of  universal  detes- 
tation. 

4.  It  is  his  duty  to  leave  every  thing  else  undone.     From 
no  plea  of  present  necessity,  or  of  peculiar  circumstances, 
may  he  overstep  the   limits  of  his   constitutional  power, 
either  in  the  act  itself,  or  the  purpose  for  which  the  act  is 
done.     The  moment  he  does  this,  he  is  a  tyrant.     Pre- 
cisely the  power  committed  to  him  exists,  and  no  other. 
If  he  may  exercise  one  power  not  delegated,  he  may  exer- 
cise another,  and  he  may  exercise  all ;  thus,  on  principle, 
he  assumes  himself  to  be  the  fountain  of  power ;  restraint 


360  THE    DUTY    OF    THE    OFFICERS 

upon  encroachment  ceases,  and  all  liberty  is  henceforth 
at  an  end.  If  the  powers  of  a  legislator  are  insuffi- 
cient to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  society,  inconveniences 
will  arise.  It  is  better  that  these  should  be  endured  until 
the  necessity  of  some  modification  be  made  apparent,  than 
to  remedy  them  on  principles  which  destroy  all  liberty,  arid 
thus  remove  one  inconvenience  by  taking  away  the  possi- 
bility of  ever  removing  another. 
II.  Of  judicial  officers. 

1.  The  judicial  officer  forms  an  independent  branch   of 
the  government,  or  a  separate   and  distinct  agent,  for  ex- 
ecuting a  particular  part  of  the  contract  which  society  has 
made  with  the  individual.     As  I  have  said  before,  it  mat- 
ters not  how  he  is  appointed  :  as  soon  as  he  is  appointed,  he 
is  the  agent  of  society,  and  of  society  alone. 

The  judge,  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  the  legisla- 
tor, is  bound  by  the  principles  of  the  social  contract ;  and 
by  those  of  the  particular  civil  compact  of  the  society  in 
whose  behalf  he  acts.  This  is  the  limit  of  his  authority  j 
and  it  is  on  his  own  responsibility,  if  he  transcend  it. 

2.  The  provisions  of  this  compact,  as  they  are  embodied 
in  laws,  he  is  bound  to  enforce. 

And  hence  we  see  the  relation  in  which  the  judge 
stands  to  the  legislator.  Both  are  equally  limited  by  the 
principles  of  the  original  compact.  The  acts  of  both  are 
valid,  in  so  far  as  they  are  authorized  by  that  compact. 
Hence,  if  the  legislator  violate  his  trust,  and  enact  laws  at 
variance  with  the  constitution,  the  judge  is  bound  not  to 
enforce  them.  The  fact,  that  the  one  has  violated  the 
constitution,  imposes  upon  the  other  no  obligation  to  do 
the  same.  Thus  the  judge,  inasmuch  as  he  is  obliged  to 
decide  upon  the  constitutionality  of  a  law  before  he  en- 
forces it,  becomes  accidentally,  but  in  fact,  a  coordinate 
power,  without  whose  concurrence  the  law  cannot  go  into 
effect. 

Hence  we  see  that  the  duty  of  a  judge  is  to  understand, 

1.  The  principles  of  that  contract  from  which  he  de- 
rives his  power ; 

2.  The  laws  of  the  community,  whose  agent  he  is  ; 

3.  To  explain  these  laws  without  fear,  favor,  or  afiec- 


OF    A    GOVERNMENT.  361 

lion  ;  and  to  show  their  bearing  upon  each  individual  case, 
without  bias,  either  towards  the  individual,  or  towards  so- 
ciety;  and, 

4.  To  pronounce  the  decision  of  the  law,  according  to 
its  true  intent. 

5.  As  the  jury  are  a  part  of  the  judicial   agents  of  the 
government,  they  are  bound  in  the  same  manner  to  decide 
upon  the  facts,  according   to    their   best   knowledge    and 
ability,  with  scrupulous  and  impartial  integrity. 

III.   Of  executive  officers. 

The  executive  office  is  either  simple  or  complex. 

1.  Simple;  as  where  his  only  duty  is,  to  perform  what 
either  the  legislative  or  judicial  branches  of  the  government 
have  ordered  to  be  done. 

Such  is  the  case  with  sheriffs,  military  officers,  &tc. 

Here  the  officer  has  no  right  to  question  the  goodness  or 
wisdom  of  the  law  ;  since  for  these  he  is  not  responsible. 
His  only  duty  is  to  execute  it,  so  long  as  he  retains  his 
office.  If  he  believe  the  action  required  of  him  to  be 
morally  wrong,  or  at  variance  with  the  constitution,  he 
should  resign.  He  has  no  right  to  hold  the  office,  and 
refuse  to  perform  the  duties  which  others  have  been  empow- 
ered to  require  of  him. 

2.  Complex ;  where  legislative  and  executive  duties  are 
imposed  upon  the  same  person ;  as  where  the  chief  magis- 
trate is  allowed  a  vote,  on  all  acts  of  the  other  branches  of 
the  legislature. 

As  far  as  his  duties  are  legislative,  he  is  bound  by  the 
same  principles  as  any  other  legislatoi. 

Sometimes  his  power  is  limited  to  a  vote  on  mere  con- 
stitutional questions  ;  and  at  others,  it  extends  to  all  ques- 
tions whatsoever.  Sometimes  his  assent  is  absolutely  ne- 
cessary to  the  passage  of  all  bills  ;  at  others,  it  is  only  con- 
ditionally necessary,  that  is,  the  other  branches  may,  under 
certain  circumstances,  enact  laws  without  it. 

When  this  legislative  power  of  the  executive  has  been 
exerted  within  its  constitutional  limits,  he  becomes  merely 
an  executive  officer.  He  has  no  other  deliberative  power 
than  that  conferred  upon  him  by  the  constitution.  He 
is  under  the  same  obligations  as  any  other  executive  officer, 
31 


362  THE   DUTY   OF    THE    OFFICERS,    ETC 

to  execute  the  law,  unless  it  seem  to  him  a  violation  of 
moral  or  constitutional  obligation.  In  that  case,  it  is  his 
duty  to  resign.  He  has  no  more  right  than  any  other  man, 
to  hold  the  office,  while  he  is,  from  any  reason  whatever, 
unable  to  discharge  the  duties  which  the  office  imposes 
upon  him.  That  executive  officer  is  guilty  of  gross  per- 
version of  official  and  moral  obligation,  who,  after  the 
decision  of  the  legislative  or  judicial  branch  of  a  govern- 
ment has  been  obtained,  suffers  his  own  personal  views  to 
influence  him  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty.  The  exhibi- 
tion of  such  a  disposition  is  a  manifest  indication  of  an 
entire  disqualification  for  office.  It  shows  that  a  man  is 
either  destitute  of  the  ability  to  comprehend  the  nature  of 
his  station,  or  fatally  wanting  in  that  self-government,  so 
indispensably  necessary  to  him  who  is  called  to  preside  over 
important  business. 

And  not  only  is  an  executive  officer  bound  to  exert  no 
other  power  than  that  committed  to  him  ;  he  is  also  bound 
to  exert  that  power  for  no  other  purposes  than  those  for 
which  it  was  committed.  A  power  may  be  conferred  for 
the  public  good  ;  but  this  by  no  means  authorizes  a  man 
to  use  it  for  the  gratification  of  individual  love  or  hatred  ; 
much  less  for  the  sake  of  building  up  one  political  party, 
or  of  crushing  another.  Political  corruption  is  in  no  re- 
spect the  less  wicked,  because  it  is  so  common.  Dishon- 
esty is  no  better  policy  in  the  affairs  of  state  than  in  any 
other  affairs;  though  men  may  persuade  themselves  and 
others  to  the  contrary. 


363 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS. 

FROM  what  has  already  been  stated,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  duties  of  a  citizen  are  of  two  kinds :  first,  as  an 
individual ;  and,  second,  as  a  member  of  society.  A  few 
remarks  on  each  of  these  will  close  this  part  of  the  sub- 
ject. 

FIRST.     A.S  an  individual. 

Every  citizen,  as  an  individual,  is  bound  to  observe,  in 
good  faith,  the  contract  which  he  has  made  with  society. 
This  obliges  him, — 

1 .  To  observe  the  law  of  reciprocity,  in  all  his  intercourse 
with  others. 

The  nature  of  this  law  has  been  already  explained.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  remark,  that  society  furnishes  an  ad- 
ditional reason  for  observing  it, — a  reason  founded  both  in 
voluntary  compact,  and  also  in  the  necessity  of  obedience 
to  our  own  happiness.  It  may  also  be  added,  that  the 
nature  of  the  law  of  reciprocity  binds  us,  not  merely  to 
avoid  those  acts  which  are  destructive  to  the  existence  of 
society,  but  also  those  which  would  interfere  with  its  hap- 
piness. The  principle  is,  in  all  cases,  the  same.  If  we 
assume  the  right  to  interfere  with  the  smallest  means  of 
happiness  possessed  by  our  neighbor,  the  admission  of  that 
assumption  would  excuse  every  form  of  interference. 

2.  To  surrender  the  right  of  redressing  his  wrongs  wholly 
to  society.     This  has  been  considered  already,  in  treating 
of  the  social  compact.     Aggression  and  injury  in   no  case 
justify  retaliation.     If  a  man's  house  be  attacked,  he  may, 
so  far  as  society  is  concerned,  repel  the  robber,  because  here 
society  is  unable,  at  the  instant,  to  assist  him ;  but  he  is  at 
liberty  to  put  forth   no  other  effort  than  that  necessary  to 
protect  himself,  or  to  secure  the  aggressor,  for  the  purpose 


362  THE    DUTY    OF    THE    OFFICERS,    ETC 

to  execute  the  law,  unless  it  seem  to  him  a  violation  of 
moral  or  constitutional  obligation.  In  that  case,  it  is  his 
duty  to  resign.  He  has  no  more  right  than  any  other  man, 
to  hold  the  office,  while  he  is,  from  any  reason  whatever, 
unable  to  discharge  the  duties  which  the  office  imposes 
upon  him.  That  executive  officer  is  guilty  of  gross  per- 
version of  official  and  moral  obligation,  who,  after  the 
decision  of  the  legislative  or  judicial  branch  of  a  govern- 
ment has  been  obtained,  suffers  his  own  personal  views  to 
influence  him  in  the  discharge  of  his  duty.  The  exhibi- 
tion of  such  a  disposition  is  a  manifest  indication  of  an 
entire  disqualification  for  office.  It  shows  that  a  man  is 
either  destitute  of  the  ability  to  comprehend  the  nature  of 
his  station,  or  fatally  wanting  in  that  self-government,  so 
indispensably  necessary  to  him  who  is  called  to  preside  over 
important  business. 

And  not  only  is  an  executive  officer  bound  to  exert  no 
other  power  than  that  committed  to  him  ;  he  is  also  bound 
to  exert  that  power  for  no  other  purposes  than  those  for 
which  it  was  committed.  A  power  may  be  conferred  for 
the  public  good  ;  but  this  by  no  means  authorizes  a  man 
to  use  it  for  the  gratification  of  individual  love  or  hatred  ; 
much  less  for  the  sake  of  building  up  one  political  party, 
or  of  crushing  another.  Political  corruption  is  in  no  re- 
spect the  less  wicked,  because  it  is  so  common.  Dishon- 
esty is  no  better  policy  in  the  affairs  of  state  than  in  any 
other  affairs;  though  men  may  persuade  themselves  and 
others  to  the  contrary. 


363 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS. 

FROM  what  has  already  been  stated,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  duties  of  a  citizen  are  of  two  kinds :  first,  as  an 
individual ;  and,  second,  as  a  member  of  society.  A  few 
remarks  on  each  of  these  will  close  this  part  of  the  sub- 
ject. 

FIRST.     A.S  an  individual. 

Every  citizen,  as  an  individual,  is  bound  to  observe,  in 

f)od  faith,  the  contract  which  he  has  made  with  society. 
his  obliges  him, — 

1 .  To  observe  the  law  of  reciprocity,  in  all  his  intercourse 
with  others. 

The  nature  of  this  law  has  been  already  explained.  It 
is  only  necessary  to  remark,  that  society  furnishes  an  ad- 
ditional reason  for  observing  it, — a  reason  founded  both  in 
voluntary  compact,  and  also  in  the  necessity  of  obedience 
to  our  own  happiness.  It  may  also  be  added,  that  the 
nature  of  the  law  of  reciprocity  binds  us,  not  merely  to 
avoid  those  acts  which  are  destructive  to  the  existence  of 
society,  but  also  those  which  would  interfere  with  its  hap- 
piness. The  principle  is,  in  all  cases,  the  same.  If  we 
assume  the  right  to  interfere  with  the  smallest  means  of 
happiness  possessed  by  our  neighbor,  the  admission  of  that 
assumption  would  excuse  every  form  of  interference. 

2.  To  surrender  the  right  of  redressing  his  wrongs  wholly 
to  society.     This  has  been  considered  already,  in  treating 
of  the  social  compact.     Aggression  and  injury  in   no  case 
justify  retaliation.     If  a  man's  house  be  attacked,  he  may, 
so  far  as  society  is  concerned,  repel  the  robber,  because  here 
society  is  unable,  at  the  instant,  to  assist  him ;  but  he  is  at 
liberty  to  put  forth   no  other  effort  than  that  necessary  to 
protect  himself,  or  to  secure  the  aggressor,  for  the  purpose 


364  THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS. 

of  delivering  him  over  to  the  judgment  of  society.  If,  after 
having  secured  him,  we  put  him  to  death,  this  is  murder. 

3.  To  obey  all  laws  made  in  accordance  with  the  con- 
stituted powers  of  society.  Hence,  we  are  in  no^  manner 
released  from  this  obligation,  by  the  conviction  that  the  law 
is  unwise  or  inexpedient.  We  have  confided  the  decision 
of  this  question  to  society,  and  we  must  abide  by  that  de- 
cision. To  do  otherwise,  would  be  to  constitute  every  man 
the  judge  in  his  own  case ;  that  is,  to  allow  every  man  to 
obey  or  disobey  as  he  pleased,  while  he  expected  from  every 
oilier  man  implicit  obedience.  Thus,  though  a  man  were 
convinced  that  laws  regulating  the  rate  of  interest  were  in- 
expedient, this  would  give  him  no  right  to  violate  these  laws. 
He  must  obey  them  until  he  be  able  to  persuade  society  to 
think  as  he  does. 

SECONDLY.  The  citizen  is  under  obligations  as  a  con- 
stituent member  of  society.  By  these  obligations,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  is  bound  to  fulfil  the  contract  which  he  has 
made  with  every  individual. 

Hence,  he  is  bound, — 

1.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  secure  to  every 
individual,  from  the  highest  and  most  powerful  to  the  lowest 
and  most  defenceless,  the  full  benefit  of  perfect  protection 
in  the  enjoyment  of  his  rights. 

2.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  procure  for  every 
individual  just  and  adequate  redress  for  wrong. 

3.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  carry  into  effect 
the  laws  of  civil  society,  and  to  detect  and  punish  crime, 
whether  committed  against  the  individual  or  against  soci- 
ety.    Wherever  he  knows  these  laws  to  be  violated,  he 
is  bound  to  take  all  proper  steps  to  bring  the  offenders  to 
justice. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  he  is  to  consider,  not 
merely  his  property,  but  his  personal  service,  pledged  to  the 
fulfilment  of  this  obligation.  He  who  stands  by,  and  sees  a 
mob  tear  down  a  house,  is  a  partaker  in  the  guilt.  And,  if 
society  knowingly  neglect  to  protect  the  individual  in  the 
enjoyment  of  his  rights,  every  member  of  that  society  is,  in 
equity,  bound,  in  his  proportion,  to  make  good  that  loss,  how 
great  soever  it  may  be. 


THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS.  365 

4.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  citizen  to  bear,  cheerfully,  his  pro- 
portionate burden  of  the  public  expense.     As  society  can- 
not be  carried  on  without  expense,  he,  by  entering  into 
society}  obliges  himself  to  bear  his  proportion  of  it.     And, 
besides  this,  there  are  but  few  modes  in  which  we  receive 
back  so  much  for  what  we  expend,  as  when  we  pay  money 
for  the  support  of  civil  government.     The  gospel,  I  think, 
teaches  us  to  go  farther,  and  be  ready  to  do  more  than  we 
are  compelled  to  do  by  law.     The  precept,  "  If  a  man 
compel  thee  to  go  a  mile,  go  with  him  twain,"  refers  to 
labor  in  the  public  service,  and  exhorts  us  to  do  more  than 
can  be  in  equity  demanded  of  us. 

5.  Besides  this,  I  think  a  citizen  is  under  moral  obligation 
to  contribute  his  proportion  to  every  effort  which  affords  a 
reasonable  prospect  of  rendering  his   fellow-citizens  wiser 
and  better.     From  every  such  successful  effort,  he  receives 
material  benefit,  both  in  his  person  and  estate.     He  ought 
to  be  willing  to  assist  others  in  doing  that  from  which  he 
himself  derives  important  advantage. 

6.  Inasmuch  as  society  enters  into  a  moral  obligation   to 
fulfil  certain  duties,  which  duties  are  performed  by  agents 
whom  the  society  appoints  ;  for  their  faithful  discharge  of 
those  duties,  society  is  morally  responsible.     As  this  is  the 
case,  it  is  manifestly  the  duty  of  every  member  of  society 
to  choose  such  agents  as,  in  his  opinion,  will  truly  and  faith- 
fully discharge  those  duties  to  which  they  are  appointed. 
He  who,  for  the  sake  of  party  prejudice  or  personal  feeling, 
acts  otherwise,  and  selects  individuals  for  office  without  re- 
gard to  these  solemn  obligations,  is  using  his  full  amount  of 
influence  to  sap  the  very  foundations  of  society,  and  to  per- 
petrate the  most  revolting  injustice. 

Thus  far,  we  have  gone  upon  the  supposition  that  society 
has  exerted  its  power  within  its  constituted  limits.  This, 
however,  unfortunately,  is  not  always  the  case.  The  ques- 
tion then  arises,  What  is  the  duty  of  an  individual,  when 
such  a  contingency  shall  arise  ? 

Now,  there  are  but  three  courses  of  conduct,  in  such  a 
case,  for  the  individual  to  pursue  :  passive  obedience,  resist- 
ance, and  suffering  in  the  cause  of  right : 
31* 


366  THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS. 

1.  Passive  obedience,  in  many  cases,  would  be  manifestly 
wrong.     We  have  no  right  to  obey  an  unrighteous  law, 
since  we  must  obey  God  at  all  hazards.     And,  aside  from 
this,  the  yielding  to  injustice  forms  a  precedent  for  wrong, 
which  may  work  the  most  extensive  mischief  to  those  who 
shall  come  after  us.     It  is  manifest,  therefore,  that  passive 
obedience  cannot  be  the  rule  of  civil  conduct. 

2.  Resistance  by  force. 

Resistance  to  civil  authority,  by  a  single  individual,  would 
be  absurd.  It  can  succeed  only  by  the  combination  of  all 
the  aggrieved  against  the  aggressors,  terminating  in  an  ap- 
peal to  physical  force  ;  that  is,  by  civil  war. 

The  objections  to  this  course  are  the  following : 

1.  It  is,  at  best,  uncertain.     It  depends  mainly  on  the 
•question,  which  party  is,  under  the  present  circumstances, 
the  stronger  ?     Now,  the  oppressor  is  as  likely  to  be  the 
stronger  as  the  oppressed,  as  the  history  of  the  world  has 
abundantly  shown. 

2.  It  dissolves  the  social  fabric,  and  thus  destroys  what- 
ever has  thus  far  been  gained  in  the  way  of  social  organi- 
zation.    But  it  should  be  remembered  that  few  forms  of 
society  have  existed  for  any  considerable  period,  in  which 
there  does  not  exist  much-  that  is  worthy  of  preservation. 

3.  The  cause  of  all  oppression  is  the  wickedness  of  man. 
But  civil  war  is,  in  its  very  nature,  a  most  demoralizing  pro- 
cess.    It  never  fails  to  render  men  more  wicked.     Can  it 
then  be  hoped  that  a  form  of  government  can  be  created,  by 
men    already  worse    than  before,  better  than    that  which 
their  previous  but  less  intense  wickedness  rendered  intoler- 
able? 

4.  Civil  war  is,  of  all  evils  which  men  inflict  upon  them- 
selves, the  most  horrible.     It  dissolves  not  only  social  but 
domestic  ties,  overturns  all  the  security  of  property,  throws 
back,  for  ages,  all  social  improvement,  and  accustoms  men 
to  view,  without  disgust  and  even  with  pleasure,  all  that  is 
atrocious  and  revolting.     Napoleon,  accustomed  as-  he  was 
to  bloodshed,  turned  away  with  hoiTor  from  the  contempla- 
tion of  civil  war.     This,  then,  cannot  be  considered  the  way 
designed  by  our  Creator  for  rectifying  social  abuses. 


THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS.  367 

3.  The  third  course  is  that  of  suffering  in  the  cause  of 
right.  Here  \ve  act  as  we  believe  to  be  right,  in  defiance 
of  oppression,  and  bear  patiently  whatever  an  oppressor 
may  inflict  upon  us. 

The  advantages  of  this  course  are,- 

1.  It  preserves  entire  whatever  exists  that  is  valuable  in 
the  present  organization. 

2.  It  presents  the  best  prospect  of  ultimate  correction  of 
abuse,  by  appealing  to  the  reason  and  the  conscience  of 
men.     This  is,  surely,  a  more  fit  tribunal  to  which  to  refer 
a  moral  question,  than  the  tribunal  of  physical  force. 

3.  It  causes  no  more  suffering  than  is  actually  necessary 
to  accomplish  its  object ;  for,  whenever  men  are  convinced 
of  the  wickedness  of  oppression,   the  suffering,    of  itself, 
ceases. 

4.  Suffering  in  the  cause  of  right  has  a  manifest  tendency 
to  induce  the  injurious  to  review  their  conduct,  under  all 
the  most  favorable  circumstances  for  conviction.     It  disarms 
pride  and  malevolence,  and  enlists  sympathy  in  favor  of 
the  sufferer.     Hence,  its  tendency  is  to  make  men  better. 

5.  And  experience  has  shown  that  the  cause  of  civil 
liberty  has  always  gained  more  by  martyrdom  than  by  war. 
It  has  rarely  happened  that,  during  civil  war,  the  spirit  of 
true  liberty  has  not  declined.     Such  was  the  case  in  the 
time  of  Charles  I,  in  England.     How  far  the  love  of  liberty 
had  declined  in  consequence  of  civil  war,  is  evident  from 
the  fact,  that  Cromwell  succeeded  immediately  to  unlimited 
power,  and  Charles  II  returned  with  acclamation,  to  inflict 
upon  the  nation  the  most  odious  and  heartless  tyranny  by 
which  it  was  ever  disgraced.     During  the  suffering  for  con- 
science under  his  reign,  the  spirit  of  liberty  revived,  hurled 
his  brother  from  the  throne,  and  established  British  free- 
dom upon  a  firm,  and,  we  trust,  an  immovable  foundation. 

6.  Every  one  must  be  convinced,  upon  reflection,  that 
this  is  really  the  course    indicated   by  the  highest  moral 
excellence.     Passive  obedience  may  arise  from  servile  fear ; 
resistance,  from  vain-glory,  ambition,  or  desire  of  revolution. 
Suffering  for  the  sake  of  right  can  arise  only  from  a  love  of 
justice   and   a  hatred  of  oppression.     The   real  spirit  of 


368  THE    DUTIES    OF    CITIZENS. 

liberty  can  never  exist,  in  any  remarkable  degree,  in  any 
nation  where  there  is  not  this  willingness  to  suffer  in  the 
cause  of  justice  and  liberty.  Ever  so  little  of  the  spirit  of 
martyrdom  is  always  a  more  favorable  indication  for  civili- 
zation, than  ever  so  much  dexterity  of  party  management,  or 
ever  so  turbulent  protestation  of  immaculate  patriotism. 


369 


DIVISION   II. 

THE    LAW    OF    BENEVOLENCE. 

CHAPTER     FIRST. 

GENERAL    OBLIGATION  AND    DIVISION    OF    THE    SUBJECT. 

WE  have  thus  far  considered  merely  the  law  of  recipro- 
city ;  that  is,  the  law  which  prevents  our  interference  with 
those  means  of  happiness  which  belong  to  our  neighbor, 
from  the  fact  that  they  are  the  gift  of  God  to  him.  But  it 
is  manifest  that  this  is  not  the  only  law  of  our  present  con- 
stitution. Besides  being  obliged  to  abstain  from  doing 
wrong  to  our  neighbor,  we  are  also  obliged  to  do  him  good ; 
and  a  large  part  of  our  moral  probation  actually  comes 
under  this  law. 

The  law  of  benevolence,  or  the  law  which  places  us 
under  obligation  to  be  the  instruments  of  happiness  to  those 
who  have  no  claim  upon  us  on  the  ground  of  reciprocity,  is 
manifestly  indicated  by  the  circumstances  of  our  constitution. 

1.  We  are  created  under  a  constitution  in  which  we  are  of 
necessity  dependent  upon  the  benevolence  of  others.  Thus 
we  are  all  exposed  to  sickness,  in  which  case  we  become 
perfectly  helpless,  and  when,  were  it  not  for  the  kindness 
of  others,  we  must  perish.  We  grow  old,  and  by  age  lose 
the  power  of  supporting  ourselves.  Were  benevolence  to 
be  withdrawn,  many  of  the  old  would  die  of  want.  The 
various  injuries,  arising  from  accident  as  well  as  from  disease, 
teach  us  the  same  lesson.  And,  besides,  a  world  in  which 
every  individual  is  subject  to  death,  must  abound  with 
widows  and  orphans,  who,  deprived  by  the  hand  of  God  of 
their  only  means  of  support,  must  frequently  either  look  for 
sustenance  and  protection  to  those  on  whom  they  have  no 


370  GENERAL    OBLIGATION    AND 

claim  by  the  law  of  reciprocity,  or  they  must  die.  Now, 
as  we  live  under  a  constitution  in  which  these  things  are  of 
daily  occurrence,  and  many  of  them  by  necessity  belonging 
to  it,  and  as  we  are  all  equally  liable  to  be  in  need  of 
assistance,  it  must  be  the  design  of  our  Creator  that  we 
should,  under  such  circumstances,  help  each  other. 

2.  Nor  do  these  remarks  apply  merely  to  the  necessity 
of  physical  support.     Much  of  the  happiness  of  man  depends 
upon  intellectual  and  moral  cultivation.     But  it  is  generally 
the  fact,  that  those  who  are  deprived  of  these  means  of 
happiness  are  ignorant  of  their  value  ;  and  would,  therefore, 
remain  for  ever  deprived  of  them,  were  they  not  awakened 
to  a  conviction   of  their  true  interests  by  those  who  have 
been   more    fortunate.     Now,    as   we   ourselves   owe   our 
intellectual  happiness  to  the  benevolence,  either  near  or 
more  remote,  of  others,  it  would  seem  that  an  obligation  was 
imposed  upon  us  to  manifest  our  gratitude  by  extending  the 
olessings  which  we  enjoy,  to  those  who  are  destitute  of 
them.     We  frequently  cannot  requite  our  actual  benefactors, 
but  we  always  may  benefit  others  less  happy  than  ourselves  ; 
and  thus,  in  a  more  valuable  manner,  promote  the  welfare 
of  the  whole  race  to  which  we  belong. 

3.  This  being  manifestly  an  obligation  imposed  upon  us 
by  God,  it  cannot  be  affected  by  any  of  the  actions  of  men  ; 
that  is,  we  are  bound  by  the  law  of  benevolence,  irrespective 
of  the  character  of  the  recipient.     It  matters  not  though  he 
be  ungrateful,  or  wicked,  or  injurious  ;  this  does  not  affect 
the  obligation  under  which  we  are  placed  by  God,  to  treat 
our  neighbor  according  to  the  law  of  benevolence.     Hence, 
in  all  cases,  we  are  bound  to  govern  ourselves,  not  by  the 
treatment  which  we  have  received  at  his  hands,  but  accord- 
ing to  the  law  by  which  God  has  directed  our  intercourse 
with  him  to  be  governed. 

And  yet  more.  It  is  evident  that  many  of  the  virtues 
most  appropriate  to  human  nature,  are  called  into  exercise 
only  by  the  miseries  or  the  vices  of  others.  How  could 
there  be  sympathy  and  mercy,  were  there  no  suffering  ? 
How  could  there  be  patience,  meekness,  and  forgiveness, 
were  there  no  injury  ?  Thus  we  see,  that  a  constitution 
which  involves,  bv  necessity,  suffering,  and  the  obligation  to 


DIVISION    OF    THE    SUBJECT.  371 

relieve  it,  is  that  which  alone  is  adapted  to  the  perfection 
of  our  moral  character  in  our  present  state. 

This  law  of  our  moral  constitution  is  abundantly  set  forth 
in  the  Holy  Scriptures. 

It  is  needless  here  to  speak  of  the  various  passages  in  the 
Old  Testament  which  enforce  the  necessity  of  mercy  and 
charity.  A  single  text  from  our  Savior's  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  will  be  sufficient  for  my  purpose.  It  is  found 
Luke  vi,  32 — 36,  and  Matthew  v,  43 — 48.  I  quote  the 
passage  from  Luke : 

"  If  ye  love  them  that  love  you,  what  thank  have  ye  ? 
for  sinners  also  love  those  that  love  them.  And  if  ye  do 
good  to  those  that  do  good  to  you,  what  thank  have  ye  ? 
for  sinners  also  do  even  the  same.  And  if  ye  lend  to  them 
of  whom  ye  hope  to  receive,  what  thank  have  ye  ?  for 
sinners  also  lend  to  sinners,  to  receive  as  much  again. 
But  love  ye  your  enemies,  and  do  good,  and  lend,  hoping 
for  nothing  again  ;  and  your  reward  shall  be  great,  and  ye 
shall  be  the  children  of  the  Highest,  for  he  is  kind  unto  the 
unthankful  and  to  the  evil.  Be  ye,  therefore,  merciful,  as 
your  Father  in  heaven  is  merciful."  In  Matthew  it  is 
said,  "  Love  your  enemies,  bless  them  that  curse  you,  do 
good  to  them  that  hate  you,  and  pray  for  them  that  de- 
spitefully  use  you  and  persecute  you  ;  that  ye  may  be  the 
children  of  (that  is,  that  ye  may  imitate,)  your  Father 
which  is  in  heaven,  for  he  maketh  his  sun  to  rise  upon  the 
evil  and  upon  the  good,  and  sendeth  rain  upon  the  just 
and  upon  the  unjust." 

The  meaning  of  this  precept  is  obvious  from  the  context. 
To  be  merciful,  is  to  promote  the  happiness  of  those  who 
have  no  claim  upon  us  by  the  law  of  reciprocity,  and  from 
whom  we  can  hope  for  nothing  by  way  of  remuneration. 
We  are  to  be  merciful,  as  our  Father  who  is  in  heaven  is 
merciful. 

1.  God  is  the  independent  source  of  happiness  to  every 
thing  that  exists.  None  can  possibly  repay  him,  and  yet 
his  bounty  is  unceasing.  All  his  perfections  are  continually 
employed  in  promoting  the  happiness  of  his  creation.  Now, 
we  are  commanded  to  be  imitators  of  him ;  that  is,  to 
employ  all  our  powers,  not  for  our  own  gratification,  but  for 


372  GENERAL    OBLIGATION    ANI> 

the  happiness  of  others.  We  are  to  consider  this  not  as  an 
onerous  duty,  but  as  a  privilege ;  as  an  opportunity  con- 
ferred upon  us  of  attaining  to  some  resemblance  to  the 
Fountain  and  Author  of  all  excellence. 

2.  This  precept  teaches  us  that  our  obligation  is  not 
altered  by  the  character  of  the  recipient.     God  sends  rain 
on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust,  and  causeth  his  sun  to  shine 
on  the  evil  and  on  the  good.     "  God  commendeth  his  love 
to  us,  in  that,  while  we  were  yet  sinners,  Christ  died  for  us." 
In  imitation  of  this  example,  we  are  commanded  to  do  good 
to,  and  promote  the  happiness  of,  the  evil  and  the  wicked. 
We  are  to  comfort  them  when  they  are  afflicted  ;  to  relieve 
them  when  they  are  sick ;  and  specially,  by  all  the  means 
in  our  power,  to  strive  to  reclaim  them  to  virtue.     We  are 
not,  however,  to  give  a  man  the  means  of  breaking  the  laws 
of  God  ;  as  to  furnish  a  drunkard  with  the  means  of  in- 
temperance :  this  would  be  to  render  ourselves  partakers  of 
his  sin.     What  is  here  commanded  is  merely  the  relieving 
his  misery  as  a  suffering  human  creature. 

3.  Nor  is  our  obligation  altered  by  the  relation  in  which 
the  recipient  may  stand  to  us.     His  being  our  enemy  in  no 
manner  releases  us  from  obligation.     Every  wicked  man  is 
the  enemy  of  God ;  yet  God  bestows  even,  upon  such,  the 
most  abundant  favors. 

"  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  sent  his  only  begotten 
Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  on  him  should  not  perish,  bin 
have  everlasting  life."  Jesus  Christ  spent  his  life  in  acts 
of  mercy  to  his  bitterest  enemies.  He  died  praying  for  his 
murderers.  So  we  are  commanded  to  love  our  enemies,  to 
overcome  evil  with  good,  and  to  follow  the  example  of  St. 
Paul,  who  declares  to  the  Corinthians,  "  I  desire  to  spend 
and  be  spent  for  you ;  though  the  more  abundantly  I  love 
you,  the  less  I  be  loved." 

In  a  word,  God  teaches  us  in  the  Holy  Scriptures,  that 
all  our  fellow-men  are  his  creatures  as  well  as  ourselves ; 
and,  hence,  that  we  are  not  only  under  obligation,  under 
all  circumstances,  to  act  just  as  he  shall  command  us,  but 
that  we  are  specially  under  obligation  to  act  thus  to  our 
fellow-men,  who  are  not  only  our  brethren,  but  who  are 
also  under  his  special  protection.  He  declares  that  they 


DIVISION    OF    THE    SUBJECT.  373 

are  all  his  children ;  that,  by  showing  mercy  to  them,  we 
manifest  our  love  to  him;  and  that  this  manifestation  is 
the  most  valuable,  when  it  is  the  most  evident  that  we  are 
influenced  by  no  other  motive  than  love  to  him. 

Shakspeare  has  treated  this  subject  very  beautifully  in 
the  following  passages  : 

'Tis  mightiest  in  the  mightiest ;  it  becomes 

The  throned  monarch  better  than  his  crown. 

His  sceptre  shows  the  force  of  temporal  power, 

The  attribute  to  awe  and  majesty, 

Wherein  doth  sit  the  dread  and  fear  of  kings  ; 

But  mercy  is  above  the  sceptred  sway. 

It  is  enthroned  in  the  heart  of  kings. 

It  is  an  attribute  of  God  himself; 

And  earthly  power  doth  then  show  likest  God's 

When  mercy  seasons  justice. 

Mer.  of  Venice,  Act  4,  Scene  1 

Alas!  alas! 

Why  all  the  souls  that  are,  were  forfeit  once ; 
And  He  that  might  the  advantage  best  have  took, 
Found  out  the  remedy.     How  would  you  be, 
If  He,  who  is  the  top  of  judgment,  should 
But  judge  you  as  you  are? 

Measure  for  Measure,  Act  2,  Scene  2. 

The  Scriptures  enforce  this  duty  upon  us  for  several 
reasons : 

1.  From  the  example  of  God.     He  manifests  himself  to 
us  as  boundless  in  benevolence.     He  has  placed  us  under 
a  constitution  in  which  we  may,  at  humble  distance,  imitate 
him.     This  has  to  us  all  the  force  of  law,  for  we  are  surely 
under  obligation  to  be  as  good  as  we  have  the  knowledge 
and  the  ability  to  be.     And  as  the  goodness  of  God  is 
specially  seen  in  mercy  to  the  wicked  and  the  injurious,  by 
the  same   principles  we   are   bound   to   follow  the  same 
example. 

2.  We  live,  essentially  and  absolutely,  by  the  bounty 
and  forbearance  of  God.     It  is  meet  that  we  should  show 
the  same  bounty  and  forbearance  to  our  fellow-men. 

3.  Our  only  hope  of  salvation  is  in  the  forgiveness  of 
God — of  that  God  whom  we  have  offended  more  than  we 
can  adequately  conceive.     How  suitable  is  it,  then,  th\\t 
we  forgive  the  little  offences  of  our  fellow-men  against  us  \ 

32 


374  GENERAL    OBLIGATION   AND 

Our  Savior  illustrates  this  most  beautifully  in  his  parable  of 
the  two  servants,  Matthew,  xviii,  23 — 35. 

4.  By  the  example  of  Christ,  God  has  shown  us  what  is 
that  type  of  virtue,  which,  in  human  beings,  is  most  accept- 
able in  his  sight.     This  was  an  example  of  perfect  forbear- 
ance, meekness,  benevolence  and  forgiveness.     Thus,  we 
are  not  only  furnished  with  the  rule,  but  also  with  the  ex- 
emplification of  the  manner  in  which  the  rule  is  to  be  kept. 

5.  These  very  virtues,  which  are  called  forth  by  suffer- 
ing from  the  wickedness  and  injury  of  our  fellow-men,  are 
those  which  God  specially  approves,  and  which  he  declares 
essential  to  that  character  which  shall  fit  us  for  heaven. 
Blessed   are   the   merciful,  for   they  shall   obtain   mercy. 
Blessed  are  the  meek,  blessed  are  the  peace-makers,  &tc. 
A  thousand  such  passages  might  easily  be  quoted. 

6.  God  has  declared  that  our  forgiveness  with  him  de- 
pends upon  our  forgiveness  of  others.     "  If  ye  forgive  not 
men  their  trespasses,  neither  will  your  Father,  who  is  in 
aeaven,  forgive  you  your  trespasses."     "  He   shall   have 
judgment  without   mercy,    that   showeth   no   mercy ;   but 
mercy  rejoiceth  against  judgment ;"  that  is,  a  merciful  man 
rejoices,  or  is  confident,  in  the  view  of  the  judgment  day. 

If  it  be  asked,  What  is  the  Christian  limit  to  benevolence, 
I  answer,  that  no  definite  rule  is  laid  down  in  the  Scrip- 
tures, but  that  merely  the  principle  is  inculcated.  All  that 
we  possess  is  God's,  and  we  are  under  obligation  to  use  it 
all  as  He  wills.  His  will  is  that  we  consider  every  talent 
as  a  trust,  and  that  we  seek  our  happiness  from  the  use  of 
it,  not  in  self-gratification,  but  in  ministering  to  the  happi- 
ness of  others.  Our  doing  thus  he  considers  as  the  evi- 
dence of  our  love  to  him  ;  and  therefore  he  fixes  no  definite 
amount  which  shall  be  abstracted  from  our  own  immediate 
aourr.es  of  happiness  for  this  purpose,  but  allows  us  to  show 
our  consecration  of  all  to  him,  just  as  fully  as  we  please. 
If  this  be  a  privilege,  and  one  of  the  greatest  privileges,  of 
our  present  state,  it  would  seem  that  a  truly  grateful  heart 
would  not  ask  how  little,  but  rather  how  much,  may  I  do  to 
testify  my  love  for  the  God  who  preserves  me,  and  the 
Savior  who  has  redeemed  me. 

And,  inasmuch  as  our  love  to  God  is  more  evidently  dis- 


DIVISION    OF    THE    SUBJECT.  375 

played  in  kindness  and  mercy  to  the  wicked  and  the  injuri- 
ous than  to  any  others,  it  is  manifest  that  we  are  bound, 
by  this  additional  consideration,  to  practise  these  virtues 
toward  them,  in  preference  to  any  others. 

And  hence  we  see  that  benevolence  is  a  religious  act,  in 
just  so  far  as  it  is  done  from  love  to  God.  It  is  lovely,  and 
respectable,  and  virtuous,  when  done  from  sympathy  and 
natural  goodness  of  disposition.  It  is  pious,  only  when 
done  from  love  to  God. 


376 


CHAPTER    SECOND. 

OF    BENEVOLENCE     TO    THE    UNHAPPY. 

A  MAN  may  be  simply  unhappy  from  either  his  physical 
or  his  intellectual  condition.  We  shall  consider  these 
separately. 


SECTION    I. 

UNHAPPiNESS   FROM  PHYSICAL  CONDITION. 

The  occasions  of  unhappiness  from  this  cause,  are 
simple  poverty,  or  the  mere  want  of  the  necessities  and 
conveniences  of  life  ;  and  sickness  and  decrepitude,  either 
alone,  or  when  combined  with  poverty. 

1.  Of  poverty.     Simple  poverty,  or  want,  so  long  as  a 
human  being  has  the  opportunity  of  labor  sufficiently  pro- 
ductive to  maintain  him,  does  not  render  him  an  object  of 
charity.     "  If  a  man  will  not  work,  neither  shall  he  eat," 
is  the  language  no  less  of  reason  than  of  revelation.     If 
a  man   be  indolent,  the  best  discipline  to  which   he  can 
be  subjected,  is,  to  suffer  the  evils  of  penury.     Hence,  all 
that  we  are  required  to  do  in  such  a  case,  is,  to   provide 
such  a  person  with   labor,  and  to  pay  him  accordingly. 
This  is  the  greatest  kindness,  both  to  him  and  to  society. 

2.  Sometimes,  however,  from  the  dispensations  of  Provi- 
dence, a  human  being  is  left  so  destitute  that  his  labor  is 
insufficient  to  maintain  him.     Such  is  frequently  the  case 
with  widows  and  orphans.     This  forms  a  manifest  occasion 
for  charity.     The  individuals  have  become,  by  the  dispen- 


UNHAPPINESS    FROM   PHYSICAL    CONDITION.          377 

sation  of  God,  unable  to  help  themselves,  and  it  is  both 
our  duty  and  our  privilege  to  help  them. 

3.  Sickness.     Here  the  ability  to  provide  for  ourselves 
is  taken  away,  and  the  necessity  of  additional  provision  is 
created.     In  such  cases,  the  rich  stand  frequently  in  need 
of  our  aid,  our   sympathy,  and  our  services.     If  this  be 
the  case  with  them,  how  much  more  must  it  be  with  the 
poor,  from  whom,  the  affliction  which  produces  suffering, 
takes  away  the  power  of  providing  the  means  necessary 
for  alleviating  it !     It  is  here,  that  the  benevolence  of  the 
gospel    is    peculiarly     displayed.      Our    Savior   declares, 
"  inasmuch  as  ye  have  done  it  unto  one  of  the  least  of 
these,  ye  have  done  it  unto  me."     Bishop  Wilson,  on  this 
passage,  has  the  following  beautiful  remark  :  "  '  Inasmuch ' 
(as  often)  ;  who,  then,  would  miss  any  occasion  ?     *  The 
least ; '  who,  then,  would  despise  any  object  ?     l  To  me ; ' 
so  that,  in  serving  the  poor,  we  serve  Jesus  Christ." 

4.  Age   also  frequently  brings  with   it   decrepitude  of 
body,  if  not  imbecility  of  mind.     This  state  calls  for  our 
sympathy   and   assistance,   and  all  that    care    and  atten- 
tion which  the  aged  so  much  need,  and  which  it  is  so  suit- 
able for  the  young  and  vigorous  to  bestow. 

The  above  are,  I  believe,  the  principal  occasions  for  the 
exercise  of  benevolence  towards  man's  physical  sufferings. 
We  proceed  to  consider  the  principles  by  which  our  benev- 
olence should  be  regulated.  These  have  respect  both  to 
the  recipient  and  to  the  benefactor. 

I.  Principles  which  relate  to  the  recipient. 

It  is  a  law  of  our  constitution,  that  every  benefit  which 
God  confers  upon  us,  is  the  result  of  labor,  and  generally 
of  labor  in  advance  ;  that  is,  a  man  pays  for  what  he  re- 
ceives, not  after  he  has  received  it,  but  before.  This  rule 
is  universal,  and  applies  to  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral 
benefits,  as  will  be  easily  seen  upon  reflection. 

Now,  so  universal  a  rule  could  not  have  been  established 
without  both  a  good  and  a  universal  reason  ;  and,  hence, 
we  find,  by  experience,  that  lafior,  even  physical  labor,  is 
necessary  to  the  healthful  condition  of  man,  as  a  physical, 
an  intellectual,  and  a  moral  being.  And,  hence,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  the  rule  is  just  as  applicable  to  the  poor  as  to  the 
32* 


378          UNHAPPINESS    FROM    PHYSICAL    CONDITION. 

rich.  Or  to  state  the  subject  in  another  form :  Labor  is 
either  a  benefit  or  a  curse.  If  it  be  a  curse,  there  can  be 
no  reason  why  every  class  of  men  should  not  bear  that 
portion  of  the  infliction  which  God  assigns  to  it.  If  it  be 
a  benefit,  there  can  be  no  reason  why  every  man  should 
not  enjoy  his  portion  of  the  blessing. 

And,  hence,  it  will  follow  that  our  benevolence  should 
cooperate  with  this  general  law  of  our  constitution. 

1.  Those  who  are  poor,  but  yet  able  to  support  them- 
selves, should  be  enabled  to  do  so  by  means  of  labor,  and 
on  no  other  condition.     If  they  are  too  indolent  to  do  this, 
they  should  suffer  the  consequences. 

2.  Those  who  are  unable  to  support  themselves  wholly, 
should  be  assisted  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  thus  unable. 
Because  a  man  cannot  do  enough  to  support  himself,  there 
is  no  reason  why  he  should  do  nothing. 

3.  Those  who  are  unable  to  do  any  thing,  should  have 
every  thing  done  for  them  which  their  condition  requires. 
Such  are  infants,  the  sick,  the  disabled,  and  the  aged. 

Benevolence  is  intended  to  have  a  moral  effect  upon  the 
recipient,  by  cultivating  kindness,  gratitude,  and  universal 
benevolence  among  all  the  different  classes  of  men.  That 
mode  of  charity  is  therefore  most  beneficial  to  its  ob- 
ject, which  tends,  in  the  highest  degree,  to  cultivate  the 
kinder  and  better  feelings  of  his  nature.  Hence,  it  is  far 
better  for  the  needy,  for  us  to  administer  alms  ourselves, 
than  to  employ  others  to  do  it  for  us.  The  gratitude  of 
the  recipient  is  but  feebly  exercised  by  the  mere  fact  of 
the  relief  of  his  necessities,  unless  he  also  have  the  oppor- 
tunity of  witnessing  the  temper  and  spirit  from  which  the 
charity  proceeds. 

II.  Principles  which  relate  to  the  benefactor. 

The  Christian  religion  considers  charity  as  a  means  of 
moral  cultivation,  specially  to  the  benefactor.  It  is  always, 
in  the  New  Testament,  classed  with  prayer,  and  is  gov- 
erned essentially  by  the  same  rules.  This  may  be  seen 
from  our  Savior's  Sermon  on  the  Mount. 

Hence,  1.  That  method  of  charity  is  always  the  best 
which  calls  into  most  active  exercise  the  virtues  of  self- 
denial  and  personal  sacrifice,  as  they  naturally  arise  from 


UNHAPPINESS    FROM    PHYSICAL    CONDITION.          379 

kindness,  sympathy  and  charity,  or  universal  love  to  God 
and  man.  And,  on  the  contrary,  all  those  modes  of  benev- 
olence must  be  essentially  defective,  in  which  the  distresses 
of  others  are  relieved,  without  the  necessary  exercise  of 
these  virtues. 

2.  As  charity  is  a  religious  service,  and  an  important 
means  of  cultivating  love  to  God,  and  as  it  does  this  in  pro- 
portion as  all  external  and  inferior  motives  are  withdrawn, 
it  is  desirable,  also,  that,  in  so  far  as  possible,  it  be  done 
secretly.  The  doing  of  it  in  this  manner  removes  the 
motives  derived  from  the  love  of  applause,  and  leaves  us 
simply  those  motives  which  are  derived  from  love  to  God. 
Those  modes  of  benevolence  which  are,  in  their  nature,  the 
farthest  removed  from  human  observation,  are,  cateris 
paribus,  the  most  favorable  to  the  cultivation  of  virtue,  and 
are,  therefore,  always  to  be  preferred. 

Hence,  in  general,  those  modes  of  charity  are  to  be 
preferred,  which  most  successfully  teach  the  object  to  re- 
lieve himself,  and  which  tend  most  directly  to  the  moral 
benefit  of  both  parties.  And,  on  the  contrary,  those  modes 
of  charity  are  the  worst,  which  are  the  farthest  removed 
from  such  tendencies. 

These  principles  may  easily  be  applied  to  some  of  the 
ordinary  forms  of  benevolence. 

I.  Public  provision  for  the  poor  by  poor  laws  will  be 
found  defective  in  every  respect. 

1.  It  makes  a  provision  for  the  poor  because  he  is  poor. 
This,  as  I  have  said,  gives  no  claim  upon  charity. 

2.  It  in  no  manner  teaches  the  man  to  help  himself; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  tends  to  take  from  him  the  natural 
stimulus  for  doing  so. 

3.  Hence,  its  tendency  is  to  multiply  paupers,  vagrants, 
and  idlers.     Such  have  been  its  effects,  to   an  appalling 
degree,  in  Great  Britain  ;  and  such,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  must  they  be  every  where.     It  is  taking  from  the  in- 
dustrious a  portion  of  their  earnings,  and  conferring  them, 
without  equivalent,  upon  the  idle. 

4.  It  produces  no  feeling  of  gratitude  towards  the  bene- 
factor, but  the  contrary.     In  those  countries  where  poor- 
rates  are  the  highest,  the  poor  will  be  found    the   most 


380          UNHAPPINESS    FROM   PHYSICAL    CONDITION. 

discontented  and  lawless,  and  the  most  inveterate  against 
the  rich. 

5.  It  produces  no  moral  intercourse  between  the  parties 
concerned,  but  leaves  the  distribution  of  bounty  to  the  hand 
of  an  official  agent.     Hence,  what  is  received,  is  claimed 
by  the  poor  as  a  matter  of  right ;  and  the  only  feeling 
elicited  is  that  of  displeasure,  because  it  is  so  little. 

6.  It  produces  no  feeling  of  sympathy  or  of  compassion 
in  the  rich ;  but,  being  extorted  by  force  of  law,  is  viewed 
as  a  mere  matter  of  compulsion. 

Hence,  every  principle  would  decide  against  poor  laws 
as  a  means  of  charity.  If,  however,  the  society  undertake 
to  control  the  capital  of  the  individual,  and  manage  it  as 
they  will,  and  by  this  management  make  paupers  by  thou- 
sands, I  do  think  they  are  under  obligation  to  support  them. 
If,  however,  they  insist  upon  pursuing  this  course,  it  would 
be  better  that  every  poor-house  should  be  a  work-house ;  and 
that  the  poor-rates  should  always  be  given  as  the  wages  of 
some  form  of  labor. 

I  would  not,  however,  be  understood  to  decide  against 
all  public  provision  for  the  necessitous.  The  aged  and 
infirm,  the  sick,  the  disabled,  and  the  orphan,  in  the  failure 
of  their  relatives,  should  be  relieved,  and  relieved  cheerfully 
and  bountifully,  by  the  public.  I  only  speak  of  provision 
for  the  poor,  because  they  are  poor,  and  do  not  refer  to 
provision  made  for  other  reasons.  Where  the  circum- 
stances of  the  recipient  render  him  an  object  of  charity,  let 
him  be  relieved,  freely  and  tenderly.  But,  if  he  be  not  an 
object  of  chanty,  to  make  public  provision  for  him  is  inju- 
rious. 

II.   Voluntary  associations  for  purposes  of  charity. 

Some  of  the  inconveniences  arising  from  poor-laws  are 
liable  to  ensue,  from  the  mode  of  conducting  these  insti- 
tutions. 

1.-  They  do  not  make  the  strongest  appeal  to  the  moral 
feelings  of  the  recipient.  Gratitude  is  much  diminished, 
when  we  are  benefited  by  a  public  charity,  instead  of  a 
private  benefactor. 

2.  This  is  specially  the  case,  when  a  charity  is  funded ; 
and  the  almoner  is  merely  the  official  organ  of  a  distribution, 


UNHAPPINESS    FROM   PHYSICAL    CONDITION.  381 

in  which  he  can  have  but  a  comparatively  trifling  personal 
interest. 

3.  The  moral  effect  upon  the  giver  is  much  less  than  it 
would  be,  if  he  and  the  recipient  were  brought  immediately 
into  contact.  Paying  an  annual  subscription  to  a  charity, 
has  a  very  different  effect  from  visiting  and  relieving,  with 
our  own  hands,  the  necessities  and  distresses  of  the  sick  and 
the  afflicted. 

I  by  no  means,  however,  say  that  such  associations  are 
not  exceedingly  valuable.  Many  kinds  of  charity  cannot 
well  be  carried  on  without  them.  The  comparatively  poor 
are  thus  enabled  to  unite  in  extensive  and  important  works 
of  benevolence.  In  many  cases,  the  expenditure  of  capital, 
necessary  for  conducting  a  benevolent  enterprise,  requires  a 
general  effort.  I  however  say,  that  the  rich,  who  are  able 
to  labor  personally  in  the  cause  of  charity,  should  never 
leave  the  most  desirable  part  of  the  work  to  be  done  by 
others.  They  should  be  their  own  almoners.  If  they  will 
not  do  this,  why  then  let  them  furnish  funds  to  be  distributed 
by  others ;  but  let  them  remember,  that  they  are  losing  by 
far  the  most  valuable,  that  is,  they  are  losing  the  moral 
benefit  which  God  intended  them  to  enjoy.  God  meant 
every  man  to  be  charitable  as  much  as  to  be  prayer- 
ful ;  and  he  never  intended  that  the  one  duty,  any  more 
than  the  other,  should  be  done  by  a  deputy.  The  same 
principles  would  lead  us  to  conclude,  what,  I  believe,  ex- 
perience has  always  shown  to  be  the  fact,  that  a  fund  for 
the  support  of  the  poor  of  a  town,  has  always  proved  a 
nuisance  instead  of  a  benefit.  And,  in  general,  as  charity 
is  intended  to  be  a  means  of  moral  improvement  to  both 
parties,  and  specially  to  the  benefactor,  those  modes  of 
charity  which  do  not  have  in  view  the  cultivation  of  moral 
excellence,  are,  in  this  respect,  essentially  defective. 


384  OP   UNHAPPINESS    FROM 

possessor  is  taught  the  necessity  of  exerting  it  to  practical 
purpose,  the  better  is  it  for  him,  and  the  better  for  society. 
The  poets  tell  us  much  of  the  amount  of  genius  which  has 
been  nipped  in  the  bud  by  the  frosts  of  adversity.  This, 
doubtless,  is  true ;  but  let  it  not  be  forgotten  that,  by  the 
law  of  our  nature,  early  promise  is  frequently  delusive. 
The  poets  do  not  tell  us  how  great  an  amount  of  genius  is 
also  withered  by  the  sun  of  prosperity.  It  is  probable  that 
a  greater  proportion  of  talent  is  destroyed,  or  rendered  val- 
ueless, by  riches  than  by  poverty  ;  and  the  rapid  mutations 
of  society,  I  think,  demonstrate  this  to  be  the  fact. 

The  same  principles  will,  in  substance,  apply  to  the  case 
in  which,  for  a  particular  object,  as  for  the  promotion  of 
religion,  it  is  deemed  expedient  to  increase  the  proportion 
of  professionally  educated  men. 

In  this,  as  in  every  other  instance,  if  we  would  be  truly 
useful,  our  charities  must  be  governed  by  the  principles 
which  God  has  marked  out  in  the  constitution  of  man. 

The  general  principle  of  God's  government  is,  that,  for 
all  valuable  possessions,  we  must  render  a  consideration ; 
and  experience  has  taught,  that  it  is  impossible  to  vary 
from  this  rule,  without  the  liability  of  doing  injury  to  the 
recipient.  The  reason  is  obvious  ;  for  we  can  scarcely,  in 
any  other  manner,  injure  another  so  seriously,  as  by  lead- 
ing him  to  rely  on  any  one  else  than  himself,  or  to  feel 
that  the  public  are  under  obligations  to  take  charge  of  him. 

Hence,  charity  of  this  sort  should  be  governed  by  the 
following  principles  : 

1.  The  recipient  should  receive  no  more  than  is  neces- 
sary, with  his  own  industrious  exertions,  to  accomplish  the 
object. 

2.  To  loan  money  is  better  than  to  give  it. 

3.  It  should   be  distributed   in   such   manner   as   most 
successfully   to  cultivate   the    good    dispositions   of   both 
parties. 

Hence,  private  and  personal  assistance,  when  practica- 
ble, has  some  advantages  over  that  derived  from  associa- 
tions. And,  hence,  such  supervision  is  always  desirable,  as 
will  restrict  the  charity  to  that  class  of  persons  for  whom 
it  was  designed,  and  as  will  render  it  of  such  a  nature, 


INTELLECTtkL    CONDITION.  385 

that  those  of  every  other  class  would  be  under  the  least 
possible  temptation  to  desire  it. 

And,  in  arranging  the  plan  of  such  an  association,  it 
should  always  be  borne  in  mind,  that  the  sudden  change  in 
all  the  prospects  of  a  young  man's  life,  which  is  made  by 
setting  before  him  the  prospect  of  a  pi'of3Jsional  education, 
is  one  of  the  severest  trials  of  human  virtue. 

Public  provision  for  scientific  education,  does  not  come 
under  the  head  of  benevolence.  Inasmuch,  however,  as 
the  cultivation  of  science  is  advantageous  to  all  classes  of 
a  community,  it  is  for  the  interest  of  the  whole  that  it  be 
cultivated.  But  the  means  of  scientific  education,  as  phil- 
osophical instruments,  libraries,  and  buildings,  could  never 
be  furnished  by  instructors,  without  rendering  this  kind  of 
education  so  expensive  as  to  restrict  it  entirely  to  the  rich. 
It  is,  therefore,  wise  for  a  community  to  make  these  pro- 
visions out  of  the  common  stock,  so  that  a  fair  opportunity 
of  improvement  may  be  open  to  all.  When,  however,  the 
public  fails  to  discharge  this  duty,  it  is  frequently,  with 
great  patriotism  and  benevolence,  assumed  by  individuals. 
I  know  of  no  more  interesting  instances  of  expansive  benevo- 
lence, than  those  in  which  wealth  is  appropriated  to  the 
noble  purpose  of  diffusing  over  all  coming  time,  "  the  light 
of  science  and  the  blessings  of  religion."  Who  can  esti- 
mate the  blessings  which  the  founders  of  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge universities  have  conferred  upon  the  human  race ! 
33 


ass 


CHAPTER    THIRD. 

BENEVOLENCE    TO   THE  WICKED. 

WE  now  come  to  treat  of  a  form  of  benevolence,  in 
which  other  elements  are  combined.  What  is  our  duty  to 
our  fellow-men  who  are  wicked  1 

A  wicked  man  is,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  unhappy. 
He  is  depriving  himself  of  all  the  pleasures  of  virtue  ;  he 
is  giving  strength  to  those  passions,  which,  by  their  un- 
governable power,  are  already  tormenting  him  with  insati- 
able and  ungratified  desire ;  he  is  incurring  the  pains  of  a 
guilty  conscience  here,  and  he  is,  in  the  expressive  language 
of  the  Scriptures,  "  treasuring  up  wrath,  against  the  day  of 
wrath  and  of  righteous  indignation."  It  is  manifest,  then, 
that  no  one  has  stronger  claims  upon  our  pity,  than  such  a 
fellow-creature  as  this. 

So  far,  then,  as  a  wicked  man  is  miserable  or  unhappy, 
he  is  entitled  to  our  pity,  and,  of  course,  to  our  love  and 
benevolence.  But  this  is  not  all.  He  is  also  wicked ;  and 
the  proper  feeling  with  which  we  should  contemplate 
wickedness,  is  that  of  disgust,  or  moral  indignation.  Hence, 
a  complex  feeling  in  such  a  case  naturally  arises — that  of 
benevolence,  because  he  is  unhappy ;  and,  that  of  moral 
indignation,  because  he  is  sinful.  These  two  sentiments, 
however,  in  no  manner  conflict  with,  but  on  the  contrary, 
if  properly  understood,  strengthen  each  other. 

The  fact  of  a  fellow-creature's  wickedness,  affects  not 
our  obligation  to  treat  him  with  the  same  benevolence  as 
would  be  demanded  in  any  other  case.  If  he  is  necessi- 
tous, or  sick,  or  afflicted,  or  ignorant,  our  duty  to  relieve, 
and  sympathize  with,  and  assist,  and  teach  him,  are  the 
same  as  though  he  were  virtuous.  God  sends  his  rain  on 
the  evil  and  on  the  good. 

But  especially,  as  the  most  alarming  source  of  his  mis- 


BENEVOLENCE    TO    THE    WICKED.  387 

ery  is  his  moral  character,  the  more  we  detest  his  wicked- 
ness, the  more  strongly  would  benevolence  urge  us  to 
make  every  effort  in  our  power  to  reclaim  him.  This, 
surely,  is  the  highest  exercise  of  charity  ;  for  virtue  is  the 
true  solace  against  all  the  evils  incident  to  the  present  life, 
and  it  is  only  by  being  virtuous  that  we  can  hope  for  eternal 
felicity. 

We  are  bound,  then,  by  the  law  of  benevolence,  to  labor 
to  reclaim  the  wicked : — 

1.  By  example,  by  personal  kindness,  by  conversation, 
and  by  instructing  them  in  the  path  of  duty,  and  persuading 
them  to  follow  it. 

2.  As  the  most  efficacious  mode  of  promoting  moral  ref- 
ormation, yet  discovered,  is  found  to  be  the  inculcation  of 
the  truths  of  the  Holy  Scriptures  ;  it  is  our  imperative  duty 
to  bring  these  truths  into  contact  with  the  consciences  of 
men.     This  duty  is,  by  our  Savior,  imposed  upon   all  his 
disciples  :  "  Go  ye  into  all  the  world,  and  preach  the  gos- 
pel to  every  creature." 

3.  As  all  men  are  our  brethren,  and  as  all  men  equally 
need  moral  light,  and  as  experience  has  abundantly  shown, 
that  all  men  will  be  both  wicked  and  unhappy  without  it, 
this  duty  is  binding  upon  every  man  towards  the  whole 
human  race.     The  sentiments  of  Dr.  Johnson  on  this  sub- 
ject, in  his  letter  on  the  translation  of  the  Scriptures  into 
the  Gaelic  language,  are  so  apposite  to  my  purpose,  that  I 
beg  leave  to  introduce  them  here,  though  they  have  been 
so  frequently  published.     "  If  obedience  to  the  will  of  God 
be  necessary  to  happiness,  and  knowledge  of  his  will  ne- 
cessary to  obedience,  I  know  not  how  he  that  withholds  this 
knowledge,  or  delays  it,  can  be  said  to  love  his  neighbor  as 
himself.     He  that  voluntarily  continues  in  ignorance  is  guilty 
of  all  the  crimes  which  that  ignorance  produces  ;  as,  to  him 
that  should  extinguish  the  tapers  of  a  light-house,  might  be 
justly  imputed  the  calamities  of  shipwrecks.     Christianity  is 
the  highest  perfection  of  humanity  ;  and  as  no  man  is  good 
but  as  he  wishes  the  good  of  others,  no  man  can  be  good  in 
the  highest  degree  who  wishes  not  to  others  the  largest 
measures  of  the  greatest  good." — Life,  Azino  1766. 

We  see,  then,  that,  in  so  far  as  wicked  men  are  by  their 


388  BENEVOLENCE    TO    THE    WICKED. 

wickedness  miserable,  benevolence  renders  it  our  duty  to 
reclaim  them.  And  to  such  benevolence  the  highest  re- 
wards are  promised.  "  They  that  turn  many  to  righteous- 
ness shall  shine  as  the  stars  for  ever  and  ever."  But  this 
is  not  all.  If  we  love  our  Father  in  heaven,  it  must  pain 
us  to  see  his  children  violating  his  just  and  holy  laws, 
abusing  his  goodness,  rendering  not  only  themselves  but 
also  his  other  children  miserable,  and  exposing  themselves 
and  others  to  his  eternal  displeasure.  The  love  of  God 
would  prompt  us  to  check  these  evils,  and  to  teach  our 
brethren  to  serve,  and  love,  and  reverence  our  common 
Father,  and  to  become  his  obedient  children,  both  now  and 
for  ever. 

Nor  is  either  of  these  sentiments  inconsistent  with  the 
greatest  moral  aversion  to  the  crime.  The  more  hateful 
to  us  is  the  conduct  of  those  whom  we  love,  the  more 
zealous  will  be  our  endeavors  to  bring  them  back  to  virtue. 
And  surely  the  more  we  are  sensible  of  the  evil  of  sin 
against  God,  the  more  desirous  must  we  be  to  teach  his 
creatures  to  love  and  obey  him. 

The  perfect  exemplification  of  both  of  these  sentiments 
is  found  in  the  character  of  our  Lord  and  Savior  Jesus 
Christ.  While,  in  all  his  conduct  and  teachings,  we  observe 
the  most  intense  abhorrence  of  every  form  of  moral  evil,  yet 
we  always  find  it  combined  with  a  love  for  the  happiness, 
both  temporal  and  spiritual,  of  man;  which,  in  all  its  bear- 
ings, transcends  the  limits  of  finite  comprehension.  This  is 
the  example  which  God  has  held  forth  for  our  imitation. 
It  would  be  easy  to  show  that  the  improvement  of  the 
moral  character  of  our  fellow-men  is  also  the  surest  method 
of  promoting  their  physical,  intellectual,  and  social  hap- 
piness. 


389 


CHAPTER    FOURTH. 

BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS 

THE  cases  to  be  considered  here  are  three  : 

I.  Where  injury  is  committed  by  an  individual  upon  an 
individual. 

II.  Where  injury  is  committed  by  an  individual  upon 
society. 

III.  Where  injury  is  committed  by  a  society  upon  a 
society. 

I.  Where  an  injury  is  committed  by  an  individual  upon 
an  individual. 

In  this  case,  the  offender  is  guilty  of  wickedness,  and  of 
violation  of  our  personal  rights. 

1.  In  so  far  as  the  action  is  wicked,  it  should  excite  OU 
moral  detestation,  just  as  in  the  case  in  which  wrong  is  done 
to  any  one  else. 

2.  In  so  far  as  the  wicked  man  is  unhappy,  he  should 
excite  our  pity,  and  our  active  effort  to  benefit  him. 

3.  As  the  cause  of  this  unhappiness  is  moral  wrong,  it  is 
our  duty  to  reclaim  him. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  injury  is  done  to  us,  it  is  our  duty  to 
forgive  him.     On  this  condition  alone  can  we  hope  to  be 
forgiven. 

5.  Yet  more  ;  inasmuch  as  the  injury  is  done  to  us,  it 
gives  us  an  opportunity  of  exercising  special  and  peculiar 
virtue.     It  is  therefore  our  special  duty  to  overcome  it  by 
good ;  that  is,  the  duty  of  reclaiming  him  from  wrong  rests 
specially  upon  us ;  and  is  it  to  be  fulfilled  by  manifesting 
towards   him   particular  kindness,   and   the  most  cheerful 
willingness  to  serve  him.     "  Be  not  overcome  of  evil,  but 
overcome  evil  with  good."     That  is,  it  is  our  special  duty, 
by  an  exhibition  of  peculiar  benevolence,  to  reclaim  the 
injurious  person  to  virtue. 

33* 


390  BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS. 

Such  is  plainly  the  teaching  of  the  Holy  Scriptures.  It 
will  require  but  a  few  words  to  show  that  this  is  the  course 
of  conduct  indicated  by  the  conditions  of  our  being. 

1.  I  think  that  every  one  must  acknowledge  this  to  be 
the  course  pointed  out  by  the  most  exalted  virtue.     Every 
man's  conscience  testifies,  that  to  reward  evil  with  good 
is    noble,  while    the  opposite    course  is   mean.     There  is 
nothing  more  strongly  indicative  of  littleness  of  spirit,  than 
revenge. 

2.  This  mode  of  treating  injuries  has  a  manifest  tendency 
to  put  an  end  to  injury,  and  every  form  of  ill-will : 

For,  1.  No  man  can  long  continue  to  injure  him,  who 
requites  injury  with  nothing  but  goodness. 

2.  It  improves  the  heart  of  the  offender,  and  thus  not 
only  puts  an  end  to  the  injury  at  that  particular  time,  but 
also  greatly  diminishes  the  probability  of  its  recurrence  at 
any  subsequent  time.     Were  this  course  universally  pur- 
sued, there  would  be  done  on  earth  the  least  possible  injury. 

3.  It  improves,  in  the  most  signal  manner,  the  offended 
person  himself;  and  thus  renders  it  less  likely  that  he  will 
-ever  commit  an  injury  himself. 

In  a  word,  the  tendency  of  this  mode  of  treating  an  inju- 
rious person,  is  to  diminish  indefinitely  the  liability  to  injury, 
and  to  render  all  parties  both  happier  and  better. 

On  the  contrary,  the  tendency  of  retaliation  is  exactly 
the  reverse.  We  should  consider, 

1.  That  the  offender  is  a  creature  of  God,  and  we  are 
bound  to  treat  him   as  God  has  commanded.     Now,  no 
treatment  which  we  have  received  from  another,  gives  us, 
by  the  law  of  God,  any  right  to  treat  him  in  any  other 
manner  than  with  kindness.     That  he  has  violated  his  duty 
towards  us  and  towards  God,  affords  no  reason  why  we 
should  be  guilty  of  the  same  crimes. 

2.  The  tendency  of  retaliation  is,  to  increase,  and  fos- 
ter, and  multiply  wrongs,  absolutely  without  end.     Such, 
we  see,  is  its  effect  among  savage  nations. 

3.  Retaliation    renders  neither  party  better,  but  always 
renders  both  parties  worse.     The  offended  party  who  re- 
taliates, does  a  mean  action  when  he  might  have  done  a 
noble  one. 


BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS.  391 

Such,  then,  is  the  scriptural  mode  of  adjusting  individual 
differences. 

II.  When  the  individual  has  committed  an  injury  against 
society. 

Such  is  the  case  when  an  offender  has  violated  a  law  of 
society,  and  comes  under  its  condemnation.  In  what  way 
and  on  what  principles  is  society  bound  to  treat  him  ? 

1.  The   crime  being   one  which,  if  permitted,    would 
greatly  injure  if  not  destroy  society,  it  is  necessary  that  it 
be  prevented.     Society  has,  therefore,  a  right  to  take  such 
measures  as  will  insure  its  prevention.     This   prevention 
may  always  be  secured  by  solitary  confinement. 

But,  this  being  done,  society  is  under  the  same  obliga- 
tions to  the  offender,  as  the  several  individuals  composing 
the  society  are  under  to  him.  Hence,- — 

2.  They  are  bound  to  seek  his  happiness  by  reclaiming 
him ;  that  is,  to  direct  all  treatment  of  him,  while  under 
their  care,  with  distinct  reference  to  his  moral  improvement. 
This  is  the  law  of  benevolence,  and  it  is  obligatory  no  less 
on  societies  than  on  individuals.     Every  one  must  see  that 
the  tendency  of  a  system  of  prison  discipline  of  this  kind 
must  be  to  diminish  crime  ;  while  that  of  any  other  system 
must  be,  and  always  has  been,  to  increase  it. 

Nor  is  this  chimerical.  The  whole  history  of  prisons  has 
tended  to  establish  precisely  this  result.  Prisons  which 
have  been  conducted  on  the  principle  of  retaliation,  have 
every  where  multiplied  felons ;  while  those  which  have 
been  conducted  on  the  principle  of  rendering  a  prison  a 
school  of  moral  reformation,  have,  thus  far,  succeeded  beyond 
even  the  anticipations  of  their  friends.  Such  a  prison  is 
also  the  greatest  terror  to  a  wicked  man  ;  and  it  ceases  not 
to  be  so,  until  he  becomes,  at  least,  comparatively  virtuous. 
The  whole  experience  of  John  Howard  is  summed  up  by 
himself  in  a  single  sentence :  "  It  is  in  vain  to  punish  the 
wicked,  unless  you  seek  to  reclaim  them." 

By  what  I  have  said  above,  I  would  not  be  understood 
to  deny  the  right  of  society  to  punish  murder  by  death. 
This  right,  I  think,  however,  is  to  be  established,  not  by 
the  principles  of  natural  law,  but  by  the  command  of  God 
to  Noah.  The  precept,  in  this  case,  seems  to  me  to  have 


392  BENEVOLENCJL    TOWAK.D    THE    INJUKIOUS. 

been  given  to  the  whole  human  race,  and  to  be  still  obli- 
gatory. 

III.  Where  one  society  violates  the  rights  of  another 
society.  The  principles  of  the  gospel,  already  explained, 
apply  equally  to  this  as  to  the  preceding  cases. 

1.  The  individual  has,  by  the  law  of  God,  no  right  to 
return  evil  for  evil ;  but  is  bound  to  conduct  towards  eveiy 
other  individual,  of  what  nation  soever,  upon  the  principle 
of  charity. 

2.  The  individual  has  no  right  to  authorize  society  to  do 
any  thing  contrary  to  the  law  of  God  ;  that  is  to  say,  men 
connected  in  societies  are  under  the  same  moral  law  as 
individuals.     What  is  forbidden  to  the  one  is  forbidden  also 
to  the  other. 

3.  Hence,  I  think  we  must  conclude  that  an  injury  is  to 
be  treated  in  the  same  manner ;  that  is,  that  we  are  under 
obligation  to  forgive  the  offending  party,  and  to  strive  to 
render  him  both  better  and  happier. 

4.  Hence,  it  would  seem  that  all  wars  are  contrary  to 
the  revealed  will  of  God,  and   that  the  individual  has  no 
right  to  commit  to  society,  nor  society  to  commit  to  govern- 
ment, the  power  to  declare  war. 

Such,  I  must  confess,  seems  to  me  to  be  the  will  of  our 
Creator  ;  and,  hence,  that,  to  all  arguments  brought  in 
favor  of  war,  it  would  be  a  sufficient  answer,  that  God  has 
forbidden  it,  and  that  no  consequences  can  possibly  be  con- 
ceived to  arise  from  keeping  his  law,  so  terrible  as  those 
which  must  arise  from  violating  it.  God  commands  us  to 
love  every  man,  alien  or  citizen,  Samaritan  or  Jew,  as  our- 
selves ;  and  the  act  neither  of  society  nor  of  government  can 
render  it  our  duty  to  violate  this  command. 

But  let  us  look  at  the  arguments  offered  in  support  of 
war. 

The  miseries  of  war  are  acknowledged.  Its  expense, 
at  last,  begins  to  be  estimated.  Its  effects  upon  the  physi- 
cal, intellectual,  and  moral  condition  of  a  nation,  are  de- 
plored. It  is  granted  to  be  a  most  calamitous  remedy  for 
evils,  and  the  most  awful  scourge  that  can  be  inflicted  upon 
the  human  race.  It  will  be  granted,  then,  that  the  resort 
to  it,  if  not  necessary,  must  be  intensely  wicked  ;  and  that 


BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS.  393 

if  it  be  not  in  the  highest  degree  useful,  it  ought  to  be  uni- 
versally abolished. 

It  is  also  granted,  that  the  universal  abolition  of  war 
would  be  one  of  the  greatest  blessings  that  could  be  con- 
ferred upon  the  human  race.  As  to  the  general  principle, 
then,  there  is  no  dispute.  The  only  question  which  arises 
is,  whether  it  be  not  necessary  for  one  nation  to  act  upon 
the  principle  of  offence  and  defence  so  long  as  other  nations 
continue  to  do  the  same  ? 

I  answer,  first.  It  is  granted  that  it  would  be  better 
for  rnan  in  general,  if  wars  were  abolished,  and  all  means, 
both  of  offence  and  defence,  abandoned.  Now,  this  seems 
to  me  to  admit,  that  this  is  the  law  under  which  God  has 
created  man.  But  this  being  admitted,  the  question  seems 
to  be  at  an  end  ;  for  God  never  places  men  under  circum- 
stances in  which  it  is  either  wise,  or  necessary,  or  innocent, 
to  violate  his  laws.  Is  it  for  the  advantage  of  him  who 
lives  among  a  community  of  thieves,  to  steal ;  or  for  one 
who  lives  among  a  community  of  liars,  to  lie?  On  the 
contrary,  do  not  honesty  and  veracity,  under  these  very 
circumstances,  give  him  additional  and  peculiar  advantages 
over  his  companions  ? 

Secondly.  Let  us  suppose  a  nation  to  abandon  all 
means,  both  of  offence  and  of  defence,  to  lay  aside  all 
power  of  inflicting  injury,  and  to  rely  for  self-preservation 
solely  upon  the  justice  of  its  own  conduct,  and  the  moral 
effect  which  such  a  course  of  conduct  would  produce  upon 
the  consciences  of  men.  How  would  such  a  nation  pro- 
cure redress  of  grievances  1  and  how  would  it  be  protected 
from  foreign  aggression  ? 

I.  Of  redress  of  grievances.  Under  this  head  would 
be  comprehended  violation  of  treaties,  spoliation  of  property, 
and  ill-treatment  of  its  citizens. 

1  reply,  1.  The  very  fact  that  a  nation  relied  solely  upon 
the  justice  of  its  measures,  and  the  benevolence  of  its  con- 
duct, would  do  more  than  any  thing  else  to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  injury.  The  moral  sentiment  of  every  com- 
munity would  rise  in  opposition  to  injury  inflicted  upon  the 
just,  the  kind,  and  the  merciful.  Thus,  by  this  course,  the 


394  BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS. 

probabilities  of  aggression  are  rendered  as  few  as  the  nature 
of  man  will  permit. 

2.  But  suppose  injury  to  be  done.     I  reply,  the  proper 
appeal  for  moral  beings  upon  moral   questions,  is  not  to 
physical  force,  but  to  the  consciences  of  men.     Let  the 
wrong  be  set  forth,  but  be  set  forth  in  the  spirit  of  love ; 
and  in  this  manner,  if  in  any,  will  the  consciences  of  men 
be  aroused  to  justice. 

3.  But  suppose  this  method  to  fail.     Why,  then,  let  us 
suffer  the  injury.     This  is  the  preferable  evil  of  the  two. 
Because  they  have  injured  us   a  little,  it  does  not  follow 
that  we  should  injure  ourselves  much.     But  it  will  be  said, 
what  is  then  to  become  of  our  national  honor  ?     I  answer, 
first,  if  we  have  acted  justly,  we  surely  are  not  dishonored. 
The  dishonor  rests  upon  those  who  have  done  wickedly. 
I  answer  again,  national  honor  is  displayed  in  forbearance, 
in  forgiveness,  in   requiting   faithlessness  with   fidelity,  and 
grievances  with  kindness  and  good  will.     These  virtues  are 
surely  as  delightful  and  as  honorable  in  nations  as  in  indi- 
viduals. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  what  is  to  prevent  repeated  and 
continued  aggression  ?  I  answer,  first,  not  instruments  of 
destruction,  but  the  moral  principle  which  God  has  placed 
in  the  bosom  of  every  man.  I  think  that  obedience  to  the 
law  of  God,  on  the  part  of  the  injured,  is  the  surest  preven- 
tive against  the  repetition  of  injury.  I  answer,  secondly, 
suppose  that  acting  in  obedience  to  the  law  of  benevolence 
will  not  prevent  the  repetition  of  injury,  will  acting  upon  the 
principle  of  retaliation  prevent  it  ?  This  is  really  the  true 
question.  The  evil  tempers  of  the  human  heart  are  al- 
lowed to  exist,  and  we  are  inquiring  in  what  manner  shall 
we  suffer  the  least  injury  from  them ;  whether  by  obeying 
the  law  of  benevolence,  or  that  of  retaliation  ?  It  is  not 
necessary,  therefore,  to  show,  that,  by  adopting  the  law  of 
benevolence,  we  shall  not  suffer  at  all ;  but  that,  by  adopt- 
ing it,  we  shall  suffer  less  than  by  the  opposite  course ;  and 
that  a  nation  would  actually  thus  suffer  less  upon  the  whole 
than  by  any  other  course,  cannot,  I  think,  be  doubted  by 
any  one  who  will  calmly  reflect  upon  the  subject. 


BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD    THE    INJURIOUS.  395 

II.  How  would  such  a  nation  be  protected  from  external 
attack  and  entire  subjugation  ?  I  answer,  by  adopting  the 
law  of  benevolence,  a  nation  would  render  such  an  event 
in  the  highest  degree  improbable.  The  causes  of  national 
war  are  most  commonly,  the  love  of  plunder,  and  the  love 
of  glory.  The  first  of  these  is  rarely,  if  ever,  sufficient  to 
stimulate  men  to  the  ferocity  necessary  to  war,  unless  when 
assisted  by  the  second.  And  by  adopting  as  the  rule 
of  our  conduct  the  law  of  benevolence,  all  motive  arising 
from  the  second  cause  is  taken  away.  There  is  not  a 
nation  in  Europe  that  could  be  led  on  to  war  against  a 
harmless,  just,  forgiving,  and  defenceless  people. 

But  suppose  such  a  case  really  should  occur,  what  are 
we  then  to  do  ?  I  answer,  is  it  certain  that  we  can  do  better 
than  suffer  injury  with  forgiveness  and  love,  looking  up  to 
God,  who,  in  his  holy  habitation,  is  the  Judge  of  the  whole 
earth  ?  And  if  it  be  said,  we  shall  then  all  be  subjected 
and  enslaved,  I  answer  again,  have  wars  prevented  men 
from  being  subjected  and  enslaved  ?  Is  there  a  nation  on 
the  continent  of  Europe  that  has  not  been  overrun  by 
foreign  troops  several  times,  even  within  the  present  cen- 
tury ?  And  still  more,  is  it  not  most  commonly  the  case, 
that  the  very  means  by  which  we  repel  a  despotism  from 
abroad,  only  establishes  over  us  a  military  despotism  at 
home  ?  Since,  then,  the  principle  of  retaliation  will  not, 
with  any  certainty,  save  a  country  from  conquest,  the  real 
question,  as  before,  is,  by  obedience  to  which  law  will  a 
nation  be  most  likely  to  escape  it,  by  the  law  of  retaliation, 
or  by  that  of  benevolence  ?  It  seems  to  me,  that  a  man 
who  will  calmly  reflect,  will  see  that  the  advantages  of 
war,  even  in  this  respect,  are  much  less  than  they  have 
been  generally  estimated. 

I  however  would  by  no  means  assert  that  forgiveness  of 
injuries  alone  is  a  sufficient  protection  against  wrong.  I 
suppose  the  real  protection  to  be  active  benevolence.  The 
Scriptures  teach  us  that  God  has  created  men,  both  as  in- 
dividuals and  as  societies,  under  the  law  of  benevolence ; 
and  that  he  intends  this  law  to  be  obeyed.  Societies  have 
never  yet  thought  of  obeying  it  in  their  dealings  with  each 
other;  and  men  generally  consider  the  allusion  to  it  as 


396  BENEVOLENCE    TOWARD   THE    INJURIOUS. 

puerile.  But  this  alters  not  the  law  of  God,  nor  the  pun- 
ishments which  he  inflicts  upon  nations  for  the  violation  of 
it.  This  punishment  I  suppose  to  be  war.  I  believe 
aggression  from  a  foreign  nation  to  be  the  intimation  from 
God  that  we  are  disobeying  the  law  of  benevolence,  and 
that  this  is  his  mode  of  teaching  nations  their  duty,  in  this 
respect,  to  each  other.  So  that  aggression  seems  to  me  in 
no  manner  to  call  for  retaliation  and  injury,  but  rather 
to  call  for  special  kindness  and  good  will.  And  still 
farther,  the  requiting  evil  with  good,  tends  just  as  strongly 
to  the  cessation  of  all  injury,  in  nations  as  in  individuals. 
Let  any  man  reflect  upon  the  amount  of  pecuniary  expen- 
diture, and  the  awful  waste  of  human  life,  which  the  wars 
of  the  last  hundred  years  have  occasioned,  and  then  I  will 
ask  him  whether  it  be  not  evident,  that  the  one  hundredth 
part  of  this  expense  and  suffering,  if  employed  in  the 
honest  effort  to  render  mankind  wiser  and  better,  would, 
long  before  this  time,  have  banished  wars  from  the  earth, 
and  rendered  the  civilized  world  like  the  garden  of  Eden. 

If  this  be  true,  it  will  follow,  that  the  cultivation  of  a 
military  spirit  is  injurious  to  a  community,  inasmuch  as  it 
aggravates  the  source  of  the  evil,  the  corrupt  passions  of 
the  human  heart,  by  the  very  manner  in  which  it  attempts 
to  correct  the  evil  itself. 

I  am  aware  that  all  this  may  be  called  visionary,  roman- 
tic, and  chimerical.  This,  however,  neither  makes  it  so, 
nor  shows  it  to  be  so.  The  time  to  apply  these  epithets 
will  be,  when  the  justness  of  their  application  has  been 
proved.  And  if  it  be  said,  these  principles  may  all  be 
very  true,  but  you  can  never  induce  nations  to  act  upon 
them ;  I  answer,  If  they  be  true,  then  God  requires  us 
thus  to  act ;  and  if  this  be  the  case,  then  that  nation  will  be 
the  happiest  and  the  wisest,  which  is  the  first  to  obey  his  com- 
mandments. And,  if  it  be  said,  that  though  all  this  be  so, 
yet  such  is  the  present  state  of  man,  that  until  his  social 
character  be  altered,  the  necessity  of  wars  will  exist ;  I 
answer  ;  first,  it  is  a  solemn  thing  to  meet  the  punishments 
which  God  inflicts  for  the  transgression  of  his  laws.  And, 
secondly,  inasmuch  as  the  reason  for  this  necessity  arises 
from  the  social  wickedness  of  man,  we  are  under  impera- 


OUR   DUTY   TO    BRUTES.  397 

tive  obligations  to  strive  to  render  that  wickedness  less ; 
and,  by  all  the  means  in  our  power,  to  cultivate  among 
nations  a  spirit  of  mutual  kindness,  forbearance,  justice  and 
benevolence. 


NOTE.  I  should  be  guilty  of  injustice  to  one  class  of 
my  fellow-creatures,  if  I  should  close  this  treatise  upon 
human  duty,  without  a  single  remark  upon  our  obligations 
to  brutes. 

Brutes  are  sensitive  beings,  capable  of,  probably,  as 
great  degrees  of  physical  pleasure  and  pain  as  ourselves. 
They  are  endowed  with  instinct  which  is,  probably,  a  form 
of  intellect  inferior  to  our  own,  but  which,  being  gener- 
ically  unlike  to  ours,  we  are  unable  to  understand.  They 
differ  from  us  chiefly  in  being  destitute  of  any  moral 
faculty. 

We  do  not  stand  to  them  in  the  relation  of  equality. 
"  Our  right  is  paramount,  and  must  extinguish  theirs.3' 
We  have,  therefore,  a  right  to  use  them  to  promote  our 
comfort,  and  may  innocently  take  their  life,  if  our  necessi- 
ties demand  it.  This  right  over  them,  is  given  to  us  by 
the  revealed  will  of  God.  But,  inasmuch  as  they,  like 
ourselves,  are  the  creatures  of  God,  we  have  no  right  to 
use  them  in  any  other  manner  than  that  which  God  has 
permitted.  They,  as  much  as  ourselves,  are  under  his 
protection. 

We  may,  therefore,  use  them,  1.  For  our  necessities. 
We  are  designed  to  subsist  upon  animal  food  ;  and  we  may 
innocently  slay  them  for  this  purpose. 

2.  We  may  use  them  for  labor,  or  for  innocent  physical 
recreation,  as  when  we  employ  the  horse  for  draught,  or  for 
the  saddle. 

3.  But,  while  we  so  use  them,  we  are  bound  to  treat 
them  kindly,  to  furnish  them  with  sufficient  food,  and  with 
convenient   shelter.      He  who  cannot  feed  a  brute  well, 
ought  not  to  own  one.     And  when  we  put  them  to   death, 
it  should  be  with  the  least  possible  pain. 

4.  We  are  forbidden  to  treat  them  unkindly  on  any  pre- 

34 


398  OUR    DUTY   TO   BRUTES. 

tence,  or  for  any  reason.  There  can  be  no  clearer  indica- 
tion of  a  degraded  and  ferocious  temper,  than  cruelty  to 
animals.  Hunting,  in  many  cases,  and  horse-racing,  seem 
to  me  liable  to  censure  in  this  respect.  Why  should  a 
man,  for  the  sake  of  showing  •  his  skill  as  a  marksman, 
shoot  down  a  poor  animal,  which  he  does  not  need  for 
food  ?  Why  should  not  the  brute,  that  is  harming  no 
living  thing,  be  permitted  to  enjoy  the  happiness  of  its 
physical  nature  unmolested  ?  "  There  they  are  privileged  ; 
and  he  that  hurts  or  harms  them  there,  is  guilty  of  a 
wrong." 

5.  Hence,  all  amusements  which  consist  in  inflicting 
pain  upon  animals,  such  as  bull-baiting,  cock-fighting,  Stc., 
are  purely  wicked.  God  never  gave  us  power  over  ani- 
mals for  such  purposes,  i  can  scarcely  conceive  of  a 
more  revolting  exhibition  of  human  nature,  than  that  which 
is  seen  when  men  assemble  to  witness  the  misery  which 
brutes  inflict  upon  each  other.  Surely,  nothing  can  tend 
more  directly  to  harden  men  in  worse  than  brutal  ferocity. 


END. 


I 

Rl 

LC 

T 

6-1 


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